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Abstract	  The	  GB	  electricity	  system	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  change,	  both	  physically	  and	  operationally.	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  low	  carbon	  and	  secure.	  Current	  system	  structures	  revolve	  around	  large-­‐scale	  centralised	  generation	  to	  deliver	  this	  security.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  with	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  energy	  security,	  which	  reflects	  the	  future	  needs	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  a	  decentralised	  approach	  would	  be	  more	  beneficial	  to	  deliver	  these	  needs.	  This	  thesis	  identifies	  the	  governance	  processes	  that	  make	  up	  current	  energy	  security	  and	  evaluates	  how	  these	  might	  change	  in	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity.	  The	  research	  consists	  of	  31	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  from	  the	  government,	  regulatory,	  market	  and	  civil	  society	  based	  actor	  groups.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  research	  utilised	  a	  secondary	  analysis	  of	  consultation	  responses	  and	  Government	  publications.	  This	  thesis	  uses	  multi-­‐layer	  perspective	  theory	  to	  interpret	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  multi-­‐layer	  perspective,	  an	  advancement	  of	  the	  governance	  perspective	  was	  also	  required.	  This	  develops	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  actor	  relationships	  rules	  and	  the	  incentives	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  This	  research	  developed	  for	  key	  findings.	  Firstly,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  future	  would	  introduce	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  small	  investors,	  who	  in	  a	  centralised	  system	  would	  not	  exist.	  The	  second	  key	  point	  is,	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  responsible	  for	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  their	  actions	  are	  focused	  on	  centralised	  electricity	  technologies.	  The	  third	  point	  is	  that	  energy	  security	  (in	  its	  boarder	  definition)	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  working	  together.	  The	  fourth	  point	  is	  that	  current	  energy	  security	  is	  incorrectly	  dominated	  by	  supply	  meeting	  demand.	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  research	  is	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  which	  is	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	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1 Introduction	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  called	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions	  of	  80%	  by	  2050	  from	  1990	  levels.	  This	  will	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  sector	  as	  energy	  supply	  contributes	  around	  40%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  total	  emissions	  (DECC,	  2013a).	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  drivers	  forcing	  change,	  including:	  the	  recent	  downturn	  in	  the	  economy	  coupled	  with	  escalating	  fuel	  prices,	  the	  increase	  in	  energy’s	  links	  with	  the	  multi-­‐polar	  world	  and	  concerns	  over	  resource	  depletion.	  	  Therefore,	  future	  supply	  will	  need	  to	  take	  these	  aspects	  into	  account.	  The	  Government	  has	  identified	  the	  need	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  with	  a	  set	  of	  goals,	  targets	  and	  budgets	  for	  carbon	  emissions,	  one	  aspect	  of	  which	  is	  the	  development	  of	  renewable	  energy	  technology	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  There	  has	  been	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  demand	  for	  electricity	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  and	  demand	  is	  set	  to	  increase	  again	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  electrifying	  the	  heat	  and	  transport	  industries.	  However,	  between	  2011	  and	  2013	  the	  demand	  level	  has	  fallen.	  Further	  to	  this,	  there	  are	  as	  yet	  untapped	  efficiency	  gains,	  which	  could	  be	  unlocked	  through	  the	  demand	  side	  and	  with	  it	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  distribution	  networks.	  Therefore,	  the	  future	  will	  need	  to	  allow	  for	  not	  only	  a	  changing	  supply	  industry,	  but	  also	  a	  change	  to	  the	  demand	  side.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  looking	  at	  the	  changes	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  bring	  to	  the	  current	  model	  of	  electricity	  generation	  focussing	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	  The	  thesis	  has	  developed	  two	  research	  questions:	  
• How	  will	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  change	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security?	  
• Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  (not	  just	  supply)?	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this,	  the	  thesis	  will	  need	  to	  set	  out	  what	  it	  means	  by	  certain	  terminology,	  namely	  decentralised	  electricity,	  energy	  security	  and	  governance.	  	  
A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  includes	  two	  dimensions:	  the	  technological	  aspect	  (including	  generation	  size	  and	  locality)	  and	  the	  aspect	  of	  ownership	  (where	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders	  are	  able	  to	  access	  the	  electricity	  system):	  
• The	  generation	  plant	  would	  be	  either	  connected	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  or	  off	  grid,	  at	  a	  location	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use.	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• A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  has	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  with	  ownership	  of	  infrastructure,	  of	  different	  scales	  and	  dispersed	  geography.	  However,	  in	  literature	  the	  term	  ‘decentralised	  electricity’	  is	  not	  often	  used.	  In	  order	  to	  classify	  the	  situation,	  alternative	  terminology	  needs	  to	  be	  found,	  such	  as,	  ‘embedded’	  and	  ‘distributed’	  generation.	  Although	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  is	  often	  synonymous	  with	  renewable	  generation	  it	  is	  not	  a	  prerequisite.	  However,	  what	  is	  evident	  is	  that	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  does	  assume	  variable	  power	  production.	  This	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  some	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  (wind	  and	  solar)	  and	  identifies,	  technologically	  a	  security	  of	  supply	  issue.	  Energy	  security	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  simply	  short-­‐term	  supply	  operations	  and	  a	  definition	  to	  encompass	  all	  aspects	  is	  required.	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  identified	  energy	  security	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  challenges	  to	  the	  UK	  energy	  system.	  Although,	  it	  is	  only	  recently	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  energy	  security:	  	  
“ensuring	  that	  consumers	  have	  access	  to	  the	  energy	  services	  
they	  need	  (physical	  security)	  at	  prices	  that	  avoid	  excessive	  
volatility”	  (DECC	  2012o	  pg.	  5).	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  need	  to	  be	  explored.	  These	  dimensions	  have	  been	  broken	  down	  to	  categories,	  including:	  firstly,	  the	  drivers,	  which	  encompass	  the	  external	  influences	  which	  act	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  create	  change;	  secondly,	  the	  issues	  which	  set	  out	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  drivers;	  thirdly,	  the	  dimensions	  of	  risk	  which	  is	  affected	  by	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  issues;	  and	  finally	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  risks.	  These	  four	  categories	  of	  energy	  security	  together	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  energy	  security	  and	  ultimately	  help	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  .	  From	  these	  dimensions	  if	  follows	  that	  the	  requirements	  of	  energy	  security	  are:	  
• The	  provision	  of	  reliable	  energy	  supplies	  for	  primary	  fuels	  and	  their	  delivery.	  
• The	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  unforeseen	  future	  changes.	  
• There	  should	  be	  protection	  for	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  energy	  price	  rises.	  
• The	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  economy.	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In	  order	  to	  achieve	  these	  requirements	  for	  energy	  security,	  suitable	  governance	  processes	  need	  to	  be	  established.	  The	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  is	  defined	  with	  two	  interlinked	  aspects:	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  boarder	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  could	  mean	  a	  change	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  from	  the	  predominantly	  centralised	  operation	  at	  present,	  to	  a	  decentralised,	  low	  carbon	  system.	  This	  change	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  would	  inevitably	  mean	  a	  change	  to	  the	  governance	  processes	  in	  which	  it	  operates.	  This	  thesis	  will	  discuss	  whether	  these	  modified	  governance	  processes	  are	  better	  placed	  to	  meet	  the	  energy	  security	  challenge	  for	  the	  UK.	  An	  important	  note	  to	  make	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Great	  Britain.	  GB	  includes	  England,	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  and	  as	  such	  concerns	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  thesis.	  This	  includes	  aspects	  such	  as	  the	  GB	  electricity	  markets	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  system	  operator.	  The	  UK	  includes	  England,	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland,	  officially	  known	  as	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  UK	  relates	  to	  the	  UK	  Government	  and	  many	  of	  the	  policies,	  targets	  and	  goals	  which	  have	  been	  set. This	  thesis	  has	  been	  set	  out	  such	  that	  the	  initial	  chapter	  (chapter	  2)	  discusses	  the	  development	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  after	  1990.	  It	  begins	  by	  identifying	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system.	  It	  discusses	  the	  ‘dash	  for	  gas’	  and	  the	  development	  of	  retail	  market	  choice	  for	  consumers.	  It	  then	  examines	  the	  wholesale	  market	  approach	  for	  electricity,	  starting	  with	  the	  Electricity	  Pool	  to	  New	  Electricity	  Trading	  Arrangements	  (NETA),	  British	  Electricity	  Trading	  and	  Transmission	  Arrangements	  (BETTA)	  and	  the	  use	  of	  Purchase	  Power	  Agreements.	  From	  this,	  chapter	  2	  identifies	  the	  changes	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  will	  bring	  to	  the	  UK	  electricity	  market.	  Over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  also	  seen	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  change	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  networks,	  from	  RPI-­‐X	  price	  controls	  to	  RIIO.	  	  Chapter	  2	  then	  sets	  out	  the	  policy	  context,	  including	  the	  UK	  Government	  goals	  of	  Climate	  Change,	  Affordability	  and	  Energy	  Security.	  It	  identifies	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  UK	  Government	  including	  carbon	  reduction	  and	  the	  renewable	  energy	  targets.	  Chapter	  2	  concludes	  by	  identifying	  the	  key	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  electricity	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system.	  This	  includes	  DECC,	  the	  Treasury,	  Ofgem,	  transmission	  network	  operators,	  distribution	  network	  operators,	  the	  System	  Operator,	  ELEXON,	  energy	  supply	  companies,	  consumers	  and	  other	  groups	  such	  as	  commons	  select	  committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  By	  establishing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  from	  1990	  to	  present,	  Chapter	  3	  can	  then	  set	  out	  the	  future.	  This	  includes	  the	  projected	  changes	  to	  demand	  from	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport,	  the	  possible	  increase	  in	  demand	  side	  response	  and	  the	  possible	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  storage.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  potential	  changes	  in	  demand	  are	  the	  possible	  impacts	  from	  the	  supply	  side,	  such	  as	  investment	  in	  electricity	  generation	  and	  the	  procurement	  of	  transitional	  fuels.	  Chapter	  3	  then	  looks	  at	  the	  future	  of	  both	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  smarter	  electricity	  grid	  and	  greater	  interconnection	  to	  Europe.	  	  This	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  influences.	  Current	  geopolitical	  aspects	  for	  energy	  security	  can	  include	  the	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  primary	  resources	  specifically	  for	  oil	  and	  gas,	  meaning	  countries	  with	  lower	  resources	  can	  be	  more	  exposed	  to	  global	  prices	  and	  supply	  interruption1.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  specialized	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  such	  as	  for	  the	  operation	  and	  decommissioning	  of	  nuclear	  generation.	  Future	  geopolitics	  could	  also	  bring	  in	  further	  complications	  such	  as	  the	  development	  of	  a	  global	  infrastructure	  for	  smart	  grids.	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  is	  that	  each	  global	  state	  is	  interconnected;	  therefore,	  greater	  security	  internationally	  would	  lead	  to	  greater	  security	  for	  the	  UK.	  Although,	  each	  state	  will	  make	  different	  decisions	  and	  have	  different	  opinions	  on	  the	  future	  of	  their	  electricity	  system.	  These	  decisions	  can	  be	  primarily	  political,	  however,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  that	  each	  state	  would	  aim	  to	  avoid	  harming	  its	  own	  security	  of	  supply	  (Skea	  and	  Ekins,	  2014).	  Therefore,	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  time	  and	  space	  this	  additional	  complexity	  of	  geopolitics	  means	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  focusing	  on	  the	  UK	  energy	  system.	  However	  this	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Ekins	  and	  Watson	  UK	  Energy	  in	  a	  Global	  Context	  (Ekins	  and	  Watson,	  2014)	  and	  in	  Malcolm	  Wicks	  Energy	  Security:	  A	  National	  Challenge	  in	  a	  Changing	  World	  (Wicks,	  2009).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  These	  issues	  can	  be	  combatted	  by	  the	  level	  of	  national	  storage	  (see	  section	  3.2.1.4)	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The	  fourth	  chapter	  develops	  further	  the	  energy	  security	  concept.	  It	  does	  this	  by	  looking	  more	  deeply	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  UK	  Government	  policy	  and	  how	  it	  has	  changed:	  from	  being	  an	  issue	  of	  supply	  to	  be	  developed	  into	  a	  more	  rounded	  concept	  featuring	  an	  affordability	  aspect	  along	  with	  it.	  However,	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  Government	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  energy	  security.	  Therefore,	  as	  said	  above	  chapter	  four	  breaks	  down	  the	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  into	  different	  dimensions	  including:	  the	  Drivers,	  Issues,	  Risks	  and	  the	  Impacts.	  By	  identifying	  each	  aspect	  this	  thesis	  is	  able	  to	  isolate	  a	  set	  of	  ‘requirements’	  the	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  meet	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  energy	  security	  in	  its	  wider	  sense.	  Chapter	  5	  defines	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  and	  its	  impacts	  on	  energy	  security.	  It	  explains	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  (including:	  the	  policies,	  economic	  and	  social	  aspects).	  It	  then	  delves	  further	  into	  the	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  technical	  and	  non-­‐technical	  impacts	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  including	  flexibility,	  diversity,	  dependence	  on	  insecure	  supplies,	  demand	  and	  supply,	  and	  the	  economics	  of	  decentralisation.	  	  Having	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  energy	  security	  and	  decentralised	  electricity,	  set	  out	  in	  the	  first	  chapters	  this	  thesis	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  review	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  through	  the	  transition	  literature.	  This	  begins	  by	  discussing	  the	  current	  lock	  in	  to	  centralisation	  and	  then	  the	  different	  transition	  theories.	  It	  takes	  the	  multi	  layer	  perspective	  as	  a	  good	  grounding	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  a	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon,	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  what	  is	  identified	  as	  lacking	  from	  this	  model	  is	  the	  required	  changes	  to	  the	  governance	  processes	  needed	  for	  a	  transition.	  Therefore,	  chapter	  five	  identifies	  the	  various	  governance	  theories	  and	  approaches	  and	  discusses	  the	  relationships	  of	  each	  of	  the	  main	  stakeholder	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  GB	  electricity	  system.	  From	  each	  of	  these	  defining	  chapters,	  chapter	  6	  then	  sets	  out	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  thesis.	  From	  this	  it	  identifies	  the	  methodology	  that	  is	  used	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  these	  objectives	  including	  the	  primary	  research	  technique	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  final	  four	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  research.	  Chapter	  seven	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity.	  It	  discusses	  the	  governance	  needed	  to	  achieve	  this,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  timescales	  involved.	  It	  shows	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how	  a	  low	  carbon,	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  implemented	  gradually	  but	  in	  relatively	  short	  timescale.	  It	  also	  argues	  that	  a	  low	  carbon,	  centralised	  system	  is	  a	  large	  step	  change	  resulting	  from	  the	  necessity	  of	  large	  power	  plants.	  This	  chapter	  goes	  on	  further	  to	  discuss	  the	  skills	  required	  for	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  It	  identifies	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  likely	  require	  a	  large	  number	  of	  comparatively	  ‘lower	  level’	  and	  easier	  to	  find	  set	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge.	  However,	  a	  centralised	  plant	  would	  require	  a	  small	  number	  of	  comparatively	  high	  level	  technical	  skills	  to	  run	  the	  larger	  plant.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  the	  nuclear	  generation	  of	  electricity.	  As	  the	  UK	  has	  not	  introduced	  new	  nuclear	  generation	  since	  Sizewell	  b	  in	  1995,	  development	  of	  new	  nuclear	  power	  may	  require	  importing	  the	  skills	  from	  overseas.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  the	  skills	  for	  a	  nuclear	  generating	  plant	  would	  still	  be	  required	  for	  the	  decommissioning	  of	  the	  existing	  generation	  plant.	  Although	  the	  skills	  to	  run	  a	  plant	  may	  be	  different	  from	  those	  required	  to	  decommission	  they	  would	  be	  of	  similar	  technical	  complexity.	  Chapter	  eight	  looks	  at	  the	  changes	  to	  investment	  structure	  dictated	  by	  adopting	  decentralised	  electricity.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  secure	  low	  carbon	  future	  to	  be	  reality	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  large	  investment	  into	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  investment	  profile	  for	  a	  low	  carbon,	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Investments	  will	  be	  needed	  in	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  generation	  capacity.	  There	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  investment	  into	  capacity,	  transitional	  fuels	  such	  as	  natural	  gas	  and	  how	  the	  markets	  and	  investors	  might	  respond.	  Changing	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  likely	  change	  the	  number,	  relationship	  and	  power	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector	  stakeholders.	  Chapter	  nine	  discusses	  these	  changes	  looking	  specifically	  at	  the	  role	  of	  Government,	  Ofgem,	  Network	  Operators,	  System	  Operator	  and	  the	  Big	  Six	  energy	  companies.	  Chapter	  10	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  the	  consumer	  in	  making	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  secure	  and	  how	  this	  may	  change	  in	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation.	  It	  looks	  at	  the	  use	  of	  demand	  management	  mechanisms	  and	  technologies,	  how	  to	  manage	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  engaging	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  consumers	  which	  is	  the	  likely	  result	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	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2 The	  UK	  electricity	  system	  post	  1990	  This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  and	  how	  it	  has	  developed.	  It	  will	  discuss	  the	  Government’s	  move	  away	  from	  directly	  owning	  assets	  associated	  with	  the	  energy	  industry	  and	  from	  control	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  It	  also	  introduces	  the	  electricity	  market	  arrangements	  and	  provides	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  more	  complex	  policies,	  mechanisms	  and	  institutions	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  thesis.	  In	  addition,	  it	  will	  identify	  the	  main	  stakeholders	  who	  operate	  at	  present	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  describe	  their	  various	  responsibilities	  and	  how	  they	  play	  a	  role	  in	  policy	  formation.	  
2.1 	  Privatisation	  and	  its	  impacts	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  changed	  dramatically	  since	  privatisation.	  The	  infrastructure,	  players,	  policies	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  have	  had	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  from	  economics	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  the	  requirements	  placed	  on	  electricity	  by	  consumers	  (Simmonds,	  2002).	  Arguably	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  was	  the	  privatisation	  of	  industry	  assets	  during	  the	  1990s	  (Surrey,	  1996).	  It	  was	  essentially	  a	  shift	  from	  public	  to	  private	  ownership	  in	  a	  bid	  for	  economic	  efficiency	  (Beder,	  2005).	  The	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  the	  system	  required	  new	  organisations	  to	  be	  set	  up,	  making	  the	  energy	  system	  the	  most	  complex	  privatisation	  the	  Government	  had	  hitherto	  undertaken	  (Green,	  1991;	  Branston,	  2002;	  Helm,	  2003).	  The	  privatisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry	  unlocked	  assets	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry,	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  of	  the	  Central	  Electricity	  Generating	  Board	  (CEGB),	  valued	  at	  £32bn	  (Helm,	  2003).	  In	  addition,	  trade	  unions	  had	  recently	  exercised	  their	  power	  to	  severely	  disrupt	  the	  energy	  system,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  1981	  miners’	  strike,	  making	  the	  Government	  appear	  as	  if	  they	  had	  limited	  control	  over	  the	  industry	  (PMSU,	  2001).	  By	  privatising	  the	  energy	  system	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unions	  was	  reduced	  as	  workers	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  private	  sector.	  Privatisation	  also	  provided	  a	  wider	  share	  of	  ownership	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  (Pollit,	  2012).	  	  Increasing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  industry	  was	  another	  aim	  for	  the	  Government’s	  move	  to	  a	  privately	  owned	  system	  (Thomas,	  1996a;	  Pettinger,	  2011).	  A	  state	  run	  power	  plant	  could	  be	  criticised	  for	  inefficiencies	  and	  therefore	  wastages.	  In	  theory,	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privately	  owned	  energy	  companies	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  cut	  costs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  profitability	  whilst	  in	  a	  nationalised	  industry,	  managers	  do	  not	  share	  any	  profits	  and	  therefore	  may	  have	  a	  reduced	  motivation	  to	  increase	  efficiency.	  State	  owned	  industry	  might	  also	  be	  considered	  inefficient	  because	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  elected	  politicians	  managing	  the	  industry	  is	  often	  different	  to	  that	  of	  business	  managers	  (Moore,	  1992).	  	  From	  1948	  to	  1990,	  the	  Central	  Electricity	  Generating	  Board	  (CEGB)	  owned	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry	  and	  the	  transmission	  system	  as	  a	  monopoly,	  with	  twelve	  Regional	  Boards	  responsible	  for	  distribution	  and	  supply	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  a	  further	  two	  in	  Scotland	  (Newbery	  and	  Pollit,	  1997).	  The	  restructuring	  of	  the	  CEGB	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  privatisation	  saw	  the	  creation	  of	  four	  successor	  companies	  in	  England,	  two	  generating	  companies	  –	  National	  Power	  and	  PowerGen	  -­‐	  Nuclear	  Electric,	  which	  initially	  held	  the	  nuclear	  generation,	  and	  transmission	  assets	  were	  transferred	  into	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company.	  In	  addition,	  the	  CEGB’s	  twelve	  regional	  area	  boards	  were	  directly	  replaced	  by	  Regional	  Electricity	  Companies	  (REC),	  which	  owned	  and	  operated	  the	  distribution	  networks	  as	  well	  as	  supplying	  consumers	  (Domah	  and	  Pollitt,	  2000).	  Initially,	  the	  RECs	  also	  owned	  National	  Grid,	  but	  had	  largely	  disposed	  of	  these	  assets	  by	  the	  mid	  1990s	  (Help,	  2003).	  The	  Scottish	  electricity	  system	  was	  privatised	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Scotland’s	  two	  main	  energy	  companies:	  the	  South	  of	  Scotland	  Electricity	  Board	  (SSEB)	  and	  The	  Hydro	  Electric	  Board	  were	  replaced	  by	  Scottish	  Power	  and	  Scottish	  Hydro-­‐Electric2	  respectively	  (Thomas,	  1996a;	  Simmonds,	  2002).	  The	  privatisation	  of	  the	  Scottish	  electricity	  system	  was	  not	  followed	  with	  significant	  liberalisation.	  Vertical	  integration	  of	  the	  two	  Scottish	  companies	  was	  maintained	  leaving	  limited	  levels	  of	  competition	  and	  opportunity	  for	  new	  entry	  (Prandini,	  2007).	  This	  dominance	  of	  the	  Scottish	  system	  by	  two	  electricity	  companies	  was	  not	  changed	  until	  the	  New	  Electricity	  Trading	  Arrangements	  (NETA)	  were	  extended	  to	  include	  Scotland	  under	  the	  British	  Electricity	  Trading	  and	  Transmission	  Arrangements	  (BETTA)	  (Green,	  2010).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Hydro-­‐Electric	  later	  merged	  with	  Southern	  Electric	  to	  form	  Scottish	  and	  Southern	  Electric	  
(Simmonds,	  2002).	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2.1.1 ‘Dash	  for	  Gas’	  Electricity	  from	  gas	  fuelled	  electric	  plants	  The	  introduction	  of	  competition	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  provided	  a	  drive	  for	  greater	  efficiency	  in	  the	  sector	  (IEA,	  2005;	  Pollitt,	  2007).	  The	  reduction	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  gas	  turbines,	  the	  increased	  availability	  of	  gas	  as	  a	  fuel,	  coupled	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  new	  actors	  (often	  the	  RECs)	  to	  enter	  the	  electricity	  generation	  market	  meant	  that	  Combined	  Cycle	  Gas	  Turbines	  began	  displace	  coal	  fired	  generation.	  By	  1996	  gas	  had	  taken	  a	  23%	  share	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐1	  and	  Figure	  2-­‐2	  (Newbery	  and	  Pollitt,	  1997;	  DECC,	  2009c).	  Replacing	  the	  ‘dirty’	  coal	  generation	  with	  natural	  gas	  provided	  an	  additional	  benefit	  to	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  overall	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐1	  Fuels	  used	  to	  generate	  electricity	  1948	  to	  2011	  (DECC,	  2013o)	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Figure	  2-­‐2	  Gas	  consumption	  by	  sector	  (DECC,	  2013b)	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2.1.3 The	  Pool	  Following	  privatisation	  wholesale	  electricity	  was	  traded	  through	  ‘The	  Pool’	  (see	  Figure	  2-­‐3).	  The	  Pool	  was	  set	  up	  to	  facilitate	  competition	  through	  a	  bidding	  process	  for	  generators	  setting	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  on	  a	  half	  hourly	  basis	  (Lowrey,	  1999).	  The	  generators	  were	  required	  to	  provide	  the	  price	  at	  which	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  operate	  for	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  and	  The	  National	  Grid	  Company	  would	  estimate	  the	  demand	  as	  a	  result	  of	  notification	  of	  demand	  and	  by	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  generation	  needed	  (Simmons,	  2002).	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  cheapest	  technologies	  were	  operated	  throughout	  the	  day.	  The	  advantage	  of	  the	  Pool	  was	  originally	  stated	  as	  its	  transparency.	  The	  regulator	  could	  see	  the	  prices	  set	  by	  the	  pool	  and	  any	  abuse	  would	  be	  obvious	  (Helm,	  2003).	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In	  practice,	  half	  hourly	  prices	  in	  the	  England	  and	  Wales	  Pool,	  tended	  to	  be	  volatile	  because	  of	  their	  being	  only	  two	  trading	  companies.	  (Green,	  1999).	  Alternative	  trading	  arrangements,	  known	  as	  Contracts	  for	  Difference	  (CfDs)	  emerged	  to	  provide	  more	  stable	  pricing:	  participants	  agreed	  a	  price	  for	  a	  fixed	  quantity	  of	  electricity	  and	  if	  the	  Pool	  price	  was	  lower,	  then	  the	  buyer	  paid	  the	  difference	  and	  if	  it	  was	  higher,	  then	  the	  seller	  paid	  (Green,	  1999).	  Ultimately	  70	  to	  90%	  of	  electricity	  was	  traded	  through	  CfDs	  (Thomas,	  1996b;	  Green,	  1999;	  Helm	  and	  Powell,	  1992	  in	  Helm,	  2003).	  	  
2.1.4 NETA	  and	  BETTA	  By	  the	  late	  1990s	  it	  was	  increasingly	  obvious	  that	  the	  Pool	  was	  not	  achieving	  what	  it	  set	  out	  to	  do.	  The	  Pool	  prices	  tended	  to	  be	  volatile	  and	  therefore	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  electricity	  was	  sold	  through	  bilateral	  contracts	  called	  the	  CfDs	  (Simmons,	  2002).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  CfDs	  with	  the	  Pool	  meant	  there	  was	  limited	  transparency	  for	  the	  Regulator	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  increases	  in	  efficiency	  made	  by	  the	  generators	  not	  being	  reflected	  in	  the	  reduction	  in	  price	  for	  the	  consumer	  (Ofgem,	  2000).	  In	  addition,	  there	  were	  episodes	  of	  market	  abuse	  from	  National	  Power	  and	  PowerGen	  which	  resulted	  in	  inflated	  Pool	  prices	  and	  ultimately	  resulted	  in	  the	  Government	  requiring	  the	  two	  companies	  to	  divest	  some	  of	  their	  stations	  to	  reduce	  their	  market	  power	  (Newbery	  1998).	  The	  Labour	  Party	  came	  into	  power	  in	  1997.	  Their	  view	  was	  that	  privatisation	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry	  in	  1990	  had	  not	  been	  orientated	  enough	  to	  consumers.	  The	  Government	  implemented	  the	  Utilities	  act	  2000	  which	  established	  new	  duties	  for	  Ofgem	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  market	  arrangements	  -­‐	  the	  New	  Electricity	  Trading	  Arrangements	  (NETA).	  	  NETA	  came	  into	  being	  in	  March	  2001.	  It	  abolished	  the	  Pool	  and	  instead	  established	  a	  system	  of	  bilateral	  contracts	  for	  power	  between	  generators,	  suppliers,	  traders	  and	  consumers,	  with	  electricity	  traded	  at	  a	  price	  agreed	  by	  the	  counter-­‐parties	  (ELEXON,	  2011a).	  The	  use	  of	  bilateral	  contracts	  means	  the	  generators	  can	  self-­‐dispatch	  to	  the	  network.	  However,	  they	  are	  required	  to	  notify	  the	  balancing	  mechanism	  of	  any	  differences	  to	  their	  contracts.	  The	  wholesale	  market	  works	  in	  three	  voluntary	  stages:	  forward	  and	  future	  contracts,	  short-­‐term	  bilateral	  market	  and	  the	  balancing	  mechanism,	  as	  seen	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐4.	  The	  key	  characteristics	  of	  NETA	  are:	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• Future	  contracts	  are	  made	  from	  up	  to	  a	  year	  in	  advance	  to	  24	  hours	  ahead	  of	  real	  time.	  These	  contracts	  are	  intended	  to	  reflect	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  trading	  between	  a	  supplier	  and	  generator.	  
• The	  short-­‐term	  bilateral	  market,	  often	  called	  power	  exchanges	  is	  a	  way	  of	  sellers	  and	  buyers	  fine	  tuning	  their	  position	  as	  their	  demand	  forecasts	  become	  more	  accurate.	  These	  contracts	  can	  be	  made	  up	  to	  hour	  before	  real	  time.	  	  
• The	  balancing	  mechanism	  is	  operated	  by	  the	  System	  Operator	  arm	  of	  National	  Grid	  Company.	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  can	  be	  continuously	  matched.	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐4	  New	  Electricity	  Trading	  Arrangements/British	  Electricity	  Trading	  Arrangements	  (National	  
Grid,	  2011b)	  The	  deadline,	  known	  as	  Gate	  Closure,	  for	  agreeing	  bilateral	  contracts	  or	  trading	  is	  one	  hour	  before	  delivery.	  At	  Gate	  Closure,	  market	  participants	  are	  expected	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  volumes	  of	  output	  or	  demand	  they	  have	  contracted	  for,	  and	  any	  residual	  imbalances	  on	  the	  system,	  whether	  on	  the	  supply	  or	  demand	  side,	  are	  corrected	  by	  the	  System	  Operator.	  The	  System	  Operator	  seeks	  out	  the	  lowest	  offers	  and	  the	  highest	  bids,	  whilst	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  transmission	  constraints	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  balance	  the	  system	  (ELEXON,	  2011a).	  The	  power	  flows	  are	  metered	  in	  real	  time	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  imbalance	  between	  the	  participants’	  contractual	  position	  and	  the	  physical	  flow.	  The	  imbalance	  volumes	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are	  settled	  using	  the	  system	  buy	  price	  (SBP)	  and	  the	  system	  sell	  price	  (SSP).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  System	  Operator	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  deficit	  of	  electricity	  will	  take	  the	  next	  cheapest	  bid	  –	  but	  this	  will	  always	  be	  higher	  that	  the	  marginal	  price	  of	  the	  market	  and	  may	  be	  very	  high.	  A	  similar	  system	  acts	  in	  reverse	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  demand	  (National	  Grid,	  2011).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  there	  is	  a	  mandatory	  post-­‐event	  settlement	  process,	  which	  is	  organised	  by	  the	  Balancing	  and	  Settlement	  Code	  (BSC),	  administered	  by	  System	  Operator.	  Parties	  which	  have	  been	  out	  of	  balance	  from	  their	  stated	  position	  at	  Gate	  Closure	  (either	  on	  the	  supply	  or	  the	  demand	  side)	  are	  charged	  a	  penalty	  by	  the	  System	  Operator	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  costs	  incurred	  by	  it	  to	  keep	  the	  system	  in	  balance.	  In	  2005	  the	  trading	  arrangements	  were	  extended	  to	  cover	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  and	  became	  the	  British	  Electricity	  Trading	  Transmission	  Arrangements	  and	  created	  a	  single	  electricity	  market	  for	  the	  UK.	  While	  transmission	  networks	  in	  Scotland	  are	  still	  owned	  by	  the	  two	  Scottish	  companies,	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  overall	  British	  electricity	  transmission	  network	  has	  been	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  System	  Operator	  function	  of	  National	  Grid.	  These	  electricity	  arrangements	  were	  designed	  for	  output	  from	  large	  scale,	  predictable,	  continuous	  and	  inflexible	  generation	  such	  as	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  nuclear	  generating	  stations	  (House	  of	  Commons	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Committee,	  2011).	  However,	  the	  expected	  increase	  in	  deployment	  of	  renewable	  technologies	  results	  in	  there	  likely	  being	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  variable	  generation3	  technologies	  where	  the	  output	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  predict	  on	  a	  day	  to	  day	  basis.	  Investment	  in	  a	  variable	  source	  of	  electricity	  generation	  which	  actively	  participates	  in	  the	  current	  market	  system,	  can	  be	  considered	  risky,	  because	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐	  generation	  from	  the	  stated	  position	  before	  gate	  closure	  will	  result	  in	  penalties	  from	  the	  Balancing	  Mechanism	  (Baker	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Therefore,	  the	  variable	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  need	  other	  markets	  to	  hedge	  their	  investment	  and	  reduce	  risk.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Not	  all	  renewable	  generation	  is	  variable.	  Wind	  and	  solar	  power	  can	  come	  under	  this	  category,	  
however	  marine	  and	  biomass	  can	  be	  considered	  predictable.	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2.1.5 Purchase	  Power	  Agreements	  The	  risks	  of	  being	  exposed	  to	  penalty	  payments	  in	  the	  balancing	  mechanism	  means	  that	  small-­‐scale	  independent	  generators	  are	  unlikely	  to	  participate	  directly	  in	  trading	  in	  the	  market.	  This	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  complexity	  of	  operating	  in	  a	  24	  hour	  market-­‐based	  on	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  legal	  and	  industry	  codes.	  The	  transaction	  costs	  associated	  with	  BETTA	  are	  prohibitive	  for	  small-­‐scale	  participants	  (as	  opposed	  to	  renewable	  projects	  owned	  by	  the	  Big	  Six	  incumbent	  energy	  companies).	  Instead,	  small-­‐scale	  generators	  tend	  to	  access	  the	  market	  through	  Purchase	  Power	  Agreements	  (PPAs).	  A	  PPA	  is	  a	  contract	  set	  up	  between	  a	  generator	  and	  a	  supplier.	  It	  often	  includes	  an	  imbalance	  risk	  premium	  (meaning	  the	  generators	  are	  paid	  less	  than	  the	  value	  of	  their	  electricity	  were	  they	  able	  to	  sell	  directly)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  compensating	  for	  the	  variability	  of	  generation,	  ultimately	  reducing	  the	  overall	  price	  received	  for	  their	  output	  (Hesmondhalgh	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
2.2 Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  The	  changes	  expected	  to	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  will	  require	  a	  change	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  market.	  The	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  (EMR)	  of	  2010	  –	  2014	  is	  intended	  to	  establish	  mechanisms	  to	  replace	  and	  upgrade	  the	  UK’s	  infrastructure	  by	  incentivising	  a	  further	  £110bn	  worth	  of	  investment	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  This	  reform	  has	  two	  main	  features:	  the	  Contracts	  for	  Difference	  (CfD)	  and	  the	  Capacity	  Mechanism	  (CM)	  and	  two	  secondary	  features:	  the	  emissions	  performance	  standard	  and	  the	  carbon	  floor	  price	  already	  functioning	  under	  the	  finance	  Act	  2012.	  
2.2.1 Contracts	  for	  Difference	  (CfDs)	  The	  Contracts	  for	  difference	  (CFD)	  are	  essentially	  a	  support	  mechanism	  for	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  generation,	  designed	  to	  replace	  the	  renewables	  obligation	  (RO)	  for	  renewables	  and	  include	  nuclear	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  (CCS)	  generation.	  The	  contracts	  are	  held	  between	  the	  generator	  and	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Contracts	  Company4	  and	  provide	  a	  fixed	  price	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  electricity	  generated.	  The	  Government	  states	  that	  new	  investors	  should	  be	  able	  to	  utilise	  the	  new	  CfDs,	  allowing	  more	  investors	  into	  the	  system,	  which	  it	  is	  hoped	  will	  boost	  competition	  within	  the	  market	  (DECC,	  2014c).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A	  private	  company,	  owned	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (DECC),	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The	  CfDs	  operate	  by	  setting	  a	  fixed	  ‘strike	  price’	  which	  is	  set	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  a	  reference	  price	  which	  moves	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  wholesale	  price	  of	  electricity.	  The	  generator	  ‘topped	  up’	  from	  the	  reference	  price	  to	  meet	  the	  strike	  price	  and	  if	  the	  reference	  price	  exceeds	  the	  strike	  price	  the	  generator	  is	  required	  to	  pay	  the	  difference	  back	  (see	  	  Figure	  2-­‐5).	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐5	  The	  operation	  of	  an	  intermittent	  Contract	  for	  Difference	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  However,	  the	  contracts	  for	  difference	  have	  been	  criticised	  for	  many	  reasons,	  such	  as,	  their	  complexity	  and	  increased	  costs	  for	  consumers	  (Toke,	  2013).	  Although	  the	  CfDs	  operate	  for	  renewable	  technologies,	  nuclear	  and	  CCS,	  the	  operation	  will	  be	  differ	  for	  the	  variable	  renewable	  technologies.	  Firstly	  with	  the	  length	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  renewable	  generation	  contracts	  would	  last	  15	  years	  whereas	  nuclear	  could	  be	  for	  35	  years	  (Jowit,	  2013).	  Secondly,	  for	  renewables	  the	  reference	  price	  will	  track	  the	  market	  price	  by	  the	  day	  ahead	  market,	  meaning	  the	  reference	  price	  will	  move	  closely	  with	  the	  wholesale	  market	  price.	  For	  nuclear	  the	  reference	  price	  will	  be	  set	  for	  12	  months	  looking	  at	  the	  average	  year	  ahead	  wholesale	  price.	  Thirdly,	  the	  strike	  price	  will	  be	  set	  differently.	  For	  variable	  renewable	  generation	  the	  strike	  price	  will	  be	  imposed	  upon	  them.	  However,	  nuclear	  generation	  will	  be	  able	  to	  negotiate	  its	  price	  for	  each	  generation	  station.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  CFDs	  have	  been	  criticised	  as	  a	  way	  for	  Government	  to	  subsidise	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  without	  clearly	  identifying	  the	  amount	  of	  subsidy	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  renewable	  generators	  (Toke,	  2011).	  Further	  to	  this	  the	  Levy	  Control	  Framework	  (LCF)	  effectively	  caps	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  can	  be	  spent	  on	  low	  carbon	  generation.	  The	  LCF	  has	  set	  out	  money	  until	  2020	  but	  it	  is	  not	  known	  how	  much	  there	  will	  be	  after	  2020.	  Once	  nuclear	  power	  comes	  on	  stream	  then	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	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money	  will	  be	  left	  for	  promoting	  renewables.	  Any	  subsidy	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  would	  likely	  mean	  less	  money	  for	  renewables.	  
2.2.2 Capacity	  Market	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  UK	  Governments	  Electricity	  market	  reform	  package	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  capacity	  market	  (CM).	  The	  Government’s	  aim	  for	  the	  CM	  is	  to	  stimulate	  sufficient	  investment	  into	  electricity	  generation	  capacity	  to	  meet	  electricity	  demand	  at	  all	  times.	  The	  capacity	  providers	  will	  be	  offered	  a	  fixed	  payment	  to	  ensure	  capacity	  and	  penalised	  for	  failing	  to	  deliver	  that	  capacity	  (DECC,	  2012e,	  DECC,	  2014a).	  	  The	  capacity	  market	  consist	  of	  six	  stages:	  firstly,	  the	  amount	  of	  capacity	  to	  be	  auctioned	  is	  decided	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Sate	  (DECC).	  Secondly,	  eligible	  applicants5	  participate	  in	  a	  pre-­‐qualification	  process	  run	  by	  the	  delivery	  body	  (The	  National	  Grid,	  System	  Operator).	  The	  third	  stage	  is	  the	  auction,	  where	  successful	  pre-­‐qualification	  applicants	  compete	  for	  capacity	  agreements	  four	  years	  ahead	  of	  delivery	  the	  first	  of	  which	  will	  be	  for	  53.3	  GW	  in	  December	  2014	  (DECC,	  2014d).	  The	  fourth	  stage	  is	  the	  secondary	  market,	  where	  participants	  can	  trade	  (financial	  or	  physical)	  agreements	  between	  the	  auction	  and	  delivery.	  The	  fifth	  stage	  is	  the	  delivery,	  where	  payment	  is	  provided	  for	  the	  capacity	  and	  penalties	  for	  non-­‐delivery	  of	  their	  agreement.	  Finally,	  the	  payment	  for	  the	  participants,	  which	  is	  run	  through	  a	  settlement	  company	  (DECC	  2013h).	  One	  of	  the	  main	  positive	  aspects	  to	  take	  from	  the	  capacity	  mechanism	  is	  that	  it	  has	  identified	  the	  use	  of	  demand	  side	  response	  in	  the	  securing	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  It	  signifies	  the	  move	  away	  from	  supply	  meeting	  demand	  at	  any	  cost	  (Thorpe,	  2013),	  although	  demand	  side	  response	  is	  still	  a	  very	  small	  aspect	  of	  the	  mechanism	  (Mitchell,	  2014a).	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  may	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  electricity	  demand	  if	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  develops	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  schemes	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  widespread	  enough	  to	  meet	  this	  increase.	  In	  addition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Eligible	  applicants	  includes	  generating	  capacity,	  demand	  side	  response	  and	  storage	  which	  is	  not	  
supported	  by	  the	  RO,	  CfDs,	  FIT	  or	  RHI.	  It	  also	  does	  not	  include	  non-­‐GB	  generation	  from	  the	  
interconnector.	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an	  increase	  in	  low	  carbon	  renewable	  generation	  will	  mean	  supply	  will	  have	  more	  variability.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  in	  order	  for	  supply	  to	  meet	  demand	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  capacity.	  One	  solution	  is	  for	  Government	  to	  operate	  peaking	  plant	  itself,	  thereby	  ensuing	  sufficient	  capacity	  at	  times	  of	  peak	  demand	  (FoE,	  2012).	  However,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  Government	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  short-­‐term	  supply	  and	  not	  only	  taking	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  supply	  meeting	  demand	  would	  also	  be	  taking	  on	  the	  political	  risk	  if	  anything	  supply	  standards	  were	  not	  met.	  However,	  the	  CM	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  promoting	  older,	  coal	  fired	  power	  stations.	  The	  long-­‐term,	  guaranteed	  contracts	  for	  these	  coal	  power	  plants	  would	  mean	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  calculate	  the	  cost	  of	  upgrading	  the	  station	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  EU	  directives.	  These	  directives	  will	  come	  into	  place	  in	  order	  to	  force	  improved	  environmental	  performance	  (Littlecott,	  2014).	  However,	  since	  then	  the	  long	  term	  contracts	  for	  older	  coal	  fired	  Power	  stations	  have	  been	  removed	  (Carrington,	  2014).	  	  
2.3 Network	  Regulation	  Electricity	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  operate	  as	  monopolies	  and	  are	  regulated	  by	  Ofgem	  to	  ensure	  electricity	  and	  gas	  is	  delivered	  in	  an	  affordable	  and	  reliable	  manner.	  Ofgem	  have	  estimated	  that	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  will	  need	  to	  invest	  over	  £30bn	  (gas	  and	  electricity)	  over	  the	  next	  decade	  (Ofgem,	  2012g).	  Currently	  around	  20%	  of	  the	  consumer	  electricity	  tariff	  is	  related	  to	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  network	  charges	  (see	  Figure	  2-­‐6)	  meaning	  the	  cost	  of	  upgrading	  and	  maintaining	  the	  networks	  are	  central	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  system,	  especially	  if	  this	  future	  requires	  changes	  to	  their	  operation	  (Ofgem,	  2013a).	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  future,	  a	  secure	  delivery	  system	  for	  electricity	  is	  needed.	  This	  will	  have	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  additional	  usage	  from	  potential	  increased	  demand	  (Government	  has	  identified	  that	  the	  future	  will	  include	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  (DECC,	  2012n))	  and	  reduced	  predictability	  from	  variable	  generation	  sources	  (Pollit	  and	  Bialek,	  2007).	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  some	  of	  this	  investment	  would	  be	  required	  irrespective	  of	  any	  other	  changes	  in	  order	  to	  replace	  aged	  part	  of	  the	  network.	  The	  key	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  infrastructure	  investment	  allows	  further	  development	  of	  the	  network	  to	  provide	  energy	  security	  and	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  for	  electricity	  generation.	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Figure	  2-­‐6	  Typical	  Household	  Energy	  Bill	  based	  on	  average	  annual	  consumption	  figures	  of	  3,300	  kWh	  
for	  electricity	  across	  all	  big	  six	  suppliers	  and	  across	  Great	  Britain	  (Ofgem,	  2013a)	  Ofgem	  regulates	  distribution	  through	  the	  networks	  by	  the	  price	  controls	  which	  set	  the	  DNOs’	  revenue	  allowances	  at	  a	  fixed	  sum6	  over	  a	  five-­‐year	  period.	  These	  were	  designed	  to	  set	  a	  ‘fair’	  return	  of	  capital	  after	  running	  costs	  and	  at	  the	  moment	  is	  structured	  over	  a	  five	  year	  period.	  The	  current	  price	  control	  runs	  from	  1	  April	  2010	  to	  31	  March	  2015.	  This	  will	  change	  to	  RIIO	  and	  eight	  year	  periods	  after	  2015,	  see	  section	  2.3.1	  for	  further	  explanation.	  The	  network	  companies	  recover	  their	  allowed	  revenues	  from	  the	  supplier	  companies	  which	  in	  turn	  pass	  them	  on	  to	  the	  consumer.	  The	  current	  price	  control	  period	  set	  these	  returns	  through	  a	  mechanism	  known	  as	  RPI-­‐X,	  where	  RPI	  is	  the	  Retail	  Price	  Index	  reflecting	  the	  rate	  of	  inflation,	  and	  X	  is	  a	  factor	  by	  which	  returns	  are	  reduced	  from	  this	  level	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  efficiency	  gains7	  (Crouch,	  2006;	  Shaw	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Ofgem,	  2010g).	  Initially	  the	  RPI-­‐X	  approach	  was	  successful	  in	  its	  aim	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  and	  operational	  efficiency	  of	  the	  DNOs.	  The	  regulation	  of	  the	  networks	  achieved	  a	  55%	  reduction	  in	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  distribution	  from	  1995	  to	  2003	  and	  30%	  reduction	  in	  transmission	  costs	  from	  1993	  to	  2005	  (Pollit,	  2005).	  However,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Revenue	  allowances	  have	  some	  variables	  such	  as	  changes	  to	  activity	  and	  inflation	  (Ofgem,	  2009)	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emphasis	  on	  efficiency	  improvements	  within	  the	  DNOs	  led	  to	  ‘asset	  sweating’	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  under-­‐investment	  as	  the	  companies	  sought	  to	  maximise	  their	  revenues	  (Helm	  2003).	  This	  in	  turn	  created	  a	  concern	  about	  ageing	  networks	  which	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  future	  shifts	  in	  patterns	  of	  demand	  and	  increased	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  connecting	  to	  them.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  day	  to	  day	  financial	  regulation	  of	  distribution	  networks,	  Ofgem	  also	  set	  up	  and	  administered	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  intended	  to	  promote	  network	  innovation.	  These	  included	  the	  Innovation	  Funding	  Incentive,	  Distributed	  Generation	  Incentive	  and	  the	  Registered	  Power	  Zones	  each	  of	  which	  commenced	  in	  2005	  (Ofgem,	  2005;	  SP	  Power	  Systems,	  2005;	  Ofgem,	  2007b).	  They	  were	  devised	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  underinvestment	  in	  distribution	  networks,	  and	  the	  resulting	  difficulties	  for	  connection	  of	  generation	  to	  the	  networks.	  	  As	  a	  part	  of	  the	  price	  control	  running	  until	  2015	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Network	  Fund	  is	  allowing	  up	  to	  £500m	  to	  support	  projects	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Distribution	  Network	  Operators.	  This	  funding	  is	  broken	  into	  two	  different	  tiers,	  each	  of	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  distribution	  network.	  Tier	  1	  with	  £80m	  of	  investment	  covers	  the	  small-­‐scale	  projects	  which	  include	  the	  trialling	  of	  new	  equipment,	  new	  arrangement	  of	  existing	  equipment.	  Tier	  2	  provides	  £64m	  worth	  of	  funding	  per	  year	  and	  includes	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process.	  The	  projects	  to	  be	  funded	  are	  decided	  by	  Ofgem,	  who	  require	  that	  they	  development	  and	  demonstration	  of	  new	  technologies	  including	  novel	  operating	  and	  commercial	  arrangements	  (Grünewald	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Ofgem,	  2013e).	  However	  this	  is,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  Network	  Innovation	  Competition	  (NIC)	  set	  out	  by	  RIIO.	  
2.3.1 RIIO	  (Revenue	  =	  Incentives	  +	  Innovation	  +	  Outputs)	  The	  energy	  networks	  are	  in	  a	  period	  of	  change,	  in	  2010	  Ofgem	  began	  the	  review	  of	  energy	  network	  regulation	  RPI-­‐X@20.	  RPI-­‐X@20	  signified	  the	  need	  for	  a	  new	  regulatory	  framework	  which	  according	  to	  Ofgem	  will	  need	  to	  secure	  enough	  investment	  to	  maintain	  a	  reliable	  and	  secure	  network,	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  changes	  in	  demand	  and	  generation	  that	  will	  occur	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  	  Revenue	  =	  Incentives	  +	  Innovation	  +	  Outputs	  (RIIO)	  is	  the	  new	  regulatory	  framework	  designed	  to	  cover	  the	  energy	  networks	  from	  gas	  to	  electricity	  transmission	  and	  distribution.	  The	  main	  ethos	  behind	  RIIO	  is	  to	  set	  up	  a	  regulatory	  system	  where	  outputs	  were	  rewarded	  and	  companies	  delivered	  what	  customers	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wanted	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner.	  There	  are	  four	  main	  objectives	  for	  RIIO:	  firstly,	  to	  put	  stakeholders	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  decision	  making	  process.	  Secondly,	  to	  invest	  efficiently	  to	  ensuring	  continued	  safe	  and	  reliable	  services.	  Thirdly,	  promote	  innovation	  to	  reduce	  network	  costs	  for	  current	  and	  future	  consumers.	  Finally,	  play	  a	  full	  role	  in	  delivering	  a	  low	  carbon	  economy	  and	  wider	  environmental	  objectives	  (EC	  Harris,	  2013)	  The	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  network	  companies	  are	  given	  predefined	  objectives.	  How	  they	  perform	  against	  these	  objectives	  will	  determine	  their	  rates	  of	  return	  and	  the	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  of	  future	  regulatory	  reviews.	  (Bolton	  and	  Hawkes	  2013).	  Companies	  submit	  business	  plans	  on	  how	  they	  intend	  to	  meet	  RIIO	  framework.	  Ofgem	  then	  reviews	  these	  plans	  to	  determine	  levels	  of	  scrutiny,	  which	  will	  be	  applied,	  i.e.	  a	  good	  business	  plan	  can	  be	  fast	  tracked,	  a	  bad	  one	  will	  be	  re-­‐submitted.	  The	  first	  set	  of	  business	  plans	  for	  the	  distribution	  network	  companies	  were	  issued	  in	  November	  2013,	  five	  out	  of	  the	  six	  companies	  plans	  were	  rejected	  as	  they	  “did	  not	  sufficiently	  demonstrate	  value	  for	  money”	  (Ofgem,	  2013j).	  The	  main	  aspects	  of	  the	  RIIO	  which	  change	  from	  the	  current	  regulatory	  framework	  are:	  firstly,	  the	  longer	  price	  control	  period	  (eight	  years	  from	  five),	  secondly,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  innovation	  through	  funding	  competitions,	  thirdly,	  output-­‐based	  regulation,	  fourthly,	  fast	  tracking	  (an	  early	  start	  to	  operations	  networks	  if	  business	  plans	  line	  up	  fully	  with	  Ofgem’s	  view)	  and	  finally,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  customer	  service	  (EC	  Harris,	  2013).	  The	  price	  controls	  are	  in	  three	  parts:	  firstly	  for	  the	  transmission	  system	  (TIIO-­‐T1)	  which	  covers	  the	  transmission	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity,	  for	  the	  period	  of	  2013	  to	  2021	  and	  accounts	  for	  2%	  and	  4%	  of	  the	  consumers	  bill	  for	  gas	  and	  electricity	  respectively.	  Ofgem’s	  decision	  on	  National	  Grid’s	  price	  control	  package	  was	  published	  in	  December	  2012.	  These	  proposals	  earmark	  around	  £15.5	  billion	  of	  investment	  to	  upgrade	  and	  renew	  the	  networks	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  price	  control.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  electricity	  distribution	  (RIIO-­‐ED1)	  for	  the	  distribution	  network	  owners	  covering	  the	  period	  of	  2015	  to	  2023	  which	  accounts	  for	  16%	  of	  the	  consumers	  bill.	  Finally	  there	  is	  the	  gas	  distribution	  price	  control	  (RIIO-­‐GD1).	  RIIO	  includes	  an	  innovation	  stimulus	  package	  for	  the	  networks,	  including	  the	  Network	  Innovation	  Competition	  (NIC)	  which	  replaces	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Network	  Fund	  (LCNF)	  for	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks.	  The	  NIC	  is	  an	  annual	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competition	  for	  companies	  to	  compete	  for	  a	  total	  of	  £27m.	  The	  competition	  is	  focused	  around	  innovation	  projects	  which	  provide	  the	  best	  environmental	  benefits,	  cost	  reductions	  and	  security	  of	  supply.	  Another	  innovation	  mechanism	  is	  the	  Network	  Innovation	  Allowance	  (NIA)	  which	  in	  general	  will	  fund	  small-­‐scale	  projects	  by	  allowing	  0.5%	  of	  the	  companies	  revenues	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  small	  projects.	  Some	  projects	  being	  allowed	  up	  to	  1%	  of	  revenue.	  These	  are	  for	  smaller	  technical,	  commercial	  or	  operational	  initiatives	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  deliver	  financial	  benefits	  to	  the	  licensee	  and	  its	  customers	  or	  as	  a	  prototype	  for	  the	  NIC.	  	  As	  RIIO	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  operation	  so	  the	  impact	  it	  will	  have	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  still	  unclear.	  The	  new	  innovation	  schemes	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  promote	  network	  development	  and	  the	  greater	  inclusion	  of	  customer	  value	  for	  money	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  benefit	  affordability.	  However,	  previous	  network	  innovation	  mechanisms	  have	  proven	  unsuccessful	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  Firstly	  the	  lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	  the	  development	  of	  new	  innovation,	  secondly	  the	  DNOs	  placed	  a	  low	  priority	  on	  network	  innovation	  and	  therefore	  there	  was	  a	  low	  uptake	  (Woodman	  and	  Baker,	  2008).	  The	  main	  challenge	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  distribution	  system	  is	  that	  they	  will	  have	  to	  incorporate	  an	  increase	  in	  locally	  distributed	  generation	  on	  their	  electricity	  networks.	  The	  short-­‐term	  issue	  with	  increased	  generation	  is	  that	  constraints	  on	  the	  network	  can	  mean	  a	  network	  will	  need	  upgrading	  in	  that	  area	  before	  the	  generation	  is	  connected.	  With	  the	  RPI-­‐X	  system	  (and	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  same	  with	  RIIO)	  these	  upgrades	  are	  made	  when	  the	  need	  arises.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  an	  investment	  model	  where	  the	  networks	  operators	  upgrade	  the	  network	  within	  a	  region,	  making	  their	  networks	  more	  efficient	  rather	  than	  reacting	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  generators.	  If	  this	  investment	  model	  existed	  small-­‐scale	  generator	  might	  find	  that	  a	  barrier	  to	  investment	  is	  removed.	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  could	  see	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  on	  the	  distribution	  network,	  which	  would	  dominate	  the	  GB	  electricity	  portfolio.	  In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  the	  electricity	  networks	  will	  need	  to	  change	  dramatically,	  firstly,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  receive	  the	  generation,	  secondly,	  to	  manage	  the	  flow	  of	  electricity.	  The	  management	  will	  require	  new	  operational	  procedures	  and	  technologies	  which	  could	  see	  electricity	  flowing	  from	  the	  distribution	  networks	  to	  the	  transmission	  networks.	  The	  regulatory	  system	  that	  was	  developed	  during	  a	  period	  of	  highly	  centralised	  electricity	  generation	  and	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delivery.	  RIIO	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  promoting	  innovation	  further	  but	  not	  at	  the	  level	  required	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  
2.4 UK	  Government	  goals	  and	  policy	  As	  overarching	  drivers	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  the	  Government	  has	  established	  three	  objectives	  for	  energy	  policy:	  to	  “decarbonise	  energy	  generation”	  (climate	  change),	  to	  “keep	  energy	  bills	  affordable”	  (affordability)	  and	  to	  “keep	  the	  lights	  on”	  (energy	  security)	  see	  Figure	  2-­‐7	  (DECC,	  2012n:	  Pg.	  7).	  These	  three	  goals	  have	  been	  the	  mainstay	  of	  the	  Government	  energy	  policy	  for	  the	  last	  decade.	  The	  wording	  may	  alter	  but	  the	  goals	  always	  include	  climate	  change,	  affordability,	  and	  security	  (DTI,	  2003;	  2007a;	  DECC,	  2009a;	  2012d,	  2012n).	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐7	  The	  Government’s	  objectives	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  The	  three	  goals	  constitute	  a	  ‘trilemma’	  in	  terms	  of	  trying	  to	  meet	  each	  challenge	  because	  each	  can	  conflict	  with	  the	  other	  (Sautter	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Blumsack	  and	  Fernandez	  ,	  2012).	  There	  are	  links	  between	  policies,	  for	  example,	  reducing	  dependence	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  will	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  potentially	  reduce	  the	  impact	  of	  global	  price	  spikes,	  helping	  both	  affordability	  and	  energy	  security	  goals.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  trade-­‐offs	  such	  as	  the	  closing	  of	  many	  of	  the	  power	  plants	  as	  a	  result	  of	  EU	  environmental	  policies	  could	  undermine	  the	  ability	  to	  produce	  sufficient	  capacity	  levels	  and	  impact	  on	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  security	  of	  supply	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  government	  focuses	  on	  one	  or	  another,	  or	  all	  of	  
Government	  Goals	  
Security	  of	  supply	  Electricity	  demand	  may	  double	  by	  2050	  Requirement	  for	  diverse,	  reliableand	  resilient	  electricity	  supplies	  to	  keep	  the	  lights	  on	  
Affordability	  Minimise	  costs	  to	  taxpayer	  and	  keep	  energy	  bills	  down	  
Climate	  Change	  By	  2050,	  80%	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions	  (across	  the	  economy)	  on	  1990	  levels	  By	  2020,	  we	  need	  15%	  of	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	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these	  goals	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  goals	  provide	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  classifying	  different	  policy	  actions,	  and	  the	  three	  areas	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
2.4.1 Climate	  Change	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  recognised	  the	  importance	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  on	  the	  environment	  i.e.	  the	  Energy	  White	  Papers	  (EWP)	  published	  in	  2003,	  2007	  and	  2012.	  They	  have	  committed	  the	  UK	  to	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  80%	  by	  2050	  from	  1990	  levels.	  This	  target	  for	  carbon	  reduction	  has	  been	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  requirement	  in	  law	  under	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Act	  (2008)	  to	  meet	  a	  set	  of	  carbon	  budgets	  up	  to	  2050.	  The	  first	  four	  of	  these	  budgets	  have	  been	  set	  and	  cover	  the	  period	  of	  2008	  up	  to	  2027	  (DECC,	  2009b	  &	  2011i).	  According	  to	  the	  Government,	  the	  UK	  is	  currently	  on	  target	  for	  meeting	  the	  first	  three	  of	  the	  carbon	  budgets	  (DECC,	  2012L).	  However,	  the	  fourth	  budget,	  which	  entered	  into	  legislation	  separately	  in	  June	  2011	  represents	  a	  greater	  challenge	  than	  the	  linear	  projections	  of	  the	  first	  three	  as	  described	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐8,	  requiring	  a	  greater	  change	  to	  the	  system	  (Gambhir	  &	  Vallejo,	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐8	  UK	  historical	  GHG	  emissions	  to	  2009	  and	  projections	  from	  2010	  (DECC,	  2011h	  in	  Gambhir	  &	  
Vallejo,	  2011)	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The	  energy	  supply	  sector	  provides	  the	  single	  biggest	  source	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  estimated	  at	  around	  40%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  total	  carbon	  emissions	  in	  2011	  (DECC,	  2013a).	  So	  far	  the	  energy	  supply	  sector	  has	  been	  able	  to	  reduce	  its	  carbon	  emissions	  from	  241.5	  MtCO2e	  in	  1990	  to	  182.2	  in	  2011	  which	  is	  a	  reduction	  of	  24.5%	  (DECC,	  2013).	  Reductions	  in	  carbon	  emissions,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐9,	  for	  the	  electricity	  industry	  have	  been	  achieved	  through	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  gas	  over	  coal	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  zero	  carbon	  technologies	  such	  as	  renewables	  (DECC,	  2013a).	  This	  is	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐10,	  showing	  the	  changes	  to	  fuel	  mix	  for	  electricity	  generation.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  projections	  for	  demand	  can	  be	  contested,	  possible	  future	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  industry	  include	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  which	  would	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  demand.	  Alternatively,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  energy	  efficiency	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  demand	  levels	  and	  therefore,	  further	  cuts	  in	  emissions	  (DECC,	  2012n;	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Committee,	  2012).	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Figure	  2-­‐10	  Fuel	  mix	  for	  UK	  electricity	  supplied,	  1990-­‐2013	  (GWh)	  (DECC,	  2014f)	  	  
2.4.2 Affordability	  The	  policies	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  could	  have	  the	  impact	  of	  adding	  costs	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  financing	  low-­‐carbon	  investments	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  measures	  (Ofgem,	  2010a;	  CCC,	  2011;	  DECC,	  2013d)).	  These	  policies	  may	  drive	  up	  average	  household	  energy	  bills	  by	  £240	  per	  annum	  by	  2020	  (nPower,	  2013).	  In	  2012	  the	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (CCC)	  suggested	  that	  by	  2020	  the	  projected	  electricity	  bill	  will	  have	  increased	  by	  £100	  as	  a	  result	  of	  subsidised	  CfDs	  in	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  This	  added	  to	  the	  wholesale	  suppliers	  and	  networks	  increase	  in	  costs	  is	  likely	  to	  raise	  raises	  the	  bills	  by	  £185.	  The	  CCC	  identifies	  an	  £85	  ‘potential’	  reduction	  in	  electricity	  costs	  from	  efficiency	  savings	  leaving	  a	  £100	  total	  increase	  in	  costs	  from	  2011	  to	  2020;	  with	  a	  similar	  increase	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  average	  residential	  gas	  bill	  (an	  increase	  of	  £70)	  (CCC,	  2012;	  2013b).	  This	  is	  different	  to	  the	  DECC	  results	  of	  a	  11%	  reduction	  in	  the	  total	  energy	  bill	  for	  household	  consumers	  (DECC,	  2013d).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  term	  ‘consumers’	  refers	  to	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  not	  simply	  householders.	  However,	  the	  overall	  idea	  is	  that	  increasing	  energy	  efficiency	  of	  domestic	  households	  will	  mean	  that	  households	  will	  use	  less	  energy	  thereby	  offsetting	  the	  price	  rises	  with	  bills	  remaining	  the	  same	  or	  even	  reducing.	  Energy	  efficiency	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policies	  are	  therefore	  a	  key	  strategy	  for	  maintaining	  affordability.	  Nevertheless,	  affordability	  of	  energy	  to	  the	  consumer	  has	  become	  a	  political	  priority	  alongside	  climate	  change	  and	  energy	  security	  (Oxford	  Economics,	  2011,	  DECC	  2011k).	  	  The	  Government	  has	  developed	  a	  range	  of	  strategies,	  which	  help	  householders	  and	  businesses	  use	  less	  energy,	  get	  the	  best	  deal	  on	  their	  energy	  tariff,	  and	  it	  provides	  payments	  for	  the	  most	  vulnerable.	  The	  rise	  in	  prices	  was	  described	  by	  Government	  as	  a	  short-­‐term	  issue	  and	  that	  in	  the	  long	  run	  a	  more	  energy	  efficient	  system	  will	  lead	  to	  lower	  energy	  prices	  overall.	  However,	  these	  issues	  have	  become	  ‘political’	  and	  dominated	  the	  media	  from	  mid	  2013.	  (DECC,	  2013d	  see	  Figure	  2-­‐11).	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐11	  Estimated	  average	  impact	  of	  energy	  and	  climate	  change	  policies	  on	  household	  energy	  bills	  
in	  2020	  (DECC,	  2013d)	  Key	  problems	  are	  to	  establish	  what	  the	  ‘price’	  of	  electricity	  are	  how	  much	  profit	  the	  large	  energy	  companies	  are	  making	  (HoC	  ECCSC,	  2013)	  and	  secondly	  how	  to	  establish	  what	  investment	  will	  be	  required	  in	  the	  coming	  decades	  to	  transform	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system.	  Moreover,	  the	  impacts	  on	  consumers	  differ	  depending	  on	  what	  type	  of	  consumer	  they	  are.	  A	  rise	  in	  energy	  prices	  will	  mean	  reduced	  profitability	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  for	  energy	  intensive	  businesses	  and	  industry.	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  if	  rising	  prices	  stimulates	  them	  to	  invest	  in	  more	  efficient	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technology	  (Ockwell,	  2008).	  The	  business	  sector	  is	  impacted	  upon	  differently	  by	  energy	  policies	  such	  as	  the	  CRC	  Energy	  Efficiency	  Scheme,	  and	  the	  EU	  ETS	  (DECC,	  2011g).	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  policies	  to	  medium	  size	  businesses	  over	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  have	  been	  identified	  by	  the	  Government	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐12.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  policy	  changes	  will	  depend	  both	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  business	  but	  also	  the	  success	  of	  the	  policies.	  This	  is	  factored	  into	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  impact	  document	  by	  discussing	  medium	  and	  large	  businesses	  (DECC,	  2011i).	  The	  future	  costs	  to	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  users	  are	  projected	  to	  increase	  faster	  than	  the	  householder	  because	  of	  these	  low	  carbon	  policies.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  costs	  of	  electricity	  will	  increase	  by	  up	  to	  20-­‐25%	  from	  2013	  to	  2020	  for	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  users.	  However,	  the	  cost	  of	  energy	  considered	  as	  a	  factor	  of	  the	  total	  costs	  to	  the	  sector,	  are	  low:	  between	  0.5%	  and	  3%.	  Therefore,	  the	  increase	  in	  energy	  costs	  may	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  cost	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  (CCC,	  2012).	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐12	  Estimated	  impact	  of	  energy	  and	  climate	  change	  policies	  on	  average	  retail	  gas	  and	  
electricity	  prices	  paid	  by	  UK	  medium-­‐sized	  business	  users	  (DECC,	  2013m).	  Domestic	  consumers	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  specific	  policy	  action	  to	  limit	  the	  impact	  of	  fuel	  price	  rises	  and	  volatility	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  fuel	  poverty.	  In	  2000,	  The	  Warm	  Homes	  and	  Energy	  Conservation	  Act	  placed	  a	  duty	  on	  Government	  to	  have	  a	  strategy	  for	  making	  sure	  no	  person	  lives	  in	  fuel	  poverty	  as	  far	  as	  is	  reasonably	  practical	  by	  2016.	  However,	  in	  2012	  a	  report	  into	  fuel	  poverty	  commissioned	  by	  DECC	  was	  produced	  to	  examine	  three	  issues:	  firstly	  if	  fuel	  poverty	  was	  an	  issue,	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secondly;	  how	  it	  can	  be	  measured,	  and	  thirdly,	  the	  implications	  of	  measurement	  for	  policy	  approaches	  (Hills,	  2012).	  The	  Warm	  Homes	  and	  Energy	  Conservation	  Act	  (2000)	  defined	  fuel	  poverty	  as:	  “a	  member	  of	  a	  household	  living	  on	  a	  lower	  
income	  in	  a	  home	  which	  cannot	  be	  kept	  warm	  at	  reasonable	  cost.”	  The	  number	  of	  householders	  in	  England	  in	  fuel	  poverty	  has	  risen	  since	  2004	  see	  Figure	  2-­‐13.	  The	  drop	  in	  numbers	  for	  2010	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  energy	  prices	  for	  that	  year,	  however,	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  for	  2011	  increased	  again	  by	  5.5%	  and	  therefore	  a	  rise	  in	  fuel	  poverty	  is	  expected	  again	  (DECC,	  2012m;	  2012w)	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐13	  Number	  of	  fuel	  poor	  households	  in	  England	  (DECC,	  2012m)	  An	  issue	  with	  affordability	  is	  that	  if	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  increases	  for	  the	  household,	  as	  discussed	  by	  the	  CCC	  (CCC,	  2012),	  then	  some	  of	  the	  strategies	  in	  place	  to	  protect	  the	  ‘fuel	  poor’	  could	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  energy	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  consumers,	  thereby	  potentially	  increasing	  the	  numbers	  of	  fuel	  poor.	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The	  UK	  Government	  currently	  describes	  energy	  security	  as	  “making	  sure	  
consumers	  can	  access	  the	  energy	  they	  need	  at	  prices	  that	  are	  not	  excessively	  volatile”	  (DECC,	  2012o).	  Although	  energy	  security	  has	  been	  a	  factor	  involved	  in	  many	  of	  the	  policy	  decisions	  and	  Government	  has	  recently	  published	  a	  strategy	  setting	  out	  key	  policies,	  it	  does	  still	  rely	  heavily	  on	  competitive	  markets	  as	  the	  means	  of	  maintaining	  security	  of	  supply	  (Parliamentary	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  
2012).	  	  However,	  energy	  security	  challenges	  are	  complex	  and	  range	  from	  local	  through	  to	  global	  and	  are	  continually	  changing	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Energy	  security	  has	  to	  embrace	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  environment,	  governance	  patterns	  and	  international	  issues.	  It	  includes	  threats	  such	  as	  domestic	  activism;	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  on	  electricity	  networks;	  and	  availability	  of	  resources.	  These	  threats	  could	  lead	  to	  blackout	  or	  brown	  out	  situations	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  cause	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  to	  rise.	  A	  secure,	  sustainable	  and	  affordable	  electricity	  system	  would	  need	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  these	  threats	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  protection	  for	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable.	  It	  should	  also	  provide	  a	  reliable	  supply	  of	  fuel	  and	  ensure	  that	  any	  policy	  or	  action	  to	  improve	  security	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  economy.	  All	  of	  this	  has	  to	  exist	  in	  an	  energy	  industry	  which	  is	  decarbonising	  energy	  production;	  where	  domestic	  gas	  resources	  are	  depleting;	  and	  where	  the	  ageing	  fleet	  of	  power	  plants	  and	  networks	  causes	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  future	  pathway	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry.	  This	  understandably	  creates	  uncertainty	  for	  investors	  at	  a	  time	  when	  investment	  is	  greatly	  needed.	  Uncertainty	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  reduced	  investment	  again	  impacting	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  system	  to	  provide	  secure	  energy.	  Recent	  moves	  to	  reform	  the	  electricity	  market	  are	  designed	  specifically	  to	  meet	  this	  challenge	  by	  finding	  the	  low	  carbon	  investment	  required	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  replace	  the	  lost	  capacity	  and	  meet	  predicted	  increases	  in	  demand	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  Energy	  security	  is	  currently	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  for	  Government,	  but	  not	  one	  that	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  meet	  historically,	  however,	  issues	  are	  now	  changing.	  With	  so	  many	  changes	  to	  energy	  system	  on	  the	  horizon,	  ensuring	  the	  security	  of	  the	  system	  may	  become	  increasingly	  important.	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2.5 UK	  Energy	  Targets	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  identified	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  reduce	  the	  energy	  system	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels.	  As	  such	  it	  has	  implemented	  a	  set	  of	  targets,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  tackle	  these	  issues.	  The	  main	  targets	  are,	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  80%	  by	  2050	  from	  1990	  levels	  (Climate	  Change	  Act,	  2008).	  Along	  with	  this	  there	  are	  Carbon	  budgets,	  which	  provide	  interim	  targets	  as	  set	  out	  in	  section	  2.5.	  The	  Renewable	  Energy	  Directive	  (2009)	  set	  out	  a	  target	  legally	  committing	  the	  UK	  to	  provide	  15%	  of	  its	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	  by	  2020	  (DECC	  2011g).	  	  Along	  with	  these	  targets	  are	  the	  policies	  which	  help	  drive	  them.	  Two	  of	  the	  main	  policies	  set	  by	  the	  EU	  require	  the	  closure	  of	  many	  of	  the	  high	  carbon	  power	  stations	  in	  the	  UK.	  These	  are:	  the	  Large	  Combustion	  Plant	  Directive	  (LCPD)	  and	  its	  successor	  the	  Industrial	  Emissions	  Directive	  (IED).	  
2.5.1 EU	  Policy	  
2.5.1.1 Large	  Combustion	  Plant	  Directive	  (LCPD)	  	  The	  LCPD	  is	  a	  European	  directive,	  which	  aims	  to	  cut	  the	  emissions	  of	  certain	  greenhouse	  gasses	  such	  as	  sulphur	  dioxide	  (SO2),	  nitrogen	  oxides	  (NOx)	  and	  dust	  (particulate	  matter)	  from	  large	  power	  stations	  in	  the	  EU	  (National	  Grid,	  2007).	  The	  UK	  operators	  of	  large	  generating	  stations	  have	  been	  given	  the	  option	  of	  either	  meeting	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  LCPD	  emissions	  or	  opting	  out	  of	  the	  emission	  limit	  values	  and	  accepting	  limited	  running	  hours,	  closing	  the	  stations	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  (DEFRA,	  2010).	  This	  will	  cause	  around	  12GW	  of	  coal	  and	  oil	  fired	  power	  stations	  to	  close	  by	  the	  1st	  January	  2016	  (National	  Grid,	  2011b	  Table	  2-­‐1).	  However,	  under	  this	  directive	  the	  plants	  have	  20,000	  hours	  of	  operation	  which,	  if	  used	  before	  2015,	  will	  also	  require	  the	  plant	  to	  close.	  Therefore,	  each	  plant	  are	  likely	  to	  use	  their	  running	  hours	  and	  shut	  early	  if	  it	  can	  make	  more	  money	  this	  way.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  precise	  timing	  of	  closures	  is	  not	  certain	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  plan	  the	  replacement	  stations	  and	  therefore	  impacting	  on	  the	  future	  security	  of	  the	  system.	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Table	  2-­‐1	  Opted	  out	  generation	  the	  stations	  (DECC,	  2013i)	  
Plant	   Capacity	  (MW)	  	   Current	  Status	  
Cockenzie	  units	  1	  &	  2	   1,152	   Closed	  March	  2013	  Cockenzie	  units	  3	  &	  4	  
Didcot	  A	   1,958	   Closed	  March	  2013	  
Ferrybridge	   980	   Closed	  March	  2014	  
Ironbridge	   940	   Open	  
Kingsnorth	   1,940	   Closed	  December	  2012	  
Tilbury	  (7	  &	  8)	   750	   Closed	  August	  2013	  Tilbury	  (9	  &10)	  
Total	  (coal)	   7,720	   	  
Fawley	   968	   Closed	  March	  2013	  
Grain	   1300	   Closed	  December	  2012	  
Littlebrook	   1370	   Due	  to	  lose	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  
Total	  (oil)	   3638	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2.5.1.2 Industrial	  Emissions	  Directive	  (IED)	  	  The	  Industrial	  Emissions	  Directive	  IED	  provides	  additional	  tightening	  to	  the	  LCPD	  on	  the	  SO2,	  NOX	  and	  particulate	  limits	  (Poyry,	  2010).	  It	  consolidates	  seven	  environmental	  directives	  including	  the	  Integrated	  Pollution	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  (IPPC)	  directive	  and	  the	  Large	  Combustion	  Plant	  Directive	  (LCPD)	  into	  a	  single	  directive	  called	  the	  IED	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012).	  The	  IED	  provides	  relatively	  long	  lead	  times	  and	  additional	  mechanisms	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  being	  able	  to	  find	  additional	  investment	  to	  fill	  any	  loss	  in	  capacity	  (E3G,	  2013).	  The	  IED	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  options:	  to	  close	  a	  station	  by	  January	  2016;	  opt	  out	  and	  continue	  running	  for	  only	  17,500	  hours	  from	  2016	  to	  2023;	  opt	  in	  under	  a	  transitional	  plan	  which	  will	  place	  decreasing	  emissions	  targets	  on	  the	  plant	  up	  until	  2020;	  or	  opt	  in	  and	  comply	  fully	  by	  2016	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012).	  The	  age	  profile	  of	  the	  UK	  generation	  stations	  means	  that	  most	  of	  the	  gas	  power	  plants	  are	  affected.	  Government	  says	  this	  will	  impact	  on	  up	  to	  40GW	  of	  coal	  and	  gas,	  most	  of	  which	  will	  be	  able	  to	  retrofit	  abatement	  equipment	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  (DECC,	  2012h).	  At	  present	  the	  peaks	  in	  demand	  are	  met	  by	  the	  older	  power	  stations,	  which	  have	  the	  higher	  variable	  costs.	  The	  LCPD	  and	  IED	  directives	  dictate	  that	  many	  of	  these	  plants	  will	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  system	  (Newbury,	  2011).	  New	  capacity	  will	  need	  to	  be	  built	  in	  order	  to	  replace	  these	  plants.	  However,	  it	  will	  be	  hard	  to	  predict	  their	  running	  hours	  given	  the	  potential	  for	  zero	  marginal	  cost	  renewable	  electricity	  and	  therefore,	  finding	  the	  investment	  may	  be	  an	  issue,	  although	  this	  is	  deeply	  contentious	  issue.	  If	  it	  does	  turn	  out	  that	  investment	  is	  not	  available	  and	  so	  far	  this	  has	  been	  the	  case,	  it	  may	  increase	  security	  problems	  if	  the	  demand	  peaks	  are	  not	  reduced.	  If	  the	  coal	  power	  plants	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  provisions	  and	  mechanisms	  set	  by	  the	  IED,	  then	  the	  potential	  for	  investment	  into	  new	  gas	  is	  increased	  whilst	  leaving	  coal	  plant	  as	  winter	  peak	  capacity	  (Skillings,	  2013).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  National	  Grid	  has	  been	  given	  the	  power	  to	  bring	  mothballed	  plant	  back	  online	  if	  security	  is	  threatened	  (Ofgem,	  2013f).	  
2.5.2 Possible	  Energy	  Gap	  There	  is	  a	  natural	  assumption	  that	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  demand.	  Estimates	  of	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  demand	  will	  increase	  vary.	  Figure	  2-­‐14	  identifies	  how	  the	  different	  scenarios	  can	  generate	  very	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different	  outcomes	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  Figure	  2-­‐15	  identifies	  a	  significant	  drop	  off	  in	  the	  existing	  generation	  capacity	  (when	  not	  using	  non-­‐consented	  generation).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  loss	  in	  generation	  plant	  is	  the	  opted	  out	  generation	  from	  EU	  directives	  (see	  Table	  2-­‐1)	  and	  the	  current	  nuclear	  generating	  station	  coming	  to	  end	  of	  their	  lives	  (see	  Table	  2-­‐2).	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  future	  may	  see	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  level	  of	  supply	  meeting	  the	  level	  of	  demand.	  There	  are	  various	  methodologies	  which	  have	  been	  suggested	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  the	  potential	  energy	  gap.	  These	  include	  extending	  the	  operating	  life	  of	  the	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  (which	  can	  be	  done	  by	  the	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation	  (ONR)	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012)).	  However,	  extending	  the	  plants	  past	  their	  pre-­‐designed	  lifetime	  may	  have	  consequences	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  plant.	  Another	  suggestion	  is	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  with	  increased	  levels	  of	  energy	  efficiency.	  An	  additional	  opportunity	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  new	  generation	  as	  is	  happening	  with	  solar	  (3GW	  added	  in	  last	  3	  years	  (DECC,	  2014b)).	  So	  far	  the	  Feed	  in	  Tariff	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  introducing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  new	  entrants	  into	  the	  electricity	  system	  with	  379,122	  installations	  as	  of	  March	  2013	  (Ofgem,	  2013d)	  much	  of	  which	  is	  solar	  photovoltaic	  electricity.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐14	  Future	  development	  of	  peak	  demand	  based	  on	  the	  National	  Grid	  UK	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Figure	  2-­‐15	  Existing	  and	  anticipated	  GB	  electricity	  generating	  capacity	  (non-­‐derated)	  (DECC	  and	  
Ofgem,	  2010)	  
Table	  2-­‐2	  Closure	  Schedule	  of	  Nuclear	  power	  stations	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012).	  
Station	   Installed	  Capacity	  (GW)	   Current	  expected	  closure	  date	  
Wylfa	  	   1	   2012	  
Oldbury	  	   0.4	   2016	  
Hartlepool	  	   1.2	   2014	  
Heysham	  1	  	   1.2	   2014	  
Hinkley	  Point	  B	  	   1.3	   2016	  
Hunterston	  B	  	   1.2	   2016	  
Dungeness	  B	  	   1.1	   2018	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2.5.3 Renewables	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  set	  out	  a	  range	  of	  renewable	  electricity	  and	  energy	  targets	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  targets	  were	  set	  by	  the	  Non-­‐Fossil	  Fuel	  Obligation	  (NFFO)	  and	  introduced	  in	  1990.	  This	  first	  target	  asked	  for	  152MW	  declared	  net	  capacity	  (DNC)	  of	  landfill	  gas,	  sewage	  gas,	  hydro,	  wind	  energy,	  waste	  to	  energy	  and	  biomass	  projects.	  The	  second	  asked	  for	  472MW	  and	  the	  third	  in	  1994	  asked	  for	  626.9MW	  which	  included	  biomass	  gasification	  for	  the	  first	  time	  but	  excluded	  sewage	  (Mitchell,	  1995).	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  NFFO	  levy	  raised	  was	  for	  nuclear	  not	  renewables	  (typically	  98%	  of	  the	  £1.2bn	  went	  to	  nuclear)	  (Elliott,	  2005).	  This	  was	  then	  replaced	  by	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  10%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  electricity	  supply	  from	  renewables	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  (Kettle,	  1999;	  Mitchell,	  1995).	  	  In	  2001	  a	  European	  Directive	  set	  an	  indicative	  target	  of	  10%	  gross	  electricity	  consumption	  from	  renewables	  by	  2010	  (EREC,	  2009).	  In	  the	  2007	  Energy	  White	  Paper	  the	  Government	  set	  out	  an	  aspiration	  to	  double	  this	  by	  2020	  (DTI,	  2007a).	  After	  this,	  the	  2009	  EU	  Renewable	  Energy	  Directive	  set	  out	  a	  target	  legally	  committing	  the	  UK	  to	  provide	  15%	  of	  its	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	  by	  2020	  (DECC	  2011g)	  the	  equivalent	  of	  30-­‐40%	  of	  electricity	  from	  renewable	  sources.	  	  
2.5.4 Current	  Support	  Mechanisms	  for	  Renewables	  Generation	  
2.5.4.1 Renewables	  Obligation	  The	  primary	  mechanism	  to	  drive	  the	  uptake	  of	  renewables	  generation	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation	  (RO)	  Ofgem	  (2007b).	  This	  a	  market	  based	  scheme	  which	  was	  designed	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  will	  procure	  renewable	  electricity	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  compared	  to	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs.	  This	  ‘pure’	  market	  based	  operation	  is	  the	  largest	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  the	  in	  the	  world	  and	  began	  in	  April	  2002	  (Toke,	  2005).	  The	  RO	  places	  a	  responsibility	  on	  licensed	  electricity	  suppliers	  to	  source	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  their	  electricity	  from	  renewable	  sources	  (Ofgem,	  2012a;	  ENA,	  2010).	  This	  proportion	  started	  at	  3%	  and	  rose	  to	  10.4%	  by	  2010	  and	  15%	  by	  2015.	  The	  RO	  covers	  any	  renewable	  generation	  plant	  whose	  net	  capacity	  exceeds	  50kW	  or	  is	  not	  eligible	  for	  the	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariff	  (discussed	  below).	  It	  works	  on	  a	  certificate	  basis	  whereby	  the	  generator	  receives	  Renewable	  Obligation	  Certificates	  (ROCs)	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issued	  by	  Ofgem	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  generation	  and	  the	  type	  of	  technology8.	  These	  certificates	  can	  be	  traded	  with	  other	  suppliers	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  demonstrate	  they	  have	  met	  the	  requirements.	  The	  supplier	  must	  buy	  ROCs,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  there	  is	  a	  (inflation	  linked)	  buy	  out	  penalty	  of	  3p/KWh	  (starting	  price).	  This	  means	  if	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  electricity	  to	  the	  supplier	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  buy-­‐out	  price	  the	  supplier	  will	  choose	  not	  to	  meet	  their	  obligation	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  underlying	  concept	  behind	  the	  RO	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  market-­‐based	  operation	  aimed	  at	  supporting	  renewable	  generation	  while	  also	  keeping	  the	  costs	  to	  consumers	  within	  acceptable	  limits.	  However,	  while	  the	  goal	  of	  limiting	  the	  impact	  of	  costs	  to	  consumers	  may	  have	  been	  achieved	  there	  was	  a	  concern	  that	  the	  level	  of	  installation	  may	  not	  be	  high	  enough	  to	  meet	  the	  targets	  (Elliott,	  2005).	  The	  doubt	  over	  the	  level	  of	  installation	  was	  because	  the	  suppliers	  would	  want	  to	  keep	  the	  market	  price	  of	  the	  ROC	  as	  high	  as	  possible.	  If	  the	  market	  was	  flooded	  with	  renewable	  energy	  then	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  crash	  in	  the	  price	  of	  the	  ROC.	  Another	  concern	  over	  the	  RO	  is	  that	  the	  renewable	  energy	  developers	  are	  reliant	  on	  the	  changing	  price	  of	  the	  ROCs.	  This	  means	  the	  projects	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  energy	  policy	  changes	  made	  by	  Government	  which	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  market	  price	  of	  ROCs	  (Wolfe,	  2003).	  This	  also	  means	  that	  independent	  generators	  are	  exposed	  to	  the	  market	  price	  for	  power.	  They	  therefore	  have	  to	  set	  up	  purchase	  power	  agreements	  PPA	  with	  a	  supplier	  which	  has	  a	  built	  in	  penalty	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  risk	  of	  balancing	  the	  power	  (see	  section	  2.1.5).	  A	  further	  concern	  with	  the	  RO	  was	  its	  limited	  support	  for	  the	  small	  scale	  generation	  (Hain	  et	  al,	  2005).	  Until	  April	  2004	  the	  ROCs	  were	  only	  available	  to	  projects	  over	  5MW,	  eventually	  the	  small	  scale	  developer	  was	  allowed	  to	  accrue	  the	  annual	  output	  and	  then	  claim	  for	  ROCs.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  RO	  is	  a	  complex	  mechanism,	  meaning	  the	  small	  scale	  developer	  would	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  understand	  and	  therefore	  entertain	  the	  idea	  of	  utilising	  it.	  Therefore	  the	  UK	  Government	  developed	  the	  FIT	  as	  a	  mechanism	  which	  would	  deliver	  widespread	  deployment	  of	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  electricity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Initially	  the	  RO	  was	  ‘technology	  blind’	  and	  offered	  all	  technologies	  1	  ROC/MWh.	  This	  has	  
subsequently	  been	  changed	  to	  reflect	  the	  different	  costs	  and	  stages	  of	  technical	  development	  of	  
different	  renewable	  technologies.	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2.5.4.2 Feed	  in	  Tariff	  The	  main	  support	  mechanism	  for	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation	  are	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs	  (FITs)	  (Ofgem,	  2012a).	  The	  FIT	  was	  introduced	  on	  1	  April	  2010,	  under	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2008,	  and	  was	  designed	  to	  encourage	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  generation	  through	  organisations,	  businesses,	  communities	  and	  individuals	  who	  would	  not	  normally	  engage	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  has	  been	  a	  great	  success	  from	  the	  point	  of	  new	  up-­‐take	  (DECC	  2012i).	  The	  mechanism	  provides	  a	  guaranteed	  payment	  from	  a	  supplier	  for	  all	  the	  electricity	  they	  generate	  with	  an	  additional	  payment	  for	  unused	  surplus	  electricity	  they	  export.	  The	  supplier	  then	  passes	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  scheme	  (estimated	  to	  be	  £22	  for	  the	  average	  householder	  (DECC,	  2013d))	  to	  the	  consumers.	  Ofgem	  maintains	  the	  central	  register	  and	  ensures	  that	  suppliers	  comply	  with	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  requirements.	  Is	  been	  a	  very	  useful	  mechanism	  in	  terms	  of	  new	  entrance	  to	  the	  energy	  system.	  At	  the	  last	  count	  some	  379,122	  installations	  generated	  1,700	  GWh	  of	  electricity	  totalling	  £506m9	  worth	  of	  investment	  (Ofgem,	  2013d).	  In	  2013,	  renewables	  supplied	  14.9%10	  share	  of	  the	  UK’s	  electricity	  requirements	  (DECC,	  2014b).	  The	  predicted	  level	  of	  renewable	  sources	  up	  to	  2020	  is	  identified	  in	  	  (DECC,	  2012m),	  showing	  the	  UK	  as	  being	  nominally	  on	  track	  for	  the	  2020	  renewable	  energy	  targets.	  However,	  as	  can	  be	  seen,	  after	  2012	  the	  line	  is	  non-­‐linear	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  renewable	  sources	  on	  the	  system	  will	  need	  to	  increase,	  meaning	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  capacity	  deployment	  from	  each	  subsequent	  year.	  Without	  a	  major	  increase	  in	  investments	  for	  renewables	  the	  UK	  is	  unlikely	  to	  meet	  its	  renewable	  energy	  and	  electricity	  targets	  (PwC,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Figures	  as	  of	  31st	  March	  2013	  
10	  This	  figure	  include	  Hydro	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Figure	  2-­‐16	  Renewable	  Electricity,	  Heat	  and	  Transport	  Progress	  towards	  2020	  target	  (DECC,	  2013q)	  
2.6 Key	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  key	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  thesis	  has	  identified	  the	  Government	  stakeholders:	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change,	  the	  Treasury,	  and	  other	  Government	  departments	  such	  as	  Department	  of	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  and	  Defra.	  In	  addition	  other	  stakeholders	  are,	  Ofgem,	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  network	  companies,	  the	  system	  operator,	  ELEXON,	  the	  energy	  companies	  and	  consumers.	  Other	  relevant	  groups	  include	  the	  Commons	  Select	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  change.	  Each	  of	  these	  stakeholders	  and	  stakeholder	  groups	  have	  are	  interrelated.	  The	  links	  include	  market	  arrangements	  (including	  BETTA	  and	  the	  EMR)	  the	  codes,	  standards	  and	  the	  licence	  arrangements.	  The	  arrangement	  of	  these	  relationships	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐17.	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Figure	  2-­‐17	  Institutional	  relationships	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Woodman,	  2014)	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2.6.1 Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (DECC)	  DECC	  was	  created	  in	  2008	  by	  the	  merging	  of	  the	  energy	  policy	  elements	  of	  the	  Department	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  and	  some	  climate	  policy	  elements	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Environment,	  Food	  and	  Rural	  Affairs.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (currently	  Rt	  Hon	  Ed	  Davey	  MP)	  is	  a	  member	  of	  Cabinet;	  there	  are	  three	  other	  Ministers	  of	  State.	  	  The	  Department’s	  stated	  purpose	  is	  to	  “to	  make	  sure	  the	  UK	  has	  secure,	  clean,	  
affordable	  energy	  supplies	  and	  promote	  international	  action	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  
change”.	  Within	  this	  very	  broad	  statement,	  DECC	  has	  several	  areas	  of	  responsibility,	  including	  energy	  security	  and	  promoting	  renewable	  energy.	  DECC	  follows	  standard	  Government	  processes	  when	  designing	  policies,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  engaging	  stakeholders	  and	  consulting	  widely	  on	  new	  policies	  or	  amendments	  to	  existing	  ones.	  The	  processes	  involved	  in	  these	  stakeholder	  engagement	  activities	  are	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Cabinet	  Office’s	  Consultation	  Principles	  document	  (Cabinet	  Office,	  2013)	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  rationale	  for	  consultation	  as	  (p1):	  
	  to	  garner	  views	  and	  preferences,	  to	  understand	  possible	  
unintended	  consequences	  of	  a	  policy	  or	  to	  get	  views	  on	  
implementation.	  Increasing	  the	  level	  of	  transparency	  and	  
increasing	  engagement	  with	  interested	  parties	  improves	  the	  
quality	  of	  policy	  making	  by	  bringing	  to	  bear	  expertise	  and	  
alternative	  perspectives,	  and	  identifying	  unintended	  effects	  
and	  practical	  problems	  Clearly,	  widespread	  participation	  from	  stakeholders	  when	  designing	  policy	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  using	  existing	  expertise	  and	  judgement	  on	  what	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  practical	  and	  successful.	  However,	  it	  also	  inevitably	  means	  that	  stakeholders	  will	  argue	  for	  policies,	  or	  for	  details	  of	  policies,	  which	  support	  their	  best	  interests.	  This	  becomes	  an	  issue	  when	  some	  groups	  of	  stakeholders	  have	  more	  power	  than	  others,	  or	  when	  stakeholders	  seek	  to	  exclude	  other	  views	  even	  if	  they	  would	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  meeting	  broader	  policy	  goals.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  could	  be	  Government	  not	  acknowledging	  the	  views	  held	  within	  a	  consultation	  process	  (Florini	  and	  Sovacool,	  2009).	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2.6.2 Treasury	  Although	  DECC	  has	  responsibility	  for	  delivering	  the	  policy	  and	  measures	  intended	  to	  meet	  the	  Government’s	  energy	  goals,	  its	  activities	  take	  place	  within	  the	  broader	  framework	  of	  overall	  Government	  activities,	  and	  in	  particular	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  policies.	  HM	  Treasury	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  UK’s	  economics	  and	  financial	  policies	  designed	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  public	  spending,	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  UK’s	  economy.	  In	  delivering	  these	  objectives,	  the	  Treasury	  works	  closely	  with	  all	  Government	  departments,	  and	  therefore	  has	  a	  clear	  but	  indirect	  influence	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  DECC.	  In	  addition,	  however,	  the	  Treasury	  is	  also	  directly	  involved	  in	  energy	  policy	  decisions.	  These	  include	  investment	  in	  major	  infrastructure	  projects,	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  Government	  guarantees	  to	  underwrite	  major	  private	  sector	  projects,	  including	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  nuclear	  power	  station	  at	  Hinkley	  Point	  C.	  These	  are	  co-­‐ordinated	  by	  Infrastructure	  UK,	  a	  unit	  within	  the	  Treasury.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Treasury	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  funding	  for	  various	  subsidies	  designed	  to	  support	  deployment	  of	  low	  carbon	  technologies,	  including	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation.	  Energy	  companies	  pass	  the	  costs	  of	  meeting	  their	  obligations	  to	  invest	  or	  buy	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  on	  to	  consumers.	  The	  Levy	  Control	  Framework	  (LCF)	  is	  agreed	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  DECC	  and	  designed	  to	  limit	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  subsides	  (levies)	  on	  consumers	  by	  imposing	  an	  annual	  cap	  on	  how	  much	  will	  be	  spent.	  	  The	  Treasury	  also	  has	  responsibility	  for	  setting	  the	  price	  of	  carbon	  for	  the	  Government’s	  Carbon	  Price	  Support	  (CPS)	  mechanism.	  The	  CPS	  is	  intended	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  price	  of	  carbon	  seen	  in	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme	  are	  levelled	  out	  by	  imposing	  a	  minimum	  annual	  carbon	  price,	  known	  as	  the	  Carbon	  Price	  Floor11.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  CPF	  and	  the	  actual	  price	  of	  carbon	  in	  the	  EUETS	  is	  ‘topped	  up’	  by	  large	  energy	  users,	  with	  this	  difference	  known	  as	  Carbon	  Price	  Support	  (Figure	  2-­‐18).	  As	  a	  way	  of	  maintaining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  incentive	  and	  of	  enhancing	  investor	  certainty,	  the	  price	  floor	  is	  meant	  to	  rise	  each	  year,	  with	  announcements	  made	  about	  future	  levels	  made	  2	  years	  in	  advance.	  The	  CPS	  was	  introduced	  in	  2013,	  with	  a	  CPS	  level	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  CPS	  mechanism	  is	  administered	  by	  HM	  Customs	  and	  Excise	  and	  works	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  
Climate	  Change	  Levy	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£4.94/tCO2	  (HM	  Revenue	  and	  Customs,	  2013).	  This	  level	  was	  expected	  to	  rise	  to	  £30/tCO2	  by	  2020.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐18	  Carbon	  price	  floor	  illustration	  (in	  real	  2009	  prices	  and	  calendar	  years)	  Source	  HM	  
Treasury	  (2011)	  The	  intention	  behind	  the	  mechanism	  is	  to	  try	  to	  maintain	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  by	  removing	  the	  uncertainties	  about	  the	  future	  price	  of	  carbon.	  However,	  the	  2014	  Budget	  froze	  the	  level	  of	  the	  floor,	  rather	  than	  allowing	  the	  expected	  increase	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  carbon	  prices	  in	  the	  EUETS	  were	  lower	  than	  expected	  and	  that	  by	  allowing	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  carbon	  in	  the	  UK,	  business	  would	  be	  damaged	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  European	  countries	  (Murray,	  2014).	  	  The	  Treasury	  therefore	  has	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  UK’s	  energy	  policy	  aims,	  although	  this	  is	  not	  always	  explicit	  or	  direct.	  Under	  the	  coalition,	  the	  Chancellor	  has	  displayed	  a	  degree	  of	  reluctance	  to	  advance	  low	  carbon	  technologies,	  while	  also	  putting	  in	  place	  measures	  which	  maximise	  the	  exploitation	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  in	  the	  North	  Sea,	  as	  well	  as	  enthusiastically	  promoting	  fracking	  as	  a	  source	  of	  natural	  gas.	  
2.6.3 Other	  Government	  departments	  Although	  less	  significant	  than	  the	  Treasury	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  energy	  policy,	  there	  are	  several	  over	  departments	  which	  can	  also	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  influence	  DECC’s	  work.	  These	  include:	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Department	  for	  Environment	  Food	  &	  Rural	  Affairs,	  Department	  of	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  planning	  guidance	  for	  renewable	  projects	  (DECC,	  2013p),	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  which	  is	  also	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  and	  has	  objected	  to	  several	  renewable	  projects	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  might	  interfere	  with	  operations.	  	  
2.6.4 Ofgem	  
2.6.4.1 Ofgem’s	  role	  The	  regulation	  of	  the	  energy	  sector	  was	  originally	  organised	  by	  two	  separate	  agencies,	  Office	  of	  Electricity	  Regulation	  (OFFER)	  and	  Office	  of	  Gas	  Supply	  (Ofgas)	  until	  2000	  when	  Ofgem	  was	  formed.	  Ofgem	  is	  a	  non-­‐ministerial	  Government	  department	  which	  works	  with	  Government	  but	  is	  independent	  from	  it.	  Its	  work	  falls	  into	  two	  main	  areas:	  the	  design	  and	  regulation	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity	  markets,	  including	  licensing	  energy	  supply	  companies,	  and	  regulating	  the	  financial	  aspects	  of	  the	  monopoly	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  network	  companies.	  It	  carries	  out	  these	  activities	  within	  a	  broad	  framework	  of	  duties	  established	  through	  legislation.	  The	  1989	  Electricity	  Act	  conferred	  three	  main	  duties	  on	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  OFFER	  (Part	  1	  Section	  3)	  (Electricity	  Act,	  1989):	  
(a)	  to	  secure	  that	  all	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  electricity	  are	  satisfied;	  
(b)	  to	  secure	  that	  licence	  holders	  are	  able	  to	  finance	  the	  carrying	  on	  of	  the	  
activities	  which	  they	  are	  authorised	  by	  their	  licences	  to	  carry	  on;	  and	  
(c)	  subject	  to	  subsection	  (2)	  below,	  to	  promote	  competition	  in	  the	  generation	  
and	  supply	  of	  electricity.	  The	  Act	  also	  contained	  subsidiary	  duties	  largely	  focused	  on	  protecting	  consumers	  and	  ensuring	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  While	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned,	  it	  is	  clearly	  an	  implicit	  part	  of	  the	  duties	  to	  ensure	  that	  reasonable	  demands	  are	  met,	  and	  that	  licence	  holders	  can	  finance	  their	  activities.	  Over	  time	  the	  duties	  imposed	  on	  the	  regulator	  have	  changed,	  both	  substantively	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  emphasis.	  A	  key	  change	  came	  with	  the	  Utilities	  Act	  2000,	  which	  established	  the	  Gas	  and	  Electricity	  Markets	  Authority	  (GEMA)	  as	  the	  economic	  regulator	  of	  the	  gas	  and	  electricity	  industries	  in	  Great	  Britain.	  The	  Act	  also	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established	  a	  new	  regulatory	  agency	  –	  Ofgem,	  formed	  by	  the	  merger	  of	  OFFER	  and	  Ofgas	  -­‐	  as	  GEMA’s	  executive	  arm12.	  The	  Utilities	  Act	  set	  out	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  gas	  and	  electricity	  markets	  and	  imposed	  a	  new	  primary	  duty	  on	  the	  regulator	  authority	  Ofgem	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  in	  relation	  to	  electricity	  and	  gas	  (Utilities	  Act,	  2000;	  Rutledge,	  2007).	  	  
“to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  in	  relation	  to	  electricity	  
conveyed	  by	  distribution	  systems,	  wherever	  appropriate	  by	  
promoting	  effective	  competition	  between	  persons	  engaged	  in,	  
or	  in	  commercial	  activities	  connected	  with,	  the	  generation,	  
transmission,	  distribution	  or	  supply	  of	  electricity	  or	  the	  
provision	  or	  use	  of	  electricity	  interconnectors”	  (Utilities	  Act,	  
2000:	  3A	  [1])	  The	  promotion	  of	  competition	  was	  therefore	  established	  as	  the	  key	  focus	  for	  the	  regulator,	  with	  the	  other	  duties	  originally	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  1989	  effectively	  relegated	  to	  a	  lesser	  status.	  Further	  adjustments	  to	  the	  role	  and	  duties	  of	  the	  regulator	  have	  been	  contained	  in	  the	  Competition	  Act	  1998,	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  and	  the	  Energy	  Acts	  of	  2004,	  2008,	  2010,	  2011	  and	  2013.	  These	  adjustments	  reflect	  in	  particular	  a	  concern	  with	  the	  sustainability	  of	  energy	  systems,	  reflected	  in	  a	  change	  to	  the	  primary	  duty	  that	  it	  should	  “protect	  the	  
interests	  of	  existing	  and	  future	  consumers”.	  GEMA’s	  duties	  as	  they	  currently	  stand	  are	  set	  out	  in	  Box	  2.1	  (Ofgem,	  2013b)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Although	  GEMA	  and	  Ofgem	  are	  separate	  bodies,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  as	  just	  Ofgem	  –	  see	  
for	  example	  DECC	  energy	  Bill	  provisions	  2012.	  This	  thesis	  will	  also	  adopt	  this	  practice	  unless	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  institutions.	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Box	  2.1:	  Powers	  and	  duties	  of	  GEMA	  
The	  Authority’s	  principal	  objective	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  existing	  and	  future	  consumers	  in	  relation	  to	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  and	  electricity	  conveyed	  by	  distribution	  or	  transmission	  systems.	  The	  interests	  of	  such	  consumers	  are	  their	  interests	  taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  including	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity	  to	  them	  and	  in	  the	  fulfilment	  by	  the	  Authority,	  when	  carrying	  out	  its	  functions	  as	  the	  designated	  regulatory	  authority	  for	  Great	  Britain,	  of	  the	  objectives	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  40	  (a)	  to	  (h)	  of	  the	  Gas	  Directive	  and	  Article	  36	  (a)	  to	  (h)	  of	  the	  Electricity	  Directive.	  The	  Authority	  is	  generally	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  functions	  in	  the	  manner	  it	  considers	  is	  best	  calculated	  to	  further	  the	  principal	  objective,	  wherever	  appropriate	  by	  promoting	  effective	  competition	  between	  persons	  engaged	  in,	  or	  commercial	  activities	  connected	  with,	  
• the	  shipping,	  transportation	  or	  supply	  of	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  
• the	  generation,	  transmission,	  distribution	  or	  supply	  of	  electricity	  
• the	  provision	  or	  use	  of	  electricity	  interconnectors	  	  Before	  deciding	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  functions	  in	  a	  particular	  manner	  with	  a	  view	  to	  promoting	  competition,	  the	  Authority	  will	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  would	  be	  protected	  by	  that	  manner	  of	  carrying	  out	  those	  functions	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  other	  manner	  (whether	  or	  not	  it	  would	  promote	  competition)	  in	  which	  the	  Authority	  could	  carry	  out	  those	  functions	  which	  would	  better	  protect	  those	  interests.	  In	  performing	  these	  duties,	  the	  Authority	  must	  have	  regard	  to:	  
• the	  need	  to	  secure	  that,	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  economical	  to	  meet	  them,	  all	  reasonable	  demands	  in	  Great	  Britain	  for	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  are	  met;	  
• the	  need	  to	  secure	  that	  all	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  electricity	  are	  met;	  
• the	  need	  to	  secure	  that	  licence	  holders	  are	  able	  to	  finance	  the	  activities	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  obligations	  on	  them;	  and	  
• the	  need	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  sustainable	  development.	  	  In	  performing	  these	  duties,	  the	  Authority	  must	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  disabled	  or	  chronically	  sick,	  of	  pensionable	  age,	  with	  low	  incomes,	  or	  residing	  in	  rural	  area	  Subject	  to	  the	  above,	  the	  Authority	  is	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  functions	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  manner	  which	  it	  considers	  is	  best	  calculated	  to:	  
• promote	  efficiency	  and	  economy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  licensed	  under	  the	  relevant	  Act	  and	  the	  efficient	  use	  of	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  and	  electricity	  conveyed	  by	  distribution	  systems	  or	  transmission	  systems	  
• protect	  the	  public	  from	  dangers	  arising	  from	  the	  conveyance	  of	  gas	  through	  pipes	  or	  the	  use	  of	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  and	  from	  the	  generation,	  transmission,	  distribution	  or	  supply	  of	  electricity;	  and	  
• secure	  a	  diverse	  and	  viable	  long-­‐term	  energy	  supply,	  and	  shall,	  in	  carrying	  out	  those	  functions,	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  environment.	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  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  role	  and	  duties	  of	  GEMA	  (and	  therefore	  Ofgem)	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  shifting	  political	  priorities	  together	  with	  increasing	  political	  awareness	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  electricity	  systems	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  meeting	  the	  UK’s	  three	  key	  energy	  policy	  goals	  (see	  section	  2.4).	  This	  is	  shown	  by	  the	  increasing	  level	  of	  qualification	  relating	  to	  the	  principal	  objective	  of	  encouraging	  competition:	  over	  the	  years	  this	  has	  changed	  to	  a	  much	  more	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  requirement	  to	  balance	  competition	  against	  over	  policy	  goals,	  albeit	  with	  competition	  always	  the	  primary	  aim	  (Box	  2.1).	  	  As	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  institution	  have	  changed,	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  respective	  roles	  of	  Ofgem	  and	  DECC	  has	  become	  increasingly	  apparent,	  as	  recognised	  by	  DECC’s	  review	  of	  Ofgem	  which	  reported	  in	  2011:	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  In	  carrying	  out	  these	  functions	  the	  Authority	  must	  also	  have	  regard	  to:	  
• the	  principles	  under	  which	  regulatory	  activities	  should	  be	  transparent,	  accountable,	  proportionate,	  consistent	  and	  targeted	  only	  at	  cases	  in	  which	  action	  is	  needed	  and	  any	  other	  principles	  that	  appear	  to	  it	  to	  represent	  the	  best	  regulatory	  practice;	  and	  
• certain	  statutory	  guidance	  on	  social	  and	  environmental	  matters	  issued	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  	  	  The	  Authority	  may,	  in	  carrying	  out	  a	  function	  under	  the	  Gas	  Act	  and	  the	  Electricity	  Act,	  have	  regard	  to	  any	  interests	  of	  consumers	  in	  relation	  to	  communications	  services	  and	  electronic	  communications	  apparatus	  or	  to	  water	  or	  sewerage	  services	  (within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Water	  Industry	  Act	  1991),	  which	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  that	  function.	  	  The	  Authority	  must	  carry	  out	  its	  functions	  in	  the	  manner	  that	  it	  considers	  is	  best	  calculated	  to	  implement	  or	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  any	  decision	  of	  the	  Agency	  or	  the	  European	  Commission	  under	  the	  Third	  Package	  and,	  when	  carrying	  out	  its	  functions	  as	  the	  designated	  regulatory	  authority,	  consult	  and	  cooperate	  with	  the	  Agency	  and	  other	  designated	  regulatory	  authorities	  whenever	  it	  thinks	  fit.	  
	  The	  Authority	  has	  powers	  under	  the	  Competition	  Act	  to	  investigate	  suspected	  anti-­‐competitive	  activity	  and	  take	  action	  for	  breaches	  of	  the	  prohibitions	  in	  the	  legislation	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  gas	  and	  electricity	  sectors	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  is	  a	  designated	  National	  Competition	  Authority	  under	  the	  EC	  Modernisation	  Regulation	  and	  therefore	  part	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  Network.	  The	  Authority	  also	  has	  concurrent	  powers	  with	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  in	  respect	  of	  market	  investigation	  references	  to	  the	  Competition	  Commission.	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While	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  regulatory	  system	  remain	  
sound,	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  contribution	  that	  the	  energy	  sector	  
is	  now	  expected	  to	  make	  to	  wider	  policy	  goals	  and	  the	  scale	  of	  
the	  challenge	  ahead	  has	  made	  the	  world	  of	  2011	  very	  different	  
from	  that	  of	  the	  1980s.	  As	  Ofgem’s	  role	  has	  become	  more	  
complex,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  blurring	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  
Government	  and	  Ofgem	  causing	  some	  erosion	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  certainty	  that	  independent	  regulation	  was	  
designed	  to	  provide.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  an	  enduring	  solution	  
that	  sees	  Government	  clearly	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  setting	  
and	  communicating	  strategic	  direction,	  Ofgem’s	  independent	  
regulatory	  decisions	  forming	  a	  logical	  and	  coherent	  part	  of	  
this	  broader	  strategic	  policy	  framework,	  and	  ad	  hoc	  
interventions	  avoided	  where	  possible.	  (DECC,	  2011p.	  pg:6)	  This	  blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  between	  Government	  and	  regulator	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  relation	  to	  social	  and	  environmental	  issues,	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Ofgem	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  responsible	  for	  helping	  meet	  the	  Government’s	  targets,	  for	  example	  by	  enabling	  greater	  deployment	  of	  renewable	  technologies	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  carbon	  emission	  reductions.	  	  The	  blurring	  is	  also	  apparent	  in	  relation	  to	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  tension	  between	  encouraging	  competition	  as	  a	  means	  of	  delivering	  relatively	  low	  cost	  power,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  drive	  investment	  in	  new	  capacity	  in	  an	  uncertain	  and	  competitive	  electricity	  market.	  DECC’s	  Ofgem	  Review	  seeks	  to	  clarify	  the	  role	  of	  Government	  and	  of	  Ofgem	  and	  concluded	  that	  (DECC,	  2011p.	  Paras	  83	  and	  85):	  
The	  Review	  concluded	  that	  wider	  public	  interest	  goals	  should	  
remain	  embedded	  in	  Ofgem’s	  duties:	  it	  is	  right	  that	  Ofgem	  
should	  consider	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  economic	  and	  broader	  
goals	  in	  all	  its	  decision	  making.	  However,	  Ofgem’s	  
responsibilities	  should	  not	  be	  broadened:	  it	  is	  Government	  that	  
should	  make	  trade-­‐offs	  at	  the	  strategic	  level	  where	  the	  general	  
interests	  of	  citizens	  are	  at	  stake.	  Ofgem’s	  actions	  should	  be	  
coherent	  with	  the	  direction	  set	  by	  Government,	  recognising	  
that	  there	  will	  still	  be	  trade-­‐offs	  that	  Ofgem	  will	  need	  to	  make	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  regulatory	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
With	  the	  duties	  remaining	  essentially	  unchanged,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  to	  consider	  other	  ways	  for	  Government	  to	  better	  
communicate	  its	  strategic	  vision	  and	  associated	  high-­‐level	  
policy	  decisions	  to	  the	  regulator.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  need	  for	  greater	  clarity,	  the	  Government	  is	  now	  required	  to	  issue	  a	  Strategy	  and	  Policy	  Statement	  (SPS)	  setting	  out	  strategic	  goals	  for	  gas	  and	  electricity.	  This	  gives	  a	  description	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  Government,	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Ofgem,	  business	  and	  other	  organisations	  in	  the	  energy	  market,	  and	  clarifies	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  against	  which	  Ofgem	  must	  weigh	  its	  regulatory	  decision	  making.	  This	  requirement	  was	  established	  in	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2013,	  and	  an	  initial	  draft	  is	  expected	  sometime	  in	  2014.	  The	  SPS	  will	  contain	  an	  outline	  of	  DECC’s	  view	  of	  the	  need	  for	  energy	  security	  and	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  which	  Ofgem	  would	  be	  required	  to	  assess	  its	  actions	  against.	  This	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  step	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  well	  as	  other	  elements	  of	  energy	  policy.	  It	  should	  lead	  to	  greater	  clarity	  of	  how	  energy	  policy	  goals	  are	  being	  delivered	  and	  a	  framework	  against	  which	  the	  activities	  of	  Ofgem	  can	  be	  judged.	  
2.6.4.2 Ofgem	  and	  energy	  security	  Ofgem	  is	  now	  required	  to	  report	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  every	  year	  giving	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  threats	  to	  electricity	  security	  of	  supply	  in	  Great	  Britain.	  The	  Electricity	  Capacity	  Assessment	  evaluates	  a	  set	  of	  electricity	  capacity	  margins	  that	  could	  be	  delivered	  by	  the	  market	  over	  the	  next	  five	  winters	  and	  assesses	  what	  the	  risks	  to	  security	  of	  supply	  might	  therefore	  be13	  (Ofgem,	  2013c).	  The	  reports	  are	  based	  on	  National	  Grid’s	  Future	  Energy	  Scenarios	  (FES)	  work	  (National	  Grid,	  2014),	  which	  looks	  at	  four	  different	  possible	  futures	  for	  the	  electricity	  market	  up	  to	  2035	  and	  2050,	  and	  is	  augmented	  by	  Ofgem’s	  own	  sensitivity	  analysis	  of	  various	  uncertainties	  relating,	  for	  example,	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  demand	  as	  a	  result	  of	  cold	  weather	  conditions	  or	  reduced	  availability	  of	  gas	  plant.	  	  The	  Future	  Energy	  Scenarios	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below	  (see	  section	  2.7.1.1).	  The	  most	  recent	  Electricity	  Capacity	  Assessment	  (2014)	  shows	  the	  reduction	  in	  de-­‐rated	  capacity	  margin	  as	  most	  acute	  in	  2015/16	  as	  a	  result	  of	  plant	  closures.	  These	  is	  an	  improvement	  after	  that	  as	  new	  plants	  come	  on	  line	  and	  some	  mothballed	  plants	  return	  to	  operation	  (Figure	  2-­‐19).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Ofgem	  uses	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  de-­‐rated	  capacity	  margin,	  which	  is	  the	  average	  amount	  of	  
additional	  electricity	  that	  will	  available	  compared	  to	  winter	  peak	  demand.	  This	  gives	  an	  overall	  
picture	  of	  trends	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  but	  does	  not	  identify	  specific	  risks	  to	  security	  of	  supply.	  The	  
reports	  also	  consider	  Loss	  of	  Load	  Expectation	  (LOLE),	  which	  is	  the	  estimated	  number	  of	  hours	  that	  
supply	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  demand	  each	  year.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  about	  power	  cuts,	  but	  
does	  indicate	  when	  action	  might	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  reduce	  demand.	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Figure	  2-­‐19	  De-­‐rated	  capacity	  margins	  2014/15	  to	  2018/19	  (Ofgem,	  2013c	  pg:5)	  While	  the	  Electricity	  Capacity	  Assessment	  reports	  can	  create	  a	  media	  stir	  when	  they	  are	  published,	  given	  the	  possible	  reduction	  in	  capacity	  margin	  in	  the	  coming	  years,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  they	  are	  scenarios	  based	  on	  other	  scenarios	  and	  so	  are	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  possibilities	  for	  policy	  makers	  to	  consider,	  rather	  than	  predictions	  of	  what	  is	  going	  to	  happen.	  The	  other	  key	  point	  to	  make	  about	  the	  reports	  is	  that	  they	  are	  intended	  only	  to	  provide	  information	  for	  decision	  makers,	  and	  do	  not	  contain	  any	  specific	  policy	  or	  regulatory	  measures	  themselves.	  
2.6.4.3 Ofgem	  and	  Decentralised	  Generation	  Ofgem	  does	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  role	  in	  promoting	  decentralised	  generation,	  but	  it	  does	  see	  its	  role	  as	  actively	  ensuring	  that	  decentralised	  electricity	  is	  not	  unfairly	  disadvantaged	  by	  the	  regulation	  and	  operation	  of	  distribution	  networks.	  As	  part	  of	  this,	  it	  hosted	  3	  Distributed	  Generation	  Forum	  events	  in	  2012	  as	  a	  way	  of	  engaging	  generators	  and	  DNOs	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  improve	  arrangements.	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2.7 Network	  Companies	  Network	  companies	  can	  be	  broken	  into	  two	  groups;	  transmission	  and	  distribution.	  The	  high	  voltage	  (275	  and	  400kV)	  transmission	  network	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  is	  solely	  owned	  by	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company.	  The	  transmission	  network	  in	  Scotland	  is	  owned	  by	  SSE	  and	  SP	  Energy	  Networks,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  Scottish	  Power	  and	  include	  132kV	  lines	  as	  well	  as	  275kV	  and	  400kV	  (See	  Figure	  2-­‐20).	  
2.7.1 Transmission	  network	  operators	  The	  primary	  function	  of	  the	  transmission	  network	  is	  to	  deliver	  electricity	  from	  large	  generating	  stations	  to	  the	  distribution	  networks.	  The	  transmission	  network	  owner	  is	  responsible	  for	  building,	  maintaining,	  and	  managing	  the	  networks.	  In	  addition,	  the	  recent	  deployment	  of	  offshore	  wind	  farms	  has	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  transmission	  network	  companies	  in	  England,	  Wales	  and	  Scotland.	  National	  Grid	  Electricity	  Transmission	  plc	  (NGET)	  is	  the	  transmission	  owner	  for	  the	  England	  and	  Wales	  system.	  Its	  operating	  costs	  are	  recouped	  by	  charging	  generators	  and	  consumers	  Transmission	  Network	  Use	  of	  System	  charges14.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  tariffs	  for	  these	  are	  set	  annually,	  and	  are	  zonal,	  with	  different	  generator	  and	  consumer	  charges	  
depending	  on	  the	  geographic	  location.	  This	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  demand	  for	  power	  tends	  to	  be	  higher	  
in	  the	  south,	  while	  generation	  is	  more	  available	  in	  the	  north.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  a	  north-­‐south	  flow	  of	  
electricity,	  and	  consumers	  in	  the	  south	  pay	  a	  higher	  tariff,	  while	  in	  the	  north	  it	  is	  generators	  rather	  
than	  consumers	  who	  have	  the	  higher	  tariff.	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Figure	  2-­‐20	  Map	  of	  Transmission	  Network	  Owners	  in	  the	  UK	  In	  addition	  to	  maintaining	  and	  operating	  the	  transmission	  networks,	  National	  Grid	  is	  the	  administrator	  for	  the	  National	  Electricity	  Transmission	  System	  Security	  and	  Quality	  of	  Supply	  Standards	  (NETS	  SQSS).	  These	  set	  out	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  and	  methodologies	  that	  Transmission	  Licensees	  (both	  onshore	  and	  offshore)	  use	  in	  planning	  connections	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  transmission	  network	  (National	  Grid,	  2012).	  Briefly,	  the	  criteria	  define	  what	  are	  acceptable	  modes	  of	  operation,	  what	  should	  happen	  in	  case	  of	  a	  fault,	  and	  what	  criteria	  generators	  have	  to	  fulfil	  in	  order	  to	  connect	  to	  the	  transmission	  network.	  The	  SQSS	  is	  designed	  to	  maintain	  the	  overall	  security	  of	  the	  system	  by	  defining	  the	  acceptable	  limits	  of	  plant	  performance.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so	  they	  are	  reflecting	  the	  qualities	  of	  predictability	  and	  reliability	  which	  are	  associated	  with	  conventional	  generation,	  but	  which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  a	  feature	  of	  variable	  renewable	  plants	  (UKERC,	  2006).	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2.7.1.1 National	  Grid’s	  Future	  Energy	  Scenarios	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company	  produces	  annual	  scenarios	  to	  inform	  decision	  making	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  gas	  and	  electricity	  systems.	  The	  scenarios	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  Government,	  customers	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  as	  well	  as	  the	  National	  Grid;	  however,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  network	  development	  rather	  than	  on	  all	  aspects	  of	  system	  development	  and	  operation.	  	  The	  most	  recent	  Future	  Energy	  Scenarios	  (FES)	  are	  based	  around	  the	  potentially	  conflicting	  affordability	  and	  sustainability	  dimensions	  of	  electricity	  supply.	  Within	  this	  framework,	  four	  scenarios	  have	  been	  developed	  reflecting	  different	  possible	  implications	  of	  differing	  levels	  of	  commitment	  to	  these	  aims	  (Figure	  2-­‐21).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  individual	  storylines	  are	  not	  particularly	  relevant.	  The	  key	  point	  to	  make	  is	  that	  the	  future	  development	  of	  decentralised	  energy	  is	  explicitly	  considered	  in	  these	  scenarios.	  The	  projections	  for	  future	  DE	  capacity	  in	  2035/36	  ranges	  from	  17.6GW	  in	  the	  No	  Progression	  scenario	  to	  26.3GW	  –	  nearly	  20%	  of	  all	  installed	  generation	  capacity	  -­‐	  in	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Life	  scenario.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐21	  Outline	  of	  the	  Energy	  Scenarios	  (National	  Grid,	  2014)	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There	  is,	  however,	  no	  detail	  on	  the	  implications	  for	  network	  development,	  nor	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  overall	  impacts	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  for	  system	  management	  and	  operation.	  This	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  neither	  National	  Grid’s	  scenarios,	  nor	  their	  application	  in	  Ofgem’s	  Electricity	  Capacity	  Assessment	  report,	  deal	  with	  the	  systemic	  implications	  of	  increasing	  levels	  of	  decentralisation,	  nor	  address	  the	  possible	  security	  consequences	  of	  this.	  
2.7.2 Distribution	  network	  operators	  The	  distribution	  networks	  are	  broken	  into	  twelve	  regional	  networks	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  a	  further	  two	  in	  Scotland.	  The	  England	  and	  Wales	  networks	  are	  owned	  by	  seven	  different	  companies	  (Figure	  2-­‐22).	  The	  Distribution	  Network	  Operators	  (DNOs)	  distribute	  electricity	  from	  the	  transmission	  grid	  to	  homes	  and	  businesses	  using	  132	  kV,	  33	  kV,	  11	  kV	  and	  230	  V	  lines.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  six	  Independent	  Distribution	  Network	  Operators	  who	  own	  and	  operate	  smaller	  networks	  located	  within	  the	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  DNOs15.	  IDNO	  networks	  are	  mainly	  extensions	  to	  the	  DNO	  networks	  serving	  new	  housing	  and	  commercial	  developments.	  IDNOs	  are	  essentially	  regulated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  DNOs,	  including	  a	  ‘Relative	  Price	  Control’	  which	  caps	  what	  they	  charge	  their	  customers	  at	  a	  level	  broadly	  consistent	  with	  the	  DNO	  equivalent	  charge.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Energetics	  Electricity	  Limited,	  ESP	  Electricity	  Limited,	  Independent	  Power	  Networks	  Limited,	  The	  
Electricity	  Network	  Company	  Limited,	  UK	  Power	  Networks	  (IDNO)	  Ltd	  and	  Utility	  Assets	  Limited	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Figure	  2-­‐22	  Electricity	  Distribution	  Map	  (ENA,	  2013)	  DNOs	  will	  be	  key	  players	  in	  a	  more	  decentralised	  energy	  world.	  Not	  only	  will	  they	  operate	  the	  networks	  in	  a	  more	  ‘active’	  way,	  but	  generators	  who	  wish	  to	  connect	  will	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  them	  to	  consent	  to	  those	  connections	  and	  enable	  their	  power	  to	  be	  exported.	  As	  regulated	  monopolies,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  regulatory	  rules	  which	  create	  incentives	  or	  disincentives	  for	  allowing	  more	  generation	  to	  connect	  to	  the	  networks	  has	  a	  central	  role	  to	  play.	  
2.8 The	  System	  Operator	  As	  well	  as	  owning	  transmission	  network	  assets	  in	  the	  England	  and	  Wales	  system,	  National	  Grid	  also	  acts	  as	  the	  System	  Operator	  (SO)	  for	  the	  National	  Electricity	  Transmission	  System	  (NETS)	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  The	  system	  operator	  is	  required	  to	  have	  an	  entirely	  separate	  operation	  from	  National	  Grid.	  The	  SO	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  short-­‐term	  generating	  provision,	  which	  covers	  anomalies	  in	  demand	  prediction	  and	  technical	  failures	  in	  generation,	  and	  also	  ensures	  that	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  systems	  stays	  within	  the	  technical	  limits.	  The	  SO	  also	  has	  a	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licence	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  capacity	  is	  available	  to	  meet	  demand.	  It	  achieves	  this	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  including:	  	  •	   Buying	  or	  selling	  electricity	  in	  the	  Balancing	  Mechanism	  •	   Buying	  or	  selling	  electricity	  through	  Trading	  •	   Entering	  into	  contracts	  for	  Balancing	  Services	  The	  balancing	  and	  settlement	  arrangements	  and	  their	  governance	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Balancing	  and	  Settlement	  Code	  (collectively	  known	  as	  the	  BSC	  arrangements).	  The	  requirement	  to	  have	  the	  BSC	  in	  force	  is	  placed	  on	  National	  Grid	  through	  its	  Licence	  and	  managed	  by	  ELEXON.	  
2.9 ELEXON	  ELEXON	  is	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organisation	  with	  National	  Grid	  as	  the	  sole	  shareholder.	  However,	  NG	  operates	  as	  a	  passive	  shareholder	  with	  ELEXON	  being	  managed	  by	  its	  board	  of	  12	  members	  made	  up	  of	  energy	  industry	  representatives	  (ELEXON,	  2012,	  Ofgem,	  2011c).	  ELEXON’s	  role	  is	  to	  deliver	  the	  Balancing	  and	  Settlement	  Code	  (BSC)	  on	  the	  industry’s	  behalf	  and	  requires	  it	  to	  manage	  service	  contracts	  and	  handle	  trading	  disputes	  and	  enforce	  performance	  standards.	  All	  the	  major	  energy	  companies	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  BSC	  and	  therefore,	  linked	  to	  ELEXON,	  including	  its	  funding	  process.	  ELEXON	  interacts	  with	  over	  200	  companies	  and	  almost	  £1.5bn	  of	  funds.	  	  
2.10 Energy	  Companies	  
2.10.1 The	  Big	  Six	  The	  GB	  electricity	  generating	  and	  supply	  sector	  is	  dominated	  by	  six	  companies,	  known	  collectively	  as	  the	  Big	  Six.	  Collectively,	  the	  Big	  Six	  own	  a	  little	  over	  70%	  of	  GB	  electricity	  capacity,	  and	  supply	  around	  95%	  of	  domestic	  energy	  consumers.	  The	  Big	  Six	  are:	  Centrica-­‐owned	  British	  Gas,	  EDF	  Energy,	  npower,	  E.ON	  UK,	  Scottish	  Power,	  and	  SSE.	  Although	  supply	  is	  much	  more	  diverse	  in	  the	  business	  and	  industrial	  sectors	  (DECC	  2013q;	  Ofgem,	  2014b;	  Cornwall	  Energy,	  2014).	  
2.10.2 Independent	  generators	  and	  suppliers	  Around	  30%	  of	  UK	  generation	  is	  not	  owned	  by	  the	  Big	  Six.	  Some	  of	  this	  independent	  generation	  is	  conventional,	  centralised	  generation	  such	  as	  Rugeley	  and	  Drax	  coal	  stations,	  which	  are	  owned	  by	  International	  Power	  and	  Drax	  Power	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respectively	  .	  Around	  14%	  of	  current	  GB	  capacity	  is	  owned	  by	  non-­‐Big	  Six	  companies	  and	  is	  decentralised	  (DECC,	  2013g).	  
2.11 Consumers	  Different	  consumer	  groups	  such	  as	  industry,	  commercial	  business	  and	  individual	  households	  approach	  the	  electricity	  system	  with	  very	  different	  perspectives	  on	  energy	  and	  therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  socially	  shared	  concept	  of	  energy	  (Devine-­‐Wright,	  2007).	  Without	  consistency	  of	  knowledge	  a	  lack	  of	  development	  and	  engagement,	  this	  immense	  actor	  group	  currently	  appears	  to	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  mount	  any	  type	  of	  effective	  change	  to	  the	  system	  (ECCC,	  2012).	  	  A	  possibility	  within	  this	  monolithic	  view	  of	  consumers	  is	  that	  eventually	  the	  individual’s	  attitudes	  towards	  how	  the	  system	  should	  operate	  will	  become	  more	  prevalent.	  This	  could	  possibly	  be	  encouraged	  through	  an	  increase	  in	  communities	  of	  individuals	  with	  similar	  ideologies	  such	  as	  the	  Transition	  Towns	  movement,	  community	  energy	  projects	  or	  city	  energy	  projects	  (IPPR,	  2014),	  providing	  the	  drive	  and	  ability	  to	  try	  and	  change	  the	  system.	  Society	  (via	  individuals	  and	  communities)	  can	  also	  increase	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  by	  becoming	  more	  engaged	  with	  the	  operation	  and	  decisions	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  therefore	  becoming	  more	  of	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  decision	  makers.	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  FIT	  has	  provided	  the	  individual	  householder	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  energy	  system.	  Clearly,	  with	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  engagement	  by	  individuals,	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  would	  change	  and	  the	  dynamics	  may	  be	  altered,	  reducing	  the	  power	  of	  the	  main	  energy	  companies.	  Possibly	  more	  importantly,	  the	  economics	  of	  energy	  appear	  to	  be	  changing	  causing	  decentralised	  technologies	  to	  be	  more	  competitive.	  Increasing	  decentralisation	  will	  increase	  consumer	  involvement	  and	  connection	  with	  energy	  (CITI,	  2013).	  
2.11.1 Prosumer	  Movement	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  ‘prosumer’	  has	  been	  argued	  to	  be	  able	  to	  revolutionise	  the	  traditional	  centralised	  electricity	  generation	  model	  to	  more	  interactive	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  which	  changes	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  consumer	  (IEA-­‐RETD,	  2014).	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The	  term	  prosumer	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  consumers	  who	  produce	  their	  own	  power.	  This	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  electricity	  technologies	  such	  as	  solar	  pv	  and	  wind	  but	  can	  also	  include	  other	  forms	  of	  local	  generation	  such	  as	  diesel	  generators	  and	  combined	  heat-­‐and-­‐power	  systems.	  The	  prosumer	  has	  evolved	  due	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  use	  of	  traditional	  technologies	  and	  fuels	  for	  electricity	  generation.	  This	  shift	  comes	  from	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  such	  as	  economics,	  a	  price	  reduction	  in	  renewable	  generation	  (namely	  from	  government	  subsidies).	  Behavioural	  changes	  have	  also	  occurred	  stemming	  from	  environmental	  concern	  over	  climate	  change	  or	  international	  impacts	  such	  as	  the	  Fukushima	  nuclear	  disaster	  in	  Japan.	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  for	  the	  prosumer	  movement	  is	  that	  the	  technology	  is	  now	  available	  for	  the	  consumer	  to	  produce	  power	  themselves.	  Specifically	  with	  solar	  PV,	  technology	  has	  allowed	  greater	  interaction	  for	  consumers	  and	  flexibility	  ultimately	  changing	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  consumers	  and	  the	  institutions	  involved.	  PV	  in	  particular	  has	  been	  characterised	  as	  a	  disruptive	  technology	  which	  can	  revolutionise	  the	  electricity	  industry	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  computer	  or	  the	  mobile	  phone	  changes	  their	  respective	  sectors	  (Schleicher-­‐Tappeser,	  2012)	  The	  impact	  solar	  PV	  has	  had	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  closest	  renewable	  technology	  to	  reaching	  market	  parity.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  UK	  by	  2020	  (DECC,	  2014e,	  Elliott,	  2014).	  What	  needs	  to	  happen	  is,	  the	  policy	  makers	  recognise	  and	  anticipate	  the	  development	  of	  the	  prosumer	  market.	  They	  also	  need	  to	  evaluate	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  both	  financial	  and	  non-­‐quantifiable	  of	  a	  prosumer	  movement.	  
2.12 Other	  Relevant	  Groups	  
2.12.1 Commons	  select	  Committee	  The	  Commons	  Select	  Committees	  are	  generally	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  the	  work	  of	  Government	  departments	  and	  agencies.	  The	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Committee	  was	  established	  following	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  in	  2008	  (Parliament,	  2008).	  The	  committee	  was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  to	  examine	  the	  expenditure,	  administration	  and	  policy	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  and	  its	  associated	  public	  bodies.	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They	  have	  no	  direct	  influence	  on	  Government	  policy;	  their	  role	  is	  far	  more	  subtle.	  Their	  influence	  on	  the	  policy	  process	  cannot	  be	  measured.	  However,	  Russell	  and	  Benton	  (2011)	  provide	  seven	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  committee	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  system:	  contributing	  to	  debate,	  drawing	  together	  evidence,	  spotlighting	  issues,	  brokering	  between	  actors	  and	  government,	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  decision-­‐making	  through	  accountability,	  exposing	  failures,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly	  ‘generating	  fear’.  
2.12.2 Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change	  	  The	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (CCC)	  was	  established	  under	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Act	  2008.	  It	  is	  an	  independent	  body	  whose	  role	  is	  to	  advise	  UK	  Government	  and	  Devolved	  Administrations	  on	  emissions	  targets.	  It	  also	  reports	  to	  Parliament	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  emission	  reductions	  associated	  with	  climate	  change	  (CCC,	  2013a).	  The	  CCC	  has	  a	  set	  of	  strategic	  priorities	  which	  include	  advising	  Government	  on	  its	  carbon	  budgets,	  monitoring	  emissions	  reductions,	  analysis	  of	  climate	  change	  science	  and	  policy,	  and	  engage	  with	  organisations	  and	  individuals	  to	  disseminate	  the	  analysis.	  	  Therefore	  the	  CCC	  does	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  policy	  or	  any	  activity	  in	  the	  direct	  decision-­‐making.	  However,	  it	  does	  provide	  the	  information	  and	  analyses	  the	  data	  for	  decision	  makers.	  This	  advisory	  role	  to	  the	  Government	  means	  that	  the	  approach	  the	  CCC	  takes	  may	  have	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  Government.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  CCC	  provides	  information	  to	  individuals	  regarding	  climate	  change,	  the	  level	  and	  approach	  taken	  to	  this	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  consumers.	  
2.13 Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  identified	  the	  main	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  over	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  a	  century.	  This	  has	  included	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system	  and	  it	  impacts	  from	  the	  dash	  for	  gas	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  retail	  and	  wholesale	  markets.	  This	  has	  included	  the	  move	  from	  the	  Pool	  to	  NETA	  and	  then	  to	  BETTA.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  it	  has	  identified	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Reforms,	  announced	  for	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  This	  includes	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  CfDs	  on	  the	  variable	  technologies	  such	  as	  wind	  and	  solar	  power,	  which	  have	  different	  rules	  under	  the	  CfDs	  than	  that	  of	  baseload	  nuclear	  generation	  stations.	  It	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also	  identifies	  the	  Capacity	  Market	  as	  the	  Government’s	  way	  of	  ensuring	  future	  supply	  security,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  mechanism	  focuses	  on	  the	  large	  scale	  generation,	  thus	  promoting	  centralised	  technologies	  over	  smaller	  scale	  decentralised	  generation.	  With	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  market	  operation	  set	  out	  this	  chapter	  then	  identified	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  networks	  focussing	  on	  the	  future	  of	  regulation	  through	  RIIO.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  including	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  markets	  and	  regulatory	  structure,	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  UK	  Governments	  policies,	  goals	  and	  targets.	  The	  main	  goals	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  trilemma	  of	  climate	  change,	  affordability	  and	  energy	  security.	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  goals	  there	  are	  sets	  of	  targets	  for	  carbon	  reduction	  and	  renewable	  deployment.	  The	  EU	  has	  established	  directives,	  which	  will	  ensure	  the	  carbon	  efficiency	  of	  the	  electricity	  generating	  plants	  called	  the	  LCPD	  and	  IED.	  The	  point	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  is	  that	  by	  closing	  GB	  power	  plants	  due	  to	  old	  age	  or	  for	  environmental	  reasons,	  the	  future	  capacity	  levels	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  rising	  levels	  of	  demand	  and	  energy	  gap	  may	  develop.	  This	  describes	  the	  conflict	  inherent	  in	  pursuing	  the	  various	  goals	  of	  Government.	  This	  chapter	  finished	  by	  setting	  out	  the	  key	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  These	  include	  the	  Government	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change,	  the	  Treasury	  and	  other	  smaller	  Governmental	  Groups.	  These	  Governmental	  groups	  are	  responsible	  for	  setting	  the	  policy	  framework	  for	  future	  goals	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Government	  White	  papers.	  Further	  to	  this	  they	  have	  a	  role	  in	  dictating	  the	  investment	  portfolio	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  specifically	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future,	  this	  is	  at	  present	  set	  though	  the	  EMR	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.2.	  They	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  short	  term	  capacity	  levels,	  where	  the	  amount	  of	  capacity	  to	  be	  auctioned	  in	  the	  capacity	  mechanism	  is	  decided	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Sate	  (DECC).	  Government	  also	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  set	  the	  duties	  and	  give	  guidance	  to	  the	  regulator.	  Although,	  government	  departments	  such	  as	  DECC	  have	  to	  follow	  standard	  procedure	  in	  that	  they	  have	  to	  consult	  widely	  on	  new	  policies	  or	  amendments	  to	  existing	  ones.	  Further	  to	  this	  it	  is	  the	  treasury	  who	  look	  after	  the	  UK’s	  economics	  and	  financial	  policies	  designed	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  public	  spending.	  This	  means	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they	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  funding	  for	  various	  subsidies	  designed	  to	  support	  deployment	  of	  low	  carbon	  technologies,	  including	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation.	  This	  chapter	  also	  discussed	  Ofgem,	  its	  role	  in	  the	  electricity	  system,	  in	  energy	  security	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  Ofgem	  are	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  appropriate	  regulation	  for	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  network	  operators,	  the	  system	  operator	  and	  for	  all	  costs	  and	  licences.	  Ofgem’s	  principal	  objective	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  existing	  and	  future	  consumers	  in	  relation	  to	  gas	  conveyed	  through	  pipes	  and	  electricity	  conveyed	  by	  distribution	  or	  transmission	  systems.	  This	  section	  also	  described	  the	  network	  companies,	  including	  the	  distribution	  network	  owners	  and	  transmission	  network	  owners	  which	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  is	  the	  National	  Grid	  who	  also	  fulfil	  the	  role	  of	  the	  System	  Operator	  (as	  a	  wholly	  separate	  aspect	  of	  the	  NGC).	  The	  distribution	  networks	  are	  broken	  into	  twelve	  different	  regions	  England	  and	  Wales	  owned	  by	  seven	  companies.	  The	  key	  role	  at	  present	  for	  the	  DNO’s	  is	  to	  operate	  and	  maintain	  their	  networks.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  a	  future	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  their	  role	  will	  change	  dramatically.	  The	  transmission	  network	  owner	  is	  responsible	  for	  building,	  maintaining,	  and	  managing	  the	  networks,	  with	  a	  primary	  function	  of	  delivering	  electricity	  from	  large	  generating	  stations	  to	  the	  distribution	  networks.	  For	  England	  and	  Wales	  the	  TNO	  is	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company	  who	  have	  an	  additional	  role	  of	  acting	  as	  the	  System	  Operator	  (SO)	  for	  the	  National	  Electricity	  Transmission	  System	  (NETS)	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  Great	  Britain	  (although	  it’s	  role	  as	  SO	  designed	  to	  be	  entirely	  separate	  from	  the	  National	  Grid).	  	  The	  SO	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  short-­‐term	  generating	  provision,	  which	  covers	  anomalies	  in	  demand	  prediction	  and	  technical	  failures	  in	  generation,	  and	  also	  ensures	  that	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  systems	  stays	  within	  the	  technical	  limits.	  The	  SO	  also	  has	  a	  licence	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  capacity	  is	  available	  to	  meet	  demand.	  This	  chapter	  discussed	  the	  energy	  companies	  role	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  big	  6	  energy	  companies	  who	  hold	  around	  70%	  of	  the	  generation	  profile	  and	  95%	  of	  the	  domestic	  supply	  industry.	  The	  responsibility	  of	  these	  large	  utility	  companies	  is	  to	  their	  shareholders	  and	  to	  the	  contracts	  set	  up	  with	  their	  consumers.	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It	  then	  described	  the	  role	  of	  the	  consumers	  as	  well	  as	  other	  relevant	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Commons	  Select	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  The	  consumer	  groups	  is	  a	  large	  collection	  of	  different	  consumers	  from	  domestic	  householder,	  business	  and	  industry	  each	  with	  different	  perspectives	  on	  energy.	  The	  current	  view	  of	  the	  consumer	  is	  that	  of	  simply	  paying	  for	  the	  electricity	  used	  and	  having	  very	  little	  input	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  	  However,	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  FIT	  uptake	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years	  there	  has	  been	  	  an	  emergence	  of	  	  ‘prosumers’.	  The	  term	  prosumer	  refers	  to	  energy	  consumers	  who	  also	  produce	  their	  own	  power	  from	  a	  range	  of	  different	  onsite	  generators	  (IEA-­‐RETD,	  2014).	  This	  means	  that	  consumers	  are	  becoming	  more	  recognised	  as	  players	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  giving	  them	  more	  responsibility.	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3 The	  future	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  
3.1 Scale	  of	  Electricity	  Generation	  Decentralisation	  can	  have	  different	  meanings	  depending	  upon	  countries,	  languages	  and	  fields	  of	  research	  (Finney	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Within	  the	  current	  energy	  policy	  literature,	  a	  range	  of	  terms	  that	  encompass	  the	  ideas	  surrounding	  decentralisation	  are	  often	  used.	  These	  include	  ‘distributed’	  and	  ‘embedded’	  generation,	  which	  discuss	  the	  plant’s	  connection	  to	  the	  grid	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Ackermann	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Gumerman	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  El-­‐Khattam	  W.	  &	  Salama,	  2004;	  Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  King,	  2006;	  Lopes	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Karger	  and	  Hennings	  2009).	  The	  term	  ‘microgeneration’	  is	  also	  often	  used	  in	  Government	  documents	  to	  examine	  small-­‐scale	  installations	  (DTI,	  2007a;	  2007b;	  DECC,	  2010a;	  2011a).	  This	  thesis	  will	  use	  the	  different	  classifications	  and	  terminology	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  well	  rounded	  definition	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Each	  stakeholder	  may	  have	  differing	  approaches	  to	  decentralisation	  but	  one	  defining	  characteristic	  is	  reducing	  the	  distance	  from	  generation	  plant	  to	  the	  end	  user,	  providing	  a	  reduced	  overall	  transmission	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  centralised	  model	  (GOfS,	  2008).	  An	  additional	  dimension	  often	  combines	  decentralisation	  with	  low	  carbon	  or	  renewable	  characteristics	  (Purchala,	  2006).	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  decentralisation	  is	  not	  immediately	  linked	  with	  renewable	  generation,	  although	  it	  may	  provide	  access	  to	  some	  additional	  forms	  of	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  One	  aspect	  consistent	  with	  many	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  (whether	  they	  are	  from	  Government	  documents	  or	  academic	  papers)	  is	  their	  concentration	  on	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  generation.	  For	  this	  thesis,	  decentralisation	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  just	  introducing	  the	  capacity	  of	  small-­‐scale	  technologies.	  In	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  the	  technological	  and	  the	  social	  aspect	  would	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  This	  would	  also	  include	  the	  change	  to	  industry,	  markets	  and	  consumers	  as	  well	  as	  considering	  the	  overall	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  
3.2 The	  future	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  The	  UK	  electricity	  system	  is	  constantly	  evolving,	  whether	  this	  is	  from	  external	  impacts	  on	  the	  system	  or	  from	  the	  drive	  by	  new	  developments	  and	  innovations	  in	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the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  electricity.	  The	  main	  developments	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  impacting	  the	  demand	  for	  electricity	  include:	  a	  greater	  inclusion	  of	  electrified	  heat,	  electrification	  of	  transport,	  increased	  demand	  side	  response	  and	  greater	  levels	  of	  electricity	  storage.	  This	  section	  discusses	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  future	  demand,	  supply	  and	  network	  development.	  
3.2.1 Demand	  for	  Electricity	  	  
3.2.1.1 Electrification	  of	  Heat	  	  A	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  UK’s	  demand	  for	  energy	  is	  for	  heat	  at	  46%	  in	  2011	  across	  all	  sectors	  (DECC,	  2012p).	  The	  majority	  of	  heat	  is	  produced	  from	  fossil	  fuels,	  with	  gas	  heating	  approximately	  81%	  of	  homes	  and	  52%	  for	  industry	  (DECC,	  2012p	  see	  Figure	  3-­‐2	  and	  Figure	  3-­‐3).	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  consumers’	  energy	  bills	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  gas	  prices	  and	  therefore	  susceptible	  to	  the	  volatile	  changes	  to	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  and	  oil.	  One	  obvious	  way	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  is	  through	  the	  increase	  in	  efficiency	  in	  the	  home,	  businesses	  and	  industry	  which	  would	  reduce	  demand	  and	  by	  extension	  lower	  emissions.	  A	  second	  way	  is	  to	  transfer	  households	  from	  using	  gas	  for	  space	  and	  water	  heating	  to	  electricity.	  Similarly	  for	  transport	  to	  transfer	  the	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  in	  cars,	  to	  electricity.	  If	  the	  electricity	  is	  from	  low	  carbon	  sources	  then	  overall	  emissions	  fall.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  means	  of	  reducing	  carbon,	  takes	  little	  notice	  of	  the	  practicalities	  of	  customer	  preference	  or	  behaviour,	  or	  the	  possibility	  of	  introducing	  so	  much	  investment	  in	  electricity	  plants.	  	  	   	  
	   77	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐1	  Domestic	  final	  energy	  consumption	  by	  end	  use,	  UK	  2012	  (DECC,	  2013e)	  	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐2	  UK	  energy	  source	  for	  heating	  of	  homes	  (DECC,	  2012p)	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Figure	  3-­‐3	  UK	  energy	  source	  for	  industrial	  heating16	  17(DECC,	  2012c)	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  UK	  Government’s	  targets	  of	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions,	  the	  Government	  have	  produced	  ‘roadmaps’	  to	  identify	  how	  this	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  2050	  (DECC,	  2010d),	  Speirs	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  ‘roadmaps’	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  scenarios	  to	  meet	  a	  carbon	  reduction	  of	  80%	  by	  2050	  from	  1990	  levels.	  Each	  of	  the	  scenarios	  show	  a	  future	  where	  electricity	  demand	  not	  only	  increases	  but	  also	  takes	  on	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  overall	  energy	  consumption,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  all-­‐electric	  future.	  At	  present,	  7%	  of	  households	  already	  use	  electricity	  for	  space	  heating	  so	  increasing	  this	  to	  100%	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  challenge.	  Moreover,	  the	  move	  to	  an	  all-­‐electric	  future	  provides	  challenges	  to	  the	  electricity	  system’s	  operational	  structure	  because	  there	  would	  be	  drastic	  changes	  to	  power	  flows	  and	  peak	  demands	  putting	  greater	  strain	  on	  the	  networks	  for	  delivery.	  Figure	  3-­‐4	  shows	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  annual	  heat	  demand	  profile	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  electricity	  demand	  showing	  the	  drastic	  change	  the	  electrification	  heat	  will	  bring	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Industrial	  heating	  includes:	  Space	  heating,	  high	  temperature	  process,	  Low	  temperature	  process	  
and	  drying/separation	  
17	  Heat	  sold	  is	  heat	  that	  is	  produced	  and	  sold	  under	  a	  contract	  (including	  CHP	  plants	  and	  community	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the	  overall	  electricity	  demand	  profile.	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐4	  Comparison	  of	  heat	  and	  electricity	  demand	  variability	  across	  a	  year	  (domestic	  and	  
commercial)	  (DECC,	  2012p)	  A	  further	  issue	  is	  the	  current	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  at	  the	  power	  station	  level.	  If	  the	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  continues,	  then	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  be	  increasingly	  exposed	  to	  the	  global	  changes	  in	  fossil	  fuel	  prices.	  Figure	  3-­‐5	  shows	  the	  price	  of	  selected	  fuel	  components	  and	  their	  trends.	  It	  identifies	  a	  greater	  volatility	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  compared	  to	  previous	  data.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  investors	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  are	  less	  sure	  of	  their	  future	  operating	  costs	  and	  this	  will	  therefore	  increase	  their	  sense	  of	  risk	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  reduced	  investment	  (IEA,	  2007).	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Figure	  3-­‐5	  Index	  price	  of	  fuel	  identifying	  greater	  levels	  of	  volatility	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years	  (Bolton,	  
2013)	  
3.2.1.2 Electrification	  of	  Transport	  As	  with	  the	  heating	  sector,	  the	  transport	  sector	  also	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  through	  electrification.	  Domestic	  transport	  accounts	  for	  roughly	  21%	  of	  the	  UKs	  carbon	  emissions	  (DECC,	  2010d).	  Apart	  from	  electrification	  the	  emissions	  from	  transport	  could	  be	  reduced	  by	  improvements	  in	  fuel	  efficiency	  and	  an	  uptake	  in	  biofuels.	  The	  modes	  of	  transport	  include	  public	  transport	  such	  as	  rail	  and	  buses,	  and	  private	  vehicles.	  The	  promotion	  of	  electric	  vehicles	  will	  generate	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  demand	  on	  the	  electricity	  network	  (Nat	  Grid,	  2011).	  The	  electricity	  demand	  profile	  generated	  by	  the	  heating	  sector	  would	  be	  somewhat	  predictable,	  i.e.	  winter/summer	  changes,	  whereas	  daily	  routines	  with	  transport	  usage	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  the	  same	  (Nat	  Grid,	  2011).	  	  As	  with	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat,	  the	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  the	  electrification	  of	  transport	  in	  helping	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  is,	  firstly	  providing	  a	  low	  carbon	  source	  of	  electricity.	  Secondly,	  that	  the	  low	  carbon	  sources	  of	  electricity	  are	  flexible	  and	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  less	  predictable	  demand	  profiles.	  
3.2.1.3 Demand	  Side	  Response	  Demand	  side	  response	  (DSR)	  focuses	  on	  changing	  the	  time	  of	  demand	  or	  use	  of	  electricity.	  It	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  enable	  greater	  efficiency	  in	  the	  network	  and	  the	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supply	  of	  electricity	  (Frontier	  Economics,	  2012).	  It	  could	  remove	  the	  need	  for	  certain	  investment	  in	  generation	  capacity,	  networks	  and	  reduce	  the	  operating	  hours	  of	  less	  efficient	  generation	  plants	  (Bradley	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  value	  of	  DSR	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  increase	  as	  the	  level	  and	  type	  of	  demand	  increases,	  especially	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  electric	  heat	  and	  transport.	  The	  latter,	  if	  unchecked	  and	  without	  DSR,	  will	  increase	  not	  only	  the	  demand,	  but	  also	  the	  daily	  peaks	  of	  the	  system.	  DSR	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  smooth	  this	  demand	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  need	  for	  extra	  generating	  capacity.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  DSR	  provides	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  flexibility	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  helping	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  less	  predictable	  forms	  of	  low	  carbon	  generation	  (Frontier	  Economics,	  2012).	  Some	  demand	  side	  response	  mechanisms	  have	  existed	  in	  the	  UK	  for	  a	  few	  years	  in	  the	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  energy	  sectors	  through	  interruptible	  contracts	  (Torriti	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Interruptible	  contracts	  are	  agreements	  with	  the	  System	  Operator	  in	  which	  the	  consumers	  get	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  levies	  charged	  to	  use	  the	  system	  or	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  overall	  energy	  bill	  for	  limiting	  the	  amount	  of	  energy	  they	  use	  when	  the	  capacity	  margins	  are	  tight	  (Ofgem,	  2010e).	  	  A	  further	  mechanism	  is	  the	  multi-­‐rate	  tariff,	  there	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  4.5	  million	  users	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  multi-­‐rate	  tariffs	  such	  as	  Economy	  7	  (Torriti	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Multi	  rate	  tariffs	  work	  by	  offering	  the	  consumer	  cheaper	  electricity	  at	  night	  but	  more	  expensive	  rates	  during	  the	  day	  (in	  comparison	  to	  a	  standard	  tariff)	  (Ofgem,	  2010e).	  This	  encourages	  consumers	  to	  use	  less	  daytime	  peak	  demand	  and	  use	  electricity	  during	  the	  night-­‐time	  troughs	  in	  consumption.	  An	  additional	  mechanism	  which	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  utilise	  the	  demand	  side	  as	  a	  way	  to	  help	  balance	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  the	  use	  of	  time	  of	  day	  pricing.	  Time	  of	  day	  pricing	  is	  a	  strategy	  where	  by	  the	  electricity	  utility	  company	  changes	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  supplied	  to	  the	  consumer	  depending	  on	  the	  time	  of	  day.	  By	  increasing	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  at	  times	  when	  demand	  on	  the	  network	  is	  high,	  customers	  can	  be	  ‘discouraged’	  from	  consuming	  thereby	  helping	  with	  balancing	  the	  electricity	  network.	  DSR	  trials	  have	  begun	  around	  the	  world	  such	  as	  the	  Energy	  Demand	  Research	  Project	  (EDRP)	  in	  Great	  Britain	  which	  ran	  from	  2007	  to	  2010	  and	  included	  60,000	  different	  households	  (AECOM,	  2011);	  the	  Ireland	  Electricity	  Smart	  Metering	  which	  5,000	  Irish	  homes	  and	  businesses	  participated	  in;	  and	  many	  trials	  in	  North	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America	  (Frontier	  Economics,	  2012).	  DECC	  commissioned	  Frontier	  Economics	  and	  Sustainability	  First	  to	  present	  the	  findings	  from	  30	  different	  household	  trials.	  The	  evidence	  shows	  consumers	  do	  shift	  demand	  in	  response	  to	  economic	  incentives.	  Automated	  responses	  on	  appliances	  which	  have	  flexible	  loads	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  energy	  tariff.	  Such	  as	  the	  long	  running	  Economy	  7	  scheme	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  the	  shifting	  of	  demand	  from	  day	  to	  night	  is	  achieved	  (Ofgem,	  2012e).	  The	  potential	  to	  change	  demand	  patterns	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system	  is	  an	  unfamiliar	  concept	  to	  consumers.	  Electricity	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  commodity	  to	  be	  consumed	  as	  and	  when	  it	  is	  wanted	  rather	  than	  having	  any	  restrictions	  placed	  upon	  its	  use	  (McKenna	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Darby	  &	  McKenna,	  2012).	  The	  report	  by	  Frontier	  Economics	  show	  the	  demand	  response	  working	  well	  with	  an	  automated	  operation	  and	  a	  lower	  response	  from	  the	  time	  of	  day	  pricing	  for	  consumers	  where	  the	  consumers	  have	  to	  act	  directly.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  either	  the	  pricing	  structure	  is	  inadequate,	  or	  the	  consumers	  need	  to	  be	  engaged	  more	  with	  the	  energy	  system	  operation.	  By	  engaging	  the	  consumers	  with	  the	  energy	  system,	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  impacts	  of	  changing	  demand	  and	  even	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  obligation	  can	  be	  achieved	  (Owens	  &	  Driffill	  2008;	  Devine-­‐Wright	  &	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2004,	  Bovens	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  
3.2.1.4 Electricity	  Storage	  The	  move	  to	  increased	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  coupled	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  variable	  low	  carbon	  generation	  are	  likely	  to	  cause	  greater	  difficulties	  in	  the	  balancing	  of	  demand	  and	  supply,	  through	  the	  volatility	  inherent	  in	  both	  aspects	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  Current	  demand	  and	  generation	  profiles	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3-­‐6.	  A	  potential	  2050	  model	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3-­‐7	  where	  the	  balancing	  of	  demand	  and	  supply	  is	  far	  more	  complex.	  Electricity	  storage	  allows	  the	  electricity	  which	  has	  been	  generated	  to	  be	  deployed	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  which	  could	  offer	  another	  way	  of	  meeting	  the	  concerns	  about	  balancing	  supply	  and	  demand	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Figure	  3-­‐6	  Current	  demand	  profile	  (red	  line)	  and	  generation	  mix	  over	  seven	  days	  on	  an	  average	  
winter.	  (DECC	  2012r)	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐7	  Potential	  2050	  demand	  profile	  (red	  line)	  and	  generation	  mix	  over	  seven	  days	  on	  an	  average	  
winter.	  (DECC	  2012r)	  There	  are	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  technological	  methods	  of	  ‘storing’	  energy	  as	  a	  method	  for	  managing	  the	  power	  supply	  of	  a	  network.	  These	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  different	  categories	  such	  as:	  solid-­‐state	  batteries,	  flow	  batteries,	  flywheels,	  compressed	  air	  storage,	  hydrogen,	  Superconducting	  Magnet	  Energy	  Storage,	  Super	  Capacitors	  and	  pumped	  hydro	  power.	  The	  different	  technologies	  have	  differing	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  including	  their	  size	  and	  their	  discharge	  time	  for	  their	  rated	  power,	  for	  further	  information	  see	  the	  ARUP	  guide	  to	  electricity	  storage	  (ARUP,	  2013).	  The	  UK	  Power	  Networks	  who	  are	  demonstrating	  storage	  technologies	  identify	  a	  set	  of	  stakeholder	  benefits	  for	  storage	  (UK	  Power	  Networks,	  2013).	  	  
• An	  alternative	  to	  traditional	  reinforcement.	  	  
• Reduces	  peak	  demand,	  reducing	  losses	  and	  improving	  asset	  utilisation.	  	  
• Cost	  effective	  balancing	  support	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	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• Saving	  in	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  emissions	  from	  displaced	  peak	  generation,	  estimated	  to	  be	  around	  1.7k	  tonnes	  of	  CO2.	  	  
• Validation	  of	  the	  business	  models	  and	  economics	  of	  storage	  when	  leveraged	  for	  full	  system	  value,	  resulting	  in	  building	  experience	  and	  encouraging	  adoption	  on	  a	  wider-­‐scale.	  	  
• Support	  the	  development	  of	  the	  commercial	  environment	  for	  ESCOs,	  developers	  and	  investors.	  	  
• Identification	  of	  the	  key	  market,	  commercial	  and	  regulatory	  barriers	  to	  effective	  deployment	  	  Storage	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  smooth	  supply	  profiles	  from	  variable,	  less	  predictable	  sources	  and	  can	  be	  deployed	  at	  times	  of	  high	  demand.	  This	  offers	  significant	  balancing	  services	  and	  can	  reduce	  the	  use	  of	  high	  carbon,	  less	  efficient	  power	  plants.	  Storage	  systems	  also	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  remove	  the	  need	  for	  investment	  into	  networks,	  which	  would	  be	  required	  to	  meet	  peak	  demand	  if	  the	  smoothing	  did	  not	  occur	  (DECC,	  2012r).	  
3.2.2 Supply	  of	  Electricity	  
3.2.2.1 Ensuring	  Sufficient	  Investment	  in	  Electricity	  Generation	  Over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  the	  UK	  energy	  sector	  has	  been	  changing	  to	  incorporate	  market	  reform,	  liberalisation,	  privatisation	  and	  restructuring	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  The	  privatisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry	  in	  the	  1990s	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  competitive	  markets	  to	  deliver	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  incentive	  for	  investment	  in	  a	  new	  generating	  capacity	  (Joskow,	  2006).	  The	  design	  of	  the	  competitive	  markets	  was	  to	  open	  up	  the	  possible	  diversity	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  to	  keep	  the	  costs	  down.	  It	  is	  Ofgem’s	  role	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  markets	  are	  competitive	  and	  to	  monitor	  the	  end	  price	  of	  electricity	  for	  consumers	  in	  the	  retail	  market	  (Ofgem,	  2012c).	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  competition	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  identify	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  (Lieb-­‐Dóczy	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Under	  the	  old	  state-­‐run	  regime	  it	  was	  clearly	  Government	  who	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  energy	  security	  and	  meet	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  as	  they	  owned	  and	  operated	  all	  the	  energy	  assets.	  In	  a	  privately	  owned	  energy	  system	  without	  stakeholder	  roles	  clearly	  specified,	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security	  is	  less	  clear.	  	  The	  responsibility	  for	  supply	  security	  could	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  energy	  companies.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  the	  energy	  companies	  who	  own	  the	  assets	  and	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  capacity	  levels.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  costs	  as	  low	  as	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possible	  the	  energy	  companies	  would	  want	  to	  keep	  the	  excess	  capacity	  margins	  as	  low	  as	  they	  can.	  Minimising	  electricity	  system	  capacity	  is	  beneficial	  economically	  as	  long	  as	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  achieved	  (Lieb-­‐Dóczy	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
3.2.2.2 Transitional	  Fuels	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  cause	  a	  range	  of	  capacity	  concerns	  from	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  These	  concerns	  include	  the	  long	  lead	  times	  for	  new	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  with	  fears	  over	  a	  short	  fall	  in	  capacity	  which	  will	  occur	  after	  EU	  directives	  along	  with	  the	  end	  of	  certain	  power	  plants’	  lifetime.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  renewable	  generation	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  possibility	  that	  the	  variable	  nature	  of	  the	  technologies	  may	  cause	  difficulties	  at	  times	  of	  low	  output	  and	  high	  demand.	  However,	  the	  issues	  with	  renewable	  generation	  will	  likely	  be	  solved	  through	  the	  development	  of	  storage	  technologies	  and	  an	  active	  smart	  network	  operation	  (Grünewald,	  2012;	  Strbac,	  2012;	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  100%	  low	  carbon	  future	  would	  require	  a	  technology	  which	  is	  able	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  meet	  the	  multidimensional	  demands	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  One	  such	  technology	  that	  is	  widely	  considered	  as	  a	  ‘bridging	  fuel’	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system,	  is	  the	  combined	  cycle	  gas	  turbine	  (CCGT)	  (IPCC,	  2007;	  IEA;	  2011;	  Stephenson	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  reasons	  for	  the	  use	  of	  CCGT	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  relatively	  inexpensive	  technology,	  which	  produces	  less	  carbon	  emissions	  relative	  to	  other	  fossil	  fuels.	  It	  has	  short	  lead	  times	  for	  construction	  and	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  follow	  demand	  patterns	  relatively	  easily.	  	  However,	  the	  issues	  with	  natural	  gas	  is	  that	  it	  is	  still	  a	  fossil	  fuel,	  emitting	  carbon,	  therefore	  without	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  technologies,	  gas	  will	  not	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  low	  carbon	  future	  other	  than	  acting	  as	  a	  back	  up	  technology.	  
3.2.3 Networks	  Electricity	  supply	  and	  its	  security	  hinges	  on	  an	  efficient	  electricity	  network.	  The	  networks	  are	  the	  physical	  link	  delivering	  electricity	  from	  the	  generation	  plant	  to	  the	  consumer.	  The	  future	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  such	  as	  the	  expansion	  of	  low	  carbon	  technologies,	  increased	  demand	  response	  and	  storage,	  and	  then	  possible	  increase	  in	  overall	  electricity	  demand	  will	  require	  networks	  which	  can	  cope	  and	  adapt	  to	  these	  changes	  (Frontier	  Economics,	  2009;	  DECC,	  2012r).	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3.2.3.1 Smart	  Grids	  One-­‐way	  to	  achieve	  these	  changes	  is	  for	  the	  networks	  to	  be	  fitted	  with	  greater	  levels	  of	  information	  and	  communication	  technology,	  resulting	  in	  a	  ‘smarter’	  grid	  (Clastres,	  2011).	  Greater	  communication	  and	  information	  will	  give	  the	  network	  operators	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  variations	  in	  supply	  and	  demand	  by	  time	  and	  place	  so	  that	  the	  network	  can	  be	  run	  in	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	  dynamic	  way	  (DECC,	  2012k).	  	  In	  order	  to	  start	  the	  move	  to	  a	  ‘smarter’	  network	  the	  Government	  has	  introduced	  a	  policy	  to	  ensure	  that	  by	  2020	  all	  homes	  will	  have	  smart	  energy	  meters.	  These	  will	  provide	  real	  time	  information	  (if	  the	  customer	  takes	  notice	  of	  them).	  Thereby	  enabling	  the	  consumer	  to	  reduce	  and	  change	  their	  demand	  behaviour	  (DECC,	  2011g).	  Ofgem	  has	  provided	  £500m	  from	  2010	  to	  2015	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Networks	  Fund	  specifically	  for	  the	  Distributed	  Network	  Operators	  to	  trial	  new	  technologies	  and	  operational	  procedures	  (Ofgem,	  2012f).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  Government	  and	  Ofgem	  have	  set	  up	  the	  ‘Smart	  Grids	  Forum’	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  identify	  how	  the	  electricity	  network	  companies	  will	  operate	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014).	  	  
3.2.3.2 Interconnection	  with	  Europe	  The	  UK	  	  electricity	  system	  currently	  have	  very	  little	  connection	  with	  Europe	  and	  other	  market	  systems	  (Ofgem,	  2010f).	  It	  amounts	  to	  4GW	  of	  interconnector	  capacity.	  There	  are	  four	  connections	  linking	  GB	  to	  France	  (IFA),	  Northern	  Ireland	  (Moyle),	  the	  Netherlands	  (BritNed)	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  (East	  West)	  (see	  Figure	  3-­‐8)	  (SSE,	  2011a;	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012;	  National	  Grid,	  2013).	  Figure	  3-­‐8	  also	  shows	  three	  potential	  future	  interconnector	  opportunities	  to	  Norway,	  Belgium	  and	  a	  second	  to	  France.	  The	  interconnectors	  in	  place	  today	  are	  indirectly	  operated	  and	  not	  associated	  with	  the	  UK	  transmission	  business	  (Ofgem,	  2010f;	  2014c).	  The	  advantage	  of	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  interconnectivity	  is	  that	  it	  increases	  the	  available	  capacity,	  including	  the	  back-­‐up	  support	  portfolio	  for	  the	  UK.	  It	  gives	  the	  possibility	  of	  providing	  an	  uninterrupted	  supply	  of	  electricity	  for	  consumers	  (Parliamentary	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  2001)	  as	  long	  as	  the	  electricity	  is	  available	  for	  export	  from	  the	  exporting	  country	  (SSE,	  2011a).	  The	  advantages	  of	  linking	  to	  other	  markets	  are	  firstly,	  that	  during	  a	  shortage	  of	  supply	  the	  interconnectors	  can	  provide	  another	  source	  of	  electricity	  therefore	  improving	  balancing	  services,	  secondly,	  mitigating	  the	  impacts	  of	  possible	  future	  variable	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generation	  and	  thirdly	  an	  increase	  in	  competition	  from	  European	  markets	  (ECC,	  2010).	  
	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐8	  UK’s	  interconnection	  with	  Europe	  (National	  Grid,	  2013)	  	  
3.2.4 Geopolitical	  Influences	  The	  interconnection	  with	  Europe	  involves	  the	  electricity	  system	  in	  a	  physical	  link	  to	  other	  countries	  and	  the	  policies	  with	  which	  they	  operate.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  primary	  resources	  utilised	  in	  current	  electricity	  generation	  are	  unevenly	  distributed	  around	  the	  world,	  specifically	  fossil	  fuels.	  These	  resources	  are	  often	  linked	  directly	  to	  a	  country’s	  economic	  development.	  Therefore,	  a	  country	  that	  does	  not	  posses	  sufficient	  resources	  would	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  global	  markets	  and	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may	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  supply	  interruption	  (Skea	  and	  Ekins,	  2014).	  The	  complexity	  associated	  with	  the	  geopolitical	  influences	  means	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  detailed	  discussion.	  Geopolitics	  of	  energy	  focuses	  on	  understanding	  both	  the	  geographic	  resources	  and	  the	  political	  relations	  of	  their	  accountability.	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  geopolitical	  aspect	  of	  security	  of	  supply.	  
3.3 Summary	  The	  external	  impacts	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  means	  that	  the	  structure	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  industry	  needs	  to	  change.	  Arguably	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  to	  the	  energy	  industry	  is	  climate	  change.	  Energy	  use	  and	  transportation	  of	  energy	  contributes	  63%	  of	  the	  overall	  carbon	  emissions	  (DECC,	  2013a).	  Following	  this	  the	  Government	  has	  placed	  targets	  on	  the	  energy	  sector	  carbon	  reductions:	  80%	  reduction	  by	  2050	  from	  1990	  levels.	  There	  are	  also	  shorter	  term	  targets	  to	  meet	  the	  Carbon	  Budgets	  (DECC,	  2009b	  &	  2011i).	  	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  targets	  large	  amounts	  of	  investment	  will	  be	  required	  in	  a	  time	  of	  economic	  difficulty	  and	  when	  many	  of	  the	  current	  power	  stations	  are	  coming	  to	  the	  end	  of	  their	  lifetime.	  Alongside	  the	  carbon	  reductions,	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  identified	  additional	  goals	  which	  set	  the	  overarching	  context	  in	  which	  policies	  are	  established.	  These	  include	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  affordability	  to	  consumers.	  Energy	  security,	  climate	  change,	  and	  affordability	  -­‐	  each	  in	  their	  own	  right	  -­‐	  provide	  a	  challenge	  to	  policy	  making	  in	  the	  energy	  sector.	  Together	  they	  provide	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  and	  complex	  situation	  with	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  policy	  answers.	  These	  challenges	  to	  energy	  policy	  also	  come	  at	  a	  time	  when	  additional	  changes	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  have	  been	  suggested,	  such	  as	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  sectors.	  Although	  these	  suggestions	  may	  help	  with	  respect	  to	  eventually	  meeting	  carbon	  budgets,	  they	  provide	  a	  concern	  in	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand.	  So	  far	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  supply	  side	  providing	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  consumer.	  The	  future	  may	  see	  changes	  to	  this	  through	  the	  development	  of	  more	  demand	  side	  response,	  which	  could	  help	  with	  many	  of	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  goals.	  This,	  coupled	  with	  the	  development	  of	  new	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storage	  opportunities,	  could	  reduce	  the	  difficulties	  of	  balancing	  greater	  electricity	  demand	  while	  having	  greater	  levels	  of	  inflexible	  and	  variable	  generation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  increased	  links	  to	  other	  electricity	  markets	  and	  capacity	  may	  improve	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  The	  future	  electricity	  system	  in	  place	  in	  2050	  will	  look	  very	  different	  to	  the	  current	  situation.	  The	  direction	  of	  change	  the	  system	  will	  take	  is	  not	  fixed,	  although,	  the	  Government	  is	  promoting	  large	  scale	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  over	  the	  smaller	  scale	  with	  the	  market	  reform	  package.	  This	  thesis	  looks	  at	  the	  changes	  a	  small-­‐scale	  decentralised	  system	  will	  bring	  to	  energy	  security,	  including	  changes	  to	  operational	  procedures	  and	  structure.	  The	  concept	  of	  decentralisation	  has	  different	  meanings	  for	  different	  stakeholders.	  It	  can	  also	  include	  a	  range	  of	  different	  terms	  from	  ‘distributed’	  to	  ‘embedded’	  generation	  which	  each	  discuss	  the	  small-­‐scale	  technologies.	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  decentralisation	  will	  include	  not	  only	  the	  technological	  aspect	  of	  small-­‐scale	  but	  also	  the	  change	  to	  industry,	  stakeholders,	  regulation	  and	  the	  market	  approach.	  This	  thesis	  is	  asking	  whether	  a	  decentralised	  approach	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  better	  placed	  to	  meet	  the	  goals	  set	  by	  the	  UK	  Government	  specifically	  around	  the	  implementation	  and	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	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4 Energy	  security	  in	  UK	  policy	  The	  previous	  chapter	  looked	  at	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  since	  the	  1990s.	  This	  chapter	  will	  be	  more	  specific	  in	  identifying	  the	  development	  of	  understanding	  of	  energy	  security	  within	  UK	  Government	  policy.	  It	  will	  then	  categorise	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  security	  for	  the	  electricity	  system,	  looking	  at	  the	  drivers,	  issues,	  risks	  and	  impacts	  each	  of	  which	  lead	  to	  the	  system	  requirements	  for	  a	  secure	  system	  which	  provide	  the	  definition	  for	  security	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
4.1 Evolution	  In	  Government	  Policy	  The	  development	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  can	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  current	  situation	  and	  how	  governance	  might	  develop	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  energy	  system	  has	  historically	  met	  challenges	  to	  security,	  such	  as	  its	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  a	  single	  fuel	  (for	  example,	  coal	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  the	  growing	  dominance	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  1990s)	  (Helm,	  2002;	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Cherp	  and	  Jewell,	  2011).	  In	  addition,	  fossil	  fuels	  in	  particular	  can	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  international	  groups	  such	  as	  OPEC	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  (Lefèvre,	  2010).	  Other	  threats	  have	  included	  domestic	  activism	  such	  as	  the	  coal	  miners’	  strikes	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  fuel	  blockades	  in	  2000	  (Polak	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Watson	  and	  Scott,	  2009).	  More	  recently,	  concerns	  around	  capacity	  levels	  have	  arisen	  due	  to	  the	  planned	  closure	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  European	  policy	  requiring	  the	  closure	  of	  carbon	  intensive	  plants	  (LCPD	  and	  IED)	  (Ofgem,	  2012h).	  Each	  of	  these	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  threaten	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  its	  supply	  chains.	  
4.1.1 The	  development	  of	  policy	  for	  energy	  security	  Until	  recently,	  there	  were	  no	  specific	  policies	  designed	  around	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  beyond	  its	  use	  in	  broad	  policy	  statements	  which	  identified	  that	  energy	  security	  was	  a	  concern	  and	  should	  be	  a	  central	  policy	  interest	  and	  the	  use	  of	  NETA	  and	  BETTA	  to	  ensure	  security	  of	  supply	  (Parliamentary	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  2012).	  Much	  of	  the	  policy	  debate	  about	  energy	  security	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Government’s	  understanding	  of	  it	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  supply,	  rather	  than	  a	  wider	  approach	  to	  energy	  security.	  Supply	  security	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  energy	  security,	  looking	  primarily	  at	  ensuring	  the	  lights	  stay	  on	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  However,	  energy	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security	  in	  this	  thesis	  encompasses	  the	  short,	  medium	  and	  long-­‐term	  aspect	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  broader	  approach	  than	  the	  dominant	  political	  understanding.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  start	  with	  the	  New	  Labour	  Government’s	  first	  energy	  report	  through	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (DTI)	  in	  1997	  which	  set	  out	  the	  Government’s	  central	  objective	  for	  energy	  policy	  which	  was	  to,	  “ensure	  a	  secure,	  
diverse	  and	  sustainable	  supply	  of	  energy	  at	  competitive	  prices”	  (DTI,	  1997	  Pg,	  3,	  in	  Rutledge,	  2007).	  In	  this	  report	  a	  distinction	  was	  made	  between	  ‘short’,	  ‘medium’	  and	  ‘long-­‐term’	  energy	  security,	  however,	  the	  ‘longer	  term’	  issue	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  
“..beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  chapter”	  and	  therefore,	  of	  no	  concern	  to	  the	  Minister	  at	  this	  time	  (DTI,	  1997	  in	  Rutledge,	  2007).	  Following	  this,	  the	  Government	  issued	  the	  1998	  White	  Paper:	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Review	  of	  Energy	  Sources	  for	  Power	  Generation’	  (DTI,	  1998).	  One	  of	  the	  main	  outcomes	  of	  this	  was	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  permitted	  running	  hours	  for	  gas-­‐fired	  generation	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  continuing	  growth	  of	  gas	  generation	  could	  mean	  that	  it	  would	  eventually	  dominate	  the	  system	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  could	  distort	  the	  market	  and	  inhibit	  the	  integration	  of	  other	  technologies,	  so	  reducing	  diversity	  (DTI,	  1998;	  PMSU,	  2001).	  This	  was	  based	  on	  the	  concern	  that	  in	  the	  non-­‐interventionist,	  market-­‐based	  electricity	  system	  a	  single	  resource,	  generating	  electricity	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  cost	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  technologies	  would	  dominate	  the	  system	  and	  that	  relying	  on	  a	  single	  fuel	  source	  was	  risky.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  UK	  debate	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  security	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  section	  4.2.4.2.	  	  The	  growing	  alarm	  over	  the	  rise	  in	  price	  increased	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system	  being	  reliant	  on	  natural	  gas.	  In	  2001,	  the	  DTI	  and	  Ofgem	  set	  up	  the	  Joint	  Energy	  Security	  of	  Supply	  (JESS)	  working	  group	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  monitoring	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  (Rutledge,	  2007).	  It	  consisted	  of	  members	  from	  DTI	  and	  Ofgem	  and	  was	  attended	  by	  other	  representatives	  depending	  on	  requirements	  of	  discussion	  by	  members	  of	  the	  PIU	  at	  the	  Treasury,	  The	  Scottish	  Executive,	  National	  Grid	  Transco,	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  (Wright,	  2005;	  HofC,	  2007).	  Its	  role	  was	  to:	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• Assess	  the	  available	  data	  relevant	  to	  security	  of	  supply,	  to	  identify	  the	  gaps	  in	  that	  data	  and	  develop	  appropriate	  indicators	  
• To	  monitor	  at	  a	  strategic	  level,	  over	  a	  timescale	  of	  at	  least	  seven	  years	  ahead:	  
o The	  availability	  of	  supplies	  of	  gas	  
o The	  availability	  of	  supplies	  of	  electricity	  and	  fuels	  used	  for	  electricity	  generation	  
o The	  adequacy	  of	  generating	  capacity	  
o The	  adequacy	  of	  the	  UK's	  gas	  and	  electricity	  infrastructure	  
• To	  assess	  whether	  appropriate	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  are	  bringing	  forward	  timely	  investment	  to	  address	  any	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  that	  are	  anticipated	  
• To	  identify	  relevant	  policy	  issues	  and	  consider	  implications	  
• To	  report	  twice	  yearly	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Gas	  and	  Electricity	  Market	  Authority	  (JESS,	  2002;	  HofC,	  2007)	  The	  first	  JESS	  report	  published	  in	  2002	  provided	  a	  view	  of	  security	  since	  privatisation.	  It	  showed	  that	  there	  had	  been	  very	  little	  impact	  as	  a	  result	  of	  interruptions	  to	  supply,	  or	  widespread	  price	  increases	  as	  a	  result	  of	  supply	  shortages,	  network	  issues	  or	  inadequate	  balancing	  arrangements.	  The	  only	  supply	  security	  issues	  shown	  in	  the	  JESS	  report	  (2002)	  that	  occurred	  were	  short	  lived.	  These	  included	  weather	  related	  issues	  or	  a	  localised	  temporary	  interruption	  on	  the	  distribution	  side	  of	  the	  network,	  meaning	  that	  each	  issue	  would	  only	  affect	  a	  small	  number	  of	  customers.	  The	  role	  of	  JESS,	  however,	  was	  to	  monitor	  a	  set	  of	  ’security	  of	  supply’	  indicators	  and	  had	  no	  ability	  to	  intervene	  in	  policy	  decisions	  and	  regulatory	  changes.	  It	  ran	  until	  2006	  when	  it	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  Energy	  Markets	  Outlook	  which	  also	  met	  the	  Government’s	  and	  Ofgem’s	  obligations	  under	  section	  172	  of	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2004	  (DECC,	  2009d)	  
4.1.2 PIU	  Energy	  Review	  and	  the	  2003	  White	  Paper	  In	  1998	  the	  Performance	  and	  Innovation	  Unit	  was	  set	  up	  to	  report	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  energy	  policy,	  waste,	  policy	  analysis	  and	  leadership	  in	  Government.	  The	  PIU	  model	  was	  that	  of	  a	  small	  unit	  which	  could	  ‘drive’	  policies	  though	  the	  Cabinet	  departments	  (Flynn,	  2007).	  In	  2002,	  The	  PIU	  released	  the	  ‘Energy	  Review’	  green	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paper.	  The	  PIU	  noted	  that	  use	  of	  natural	  gas	  would	  increase	  in	  both	  primary	  consumption	  and	  for	  electricity	  generation,	  while	  the	  UK	  would	  become	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  imported	  oil	  and	  gas.	  However,	  the	  report	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  major	  area	  of	  concern	  as	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  European	  gas	  markets	  would	  provide	  an	  added	  level	  of	  diversity	  to	  the	  UK’s	  energy	  supply	  mix.	  The	  report	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Government	  should	  continue	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  market,	  and	  instead	  it	  should	  monitor	  its	  operation	  and	  regulation,	  including	  implications	  for	  security.	  Where	  Government	  intervention	  does	  occur they	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  risk	  levels	  associated	  with	  the	  intervention	  outweigh	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  imperfections	  in	  the	  market.	  While	  the	  PIU	  argued	  for	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  reality	  was	  somewhat	  different.	  In	  2002,	  the	  share	  price	  of	  British	  Energy,	  the	  nuclear	  generator,	  collapsed	  and	  the	  company	  was	  effectively	  bankrupt.	  In	  theory,	  the	  collapse	  of	  British	  Energy	  could	  have	  removed	  around	  20%	  of	  generation	  from	  the	  system.	  Instead	  of	  allowing	  the	  market	  to	  decide	  British	  Energy’s	  fate,	  the	  Government	  intervened	  to	  re-­‐nationalise	  the	  company	  on	  a	  temporary	  basis	  to	  own	  65%	  of	  future	  cash	  flows,	  showing	  a	  clear	  case	  where	  the	  market-­‐based	  system	  had	  failed	  (Rutledge,	  2007).	  	  The	  PIU	  Energy	  Review	  provided	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  Government’s	  2003	  Energy	  White	  Paper.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  was	  to	  put	  in	  place	  the	  policy	  framework	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  economy	  based	  on	  competitive	  markets,	  the	  Government	  would	  set	  up	  the	  framework	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  and	  once	  again	  monitor	  the	  energy	  system	  without	  getting	  involved.	  The	  Government	  set	  out	  four	  goals	  in	  the	  2003	  White	  Paper:	  the	  environment,	  sustainability,	  fuel	  poverty	  and	  energy	  supply	  reliability.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘energy	  supply	  reliability’	  had	  been	  adapted	  from	  the	  term	  ‘energy	  security’	  from	  previous	  documents.	  This	  change	  in	  wording	  could	  be	  considered,	  according	  to	  Rutledge	  (2007),	  to	  provide	  the	  Government	  a	  backward-­‐looking	  perspective.	  Therefore,	  to	  meet	  the	  goal	  of	  ‘reliable	  supplies’	  of	  energy,	  a	  review	  of	  past	  events	  would	  be	  the	  only	  indicator	  of	  security.	  Energy	  security,	  however,	  requires	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  approach	  to	  provide	  future	  reliability.	  The	  White	  Paper	  showed	  the	  new	  path	  of	  tough	  carbon	  emissions	  targets	  and	  it	  was	  this,	  which	  caught	  the	  most	  attention	  of	  the	  media.	  However,	  it	  also	  showed	  the	  importance	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  over	  dependence	  on	  imported	  energy	  using	  diversity	  to	  reduce	  the	  UKs	  vulnerability	  to	  these	  threats.	  The	  terms	  for	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energy	  security	  used	  in	  the	  report	  were	  ‘ensuring	  security	  of	  supply’	  or	  ‘energy	  reliability’	  which	  does	  not	  indicate	  a	  complete	  overview	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  report	  also	  identified	  that	  regulation	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  security.	  Therefore	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  Ofgem	  both	  have	  duties	  to	  ensure	  that	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  electricity	  and	  gas	  are	  met	  (Wright,	  2007).	  However,	  although	  it	  proposed	  investigations	  into	  providing	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  plant	  capacity	  and	  gas	  storage,	  it	  did	  not	  follow	  through	  these	  proposals	  with	  concrete	  action	  (Watson	  &	  Scott,	  2009).	  
4.1.3 Security	  of	  Supply	  Report	  The	  Security	  of	  Supply	  report	  is	  a	  joint	  document	  produced	  by	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem.	  The	  report	  is	  an	  obligation	  set	  by	  the	  2004	  Energy	  Act	  (section	  172).	  Beginning	  in	  2005,	  the	  annual	  report	  was	  to	  look	  at	  the	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  availability	  of	  electricity	  and	  gas,	  which	  meet	  the	  reasonable	  demands	  of	  consumers	  in	  Great	  Britain	  (Parliament,	  2004).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  it	  covers	  the	  Governments	  obligation	  under	  certain	  EU	  directives	  to	  monitor	  electricity	  and	  gas	  supply	  levels.	  This	  was	  then	  covered	  by	  the	  Energy	  Markets	  Outlook,	  which	  followed	  on	  from	  JESS	  (DECC,	  2009d)	  
4.1.4 2006,	  Energy	  Review	  and	  the	  2007	  White	  Paper	  After	  the	  2003	  White	  Paper	  came	  the	  2006	  Energy	  Review,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  fast	  changing	  period	  in	  the	  energy	  world.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  changes	  in	  from	  the	  2003	  to	  the	  2007	  energy	  white	  paper	  was	  the	  emphasis	  on	  carbon	  reduction.	  This	  illustrates	  the	  impact	  of	  stakeholder	  influence	  over	  political	  decisions,	  showing	  how	  Government	  policy	  documents	  can	  shift	  over	  a	  few	  years.	  However,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  2007	  White	  Paper	  was	  a	  way	  of	  bringing	  nuclear	  power	  back	  into	  discussion.	  	  The	  White	  Paper	  set	  out	  two	  energy	  security	  challenges,	  the	  first	  was	  to	  manage	  the	  increase	  in	  dependence	  on	  oil	  and	  gas	  imports	  as	  North	  Sea	  reserves	  declined,	  the	  second	  was	  to	  ensure	  the	  market	  delivered	  the	  investment	  in	  electricity	  generation	  and	  networks	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  ‘affordable’	  (pg.10).	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  Energy	  Review	  set	  out	  a	  dual	  strategy	  of	  encouraging	  open	  competitive	  markets	  outside	  the	  UK,	  to	  allow	  UK	  energy	  companies	  to	  trade	  without	  the	  need	  for	  Government	  intervention,	  and	  to	  establishing	  a	  positive	  framework	  for	  domestic	  supply	  investment	  (DTI,	  2006b).	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The	  Energy	  Review	  therefore	  reinforced	  the	  Government’s	  previous	  endorsement	  of	  using	  a	  market-­‐based	  approach	  to	  ensuring	  the	  energy	  security	  requirements	  of	  the	  UK	  were	  met.	  Very	  little	  was	  changed	  in	  2007	  when	  the	  DTI	  published	  its	  White	  Paper	  ‘Meeting	  The	  Energy	  Challenge‘.	  Here	  the	  Government	  again	  identified	  energy	  security	  as	  one	  of	  the	  two	  main	  challenges	  facing	  UK	  energy	  policy	  (DTI,	  2007a).	  Much	  of	  this	  was	  centred	  on	  the	  need	  for	  sufficient	  investment	  in	  order	  to	  address	  capacity	  concerns	  and	  estimated	  that	  around	  30	  –	  35	  GW	  of	  new	  generation	  capacity	  would	  be	  needed	  over	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  to	  replace	  existing	  stations	  which	  were	  soon	  to	  be	  retired	  (DTI,	  2007a).	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  White	  Paper	  recognised	  the	  issue	  of	  ensuring	  that	  companies	  would	  need	  reassurance	  about	  the	  return	  they	  would	  receive	  on	  their	  investment	  in	  liberalised	  energy	  markets	  and	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  was	  a	  potential	  problem	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ensuring	  the	  security	  of	  the	  UK’s	  electricity	  system.	  (DTI,	  2007a;	  Rutledge,	  2007).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  paper	  highlighted	  the	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  planning	  process,	  the	  reliance	  on	  imported	  fuel	  and	  the	  energy	  production	  methods.	  From	  this	  a	  consultation	  into	  the	  UK’s	  nuclear	  power	  production	  began	  (Coaffee,	  2008).	  	  
4.1.5 Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  The	  most	  recent	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  are	  through	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  package.	  The	  specifics	  of	  the	  EMR	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.2	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  main	  actions	  of	  the	  reform	  around	  energy	  security	  is	  to	  incentivise	  greater	  investment	  into	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  would	  signify	  that	  the	  Government	  would	  remain	  in	  its	  hands-­‐off	  role	  regarding	  energy	  security	  leaving	  the	  immediate	  responsibility	  to	  the	  energy	  companies	  and	  network	  operators.	  Having	  said	  this	  the	  EMR	  package	  through	  the	  Contracts	  for	  Differences	  and	  the	  Carbon	  Floor	  price	  effectively	  ‘picks	  winners’	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Gross	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  the	  markets	  do	  not	  perform	  in	  a	  predictable	  and	  reliable	  pattern.	  All	  the	  market	  players	  would	  need	  to	  be	  rational,	  responding	  to	  100%	  accurate	  information	  about	  costs	  and	  benefit,	  thereby	  allowing	  resources	  to	  be	  allocated	  swiftly.	  With	  no	  political	  intrusion	  and	  because	  of	  so	  much	  change	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  a	  result	  of	  EMR,	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  leading	  to	  a	  hiatus	  in	  investment	  until	  the	  future	  becomes	  clearer	  (Temperton,	  2011).	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4.1.6 Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  
4.1.6.1 What	  is	  the	  ESS	  In	  November	  2012	  the	  UK	  Government	  published	  the	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  (ESS)	  (DECC	  2012o).	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  UK	  Government	  had	  set	  out	  any	  detailed	  analysis	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  other	  than	  identifying	  it	  as	  a	  ‘challenge’	  to	  the	  energy	  system18	  (DTI,	  2003;	  2007a).	  Together	  with	  the	  ESS,	  the	  Government	  and	  Ofgem	  published	  its	  first	  Statutory	  Security	  of	  Supply	  Report,	  a	  factual	  report	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  electricity	  and	  gas	  levels	  to	  meet	  the	  consumer	  demand	  (DECC	  &	  Ofgem,	  2012).	  The	  Statutory	  Security	  of	  Supply	  Report	  is	  an	  obligatory	  report	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2004,	  Energy	  Act	  2011	  and	  under	  the	  EU	  Directives	  to	  monitor	  gas	  and	  electricity	  supplies	  (Directive	  2009/73/EC),	  and	  is	  updated	  annually.	  Three	  main	  drivers	  were	  identified	  for	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  ESS:	  
• The	  imminent	  closure	  of	  power	  stations	  (discussed	  in	  section	  2.5.2)	  
• The	  decline	  in	  UK	  Continental	  Shelf	  reserves,	  and	  the	  resulting	  need	  to	  import	  more	  fossil	  fuels,	  particularly	  gas	  
• The	  need	  to	  encourage	  investment	  in	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  UK’s	  legally	  binding	  carbon	  reduction	  targets	  The	  closure	  of	  the	  power	  stations	  (identified	  in	  section	  3.8.1)	  causing	  a	  reduction	  in	  capacity	  coupled	  with	  a	  possible	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  demand	  (see	  section	  2.3.1)	  could	  develop	  the	  very	  real	  possibility	  of	  an	  ‘energy	  gap’	  (Gore	  and	  Ares,	  2010).	  The	  second	  point	  identifies	  the	  economics	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  for	  ensuring	  security	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  	  The	  third	  and	  final	  point,	  indicates	  Government	  recognition	  of	  the	  future	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  as	  a	  risk	  to	  energy	  security,	  specifically	  if	  the	  energy	  system	  remained	  dependant	  on	  gas,	  oil	  and	  coal.	  The	  concern	  indicated	  by	  Government	  is	  toward	  the	  lack	  of	  self-­‐sustainability,	  however,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  suggest	  that	  imports	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  could	  increase	  diversity	  of	  supply	  chains	  and	  therefore	  security	  (Mueller,	  2014).	  Although,	  a	  more	  pressing	  issue	  associated	  with	  fossil	  fuels,	  is	  the	  current	  UK	  dependence	  on	  natural	  gas,	  making	  it	  a	  dominant	  influence	  on	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  (Parliament,	  2013).	  Since	  the	  price	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  can	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  In	  2009	  Malcolm	  Wicks	  carried	  out	  a	  review	  of	  international	  energy	  security	  and	  how	  it	  affected	  
the	  UK	  energy	  security	  (Wicks,	  2009)	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extremely	  volatile	  and	  future	  changes	  not	  easy	  to	  predict,	  meaning	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  will	  also	  be	  uncertain.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  three	  challenges	  to	  energy	  security	  are	  firmly	  based	  in	  ensuring	  the	  capacity	  is	  there	  to	  meet	  projected	  demand,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  sufficient	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  to	  enable	  its	  delivery,	  identifying	  energy	  security	  firmly	  as	  a	  supply	  issue.	  This	  is	  emphasised	  in	  the	  annual	  Statutory	  Security	  of	  Supply	  Reports,	  which	  focus	  almost	  entirely	  on	  supply	  side	  issues	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2013)19.	  Before	  the	  ESS	  the	  UK	  Government	  had	  not	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  energy	  security.	  This	  issue	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Committee	  (ECCC)	  report	  “UK	  Energy	  Supply:	  Security	  or	  Independence?”	  (ECCC,	  2011).	  The	  ECCC	  report	  argued	  that	  previous	  descriptions	  referred	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  interruptions	  to	  electricity,	  gas	  and	  petroleum	  products	  to	  end	  users.	  The	  Committee	  recommended	  that	  the	  Government	  adopt	  the	  following	  definition	  (p15):	  
…	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  is	  one	  that	  is	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  
of	  people	  and	  organisations	  for	  energy	  services	  such	  as	  
heating,	  lighting,	  powering	  appliances	  and	  transportation,	  in	  
a	  reliable	  and	  affordable	  way	  both	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  Government	  responses	  to	  the	  ECCC	  report	  implicitly	  acknowledged	  the	  need	  for	  a	  definition,	  and	  stated	  that	  (ECCC,	  2011	  pg.	  1):	  
…	  energy	  security	  encompasses	  a	  variety	  of	  aspects,	  and	  there	  
is	  no	  perfect	  definition.	  At	  its	  core	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  reliable	  
supply,	  that	  is	  there	  when	  needed.	  It	  also	  needs	  to	  include	  
dimensions	  of	  price	  (volatility	  as	  well	  as	  absolute	  level)	  and	  
sustainability.	  	  While	  the	  ESS	  does	  provide	  a	  definition,	  it	  is	  a	  somewhat	  simplified	  version	  of	  that	  responding	  to	  the	  ECCC	  report:	  
	  “ensuring	  that	  consumers	  have	  access	  to	  the	  energy	  services	  
they	  need	  (physical	  security)	  at	  prices	  that	  avoid	  excessive	  
volatility	  (price	  security)”	  (DECC	  2012o	  pg.	  5).	  The	  issue	  of	  sustainability	  has	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  core	  definition	  and	  is	  instead	  framed	  as	  something	  that	  must	  be	  delivered	  alongside	  energy	  security,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  There	  is	  some	  discussion	  of	  future	  network	  development	  and	  demand	  side	  response	  measures,	  but	  
this	  is	  very	  limited	  and	  deals	  only	  with	  established	  conventional	  approaches	  rather	  than	  new	  ones.	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rather	  than	  as	  an	  inherent	  part	  of	  it.	  Overall	  the	  definition	  does	  not	  move	  far	  from	  previous	  Government	  discussions	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  price	  volatility	  element.	  It	  also	  stops	  short	  of	  explicit	  criteria	  such	  as	  a	  desirable	  level	  of	  capacity	  margins	  or	  adequate	  diversity	  against	  which	  the	  state	  of	  energy	  security	  could	  be	  judged.	  The	  ESS	  therefore	  does	  not	  add	  much	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  how	  energy	  security	  might	  be	  assessed	  in	  absolute	  terms,	  but	  it	  does	  provide	  an	  interesting	  outline	  of	  how	  the	  Government	  approaches	  assessing	  risks	  to	  energy	  security.	  Essentially,	  the	  Government	  uses	  three	  approaches:	  horizon	  scanning	  for	  possible	  future	  threats,	  assessment	  of	  various	  characteristics	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  (capacity,	  diversity,	  reliability	  and	  demand	  side	  responsiveness),	  and	  finally	  stress	  testing.	  These	  assessments	  are	  intended	  to	  identify	  threats	  to	  the	  existing	  in	  the	  short	  (up	  to	  5	  years),	  medium	  (mid	  2030s)	  and	  long-­‐term	  (up	  to	  2050).	  However,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  approach	  is	  on	  the	  existing	  system,	  and	  identifiable	  threats	  relating	  to	  it;	  it	  is	  not	  directed	  at	  considering	  how	  the	  system	  might	  change,	  for	  example	  by	  increasing	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  generation,	  and	  what	  positive	  or	  negative	  implications	  this	  might	  have	  for	  future	  security.	  As	  with	  other,	  broader	  energy	  policy	  statements,	  the	  ESS	  starts	  from	  the	  position	  that	  the	  market	  will	  be	  used	  to	  address	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  challenges	  to	  energy	  security.	  However,	  it	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  way	  that	  the	  market	  values	  the	  risks	  to	  energy	  security	  does	  not	  necessarily	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Government	  would	  value	  those	  risks,	  meaning	  that	  the	  security	  provided	  by	  the	  market	  alone	  might	  not	  be	  socially	  or	  politically	  optimal.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  this	  possible	  market	  failure,	  Government	  interventions	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  energy	  security.	  	  These	  further	  actions	  include	  more	  effective	  regulation	  and	  establishing	  a	  capacity	  market	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  an	  adequate	  capacity	  margin	  in	  electricity	  generation	  (see	  section	  3.5.2).	  This	  means	  there	  is	  a	  very	  open	  ended	  concept	  of	  how	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  will	  be	  handled:	  by	  relying	  primarily	  on	  the	  market,	  the	  Government	  is	  taking	  a	  slightly	  hands	  off	  approach	  to	  energy	  security.	  The	  responsibility	  for	  this	  will	  then	  be	  placed	  on	  Ofgem	  to	  ensure	  the	  electricity	  market	  and	  associated	  measures	  provide	  sufficient	  security.	  However,	  it	  also	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Government	  to	  intervene	  to	  address	  perceived	  market	  failures	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  the	  level	  of	  intervention	  is	  left	  undefined.	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Robinson	  (2013)	  has	  criticised	  the	  ESS	  saying	  that	  if	  the	  Government	  were	  to	  promote	  the	  market	  system	  then	  it	  needs	  to	  separate	  itself	  from	  its	  operation.	  He	  argues	  that	  Government	  action	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  perfect,	  whereas	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case	  and	  perhaps	  the	  markets	  without	  Government	  intervention	  would	  be	  better	  off.	  This	  is	  also	  identified	  by	  Mueller	  (2014)	  who	  argues	  that	  markets	  are	  far	  more	  stable	  than	  the	  alternative,	  being	  Government	  policies,	  which	  are	  adapted	  and	  changed	  as	  Governments	  change.	  These	  arguments	  come	  back	  to	  the	  issues	  identified	  earlier	  in	  this	  thesis:	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  market	  led	  approach	  to	  meeting	  energy	  policy	  goals,	  including	  energy	  security,	  and	  broader	  governance	  issues	  needed	  to	  address	  market	  failures.	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐1	  UK	  Government	  Policy	  areas	  contributing	  to	  energy	  security	  The	  ESS	  identifies	  competitive	  markets	  and	  selective	  intervention	  as	  the	  foundations	  for	  delivering	  energy	  security,	  and	  it	  sets	  out	  six	  policy	  ‘pillars’	  which	  also	  contribute	  (Figure	  4-­‐1).	  These	  are:	  	  
• Resilience	  measures	  to	  protect	  against	  and	  prevent	  short-­‐term	  disruptions	  such	  as	  flooding	  and	  industrial	  action	  (e.g.	  emergency	  plants,	  stockpiling	  of	  oil).	  These	  are	  short-­‐term,	  reactive	  measures	  which	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  address	  broader	  systemic	  issues	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  
• Energy	  efficiency	  to	  lower	  the	  exposure	  to	  price	  risks.	  The	  ESS	  has	  very	  limited	  discussion	  of	  the	  possible	  contribution	  of	  energy	  efficiency	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measures	  to	  energy	  security,	  and	  instead	  refers	  to	  the	  Government’s	  Energy	  Efficiency	  Strategy	  (DECC	  2012w).	  	  
• Maximising	  domestic	  oil	  and	  gas	  to	  reduce	  exposure	  to	  international	  supply	  risks	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  Improving	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  global	  energy	  markets	  and	  providing	  the	  UK	  with	  a	  dependable	  and	  affordable	  source	  of	  foreign	  fuel	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  Ensuring	  reliable	  networks	  through	  expanding	  and	  upgrading	  transmission	  networks,	  developing	  smart	  grids	  and	  increasing	  interconnections.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  pillar	  is	  predominantly	  on	  transmission	  networks,	  and	  there	  is	  little	  discussion	  of	  the	  requirement	  for	  DNO	  development.	  The	  primary	  discussion	  for	  the	  DNOs	  is	  that	  they	  need	  to:	  
“meet	  increasing	  electricity	  demands	  and	  to	  connect	  new	  low	  
carbon	  technologies,	  such	  as	  electric	  vehicles	  and	  heat-­‐pumps,	  
and	  distributed	  generation,	  such	  as	  solar	  photovoltaic	  panels.”	  
(DECC,	  2012o	  pg:42)	  However,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  DNO	  becoming	  active	  and	  acting	  as	  system	  operators	  for	  their	  individual	  networks	  would	  have	  indicated	  a	  serious	  opportunity	  for	  promoting	  a	  large	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation.	  The	  absence	  of	  this	  discussion	  indicates	  that	  the	  Government	  only	  identifies	  the	  centralised	  approach	  as	  viable	  for	  energy	  security.	  Decarbonising	  supplies	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  and	  reducing	  dependence	  on	  international	  fossil	  fuel	  markets.	  This	  is	  obviously	  coupled	  with	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  aspects	  (focusing	  on	  the	  production	  of	  domestic	  oil	  and	  gas	  and	  improving	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  global	  energy	  markets	  respectively).	  The	  policy	  pillars	  raise	  some	  key	  issues	  which	  are	  worth	  highlighting.	  Firstly,	  the	  narrow,	  supply	  based	  approach	  to	  energy	  security	  means	  that	  the	  ESS	  fails	  to	  relate	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  to	  wider	  Government	  goals	  of	  affordability	  for	  both	  private	  consumers	  and	  business	  and	  also	  climate	  change	  (Hoggett,	  2014).	  The	  document	  has	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  social	  accountability	  and	  focuses	  purely	  on	  the	  goal	  of	  ensuring	  security	  of	  supply.	  	  Secondly,	  while	  the	  ESS	  identifies	  the	  need	  for	  long	  and	  short-­‐term	  goals	  in	  energy	  security,	  this	  is	  not	  apparent	  in	  its	  approach	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term	  issues,	  particularly	  relating	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  supplies.	  For	  a	  longer	  term	  approach	  Government	  would	  need	  to	  discuss	  the	  benefits	  of	  flexibility	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  A	  flexible	  energy	  system	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  to	  any	  future	  changes,	  impacts	  or	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risks	  which	  may	  arise.	  This	  future	  flexibility	  means	  that	  measures	  may	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  now	  that	  conflict	  with	  the	  price	  security	  to	  ensure	  future	  issues	  can	  be	  met.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  third	  issue	  to	  highlight:	  the	  lack	  of	  appreciation	  that	  decentralised	  energy	  could	  play	  an	  increasing	  role	  in	  future	  energy	  systems,	  particularly	  electricity.	  The	  ESS	  provides	  a	  limited	  discussion	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  a	  small-­‐scale	  decentralised	  energy	  system.	  The	  connection	  made	  is	  that	  small-­‐scale	  energy	  technologies	  can	  help	  with	  the	  “decarbonising	  of	  our	  supplies”	  (pg.:	  23)	  through	  the	  feed	  in	  tariff.	  	  However	  there	  is	  very	  little	  discussion	  of	  how	  this	  will	  happen	  other	  than	  through	  RIIO-­‐ED1	  price	  control.	  The	  main	  issue	  here	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  recognition	  of	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation’s	  ability	  to	  promote	  energy	  security.	  	  Instead,	  the	  continued	  reliance	  on	  market	  arrangements	  which	  promote	  centralised	  technologies	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  discussion	  over	  decentralisation	  both	  signal	  that	  Government	  intends	  to	  continue	  to	  follow	  a	  traditional,	  centralised	  pathway.	  Overall,	  the	  ESS	  is	  a	  useful	  document	  in	  that	  it	  sets	  out	  for	  the	  first	  time	  what	  the	  Government’s	  thinking	  on	  energy	  security	  is,	  but	  as	  a	  strategy	  it	  fails	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  not	  take	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  view	  of	  how	  the	  electricity	  system	  might	  develop	  in	  future,	  or	  indeed	  value	  the	  contribution	  that	  decentralised	  generation	  may	  or	  may	  not	  make	  to	  meeting	  the	  goal	  of	  energy	  security.	  
4.2 Defining	  Energy	  Security	  While	  the	  focus	  of	  policy	  surrounding	  energy	  security	  has	  largely	  been	  on	  the	  fuel	  supply	  dimension	  of	  energy	  security,	  it	  is	  apparent	  from	  wider	  evidence	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  should	  be	  broader	  than	  that.	  Energy	  Security	  is	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  concept,	  where	  different	  ideas	  of	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  does	  and	  should	  operate	  could	  provide	  different	  ideas	  for	  energy	  security.	  Therefore,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  defining	  energy	  security	  for	  this	  thesis,	  this	  section	  will	  discuss	  various	  dimensions	  associated	  with	  energy	  security	  beyond	  the	  simple	  fuel	  supply	  approach	  (see	  	  Figure	  4-­‐2).	  This	  section	  will	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  key	  components	  and	  use	  them	  to	  develop	  a	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  energy	  security.	  This	  definition	  will	  include	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  factors	  which	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  designing	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future	  governance	  arrangements	  intended	  to	  deliver	  a	  secure	  electricity	  system	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  policy	  goals.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  with	  many	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  that	  they	  have	  a	  very	  narrow	  focus,	  emphasising	  the	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply	  aspect.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  energy	  security,	  establishing	  initially	  the:	  drivers,	  issues,	  risks	  or	  threats,	  impacts	  and	  then	  finally,	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  overcome	  these	  issues.	  by	  structuring	  the	  analysis	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  this	  way	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  effects	  and	  associations	  of	  energy	  security	  can	  be	  made	  and	  a	  full	  analysis	  of	  energy	  security	  achieved.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  shown	  in	  	  Figure	  4-­‐2	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  section.	  The	  ‘Drivers’	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  provide	  the	  four	  main	  concepts,	  which	  move	  the	  energy	  system	  in	  a	  particular	  direction	  (e.g.	  continuing	  on	  centralised	  pathway	  or	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system)	  (adapted	  from	  Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  These	  are	  categorised	  into	  (1)	  social,	  (2)	  economic,	  (3)	  innovation	  and	  (4)	  political.	  From	  these	  four	  conceptual	  sectors	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  map,	  and	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  causal	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  insecurity.	  	  The	  ‘Issues’	  category	  shows	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  various	  externalities	  such	  as	  the	  (1)	  environment,	  (2)	  governance	  patterns	  or	  (3)	  international	  influences	  (adapted	  from	  Hoggett	  et	  al.,	  2011	  and	  IEA,	  2002a).	  The	  ‘Risks	  or	  Threats’	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  are	  the	  direct	  security	  concerns	  which	  literature	  and	  policy	  makers	  have	  indicated	  as	  being	  related	  to	  security	  (Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Stirling,	  2009;	  Chester,	  2010;	  Barret	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  These	  include	  (1)	  domestic	  activism	  or	  terrorism,	  (2)	  reliability	  of	  demand	  patterns,	  (3)	  investment	  in	  infrastructure,	  (4)	  technological	  failure	  and	  (5)	  resource	  availability.	  The	  ‘Impact’	  theme	  covers	  the	  response	  the	  risks	  can	  have	  on	  the	  energy	  system,	  ranging	  from,	  (1)	  number	  of	  blackouts	  and	  brownouts,	  (2)	  diversity	  and	  dependency,	  (3)	  market	  stability	  and	  (4)	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  for	  consumer	  and	  businesses.	  Finally	  the	  ‘System	  Requirements’	  category	  covers	  the	  rules	  which	  the	  energy	  system	  would	  need	  to	  adhere	  to	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  secure	  arrangement.	  
4.2.1 Drivers	  of	  the	  Electricity	  System	  Drivers	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  contain	  four	  main	  areas	  –(1)	  social,	  (2)	  economic,	  (3)	  innovation	  and	  (4)	  political	  -­‐	  which	  direct	  the	  electricity	  system	  down	  a	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particular	  pathway.	  These	  four	  conceptual	  sectors	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  are	  used	  to	  begin	  to	  map	  and	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  relating	  to	  energy	  security.	  
4.2.1.1 Social	  Drivers	  The	  domestic	  sector	  accounts	  for	  approximately	  35%	  of	  electricity	  use	  in	  the	  UK	  (not	  including	  transport)	  (DECC,	  2013g).	  Changes	  in	  behaviour	  in	  this	  area	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  predict	  as	  they	  are	  made	  up	  of	  thousands	  of	  decisions	  every	  day	  (Parag	  &	  Darby,	  2009)	  and	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  energy	  landscape	  and	  the	  other	  drivers	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  environmental	  changes;	  social	  action	  groups	  attempt	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Government	  to	  develop	  environmental	  policies.	  With	  enough	  action	  it	  may	  become	  within	  the	  Government’s	  interest	  to	  follow	  the	  ‘wants’	  of	  society	  (Kooiman,	  1993).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  as	  clear	  as	  it	  seems	  as	  different	  sections	  of	  society	  may	  have	  differing	  views	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  environment	  (Divine-­‐Wright,	  2005).	  	  Fluctuations	  to	  the	  security	  of	  energy,	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  short-­‐term	  blackouts	  or	  changes	  in	  market	  price,	  will	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  society	  (EC,	  2000).	  The	  result	  of	  this	  can	  cause	  social	  action	  to	  try	  to	  make	  a	  change.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  fuel	  strikes,	  which	  occurred	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  bringing	  transport	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  a	  standstill	  (Polak	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  A	  more	  direct	  way	  in	  which	  society	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  through	  the	  planning	  system.	  Direct	  consultation	  with	  local	  people	  on	  planning	  issues	  implies	  the	  individual	  is	  given	  the	  ability	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  they	  feel	  their	  local	  area	  should	  develop.	  However,	  this	  is	  skewed	  as	  different	  regions	  would	  have	  dissimilar	  ideas	  (Divine-­‐Wright,	  2005)	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  a	  complete	  social	  profile	  to	  attend	  the	  meetings.	  
4.2.1.2 Economic	  Drivers	  The	  economic	  drivers	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  encompass	  the	  national	  and	  global	  economic	  challenges,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  energy	  system	  (EC,	  2000).	  Changes	  to	  the	  economy	  can	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  markets	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  in	  a	  liberalised	  system	  (Ernst	  &	  Young,	  2012).	  Also,	  the	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  economy;	  higher	  energy	  prices	  can	  trigger	  higher	  domestic	  production	  costs	  causing	  a	  spiral	  effect,	  whereby	  a	  downturn	  in	  the	  economy	  will	  affect	  the	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  negatively	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which	  in	  turn	  affects	  the	  economy	  negatively	  (CSIS,	  2009;	  Labandeira	  and	  Manzano,	  2012).	  As	  the	  UK’s	  economy	  begins	  to	  recover,	  demands	  for	  energy	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  (Wicks,	  2009)	  and	  require	  a	  system	  that	  can	  adapt	  to	  this	  change.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  require	  a	  substantial	  level	  of	  investment	  to	  maintain	  and	  secure,	  estimated	  at	  £200bn	  with	  £168bn	  for	  the	  generation	  industry	  leaving	  £32	  billion	  of	  network	  investment	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	  This	  large	  level	  of	  investment	  means	  that	  in	  global	  economic	  uncertainty	  this	  task	  is	  far	  more	  difficult	  (DECC,	  2012o).	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  right	  complementary	  innovation	  there	  could	  be	  a	  number	  of	  different	  pathways	  the	  electricity	  system	  could	  take	  to	  become	  low	  carbon.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  develop	  along	  the	  pathway	  which	  is	  the	  most	  economically	  viable	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  (Ekins,	  2009).	  	  The	  importance	  of	  innovation	  is	  in	  securing	  the	  UK’s	  electricity	  future,	  while	  also	  meeting	  other	  policy	  goals	  which	  rely	  primarily	  on	  developing	  technologies	  and	  operational	  systems.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  development	  of	  more	  active	  electricity	  networks,	  interacting	  with	  both	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  sides	  (Jamasb	  and	  Pollitt,	  2008).	  Most	  areas	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry	  will	  require	  innovation	  over	  the	  next	  few	  decades,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  operational	  flexibility	  in	  a	  system	  which	  will	  incorporate	  more	  renewable	  and	  demand	  side	  technology.	  (Jamasb	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  As	  innovation	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  driven	  either	  by	  society,	  policy	  or	  technology	  it	  has	  therefore	  been	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  (Grubb	  and	  Ulph,	  2002).	  
4.2.1.3 Political	  Drivers	  The	  political	  dimension	  is	  a	  major	  factor	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  While	  direct	  command	  and	  control	  intervention	  has	  been	  rejected	  as	  an	  approach	  and	  the	  market	  substituted	  as	  the	  key	  driver	  of	  investment	  choice,	  the	  Government	  still	  has	  a	  vital,	  if	  less	  direct,	  control	  over	  system	  development	  through	  setting	  the	  framework	  for	  investment.	  Government	  policies	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  the	  development	  of	  the	  system	  and	  its	  operation,	  through,	  for	  example,	  encouraging	  the	  deployment	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  renewable	  generating	  technologies.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  political	  parties	  may	  design	  or	  alter	  their	  policies	  in	  line	  with	  the	  impact	  it	  may	  have	  on	  their	  party’s	  rating	  for	  upcoming	  elections,	  rather	  than	  looking	  beyond	  the	  five	  year	  period.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	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during	  the	  surge	  in	  oil	  prices	  during	  2008	  when	  proposals	  were	  floated	  for	  oil	  tax	  reductions.	  Another	  proposition	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  taxes	  on	  the	  ‘excessive	  profits’	  of	  large	  international	  oil	  companies	  to	  provide	  subsidies	  to	  low	  income	  families	  (Jansen	  &	  Seebregts,	  2010).	  	  The	  political	  dimension	  of	  energy	  system	  development	  is	  not	  just	  limited	  to	  policy	  making	  in	  the	  UK.	  It	  also	  includes	  the	  global	  political	  conditions	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  find	  resources	  outside	  the	  UK,	  whether	  this	  is	  primary	  fuels	  such	  as	  gas	  oil	  and	  coal,	  or	  secondary	  materials	  such	  as	  rare	  earth	  metals	  for	  the	  production	  of	  solar	  cells,	  skills	  and	  knowledge,	  or	  investment.	  	  
4.2.2 Energy	  Security	  Issues	  The	  ‘Issues’	  category	  sets	  out	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  various	  externalities	  which	  are	  not	  directly	  concerned	  with	  energy	  security	  but	  which	  provide	  the	  basis	  from	  which	  the	  risks	  develop.	  These	  issues	  are	  (1)	  planning,	  (2)	  environment,	  (3)	  governance,	  (4)	  international	  issues.	  
4.2.2.1 Planning	  Planning	  covers	  two	  key	  concepts,	  firstly,	  strategic	  planning	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  goals	  of	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  whilst	  also	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  governance,	  ensuring	  the	  system	  is	  capable	  of	  changing	  its	  operational	  procedures.	  For	  instance,	  the	  facility	  for	  international	  electricity	  imports	  would	  be	  increased	  through	  more	  interconnectors	  with	  Europe.	  This	  interconnection	  would	  become	  more	  important	  whether	  we	  move	  to	  a	  system	  dominated	  by	  intermittent	  renewable	  generation,	  or	  for	  a	  system	  of	  inflexible	  nuclear	  power.	  The	  difficulty	  with	  planning	  is	  the	  need	  for	  capacity	  to	  match	  future	  energy	  demand,	  which	  is	  inevitably	  unpredictable.	  (Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  second	  aspect	  is	  a	  more	  localised	  issue	  of	  planning	  consent,	  where	  individuals	  can	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system.	  The	  planning	  system	  can	  negatively	  impact	  on	  investment	  into	  the	  energy	  system.	  Local	  opposition	  to	  new	  energy	  generation	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  academia	  and	  through	  the	  media,	  whether	  they	  are	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  plants,	  which	  may	  help	  replace	  the	  older	  retiring	  power	  plant,	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  local	  renewable	  technology	  such	  as	  wind	  turbines,	  or	  of	  new	  transmission	  networks	  such	  as	  the	  on-­‐going	  saga	  of	  the	  Beauly-­‐Denny	  line	  in	  Scotland	  (Devine-­‐Wright,	  2004).	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4.2.2.2 Environment	  Environmental	  issues	  seem	  to	  influence	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  nearly	  every	  dimension	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  system	  security	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another.	  Its	  major	  pressure	  is	  through	  climate	  change.	  The	  transition	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system	  provides	  the	  UK	  with	  many	  complications,	  such	  as	  finding	  a	  replacement	  for	  a	  fossil	  fuel	  based	  generation.	  Climate	  change	  also	  has	  another	  interaction	  with	  energy	  security;	  the	  rise	  in	  sea	  level	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  cause	  disruption	  to	  coastal	  based	  power	  plants,	  and	  heightened	  hostility	  internationally	  for	  resource	  competition.	  This	  dimension	  can	  also	  include	  natural	  disasters,	  which	  can	  cause	  damage	  to	  infrastructure	  one	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  cases	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster	  in	  Japan.	  These	  impacts	  can	  be	  amplified	  by	  climate	  change	  effects	  but	  could	  also	  be	  entirely	  independent.	  The	  variety	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  environmental	  connections	  to	  energy	  security	  make	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  The	  full	  environmental	  issue	  can	  often	  be	  overlooked	  in	  favour	  of	  focussing	  on	  a	  few	  impacts	  and	  neglecting	  the	  rest	  (Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
4.2.2.3 Governance	  The	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  relates	  to	  the	  institutions,	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  used	  to	  run	  networks	  and	  markets,	  and	  the	  detailed	  energy	  policies	  that	  are	  implemented	  (Kooiman,	  1993;	  Rhodes,	  2007;	  Florini	  &	  Sovacool,	  2009).	  This	  then	  orders	  the	  relationships	  between	  customers	  and	  energy	  companies;	  it	  impacts	  on	  the	  investment	  and	  the	  development	  of	  supply	  chain	  issues,	  such	  as	  R&D,	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  (Florini	  &	  Sovacool,	  2009)	  Energy	  security	  stakeholders	  range	  from	  the	  individual	  households,	  business,	  through	  to	  national	  Government.	  One	  concern	  is	  the	  level	  of	  power	  each	  stakeholder	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  was	  during	  the	  California	  supply	  crisis	  (PMSU,	  2001)	  where	  rolling	  brown-­‐outs,	  blackouts	  and	  high	  wholesale	  prices	  (PIU,	  2002)	  pointed	  out	  the	  fragility	  of	  new	  market	  structures	  and	  indicated	  the	  requirement	  for	  strong	  and	  clear	  governance	  operations.	  	  The	  governance	  dimension	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  makes	  up	  a	  major	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  chapter	  5.	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4.2.2.4 International	  Issues	  The	  UK	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  energy	  imports,	  not	  only	  for	  resources	  but	  also	  economically	  (Toke,	  2011b;	  Bolton,	  2013).	  The	  impact	  of	  international	  companies,	  agencies,	  and	  states	  can	  therefore	  be	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  energy	  security.	  The	  energy	  economy	  is	  fragile	  enough	  that	  when	  conflict	  breaks	  out	  between	  two	  foreign	  countries,	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  for	  the	  UK	  increases,	  ultimately	  impacting	  on	  the	  price	  for	  the	  end	  user.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Russia	  –	  Ukraine	  Dispute	  in	  2009,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  drop	  in	  demand	  from	  consumers	  even	  though	  there	  was	  very	  little	  immediate	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  (Macalister	  and	  Sparrow,	  2009;	  IEA,	  2007).	  Another	  international	  concern	  for	  the	  UK	  in	  particular	  is	  the	  ownership	  of	  much	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  by	  transnational	  energy	  companies.	  The	  complication	  here	  is	  where	  the	  company’s	  allegiances	  lie.	  If	  there	  are	  options	  over	  where	  companies	  such	  as	  RWE	  or	  E.ON	  could	  invest,	  between	  projects	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  their	  home	  state,	  then	  the	  UK	  system	  would	  find	  they	  will	  be	  competing	  with	  other	  countries	  for	  investment	  (BIS,	  2012;	  Ward	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
4.2.3 Dimensions	  of	  Risk	  The	  risk	  dimension	  stems	  directly	  from	  the	  issues	  discussed	  above.	  The	  term	  ‘risk’	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  reference	  to	  investments,	  where	  any	  investor	  will	  evaluate	  the	  risk	  against	  the	  rewards	  on	  a	  particular	  investment.	  However,	  for	  this	  thesis	  a	  risk	  to	  energy	  security	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  particular	  impact	  which	  can	  stem	  from	  the	  one	  or	  more	  of	  issues	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.2.	  	  This	  section	  will	  identify	  the	  main	  risks	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  categorise	  them	  into:	  (1)	  domestic	  activism	  or	  terrorism,	  (2)	  reliability	  of	  demand	  patterns,	  (3)	  investment	  in	  infrastructure,	  (4)	  technological	  failure,	  (5)	  resource	  availability.	  	  These	  factors	  have	  been	  used	  as	  they	  encompass	  the	  main	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  electricity	  system.	  They	  not	  only	  identify	  the	  short-­‐term	  shocks,	  but	  also	  the	  longer	  term	  risks	  on	  an	  electricity	  system.	  They	  are	  also	  not	  specific	  to	  small-­‐scale	  or	  centralised	  technologies.	  
4.2.3.1 Domestic	  activism	  or	  terrorism	  This	  dimension	  of	  risk	  incorporates	  the	  human	  threats	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  it	  includes	  both	  domestic	  activism	  and	  terrorism,	  however,	  other	  than	  the	  human	  factor	  they	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  related.	  Any	  conscious	  human	  threat,	  which	  is	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intended	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  activism	  (Waston	  &	  Scott;	  2009).	  This	  group	  of	  threats	  also	  includes	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  where	  key	  sections	  of	  infrastructure	  may	  be	  sabotaged.	  Critical	  infrastructure	  could	  include	  gas	  pipelines,	  LNG	  terminals,	  and	  nuclear	  power	  plants.	  One	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  risks	  of	  human	  threats	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  quantify	  or	  estimate	  the	  losses	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  identify	  for	  policy	  makers	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  a	  risk	  (Woo,	  2002).	  	  Domestic	  activism,	  historically,	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  provided	  some	  of	  the	  major	  known	  impacts	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  (Grubb	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  1980s	  UK	  coal	  miners’	  strikes	  exposed	  vulnerability	  not	  only	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  but	  also	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  dependence	  on	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  was	  a	  first	  hand	  insight	  into	  the	  Government’s	  susceptibility	  for	  energy	  issues	  and	  forced	  the	  Government	  to	  take	  emergency	  measures	  and	  rethink	  its	  security	  strategy	  though	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  the	  Governments	  responsibility	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  (Ledger	  and	  Sallis,	  1995).	  In	  late	  2000	  further	  impacts	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  occurred	  such	  as	  fuel	  blockades	  of	  the	  supply	  terminals	  (PMSU,	  2001;	  PIU,	  2002).	  The	  10	  day	  oil	  refinery	  blockade	  left	  motorists	  without	  fuel	  which	  in	  turn	  caused	  shops	  to	  run	  low	  on	  food	  and	  for	  hospitals	  to	  run	  minimal	  services	  (GOfS,	  2008).	  These	  blockades	  helped	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  UK’s	  supply	  networks	  showing	  how	  a	  system	  of	  ‘just	  in	  time’	  delivery	  which	  is	  a	  common	  aspect	  across	  the	  electricity	  and	  gas	  networks	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  ‘attacks’	  (Helm,	  2002).	  Other	  domestic	  activism	  examples	  are	  the	  environmental	  protests	  towards	  the	  building	  of	  new	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  plant	  such	  as	  the	  2007	  Greenpeace	  demonstrations	  at	  Kingsnorth	  Power	  Station	  in	  Kent	  (Evans	  and	  Lewis,	  2009).	  There	  were	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  demonstrations.	  In	  the	  short-­‐term	  the	  Kingsnorth	  power	  station	  closed	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  In	  the	  longer	  term	  it	  provided	  a	  platform	  for	  discussions	  over	  the	  future	  use	  of	  coal	  for	  generating	  electricity	  and	  it	  identified	  the	  weakness	  of	  electricity	  generating	  stations	  to	  human	  attack.	  
4.2.3.2 Reliability	  of	  Demand	  patterns	  This	  category	  includes	  the	  risks	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  consumption	  patterns	  at	  the	  business	  and	  household	  level.	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  factors	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  capacity	  will	  meet	  demand	  (DECC,	  2012o);	  therefore,	  the	  risk	  of	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demand	  rising	  or	  falling	  and	  the	  current	  inability	  to	  provide	  an	  automated	  dynamic	  demand	  system	  creates	  a	  viable	  threat	  to	  the	  energy	  system.	  	  Consumer	  behaviour	  is	  becoming	  a	  key	  element	  to	  developing	  energy	  security	  with	  their	  capacity	  to	  transform	  where	  the	  energy	  comes	  from,	  the	  end-­‐user	  consumption	  intensity,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  used	  (Frontier	  Economics,	  2012).	  This	  response	  to	  energy	  security	  was	  demonstrated	  during	  2009	  with	  the	  Russia	  –	  Ukraine	  Gas	  dispute.	  Although	  there	  was	  little	  direct	  impact	  to	  the	  UK	  energy	  system,	  many	  customers	  reacted	  by	  decreasing	  their	  demand	  (IEA,	  2007).	  	  The	  existing	  models	  of	  consumer	  interaction	  favours	  passive	  consumption	  (JRC,	  2013;	  Gangale	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  where	  the	  consumer	  has	  little	  interaction	  with	  the	  energy	  system	  by	  making	  no	  adjustment	  in	  daily	  behaviour	  and	  making	  bill	  payments	  though	  direct	  debit.	  However,	  a	  change	  in	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  energy	  market	  may	  be	  able	  to	  motivate	  the	  end	  user	  to	  engage	  a	  response	  with	  secondary	  benefits	  (UKERC,	  2009).	  These	  include	  the	  move	  towards	  other	  policy	  goals	  such	  as	  a	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions,	  a	  reduction	  in	  fuel	  poverty	  as	  well	  as	  ensuring	  energy	  security.	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  environmental	  goals	  set	  by	  the	  Government,	  simply	  replacing	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  energy	  generation	  with	  low	  carbon	  supplies	  will	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  the	  economics	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  carbon	  budgets	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  reduction	  on	  energy	  demand	  is	  required	  (DECC,	  2009a).	  
4.2.3.3 Investment	  in	  infrastructure	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  future	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  as	  Government	  and	  contributors	  suggest,	  a	  significant	  level	  of	  investment	  will	  be	  required.	  This	  will	  also	  be	  needed	  to	  maintain	  the	  current	  infrastructure	  with	  a	  business	  as	  usual	  plan	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	  This	  investment	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  money	  required	  for	  the	  physical	  upgrades	  off	  the	  energy	  system,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  investment	  in	  skills	  required	  for	  its	  development	  (Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  The	  required	  investment	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  up	  to	  2020	  has	  been	  placed	  in	  the	  hundreds	  of	  billions;	  £165bn	  (Ernst	  and	  Young,	  2008),	  £200bn	  (Ofgem,	  2010;	  AEP,	  2010).	  Ofgem	  identify	  how	  this	  requirement	  for	  very	  high	  levels	  of	  investment	  will	  prove	  difficult	  with	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  which	  surrounds	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	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The	  energy	  supply	  industry	  is	  responsible	  for	  funding	  this	  investment	  through	  borrowing,	  direct	  shareholder	  investment,	  and	  retained	  earnings.	  However,	  securing	  this	  investment	  is	  not	  guaranteed	  and	  will	  rely	  on	  energy	  companies	  accessing	  debt	  and	  equity	  finance.	  This	  will	  require	  shareholders	  to	  be	  persuaded	  that	  a	  return	  will	  come	  through	  new	  assets	  after	  the	  debt	  is	  repaid.	  This	  in	  turn	  requires	  clear	  governance,	  giving	  a	  degree	  of	  certainty	  about	  the	  future	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  
4.2.3.4 Technological	  Failure	  The	  level	  of	  reserve	  capacity	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  transport	  system	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  costs	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  through	  the	  market	  structure.	  The	  physical	  capabilities	  of	  current	  infrastructure	  can	  be	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  efficiency	  based	  on	  the	  losses	  encountered	  during	  electricity	  production	  and	  the	  level	  of	  resistance	  through	  the	  transportation	  system.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  systems	  will	  degrade	  over	  time,	  therefore,	  a	  time	  constraint	  can	  be	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  manufacturer	  for	  either	  replacement	  or	  servicing	  identifying	  required	  shutdown	  periods	  for	  certain	  areas	  while	  the	  maintenance	  occurs	  (National	  Grid,	  2011b).	  This	  would	  mean	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  network	  would	  need	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  shortfall	  and	  possibly	  cause	  constraints	  on	  the	  networks.	  Environmental	  variables	  such	  as	  wind	  speed	  –the	  uncontrollable	  nature	  of	  wind	  turbines	  affecting	  capacity	  levels	  -­‐	  and	  sunlight	  levels	  for	  solar	  cell	  activity	  can	  be	  tracked	  over	  previous	  years	  to	  provide	  an	  estimated	  level	  of	  capacity	  and	  predicted	  capacity	  error.	  However,	  these	  environmental	  issues	  can	  cause	  an	  unpredictable	  impact	  over	  the	  long-­‐term,	  an	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  hot	  summer	  of	  2003	  in	  France	  causing	  the	  failure	  of	  many	  of	  their	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  from	  lack	  of	  water	  (Fouché,	  2003).	  The	  ability	  to	  provide	  accurate	  forecasting	  of	  future	  energy	  demand	  trends	  would	  require	  a	  system	  which	  would	  be	  flexible	  over	  the	  short	  and	  longer	  term.	  The	  possibility	  of	  planning	  issues	  causing	  hold	  ups	  and	  blocking	  vital	  projects	  coupled	  with	  a	  failure	  of	  policy	  at	  a	  national	  level	  leading	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  energy	  infrastructure,	  and	  research	  and	  development	  of	  energy	  source	  is	  a	  major	  risk	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  future	  energy	  system	  (Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	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4.2.3.5 Resource	  Availability	  The	  risk	  generated	  by	  primary	  energy	  sources	  is	  probably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  discussed	  issues	  in	  Government	  and	  academia	  (Grubb	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Checchi	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Barrett	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Bergmann	  2010;	  Chester,	  2010;	  Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  DECC,	  2012g;	  DECC,	  2012o;)	  With	  fossil	  fuels	  it	  is	  the	  reliance	  on	  a	  stable	  source	  of	  fuel	  for	  power	  stations,	  heating	  and	  transport.	  With	  renewable	  technology	  there	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  rare	  earth	  metal	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  build	  the	  technology	  and	  also	  the	  environmental	  concern	  of	  the	  unpredictable	  nature	  of	  its	  primary	  resource	  (Moss	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Baldi	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  fossil	  fuels	  used	  in	  electricity	  are	  a	  finite	  resource	  and	  will	  at	  some	  point	  be	  completely	  exhausted.	  As	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  decline,	  limited	  availability	  may	  cause	  the	  international	  price	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  to	  increase	  thus	  driving	  other	  cheaper	  forms	  of	  generation	  to	  the	  fore.	  Over	  the	  last	  decade	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  has	  been	  strongly	  linked	  to	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  economy.	  This	  therefore	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  security	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  vulnerability	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  markets	  and	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  cope	  with	  volatile	  fossil	  fuel	  prices	  have	  not	  been	  measured	  in	  a	  quantitative	  way	  (Jansen	  &	  Seebregts,	  2010).	  The	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  markets	  may	  be	  from	  the	  inability	  to	  predict	  future	  relations	  between	  states	  and	  the	  possible	  fluctuations	  in	  price	  due	  to	  natural	  disaster	  (Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  As	  a	  particular	  technology	  enters	  the	  market	  with	  increasing	  levels	  of	  demand,	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  raw	  materials	  increases	  along	  with	  it.	  For	  distributed	  generation	  many	  of	  these	  materials	  are	  classified	  as	  rare	  earth	  metals	  such	  as	  Silicon,	  Gallium,	  and	  Silver	  (used	  in	  solar	  cells)	  Gold	  (in	  high	  performance	  mirrors),	  Neodymium	  (used	  for	  the	  magnets	  in	  wind	  turbines)	  (Baldi	  et	  al.	  2014).	  The	  production	  of	  many	  of	  these	  rare	  materials	  is	  dominated	  by	  one	  single	  country,	  China,	  which	  has	  97%	  of	  the	  world’s	  rare	  earth	  metal	  production	  (Froggatt	  and	  Lahn,	  2010).	  The	  resource	  deficiency	  limits	  the	  supply	  chain	  of	  alternative	  generation	  technologies	  construction.	  
4.2.4 Impacts	  of	  Risk	  	  Each	  of	  the	  risks	  discussed	  above	  may	  generate	  a	  single	  or	  multiple	  impacts	  on	  the	  energy	  system.	  The	  impacts	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  indicators	  of	  energy	  security	  (Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  They	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  energy	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security	  concept	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  impacts	  include	  (1)	  the	  number	  and	  level	  of	  blackouts	  or	  brownouts	  experienced	  on	  the	  network,	  (2)	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  energy	  supply	  industry,	  (3)	  the	  market	  stability,	  and	  (4)	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy.	  
4.2.4.1 Number	  of	  blackouts	  or	  brownouts	  The	  efficiency	  of	  electricity	  outputs	  could	  be	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  main	  indicators	  for	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  (IEA,	  2005).	  They	  show	  immediate	  signals	  that	  the	  system	  is	  not	  operating	  correctly.	  Whether	  this	  is	  the	  short-­‐term	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  or	  an	  external	  impact	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events	  (Lefèvre,	  2010).	  A	  secure	  electricity	  system	  requires	  the	  reduction	  of	  involuntary	  supply	  interruptions	  for	  consumers	  (BERR,	  2007).	  This	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘keeping	  the	  lights	  on’	  (Patterson,	  2009).	  It	  is	  now	  understood	  that	  the	  security	  problem	  is	  not	  simply	  capacity	  and	  delivery	  concerns,	  it	  is	  a	  multifaceted	  issue	  balancing	  issues	  of	  demand	  and	  of	  capacity	  (McKenna	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Darby	  &	  McKenna,	  2012).	  	  The	  impact	  of	  energy	  unserved	  does	  not	  only	  impact	  economically.	  There	  are	  additional	  indirect	  impacts,	  such	  as	  the	  change	  in	  demand	  patterns;	  if	  individuals	  understand	  that	  energy	  is	  a	  fragile	  commodity	  consumers	  would	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  reliance	  on	  energy	  being	  ‘on	  tap’.	  Greater	  spikes	  in	  energy	  usage	  would	  occur	  at	  times	  of	  availability	  making	  it	  tougher	  for	  network	  operators	  to	  control	  the	  system	  and	  supply	  demands.	  
4.2.4.2 Diversity/dependence	  Diversity	  of	  fuel	  source	  has	  been	  discussed	  as	  an	  important	  method	  of	  ensuring	  supply	  security,	  by	  providing	  additional	  sources	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  failure	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  would	  not	  be	  overly	  dependant	  on	  a	  particular	  resource	  (Jansen	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Government	  use	  it	  as	  an	  important	  method	  of	  strengthening	  energy	  security	  (DTI,	  2007a;	  DTI,	  2007d;	  DTI,	  2007e,	  DECC,	  2012n).	  Measuring	  diversity	  can	  therefore	  be	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  this	  aspect	  of	  energy	  security	  (Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  DECC,	  2012o).	  A	  low	  level	  of	  diversity	  could	  mean	  a	  low	  level	  of	  security.	  In	  a	  means	  to	  use	  diversity	  as	  an	  indicator	  quantitative	  measures	  have	  been	  established.	  Diversity	  is	  however,	  a	  very	  complex	  concept	  with	  the	  energy	  system.	  It	  can	  encompass,	  fuel	  type	  and	  sources,	  technology	  types,	  and	  the	  range	  of	  required	  skills	  (Grubb	  et	  al.,	  2006).	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Sterling	  (1999)	  uses	  an	  index	  of	  diversity	  including,	  variety	  (the	  number	  of	  different	  categories20),	  balance	  (the	  spread	  of	  the	  categories)	  and	  disparity	  (the	  difference	  between	  the	  categories).	  Quantifying	  diversity	  in	  this	  way	  provides	  a	  structure	  to	  measuring	  diversity	  through	  the	  three	  indexes,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  exact	  science.	  Measuring	  disparity	  requires	  some	  form	  of	  subjectivity	  meaning	  the	  calculation	  could	  be	  different	  between	  models	  (Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Each	  category	  may	  have	  additional	  aspects,	  such	  as	  increased	  flexibility	  or	  a	  cheap	  method	  of	  providing	  baseload.	  The	  impact	  of	  each	  of	  these	  aspects	  may	  be	  different	  in	  the	  future	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  system.	  	  Diversity	  is	  a	  system	  property	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  aspect,	  which	  can	  be	  provided	  by	  a	  single	  technology	  (Watson	  and	  Scott,	  2009).	  It	  can	  be	  quantified	  to	  some	  extent	  with	  a	  level	  of	  subjectivity,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  how	  it	  should	  be	  diversified	  (Parliamentary	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  2012).	  	  
4.2.4.3 Market	  Stability	  Market	  stability	  is	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  system	  to	  cope	  with	  changes	  in	  supply	  and	  demand	  without	  causing	  significant	  movement	  in	  the	  price	  of	  energy.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  described	  as	  ‘market	  liquidity’	  (IEA,	  2002a).	  Various	  factors	  can	  cause	  price	  spikes	  such	  as	  a	  dependence	  on	  a	  single	  volatile	  fuel	  source	  such	  as	  gas	  or	  oil	  (Bolton,	  2013).	  This	  makes	  stability	  of	  prices	  in	  the	  market	  a	  good	  indicator	  for	  judging	  historical	  security.	  There	  are	  ways	  of	  ensuring	  constant	  market	  stability,	  such	  as	  establishing	  a	  high	  level	  of	  storage,	  which	  would	  provide	  a	  cushion	  when	  these	  events	  occur.	  However,	  ensuring	  market	  stability	  may	  cause	  the	  overall	  price	  for	  energy	  to	  increase	  as	  storage	  technologies	  initially	  would	  be	  expensive	  (DECC,	  2012r).	  
4.2.4.4 End	  price	  of	  energy	  for	  consumers	  and	  business	  The	  price	  of	  electricity	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  risen	  after	  a	  decade	  of	  falling	  prices	  (DECC,	  2013c).	  The	  relative	  affordability	  of	  energy	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  for	  both	  domestic	  and	  industrial	  consumers.	  	  The	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  does	  not	  indicate	  an	  insecure	  energy	  system.	  It	  can	  be	  a	  result	  of	  insecurity	  but	  it	  is	  an	  indicator	  of	  risk	  on	  the	  system	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Categories	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  sector	  being	  discussed.	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4.2.5 Energy	  Security	  Matrix	  Each	  of	  these	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  shows	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  dimensions	  identified	  each	  have	  interlinked	  aspects,	  which	  can	  occur	  over	  the	  long,	  medium	  or	  short	  time	  periods.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security,	  this	  thesis	  has	  set	  them	  out	  into	  a	  matrix	  (	  Figure	  4-­‐2).	  This	  matrix	  includes	  the	  five	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  (including	  the	  landscape	  issues,	  drivers,	  risks/threats,	  impacts	  and	  the	  system	  requirements).	  	  Figure	  4-­‐2	  identifies	  the	  landscape	  issues	  as	  the	  overarching	  externalities	  which	  impact	  on	  all	  the	  dimensions,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  having	  a	  direct	  association	  with	  the	  ‘drivers’.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  each	  dimension	  then	  influences	  the	  following	  set	  of	  dimension.	  The	  final	  dimension	  shown	  in	  the	  matrix	  is	  the	  system	  requirements	  to	  provide	  a	  secure	  system,	  which	  may	  be	  able	  to	  resolve	  the	  other	  dimensions.	  The	  requirements,	  therefore,	  directly	  guide	  the	  drivers,	  making	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  cyclical	  in	  nature.	  Consequently,	  	  Figure	  4-­‐2	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  be	  the	  final	  representation	  of	  energy	  security,	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  a	  fluid	  entity	  and	  the	  weighting	  of	  different	  aspects	  may	  change	  with	  new	  impacts	  connections	  and	  associations	  arriving	  over	  time.	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  Figure	  4-­‐2	  Matrix	  of	  energy	  security	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4.3 What	  is	  a	  secure	  energy	  system?	  The	  complexity	  of	  energy	  security	  provides	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  topic	  for	  discussion.	  When	  compared	  to	  other	  policy	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  level	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  or	  fuel	  poverty,	  there	  is	  no	  universally	  agreed	  method	  of	  measuring	  or	  defining	  energy	  security	  (BERR,	  2007;	  Löschel,	  2010;	  Checchi	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kruyt	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Chester,	  2010).	  Definitions	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  reliability	  of	  supplies,	  resilience	  to	  infrastructure	  attack	  and	  natural	  disaster.	  They	  can	  also	  look	  at	  the	  previous	  level	  of	  interruptions	  of	  supplies	  to	  end	  users	  (HofC,	  2011).	  This	  chapter	  has	  so	  far	  set	  out	  the	  main	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  a	  way	  of	  developing	  a	  comprehensive	  method	  for	  defining	  energy	  security.	  This	  has	  included	  the	  drivers,	  risks	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  energy	  security	  which	  are	  impacted	  upon	  by	  the	  overarching	  landscape	  issues.	  
4.3.1 Key	  characteristics	  for	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  The	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  needs	  to	  encompass	  many	  different	  aspects;	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  simple	  issue	  of	  supply.	  Energy	  security	  has	  many	  complex	  facets.	  The	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  UK	  energy	  security	  means	  that	  each	  of	  these	  dimensions	  can	  be	  impacted	  in	  additional	  ways,	  such	  as	  the	  timescale:	  each	  dimension	  of	  energy	  security	  can	  change	  over	  time	  and	  can	  then	  be	  separated	  into	  the	  short-­‐term,	  medium	  term	  and	  long-­‐term	  elements	  (DTI,	  1997).	  Categorising	  risk	  as	  a	  ‘shock’	  or	  ‘stress’	  is	  another	  way	  in	  which	  their	  relation	  to	  time	  is	  shown	  (Stirling,	  2009).	  There	  is	  also	  the	  interconnected	  nature	  of	  energy	  security	  to	  other	  systems	  such	  as	  food,	  water,	  waste	  and	  ecosystem	  security	  (Hanlon	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  where	  energy	  security	  can	  impact	  on	  and	  be	  impacted	  upon	  by	  other	  systems.	  Finally,	  the	  current	  dependence	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system	  on	  international	  supply	  chains	  and	  policies	  could	  mean	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  security.	  The	  requirements	  for	  a	  secure	  electricity	  system	  also	  provide	  the	  definition	  of	  electricity	  security.	  The	  choice	  to	  use	  these	  particular	  requirements	  has	  stemmed	  from	  the	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  discussed	  previously	  in	  this	  section.	  They	  incorporate	  a	  classical	  overview	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  with	  a	  forward	  looking	  approach	  responding	  to	  future	  changes.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  economic	  aspect	  looking	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  security	  for	  the	  consumers	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  UK	  economy.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  the	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  has	  four	  aspects	  discussed	  below	  but	  which	  have	  not	  been	  placed	  in	  order	  of	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priority.	  The	  significance	  of	  each	  condition	  will	  change	  between	  different	  groups	  and	  over	  time:	  
• The	  provision	  of	  reliable	  energy	  supplies	  for	  primary	  fuels	  and	  for	  delivery.	  
• The	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  unforeseen	  future	  changes.	  
• Protection	  for	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  energy	  price	  rises.	  
• That	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  undermined	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security.	  These	  requirements	  are	  developed	  from	  the	  current	  discussion	  on	  energy	  security	  and	  adapted	  to	  fit	  a	  holistic	  model	  for	  the	  modern	  energy	  system.	  The	  first	  aspect,	  ‘the	  provision	  of	  reliable	  energy	  supplies	  for	  primary	  fuels	  and	  for	  delivery’,	  is	  a	  security	  of	  supply	  statement	  echoing	  the	  older	  Governmental	  definitions	  where	  the	  issue	  was	  simply	  to	  ensure	  ‘the	  lights	  stay	  on’.	  It	  is	  meant	  to	  cover	  the	  generation	  and	  supply	  of	  electricity	  and	  therefore	  includes	  balancing	  the	  network	  (whether	  this	  is	  a	  supply	  or	  a	  demand	  based	  operation)	  and	  ensuring	  the	  appropriate	  capacity.	  The	  second	  aspect,	  ‘the	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  unforeseen	  future	  changes’,	  delivers	  a	  forward	  looking	  concept	  where	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  a	  secure	  future.	  A	  flexible	  system	  would	  mean	  that	  you	  would	  be	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  demand	  patterns,	  technology	  and	  externalities	  such	  as	  climate	  change.	  This	  aspect	  introduces	  a	  facet	  of	  sustainability	  into	  the	  definition	  (Barrett	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Whereby	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  a	  continually	  changing	  entity	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  different	  external	  influences	  placed	  on	  it	  in	  2050.	  	  The	  third	  aspect,	  protection	  for	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  energy	  price	  rises,	  is	  a	  cost	  based	  dimension,	  which	  indicates	  that	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  may	  not	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  fuel	  poor.	  Ensuring	  very	  high	  levels	  of	  security	  may	  impact	  on	  the	  end	  price	  of	  energy	  negatively,	  and	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  having	  a	  high	  level	  of	  spare	  capacity,	  which	  would	  go	  unused	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  final	  aspect,	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  undermined	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security,	  also	  covers	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  for	  energy	  intensive	  industry	  players,	  and	  the	  energy	  industry	  itself.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  assurance	  that	  any	  policies	  or	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  ensure	  security	  do	  not	  disrupt	  other	  industries	  impacting	  negatively	  on	  the	  economy.	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4.4 Summary:	  This	  chapter	  has	  looked	  at	  the	  development	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  Government	  literature.	  This	  has	  provided	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  concepts	  held	  regarding	  current	  energy	  security.	  	  The	  UK	  Government	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘security	  of	  supply’	  which	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  provide	  only	  a	  narrow	  definition	  for	  discussion,	  and	  emphasising	  secure	  fuel	  supplies.	  This	  is	  clearly	  an	  important	  element,	  but	  this	  thesis	  adopts	  a	  far	  more	  complex	  model,	  including	  the	  links	  to	  the	  economy,	  fuel	  poverty,	  the	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  ensuring	  ‘the	  lights	  stay	  on’.	  This	  chapter	  has	  then	  identified	  the	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security,	  categorising	  them	  into	  the	  drivers,	  issues,	  risks,	  and	  the	  impacts	  and	  finally	  provided	  the	  system	  requirements	  for	  a	  secure	  energy	  system.	  The	  drivers	  include	  the	  social,	  economic,	  innovation	  and	  political	  dimensions.	  These	  can	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  boarder	  sense	  as	  general	  drivers	  for	  the	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  they	  have	  been	  discussed	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  affect	  on	  security.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  drivers	  are	  the	  issues;	  the	  issues	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  drivers	  and	  dictate	  aspects,	  which	  may	  need	  to	  be	  resolved	  or	  recognised.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  environmental	  issues,	  which	  include	  the	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  futures.	  Other	  issues	  include	  the	  planning	  environment,	  international	  associations	  and	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  These	  issues	  then	  follow	  on	  to	  identifying	  the	  risks	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  importance	  of	  identifying	  and	  understanding	  the	  various	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  electricity	  system	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  thought	  about	  when	  any	  policy	  decisions	  are	  made.	  If	  any	  policy	  for	  energy	  security	  is	  made	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  only	  as	  strong	  as	  its	  weakest	  link	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  risks	  can	  break	  the	  links.	  Each	  risk	  identified	  can	  produce	  a	  number	  of	  impacts.	  The	  impacts	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  indicators	  of	  historical	  insecurity.	  They	  include	  the	  blackout	  or	  brownouts,	  the	  diversity,	  the	  market	  stability	  and	  the	  end	  price	  of	  electricity.	  	  Finally	  this	  chapter	  has	  identified	  a	  definition	  of	  energy	  security.	  It	  has	  done	  this	  by	  looking	  at	  what	  is	  required	  of	  the	  system	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  all	  the	  dimensions	  mentioned.	  This	  thesis	  proposes	  that	  this	  can	  be	  done	  through	  meeting	  four	  requirements:	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• The	  provision	  of	  reliable	  energy	  supplies	  for	  primary	  fuels	  and	  for	  delivery.	  
• The	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  unforeseen	  future	  changes.	  
• Protection	  for	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  energy	  price	  rises.	  
• That	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  undermined	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security.	  With	  a	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  this	  thesis	  will	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  on	  this	  energy	  security.	  It	  will	  do	  this	  by	  firstly	  identifying	  what	  it	  means	  by	  decentralisation.	  Classifying	  the	  aspects	  of	  a	  decentralised	  system.	  Then	  providing	  the	  potential	  benefits	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  decentralisation	  for	  energy	  security.	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5 Decentralised	  Electricity	  System’s	  Impact	  on	  Security	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  changes	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  can	  be	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  engineers,	  installers	  and	  the	  owners	  each	  of	  whom	  would	  have	  a	  ‘stake’	  in	  the	  running	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Chmutina	  and	  Goodier	  2014).	  	  A	  centralised	  electricity	  system,	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  utilising	  a	  few	  large	  generation	  plants,	  connected	  to	  the	  transmission	  network	  requiring	  the	  use	  of	  the	  distribution	  network	  to	  connect	  to	  consumer;	  and	  a	  comparatively	  low	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  operate	  within	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  definition	  of	  decentralisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  includes	  two	  main	  aspects,	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  institutional	  requirements:	  
• The	  generation	  plant	  would	  be	  either	  connected	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  or	  off	  grid,	  at	  a	  location	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use.	  
• A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  has	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  with	  ownership	  of	  infrastructure	  of	  different	  scales	  and	  dispersed	  geography.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  level	  of	  decentralisation	  is	  envisaged	  as	  being	  on	  a	  spectrum.	  It	  would	  be	  unlikely	  for	  any	  system	  to	  be	  considered	  completely	  centralised	  or	  decentralised.	  By	  operating	  through	  a	  small	  number	  of	  main	  utilities,	  a	  single	  centrally	  operated	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  network	  21,	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  considered	  highly	  centralised,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  some	  small-­‐scale	  technologies	  through	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  FIT.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  a	  completely	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  find	  each	  consumer	  having	  their	  own	  personal	  power	  source	  with	  no	  requirement	  for	  a	  centrally	  operated	  network.	  The	  discussion	  here	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  increasing	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  on	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  Distribution	  Network	  Operators,	  they	  can	  each	  be	  considered	  a	  monopoly	  
for	  their	  specific	  location.	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5.1 Aspects	  of	  Decentralisation	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  has,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  been	  split	  into	  five	  aspects:	  	  1. Policies,	  including	  the	  involvement	  of	  UK	  Government	  in	  the	  development	  of	  decentralisation.	  	  2. The	  economic	  aspect	  discusses	  the	  approach	  of	  markets	  and	  market	  mechanism	  changes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders	  entering	  into	  investment.	  	  3. The	  social	  aspect	  includes	  the	  impact	  on	  and	  from	  consumers,	  individual	  householders	  and	  businesses.	  	  4. The	  connection	  of	  decentralisation	  to	  climate	  change	  policy.	  	  5. And	  finally	  this	  thesis	  examines	  the	  implications	  in	  security	  of	  greater	  levels	  of	  decentralisation.	  This	  latter	  aspect	  is	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
5.1.1 Policies	  The	  UK	  Government’s	  policies	  and	  strategies	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  have	  been	  outlined	  in	  each	  of	  the	  Energy	  White	  Papers	  released	  over	  the	  last	  10	  years	  (DTI,	  2003;	  2007a;	  DECC	  2011b).	  With	  changing	  Governments,	  ministers	  and	  social	  landscape,	  the	  future	  vision	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  altered.	  Concern	  over	  climate	  change	  has	  increasingly	  been	  the	  driving	  force	  for	  Government	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  80%	  by	  2050	  and	  which	  has	  become	  a	  requirement	  by	  law	  under	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Act	  (2008).	  Electricity	  generation	  is	  the	  single	  biggest	  source	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  estimated	  at	  around	  32%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  total	  carbon	  emissions	  in	  2011	  (DECC,	  2012a).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  2009	  Renewable	  Energy	  Directive	  sets	  out	  a	  target	  requiring	  15%	  of	  energy	  to	  be	  sourced	  from	  renewable	  technology	  by	  2020	  (DECC	  2011g).	  One	  method	  of	  providing	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  is	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  large	  amounts	  of	  renewable	  generation	  which	  can	  be	  either	  large	  or	  decentralised	  (Gullì,	  2006;	  Tsikalakis	  &	  Hatziargyriou,	  2007;	  Bergman	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Vogel,	  2009).	  	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘decentralisation’	  in	  Government	  documents,	  however,	  is	  ambiguous.	  Therefore,	  the	  aspects	  of	  decentralisation	  have	  to	  be	  interpreted	  within	  Government	  documents.	  The	  UK	  Government	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  definition	  for	  the	  decentralisation	  of	  energy	  as	  they	  have	  no	  clear	  agenda	  for	  a	  decentralised	  future	  other	  than	  a	  loose	  set	  of	  concepts.	  This	  thesis	  has	  provided	  a	  clear	  definition	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of	  decentralisation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  discuss	  the	  issues	  and	  impacts	  associated	  with	  a	  decentralised	  future.	  	  One	  reason	  behind	  the	  design	  of	  the	  RO	  was	  that	  it	  should	  emphasise	  the	  UK’s	  commitment	  to	  having	  a	  competitive	  market	  place.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  competition	  between	  technologies	  was	  designed	  to	  provide,	  in	  theory,	  the	  lowest	  cost	  generation,	  keeping	  the	  end	  price	  of	  electricity	  lower	  for	  the	  consumer	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Finney	  et	  al	  (2012)	  discuss	  the	  RO	  as	  a	  way	  to	  minimise	  the	  economic	  barriers,	  such	  as	  the	  reduction	  in	  investment	  risk	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  investment	  opportunities.	  However,	  this	  was	  aimed	  at	  the	  larger	  generators	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  confidence	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  energy	  producers	  (Allen	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Williams,	  2010;	  Woodman	  &	  Mitchell,	  2011).	  Hence	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FIT.	  Another	  policy	  support	  for	  new	  micro	  generation	  projects	  was	  operated	  through	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Buildings	  Programme	  (DTI,	  2006a).	  A	  low	  Carbon	  Building	  Programme	  provided	  grants	  towards	  the	  costs	  of	  installing	  micro	  generation	  in	  domestic	  building	  and	  larger	  distributed	  generation	  projects	  for	  public	  buildings.	  	  Other	  policy	  instruments	  to	  reduce	  the	  capital	  costs	  of	  micro	  generation	  include	  the	  Carbon	  Emissions	  Reductions	  Target	  (CERT)	  and	  the	  VAT	  relief	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  energy	  saving	  items.	  CERT	  is	  designed	  to	  get	  energy	  suppliers	  to	  provide	  carbon	  dioxide	  emission	  reductions	  from	  the	  domestic	  sector.	  It	  is	  a	  regulated	  mechanism,	  which	  allows	  12%	  of	  the	  suppliers	  targets	  to	  be	  met	  through	  micro	  generation	  (The	  Electricity	  and	  Gas	  (Carbon	  Emissions	  Reduction)	  Order,	  2008).	  	  There	  are	  also	  less	  direct	  mechanisms	  introduced	  by	  Government	  through	  Building	  Regulations.	  By	  tightening	  Building	  Regulations	  for	  new	  buildings,	  a	  move	  towards	  zero	  carbon	  homes	  is	  generated.	  This	  was	  designed	  to	  get	  developers	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  to	  achieve	  these	  levels	  of	  building	  standards	  much	  more	  than	  in	  the	  past	  (Boardman,	  2007).	  In	  some	  circumstances	  this	  led	  to	  micro	  generation	  being	  installed	  to	  displace	  consumption	  (Bergman	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  As	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  increases	  relative	  to	  centralised	  capacity,	  it	  will	  require	  different	  operational	  systems	  for	  control	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  a	  stable	  system	  (Cossent	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Sims	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  One	  solution	  to	  aid	  this	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  greater	  demand	  elasticity	  or	  flexibility	  (Romer	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  One	  
	   123	  
way	  to	  achieve	  this	  is	  through	  smart	  meter	  implementation	  and	  storage	  technologies,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  discussed	  by	  Government	  but	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  development	  (DECC,	  2012j;	  DECC,	  2012b;	  DECC,	  2013j;	  DECC,	  2013k).	  	  Investment	  in	  technology	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  risk	  reward	  ratio.	  This	  ratio	  differs	  for	  different	  customers.	  An	  essential	  first	  step,	  however,	  is	  getting	  the	  economics	  right	  and	  that	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  many	  Government	  policies	  (DTI,	  2003;	  DTI,	  2007a;	  DECC,	  2011a).	  The	  funding	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  smart	  meters	  and	  the	  FIT	  is	  achieved	  through	  the	  energy	  companies	  who	  pass	  the	  cost	  on	  to	  the	  consumer	  through	  the	  energy	  bills.	  	  The	  Committee	  on	  Climate	  Change	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  policies	  to	  meet	  low	  carbon	  objectives	  will	  add	  approximately	  £110	  to	  each	  bill	  by	  2020	  (CCC,	  2011).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  consumers’	  energy	  bills	  initially	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  easiest	  and	  most	  effective	  option.	  The	  more	  energy	  a	  user	  consumes,	  the	  higher	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  policy	  they	  fund.	  As	  the	  growing	  energy	  costs	  from	  the	  current	  reliance	  on	  increasingly	  expensive	  fossil	  fuels	  plus	  additional	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs	  (Ofgem,	  2013a;	  DECC,	  2013l)	  means	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  lower	  carbon	  system	  may	  come	  at	  a	  high	  cost,	  especially	  to	  the	  fuel	  poor.	  
5.1.2 Economic	  aspects	  of	  Decentralisation	  For	  any	  new	  technology	  to	  establish	  itself	  within	  the	  energy	  system,	  it	  will	  need	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  current	  technologies.	  This	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  direct	  entrance	  in	  the	  market	  place	  or	  through	  mechanisms	  and	  subsidies	  such	  as	  the	  RO	  and	  the	  FIT.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  investment	  is	  to	  be	  required	  for	  a	  future	  low	  carbon	  system.	  Therefore,	  the	  future	  low	  carbon	  system	  will	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  support	  such	  a	  large	  level	  of	  investment	  and	  introduce	  investors	  who	  can	  provide	  this	  additional	  investment.	  It	  will	  also	  mean	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  future	  system	  will	  need	  to	  be	  as	  low	  as	  possible	  whilst	  meeting	  the	  Government’s	  targets	  and	  goals.	  The	  cost	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  involves	  four	  closely	  linked	  aspects:	  the	  capital	  cost	  of	  the	  technology,	  the	  running	  costs	  involved,	  the	  profitability	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  find	  investment.	  This	  section	  will	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  aspects	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  impact	  a	  decentralised	  system	  may	  have	  on	  the	  current	  centralised	  operation.	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5.1.2.1 Capital	  Costs	  of	  Generation	  Plants	  The	  upfront	  capital	  cost	  of	  distributed	  generation	  has	  been	  discussed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  barriers	  to	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system	  (IEA,	  2002a;	  Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Allen	  et	  al.	  2008;	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  2007;	  Bayod-­‐Rujula,	  2009).	  The	  Government’s	  Renewable	  Energy	  Strategy	  published	  in	  2008	  showed	  that	  the	  smaller	  micro	  generation	  technologies	  were	  seven	  to	  ten	  times	  more	  expensive	  than	  larger	  scale	  renewable	  projects	  (HM	  Government,	  2009).	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  operating	  in	  the	  renewable	  sector.	  However	  since	  these	  publications,	  the	  feed	  in	  tariff	  has	  been	  introduced	  and	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  small-­‐scale	  technologies	  has	  occurred.	  Furthermore	  the	  capital	  costs	  have	  reduced	  closing	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  large	  to	  small-­‐scale	  costs	  (DECC,	  2013f).	  One	  of	  the	  explanations	  for	  the	  higher	  cost	  of	  smaller	  distributed	  generation	  plants	  is	  the	  labour	  cost.	  The	  smaller	  plants	  are	  inherently	  more	  labour-­‐intensive	  than	  the	  centralised	  facilities.	  The	  result	  of	  this,	  however,	  is	  that	  more	  jobs	  are	  created	  benefiting	  the	  local	  area	  (Krager	  and	  Hennings,	  2009).	  This	  provides	  a	  dimension	  of	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation,	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  The	  decentralised	  electricity	  technology	  pathways	  may	  cost	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  capital	  costs;	  however,	  it	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  greater	  economic	  wealth	  through	  an	  increase	  in	  localised	  jobs	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  householder	  in	  the	  investment	  and	  ownership	  of	  generation	  plants	  (Chmutina	  and	  Goodier	  2014).	  Another	  reason	  given	  for	  the	  inflated	  costs	  of	  small-­‐scale	  technology	  was	  that	  before	  the	  FIT,	  the	  level	  of	  deployment	  was	  so	  low	  that	  the	  market	  was	  not	  competitive,	  meaning	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  installers	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  costs	  high	  (Watson	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Bergman	  and	  Jardine,	  2009).	  Since	  the	  FIT	  instillations	  the	  cost	  of	  small-­‐scale	  technologies	  has	  been	  reducing	  (DECC,	  2012q;	  UKERC,	  2013).	  
5.1.2.2 Running	  Costs	  In	  the	  current	  centralised	  system,	  the	  market	  price	  for	  electricity	  currently	  depends	  heavily	  on	  the	  price	  of	  fossil	  fuels,	  which	  dominate	  the	  system.	  The	  cost	  of	  a	  generating	  plant	  can	  be	  grouped	  as,	  initial,	  continuing,	  fixed	  and	  variable	  costs	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  5-­‐1	  (Gerwen,	  2006).	  These	  can	  be	  either	  fixed	  or	  variable	  as	  time	  and	  circumstance	  change	  (Willis	  &	  Scott,	  2000).	  Table	  5-­‐1	  shows	  investment	  cost	  variables	  in	  decentralised	  generation.	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Table	  5-­‐1	  Characterisation	  of	  costs	  for	  DG	  and	  RES	  for	  the	  UK	  -­‐	  timing	  of	  expense	  (Gerwen,	  2006)	  
Type	  of	  Expense	   Initial	   Continuing	  
Fixed	   Engineering	  cost	  Investments	  Licensing	  cost	  	  
MW-­‐based	  distribution	  tariffs	  Fixed	  taxes	  Scheduled	  maintenance	  Insurance	  Variable	   MWh-­‐based	  connection	  cost	   Unscheduled	  maintenance	  Fuel	  cost	  Fuel	  taxes	  MWh-­‐based	  distribution	  tariffs	  For	  many	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  technologies	  such	  as	  solar,	  wind	  and	  tidal	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  input	  fuel	  is	  zero.	  This	  reduces	  the	  running	  costs	  of	  these	  technologies	  and	  also	  makes	  future	  cost	  predictions	  easier	  to	  make.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  generation	  such	  as	  the	  Combined	  Cycle	  Gas	  Turbine	  (CCGT)	  the	  market	  price	  of	  electricity	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  (UKERC,	  2012).	  The	  fuel	  costs	  associated	  with	  CCGT	  can	  be	  highly	  volatile	  and	  relative	  with	  unpredictable	  changes	  to	  future	  markets.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  it	  means	  that	  although	  the	  running	  costs	  of	  renewable	  generation	  does	  not	  have	  the	  variable	  fuels	  aspect,	  they	  are	  impacted	  upon	  with	  the	  wholesale	  cost	  of	  the	  electricity	  (Roques	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  
5.1.2.3 Profitability	  of	  Generation	  The	  profitability	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  technologies	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  running	  costs	  and	  the	  upfront	  capital	  costs	  which	  have	  to	  be	  outweighed	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  it	  earns	  to	  make	  it	  profitable.	  The	  main	  feature	  in	  a	  technology’s	  profitability	  is	  the	  electricity	  market	  arrangements,	  mechanisms	  and	  subsidies.	  In	  the	  1980s	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  and	  gas	  markets	  opened	  up	  the	  ability	  for	  competition	  to	  control	  the	  market	  and	  since	  then	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  adaptations	  to	  the	  system.	  However,	  there	  is	  wide	  spread	  recognition	  that	  the	  current	  operation	  favours	  the	  centralised	  technologies	  in	  both	  the	  market	  rules	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and	  the	  approach	  within	  which	  it	  is	  regulated	  (Wolfe,	  2008;	  Woodman	  &	  Baker	  2008;	  Watson	  &	  Wright,	  2010).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  locked	  into	  a	  centralised	  ethos	  of	  operation	  (Rutledge,	  2012;	  DECC,	  2013a).	  Many	  Government	  policy	  statements	  talk	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘levelling	  the	  playing	  field’	  for	  decentralised	  investments	  (DTI,	  2006a).	  Other	  bodies	  have	  called	  for	  more	  fundamental	  reform	  of	  regulatory	  systems,	  for	  example,	  a	  change	  to	  the	  energy	  regulator’s	  duties	  so	  that	  they	  place	  more	  emphasis	  on	  Government	  environmental	  and	  social	  targets	  (Helm,	  2007;	  SDC,	  2007).	  This	  emphasis	  on	  change	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  centralised	  operation	  through	  mechanisms	  and	  subsidies,	  which	  guide	  the	  larger	  utilities	  to	  enact	  change	  (Mitchell,	  2014a).	  Establishing	  the	  profitability	  of	  a	  project	  is	  a	  fundamental	  link	  to	  ability	  to	  find	  investment	  which	  is	  discussed	  next.	  
5.1.2.4 Investment	  Increased	  decentralisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  bringing	  major	  changes	  to	  the	  investment	  scene	  (Bloomberg,	  2011;	  REN	  21,	  2014).	  Decreasing	  the	  capital	  costs	  of	  each	  unit	  is	  providing	  the	  incentive	  for	  these	  stakeholders	  who	  normally	  would	  not	  invest	  in	  the	  energy	  system,	  to	  buy	  into	  assets	  (Chmutina	  and	  Goodier	  2014).	  	  The	  promotion	  of	  renewable	  generation	  may	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  investment	  to	  the	  conventional	  generation	  that	  provides	  the	  short-­‐term	  back-­‐up	  required	  today.	  As	  the	  level	  of	  variable	  renewable	  generation	  increases,	  the	  requirement	  for	  flexible	  back-­‐up	  technologies	  will	  also	  increase.	  Therefore,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  an	  additional	  mechanism	  which	  will	  ensure	  retaining	  or	  replacing	  the	  back-­‐up	  generation	  to	  be	  financially	  viable	  whilst	  developing	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  	  A	  recent	  study	  by	  Poyry	  (2010)	  identifies	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  as	  the	  level	  of	  low	  carbon	  generation	  increases.	  The	  volatility	  of	  the	  market	  may	  also	  change	  from	  year	  to	  year	  with	  weather	  variations,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  predict	  the	  supply	  abilities	  and	  so	  undermining	  the	  case	  for	  investment	  in	  new	  plants.	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5.1.3 Social	  Historically	  the	  consumer	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  and	  any	  direct	  involvement	  in	  its	  primary	  decision	  making.	  Consumers	  are	  given	  very	  little	  choice	  in	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  operates	  other	  than	  from	  whom	  they	  buy	  their	  electricity	  (Parag	  &	  Darby,	  2009).	  Up	  until	  recently,	  most	  consumers	  appear	  uninterested	  in	  their	  energy	  provision,	  beyond	  being	  able	  to	  switch	  on	  a	  light	  (Ofgem,	  2013g).	  To	  the	  degree	  that	  customers	  that	  do	  care	  would	  likely	  be	  looking	  for	  energy	  services	  that	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  them.	  This	  means	  that	  not	  all	  customers	  will	  be	  looking	  for	  the	  same	  feature	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  therefore	  weighting	  different	  aspects	  accordingly.	  	  There	  has	  been	  increasing	  discontent	  by	  the	  public	  over	  rising	  prices	  and	  reflected	  in	  the	  Labour	  Party	  leaders	  recent	  speech	  (Miliband,	  2013).	  Britain	  is	  at	  a	  new	  stage	  of	  energy	  policy	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  2015	  election.	  Motivating	  the	  end	  user	  to	  connect	  actively	  with	  their	  energy	  use	  may	  lead	  to	  reduced	  energy	  use	  and	  therefore	  reduced	  energy	  bills.	  This	  aids	  other	  policy	  goals	  such	  as	  carbon	  reduction	  and	  if	  managed	  effectively	  could	  improve	  fuel	  poverty	  as	  well	  as	  energy	  security.	  (UKERC,	  2009)	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  householders,	  businesses	  and	  communities	  further.	  It	  does	  this	  by	  encouraging	  greater	  awareness	  of	  their	  energy	  behaviour.	  An	  individual	  consumer	  has	  very	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system,	  however,	  their	  actions	  can	  have	  a	  causal	  effect	  on	  other	  consumers	  and	  when	  looked	  at	  as	  a	  single	  actor	  group	  consumer,	  their	  influence	  can	  be	  great.	  Therefore,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  this	  actor	  group	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  consumption	  patterns	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  important	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  The	  importance	  of	  user	  behaviour	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  uptake	  and	  use	  of	  decentralised	  generation.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  suggest	  decentralisation	  is	  not	  being	  used	  to	  its	  full	  potential	  at	  the	  moment	  (Keirstead,	  2008;	  Manfren	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  Much	  of	  UK	  policy	  centred	  on	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation	  is	  focused	  on	  deployment	  and	  often	  ignores	  behaviour	  after	  implementation	  (Bergman	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Feed	  in	  Tariffs.	  The	  FIT	  provides	  an	  incentive	  for	  generating	  electricity	  and	  an	  incentive	  for	  reducing	  consumption	  known	  as	  the	  export	  tariff.	  However,	  the	  export	  tariff,	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  what	  is	  exported	  back	  to	  the	  grid,	  is	  set	  at	  4.5p/kWh	  (Ofgem,	  2012),	  which,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  level	  of	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return	  from	  simply	  generating,	  leaves	  very	  little	  incentive	  for	  reducing	  energy	  consumption	  (DECC,	  2012i).	  By	  increasing	  the	  export	  tariff,	  consumers	  would	  have	  a	  greater	  incentive	  to	  reduce	  consumption.	  A	  major	  shift	  in	  user	  behaviour	  patterns	  could	  lead	  to	  production	  and	  consumption	  models	  also	  changing.	  Whether	  the	  behaviour	  patterns	  of	  consumers	  are	  changed	  through	  the	  uptake	  of	  decentralised	  energy	  or	  vice	  versa,	  ultimately,	  a	  successful	  paradigm	  shift	  could	  provide	  a	  higher	  uptake	  of	  decentralised	  generation,	  increased	  understanding	  and	  awareness	  of	  energy	  production	  and	  consumption,	  and	  emissions	  reductions	  (Bergman	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  increase	  in	  engagement	  with	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  lead	  on	  to	  consumers	  becoming	  energy	  citizens	  or	  energy	  co-­‐providers,	  thus	  playing	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  (Sauter	  and	  Watson,	  2007;	  Chappells	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Consumer	  engagement	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  such	  as	  increased	  information	  schemes	  providing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  energy	  system,	  or	  through	  the	  consumer	  having	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  ownership	  of	  production	  and	  transportation	  technologies	  (Dobbyn	  and	  Thomas,	  2005).	  The	  level	  of	  engagement	  can	  change	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  type	  of	  energy	  system	  (centralised	  or	  decentralised).	  Table	  5-­‐2	  has	  been	  adapted	  from	  Forsight	  final	  project	  report	  Powering	  our	  Lives:	  Sustainable	  Energy	  Management	  and	  the	  Built	  Environment	  (GOfS,	  2009).	  It	  shows	  four	  routes	  for	  public	  engagement	  at	  the	  extreme	  of	  the	  spectrum	  looking	  at	  centralised,	  decentralised,	  engagement	  and	  disengagement.	  	  
Table	  5-­‐2	  Routes	  for	  public	  engagement	  and	  scales	  of	  energy	  systems	  (GOfS,	  2009)	  
Level	  of	  engagement	  
1.	  Centralised	  disengagement	  	  
 
2.	  Centralised	  engagement	  
 
3.	  Decentralised	  disengagement	  
 
4.	  Decentralised	  engagement	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Centralised	  disengagement	  is	  a	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  scenario	  where	  the	  consumers	  are	  largely	  disengaged	  from	  their	  energy	  usage	  beyond	  bill	  payment.	  The	  only	  engagement	  they	  have	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  energy	  supplier	  or	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  energy	  bill	  is	  calculated.	  	  
Centralised	  engagement	  would	  require	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information	  rolled	  out	  to	  consumers	  included	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  smart	  metering	  technologies.	  This	  enables	  consumers	  to	  track	  their	  usage	  levels	  and	  adapt	  to	  time	  of	  use	  tariffs	  which	  the	  smart	  meters	  could	  facilitate.	  	  For	  decentralised	  disengagement	  the	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation	  is	  generally	  owned	  and	  controlled	  through	  large	  companies	  with	  automated	  systems	  so	  the	  householder	  has	  minimal	  interaction	  or	  involvement.	  Essentially,	  the	  billing	  and	  metering	  system	  provide	  the	  only	  interaction,	  however,	  the	  nature	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  geographically	  dispersed	  which	  means	  there	  will	  be	  an	  increased	  engagement	  over	  a	  centralised	  system.	  In	  the	  decentralised	  engagement	  scenario	  the	  ubiquitous	  nature	  of	  energy	  becomes	  more	  visible.	  Consumers	  are	  able	  to	  see	  electricity	  generation	  every	  day	  in	  their	  locality	  even	  at	  home.	  Most	  distributed	  energy	  technologies	  incorporate	  a	  facility	  for	  monitoring	  their	  output	  and	  level	  of	  consumption.	  This	  helps	  to	  generate	  increased	  awareness	  for	  the	  consumer,	  leading	  to	  improved	  conservation	  (Wolfe,	  2008;	  Chmutina	  and	  Goodier,	  2014)	  also	  see	  section	  2.11.1.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  smart	  meters	  will	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  for	  householders	  to	  play	  a	  stronger	  role	  in	  managing	  energy	  at	  home	  (DECC,	  2013j).	  	  	  The	  UK	  environmental	  policies	  and	  targets	  are	  an	  important	  driving	  force	  towards	  change	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Government	  policy	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  promoting	  renewable	  energy	  through	  targets	  (see	  section	  2.5.3).	  Regulations	  also	  play	  a	  part	  by	  incentivising	  stakeholders	  to	  look	  for	  cleaner	  and	  more	  cost	  efficient	  solutions	  to	  energy	  production	  and	  consumption	  (Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
5.1.4 Environmental	  Aspect	  of	  Decentralisation	  Government	  needs	  to	  find	  a	  path	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  This	  could	  be	  using	  the	  current	  centralised	  operation	  to	  meet	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  Government,	  or	  a	  change	  to	  a	  predominantly	  decentralised	  system	  or	  somewhere	  between	  the	  two.	  The	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implications	  of	  scale	  on	  different	  scenarios	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  past,	  including	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Environmental	  Pollution,	  Tyndall	  Centre	  for	  Climate	  Change	  Research	  and	  by	  Ofgem	  (Watson	  &	  Wright,	  2010).	  Both	  a	  centralised	  and	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  Government’s	  goal.	  The	  discussion,	  therefore,	  should	  come	  down	  to	  other	  factors	  including	  which	  is	  more	  or	  less	  costly	  to	  the	  Government,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  consumer	  and	  which	  best	  meets	  the	  goals	  of	  energy	  policy	  and	  which	  is	  most	  acceptable	  to	  society.	  	  The	  costs	  of	  meeting	  climate	  change	  targets	  will	  be	  significant,	  but	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  costs	  of	  inaction	  (Stern,	  2006).	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  predict	  which	  pathway	  would	  be	  least	  costly	  (Watson	  &	  Wright,	  2010).	  The	  effect	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  on	  the	  environment	  takes	  three	  forms:	  1. Its	  ability	  to	  change	  consumer	  behaviour.	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  studies	  which	  indicate	  that	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  behaviour	  of	  consumers	  (Keirstead,	  2007;	  IPPR,	  2009;	  Cabinet	  Office	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  2. The	  emissions	  of	  CO₂	  levels	  during	  electricity	  production.	  The	  implementation	  of	  renewable	  generation	  reduces	  the	  requirement	  for	  fossil	  fuel	  burning	  power	  stations,	  in	  turn	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  CO2	  production	  (UKERC,	  2006;	  Krager	  and	  Hennings,	  2009).	  However,	  with	  the	  level	  of	  intermittency	  shown	  by	  renewable	  generation,	  they	  cannot	  replace	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  generation	  on	  a	  like	  for	  like	  basis	  (UKERC,	  2006;	  Sims	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Nevertheless	  intermittency	  of	  renewable	  generation	  causes	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  stations	  to	  be	  run	  at	  a	  lower	  output,	  thus	  reducing	  their	  efficiency.	  	  3. The	  third	  area	  of	  decentralisation’s	  impact,	  occurs	  with	  the	  conservation	  of	  materials.	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  plants	  results	  in	  larger	  consumption	  levels	  than	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  larger	  plants	  (Krager	  and	  Hennings,	  2009,	  Bergman	  and	  Jardine,	  2009).	  	  
5.1.5 Energy	  Security	  Energy	  security,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  policymaking	  for	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  The	  low	  carbon	  objectives	  set	  by	  Government	  mean	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that	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  operation	  and	  technology	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  may	  need	  to	  change.	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	  is	  to	  move	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  model,	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  small-­‐scale	  renewables,	  storage,	  demand-­‐side	  management	  and	  more	  consumer	  engagement	  but	  not	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  security.	  This	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  for	  energy	  security.	  
5.1.5.1 Technical	  Impacts	  of	  Increasing	  Levels	  of	  Variable	  Power	  On	  Security	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  with	  consumers	  and	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  low	  carbon	  renewable	  generation	  technologies	  (NESTA,	  2010).	  However,	  the	  depth	  of	  literature	  discussing	  the	  relationship	  of	  decentralisation	  to	  energy	  security	  is	  narrow.	  The	  majority	  of	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  technical	  engineering	  aspects	  including	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  on	  the	  electricity	  network.	  This	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  sections:	  firstly,	  it	  deals	  with	  the	  technical	  issues	  of	  increasing	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  variable	  power.	  This	  debate	  has	  been	  on-­‐going	  for	  several	  years	  and	  there	  are	  those	  who	  continue	  to	  argue	  that	  variable	  power	  increases	  insecurity	  (Grubb	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Strbac	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kubik	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Trainer,	  2013)	  However,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  and	  Denmark.	  It	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  introducing	  variable	  power	  into	  an	  electricity	  system	  requires	  new	  operation	  and	  management	  which	  is	  different	  from	  the	  operation	  and	  management	  of	  centralised	  non-­‐variable	  electricity	  but	  not	  more	  insecure	  (Coafee,	  2008;	  Lund	  and	  Mathiesen,	  2009;	  EPIA,	  2012;	  Chmutina	  and	  Goodier	  2014).	  Secondly,	  the	  section	  identifies	  the	  potential	  non-­‐technical	  benefits	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  for	  security.	  	  Technologically	  there	  are	  difficulties	  in	  using	  the	  current	  distribution	  network	  with	  larger	  volumes	  of	  generation	  as	  shown	  in	  Box	  5.1.	  Although	  all	  of	  these	  issues	  are	  well	  understood	  within	  the	  engineering	  sector,	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  lack	  of	  experience	  in	  dealing	  with	  these	  issues	  in	  Britain	  although	  not	  elsewhere	  (House	  of	  Commons,	  2010).	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  These	  issues	  can	  be	  discussed	  as	  the	  ‘power	  quality’	  of	  the	  network,	  encompassing	  the	  reliability	  provided	  by	  the	  system	  (Coll-­‐Mayor	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Power	  quality	  refers	  to	  the	  characterising	  of	  the	  voltage	  and	  current	  waveform	  and	  how	  they	  are	  aligned,	  how	  it	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  dips	  and	  interruptions	  from	  switching	  operation	  in	  the	  network,	  together	  with	  network	  disturbances,	  such	  as	  fast	  voltage	  variations	  (Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  The	  effect	  of	  distributed	  generation	  on	  power	  quality	  is	  complex	  as	  it	  can	  contribute	  to	  regions	  where	  voltage	  is	  low	  as	  it	  generally	  provides	  a	  rise	  in	  network	  voltage	  levels	  (Strbac	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  However,	  introducing	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  distributed	  generation	  causes	  bi-­‐directional	  flows,	  complicating	  the	  system	  dynamics	  (Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  bi-­‐directional	  flows	  of	  electricity	  mean	  that	  the	  distribution	  network	  becomes	  overloaded	  and	  needs	  to	  send	  power	  to	  the	  transmission	  system	  which,	  currently,	  cannot	  accept	  the	  generation	  for	  engineering	  reasons.	  There	  are	  also	  difficulties	  found	  at	  an	  operational	  level	  from	  a	  balancing	  and	  regulatory	  perspective	  (Gerber	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
Box	  5.1	  
• Accepting	  bi-­‐directional	  power	  flows	  –	  changes	  in	  generation	  levels	  may	  mean	  that	  distribution	  networks	  will	  need	  to	  re-­‐direct	  power	  back	  to	  the	  transmission	  system	  	  
• Maintaining	  electricity	  flows	  and	  voltage	  variations	  at	  a	  level	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  equipment	  ratings	  
• Ensuring	  power	  flows	  from	  load	  generation	  do	  not	  create	  short	  circuit	  currents	  in	  the	  event	  of	  network	  faults.	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Figure	  5-­‐1	  UK	  Centralised	  electricity	  network	  operation	  (DECC,	  2012r)	  	  In	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  distributed	  generation,	  the	  distributed	  network	  operator’s	  future	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  different.	  Currently,	  the	  distribution	  networks	  operate	  passively,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  requirement	  for	  operational	  management	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Sims	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  System	  Operator22	  balances	  the	  flow	  of	  electricity	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  in	  the	  future	  the	  DNO’s	  will	  become	  system	  operators	  as	  well.	  This	  will	  require	  a	  management	  of	  greater	  flow	  of	  power,	  often	  including	  the	  export	  of	  electricity	  back	  to	  the	  transmission	  system	  (Wolfe,	  2008;	  House	  of	  Commons,	  2010).	  Changing	  the	  operation	  of	  these	  networks	  from	  a	  passive	  circuit	  simply	  supplying	  load,	  to	  an	  active	  management	  based	  system	  where	  power	  flows	  and	  voltages	  requires	  changes	  in	  both	  supply	  of	  generation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  time	  and	  amount	  of	  demand	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  To	  achieve	  this,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  upgrade,	  reinforcement,	  or	  replacement	  of	  networks	  may	  be	  required	  (Woodman	  and	  Baker,	  2008;	  Ofgem,	  2010a).	  Distribution	  network	  operators	  are	  paid	  by	  the	  utilities	  for	  use	  of	  the	  network.	  The	  cost	  of	  which	  is	  then	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  consumers	  (House	  of	  Commons,	  2010).	  The	  management	  of	  a	  distribution	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  require	  new	  models	  of	  control	  and	  co-­‐ordination,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  centrally	  planned	  system	  which	  provides	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  In	  the	  UK	  the	  System	  Operator	  role	  is	  run	  by	  The	  National	  Grid	  Company	  who	  also	  own	  the	  
Transmission	  Network.	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electricity	  one	  way	  from	  generation	  to	  consumer	  (Foresight,	  2008).	  By	  entering	  into	  a	  more	  active	  role,	  the	  complexity	  from	  the	  new	  control	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  models	  increase	  the	  end	  cost	  to	  the	  consumer,	  but	  equally	  if	  consumers	  become	  more	  involved	  it	  may	  reduce	  their	  bills	  through	  energy	  efficiency	  (Davenport,	  2013;	  ECCC,	  2013).	  An	  active	  role	  for	  the	  DNOs	  is	  both	  new	  internally	  to	  the	  DNO	  but	  also	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  DNO	  and	  transmission	  operator.	  This	  may	  be	  received	  as	  an	  additional	  risk.	  Therefore,	  without	  the	  right	  regulatory	  incentives	  the	  distribution	  network	  operators	  may	  try	  to	  keep	  their	  current	  passive	  operation,	  obstructing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  networks	  (Mitchell,	  2014b).	  The	  additional	  complexity	  from	  active	  DNOs	  could	  also	  be	  carried	  on	  to	  the	  System	  Operator.	  If	  the	  number	  of	  generators	  supplying	  electricity	  to	  the	  grid	  increases,	  the	  System	  Operator	  will	  only	  have	  direct	  communication	  with	  the	  larger	  licensed	  generators.	  Without	  sufficient	  communication	  between	  generating	  stations,	  any	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  elevate	  capacity	  uncertainty.	  Therefore,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  to	  predict	  the	  level	  of	  demand	  with	  some	  uncertainty,	  the	  confidence	  in	  estimated	  supply	  levels	  may	  be	  reduced,	  making	  the	  ‘predict	  and	  provide’	  nature	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  more	  complex	  (DTI,	  2007;	  House	  of	  Commons,	  2010).	  This	  evidence	  is	  disputed,	  and	  the	  potential	  impacts	  of	  variable	  power	  are	  often	  exaggerated	  (UKERC,	  2006;	  Watson	  and	  Scott,	  2009;	  Mitchell	  2014b).	  The	  UKERC	  (2006)	  report	  has	  shown	  us	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  strong	  argument	  behind	  intermittent	  generation	  of	  a	  distributed	  network	  not	  compromising	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  until	  it	  reaches	  20%	  of	  electricity	  demand.	  After	  this,	  changes	  to	  the	  electricity	  network	  would	  be	  required	  (ECCC,	  2013).	  Changes	  could	  include	  developing	  demand	  response	  technologies	  and	  backup	  generation	  as	  and	  when	  required	  in	  order	  to	  help	  in	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  network.	  	  Balancing	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  a	  two	  way	  process	  which	  could	  also	  be	  provided	  by	  changing	  the	  demand	  profile	  with	  demand	  response	  technologies	  and	  storage	  solutions.	  Each	  of	  these	  solutions	  require	  investment	  into	  electricity	  infrastructure,	  therefore,	  the	  economic	  impacts	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  are	  increasingly	  more	  important.	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5.1.5.2 Non-­‐Technical	  Benefits	  of	  Decentralisation	  to	  Security	  
5.1.5.2.1 Brining	  the	  DNOs	  to	  21st	  Century	  Technologies	  The	  current	  strategy	  for	  the	  14	  Distribution	  Network	  Operators	  (DNOs)	  within	  the	  UK	  is	  to	  operate	  the	  networks	  on	  a	  passive	  basis,	  transporting	  power	  from	  the	  transmission	  network	  to	  the	  consumer	  (as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.7.2).	  With	  more	  generation	  connected	  to	  the	  distributed	  network,	  the	  DNO’s	  will	  have	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  system	  operation.	  This	  increase	  in	  activity	  will	  require	  the	  replacement	  or	  reinforcement	  of	  much	  of	  the	  distribution	  network	  (National	  Grid,	  2011b).	  	  In	  2005	  the	  Energy	  Networks	  Association	  showed	  that	  70%	  of	  the	  current	  Network	  is	  reaching	  the	  end	  of	  their	  designed	  lifetime.	  This	  means	  that	  instead	  of	  simply	  replacing	  like	  for	  like	  there	  is	  the	  opportunity	  to	  enable	  more	  active	  management	  for	  the	  DNO’s	  (ENA,	  2005).	  However,	  this	  opportunity	  has	  not	  been	  well	  used;	  the	  regulatory	  structure	  for	  DNOs	  does	  not	  provide	  enough	  incentive	  to	  work	  on	  longer-­‐term	  development	  plans.	  The	  ‘Use	  of	  System	  Charges’	  from	  distributed	  energy	  connected	  to	  the	  network	  incentivises	  the	  DNO	  to	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  their	  network	  rather	  than	  develop	  new	  innovations.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  biggest	  proportion	  of	  their	  revenue	  comes	  from	  charging	  consumers,	  meaning	  the	  connection	  of	  new	  generation	  to	  their	  network	  is	  a	  low	  priority	  (Awerbuch,	  2004).	  There	  have	  been	  additional	  mechanisms	  to	  promote	  DNO	  network	  innovation,	  including	  the	  Innovation	  Funding	  Incentive,	  Distributed	  Generation	  Incentive	  and	  the	  Registered	  Power	  Zones	  each	  of	  which	  commenced	  in	  2005	  (Ofgem,	  2005;	  SP	  Power	  Systems,	  2005).	  However,	  these	  had	  limited	  success	  in	  the	  past	  with	  very	  little	  up-­‐take	  (Ofgem,	  2008;	  Woodman	  &	  Baker	  2008).	  More	  recently	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Networks	  Fund	  (LCNF)	  has	  been	  established,	  specifically	  targeting	  funding	  that	  allows	  up	  to	  £500m	  over	  five	  years	  to	  support	  new	  projects	  and	  try	  out	  new	  technologies	  (Grünewald	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  provide	  DNOs	  with	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  required	  to	  enable	  a	  low	  cost	  low	  carbon	  secure	  system	  (Ofgem,	  2010c).	  Instruments	  that	  operate	  from	  outside	  the	  regulatory	  process	  such	  as	  the	  LCNF	  work	  well	  to	  promote	  research	  and	  development	  projects,	  however,	  the	  regulatory	  process	  of	  funding	  the	  networks	  may	  need	  to	  be	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redesigned	  in	  order	  for	  these	  projects	  to	  run	  over	  a	  sustained	  period	  (Lehmann	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  For	  the	  UK	  this	  has	  begun	  with	  a	  new	  regulatory	  approach	  (RIIO)	  (see	  section	  2.3.1)	  which	  puts	  security	  and	  sustainability	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  agenda	  and	  recognises	  the	  need	  for	  system	  transformation	  (Ofgem,	  2010d).	  However,	  the	  performance	  of	  such	  objectives	  is	  still	  yet	  to	  be	  seen.	  
5.1.5.2.2 Flexibility	  Providing	  a	  dynamic	  electricity	  system	  is	  a	  major	  aspect	  to	  ensuring	  energy	  security,	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  4.3.	  A	  dynamic	  electricity	  system	  is	  one	  that	  can	  react	  to	  any	  circumstance,	  short	  and	  long-­‐term.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  this	  means	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand.	  The	  current	  balancing	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  is	  mostly	  achieved	  through	  the	  supply	  industry	  where	  the	  generation	  is	  dispatched	  to	  meet	  demand	  levels	  (National	  Grid,	  2011b).	  However,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  any	  demand	  side	  involvement	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  not	  only	  improve	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  but	  also	  to	  reduce	  the	  required	  investment	  into	  additional	  capacity	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  For	  the	  longer	  term	  this	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  consumption	  such	  as	  future	  demand	  levels,	  patterns	  and	  requirements.	  These	  can	  be	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  for	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport,	  changes	  in	  peak	  demand	  times	  (or	  less-­‐predictable	  peak	  demand)	  and	  a	  requirement	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  reduce	  overall	  carbon	  emissions.	  In	  order	  for	  supply	  to	  meet	  the	  future	  changes	  to	  demand,	  the	  supply	  side	  would	  need	  to	  be	  flexible.	  Distributed	  generation	  technologies	  may	  provide	  the	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  economic	  environment	  as	  and	  when	  required.	  The	  associated	  size	  and	  scale	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  centralised	  plants	  means	  they	  have	  shorter	  construction	  times	  and	  can	  develop	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  (Pepermans	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Purchala,	  2006).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  public	  resistance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  wind	  energy	  and	  landfill	  gasses	  can	  cause	  substantial	  lead	  times	  and	  delays	  (Devine-­‐Wright,	  2005).	  Planning	  is	  still	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  distributed	  generation	  as	  it	  is	  for	  the	  centralised	  operation.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  1990s	  it	  took	  over	  6	  years	  to	  acquire	  planning	  consent	  for	  a	  50	  mile	  stretch	  of	  new	  high	  voltage	  power	  lines	  in	  North	  Yorkshire.	  More	  recently	  upgrades	  to	  the	  137	  mile	  line	  between	  Beauly	  near	  Inverness	  and	  Denny	  near	  Falkirk	  will	  have	  taken	  13	  years	  when	  it	  is	  due	  to	  finish	  in	  2014	  (Howard,	  2011;	  BBC,	  2011).	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5.1.5.2.3 Diversity	  Another	  aspect	  of	  delivering	  a	  flexible	  secure	  electricity	  system	  is	  to	  increase	  diversity.	  The	  diversity	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  encompasses	  the	  fuel	  type	  and	  sources,	  technology	  types,	  the	  location	  of	  generation	  and	  the	  range	  of	  required	  skills	  (Grubb	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.4.2.	  	  The	  2007	  Government	  White	  Paper	  shows	  how	  using	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  producers	  reduces	  the	  impact	  from	  any	  one	  generator	  (DTI,	  2007b).	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  provides	  a	  system	  with	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  producers,	  which	  includes	  additional	  resilience	  to	  temporary	  outages	  and	  failure,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  current	  centralised	  model	  (IEA	  2002b;	  BERR,	  2008).	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  single	  small	  plant	  having	  a	  much	  lower	  impact	  than	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  large	  facility	  simply	  because	  of	  its	  size	  and	  its	  proportion	  of	  electricity	  capacity.	  This	  is,	  however,	  only	  if	  the	  smaller	  plant	  is	  still	  centrally	  operated	  and	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  provider	  for	  a	  specific	  area	  (Krager	  and	  Hennings,	  2009).	  Establishing	  greater	  levels	  of	  diversity	  is	  not	  a	  single	  answer	  to	  delivering	  energy	  security.	  Any	  additional	  technology	  introduced	  to	  diversify	  the	  system	  would	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  operate	  alongside	  the	  current	  technologies	  and	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  other	  aspects	  of	  security.	  Without	  this	  the	  increase	  in	  diversity	  would	  be	  removing	  secure	  sources	  of	  generation	  thus	  reducing	  the	  overall	  security.	  
5.1.5.2.4 Removing	  Dependency	  on	  Insecure	  Supplies	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  dictated	  by	  the	  requirement	  for	  the	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  current	  natural	  resources	  required	  means	  that	  even	  without	  carbon	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  Government,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  electricity	  is	  generated	  and	  consumed	  would	  need	  to	  change.	  	  Economic	  assessments	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  an	  insecure	  electricity	  system	  are	  typically	  uncertain	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  policy	  making	  inadequate	  for	  assessing	  the	  risk	  to	  security	  (Lefèvre,	  2010).	  Fossil	  fuel	  resource	  concentration	  is	  one	  way	  of	  quantifying	  a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  security,	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  price	  and	  availability	  of	  a	  primary	  resource.	  Most	  electricity	  generation	  technologies	  are	  supported	  by	  some	  financial	  subsidy	  in	  some	  way,	  such	  as	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  consumers’	  energy	  bills,	  however,	  this	  impact	  is	  low.	  There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  main	  driver	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  consumer	  bills	  is	  the	  wholesale	  price	  of	  gas	  (CCC,	  2011;	  EDF	  2012;	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Krager	  and	  Hennings,	  2009).	  This	  means	  the	  current	  system	  places	  a	  lot	  of	  emphasis	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  primary	  resource	  for	  the	  future	  (Rutledge,	  2007;	  Barrett	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  current	  electricity	  markets	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  its	  generation,	  so	  if	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  alternative	  generation	  were	  to	  flood	  the	  market,	  then	  the	  CCGT	  plant	  profitability	  may	  come	  into	  question.	  Any	  unreliability	  in	  the	  future	  price	  of	  gas	  will	  require	  strong	  policy	  mechanisms	  to	  support	  it	  in	  order	  for	  the	  investment	  to	  be	  found.	  The	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  package	  contains	  the	  capacity	  payments	  which	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  provide	  financial	  incentives	  for	  generation	  at	  peak	  times	  (DECC,	  2013h)	  The	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  non-­‐fossil	  fuelled	  generation	  would	  reduce	  the	  UK’s	  dependence	  on	  gas	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  This	  means	  it	  would	  also	  help	  stabilise	  the	  end	  price	  of	  electricity,	  as	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  dependant	  on	  a	  single	  resource	  (Ofgem,	  2011b;	  Parliament,	  2012).	  A	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  is	  made	  up	  of	  renewable	  technologies	  where	  the	  primary	  resource	  is,	  by	  its	  nature,	  not	  going	  to	  run	  out.	  As	  a	  result	  increasing	  their	  share	  in	  the	  energy	  mix	  can	  help	  to	  reduce	  the	  dependence	  on	  imported	  fossil	  fuels.	  
“An	  increased	  use	  of	  DG	  may	  reduce	  the	  demand	  for	  imported	  
gas	  to	  some	  extent.	  Although	  gas-­‐fired	  CHP	  uses	  gas	  more	  
efficiently	  than	  centralised	  fossil-­‐fuel	  electricity	  generation,	  it	  
is	  not	  clear	  whether	  a	  wider	  deployment	  of	  CHP	  would	  lead	  to	  
an	  overall	  decrease	  in	  gas	  demand”	  (DTI,	  2007b).	  From	  a	  security	  point	  of	  view	  removing	  the	  UK’s	  dependency	  from	  unstable	  geopolitical	  regions	  will	  only	  help	  in	  security.	  The	  European	  Commission’s	  study	  (2006)	  on	  future	  Scenarios on Energy Efficiency and	  Renewables report	  has	  shown	  that	  doubling	  the	  share	  of	  renewables	  in	  electricity	  generation	  by	  2030	  would	  reduce	  import	  dependency	  by	  about	  6-­‐7%.	  Similar	  conclusions	  were	  reached	  by	  an	  assessment	  of	  EU	  energy	  policy	  analysis	  published	  by	  the	  Energy	  Research	  Centre	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  (Groenenberg	  et	  al.,	  2008). Having	  said	  this	  the	  importing	  of	  fuels	  into	  the	  UK	  may	  not	  always	  be	  considered	  a	  risk	  to	  security.	  By	  importing	  the	  resources,	  an	  additional	  level	  of	  diversity	  is	  added	  to	  the	  UK’s	  energy	  system.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  exporting	  nations	  may	  have	  a	  certain	  dependency	  on	  selling	  the	  resource,	  as	  does	  the	  country	  buying.	  The	  idea	  of	  becoming	  completely	  self-­‐sufficient	  means	  that	  any	  domestic	  issues	  will	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  not	  having	  the	  international	  supply	  chains	  in	  place	  already.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  in	  the	  1990s	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when	  the	  UK	  sourced	  all	  of	  its	  natural	  gas	  supplies	  from	  the	  North	  Sea.	  More	  recently	  with	  the	  North	  Sea	  resources	  reducing,	  the	  UK	  found	  itself	  with	  very	  little	  infrastructure	  for	  importing	  gas	  (Bolton,	  2013).	  
5.1.5.2.5 Demand	  and	  Supply	  The	  current	  relationship	  between	  the	  consumer	  and	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  one	  of	  being	  very	  removed	  from	  how	  the	  system	  operates.	  Consumers	  are	  given	  very	  little	  choice	  (other	  than	  who	  they	  buy	  their	  electricity	  from)	  in	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  operates	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  passive	  (as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.2.1).	  A	  move	  is	  needed	  from	  ‘consumers’	  to	  ‘customers’	  where	  the	  costs	  are	  justified	  (Mitchell,	  2000)	  and	  users	  are	  given	  the	  option	  of	  being	  able	  to	  support	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  deliver	  its	  goals.	  Greater	  decentralisation	  may	  motivate	  and	  engage	  the	  end	  user	  and	  this	  may	  increase	  security	  through	  a	  range	  of	  ways	  (UKERC,	  2009).	  This	  thesis	  will	  explore	  this	  further.	  Consumer	  behaviour	  is	  becoming	  a	  key	  element	  in	  developing	  energy	  security	  concepts	  with	  their	  capacity	  to	  transform	  where	  the	  energy	  comes	  from,	  the	  end-­‐user	  consumption	  intensity	  and	  when	  it	  is	  used.	  Examples	  of	  this	  are	  during	  the	  winter	  of	  2005	  to	  2006	  where	  many	  customers	  decreased	  demand	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  problems	  in	  the	  energy	  market	  which	  were	  stemmed,	  in	  part,	  from	  actions	  taken	  on	  the	  continent	  and	  in	  Russia,	  together	  with	  the	  state	  of	  the	  global	  LNG	  market	  or	  in	  Japan	  at	  the	  Fukashima	  incident	  (IEA,	  2007;	  Froggatt	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  these	  instances	  consumers	  changed	  their	  behaviour	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  security	  of	  supply.	  	  An	  increase	  in	  a	  consumer’s	  connection	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  may	  come	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  reliance	  on	  a	  secure	  system.	  For	  example,	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  from	  electrification	  of	  transport	  and	  heat	  sectors	  would	  mean	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  dependence	  on	  electricity.	  Therefore,	  consumers	  may	  take	  more	  of	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  and	  its	  availability.	  Darby	  (2010)	  posed	  the	  question	  of	  how	  an	  increase	  in	  consumer	  reliance	  on	  electricity	  security	  would	  change	  their	  willingness	  to	  adjust	  behaviour.	  	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  householders,	  businesses	  and	  communities,	  through	  the	  ‘hosting’	  of	  small-­‐scale	  energy	  projects	  in	  schools,	  supermarkets,	  and	  hospitals	  identifying	  the	  possibilities	  around	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  and	  through	  more	  visibility	  because	  of	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increased	  number	  of	  plants	  (BERR	  2008;	  UKERC,	  2009).	  The	  2007	  Energy	  White	  Paper	  discusses	  the	  benefits	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  in	  terms	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  through	  the	  behavioural	  impacts	  of	  ‘closeness’	  to	  their	  power	  source.	  This	  engagement	  encourages	  active	  demand	  throughout	  the	  day,	  reducing	  peak	  loads	  on	  the	  system,	  and	  promoting	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  efficiency	  among	  consumers	  (DTI,	  2007b;	  IPPR,	  2014).	  Additionally,	  most	  distributed	  energy	  technologies	  incorporate	  a	  facility	  for	  monitoring	  their	  output	  and	  level	  of	  consumption,	  helping	  to	  visualise	  their	  consumption	  and	  generate	  increased	  awareness	  (Wolfe,	  2008).	  Furthermore,	  a	  greater	  involvement	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  also	  extends	  to	  the	  use	  of	  technologies	  which	  could	  accompany	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  such	  as	  dynamic	  demand	  helping	  to	  balance	  the	  system	  (Delta,	  2010).	  Preferably	  any	  policy	  which	  encourages	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  would	  need	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  incentives	  to	  reduce	  energy	  demand	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Technologies	  such	  as	  ‘smart	  meters’	  would	  enable	  time	  of	  day	  usage	  for	  certain	  services	  providing	  the	  user	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  reduce	  overall	  costs.	  However,	  the	  cost	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  has	  been	  discussed	  as	  overly	  expensive	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  UK	  operates	  today	  (see	  section	  5.1.1).	  Having	  said	  this	  the	  cost	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system,	  whether	  it	  is	  centralised	  or	  decentralised,	  is	  going	  to	  mean	  a	  rise	  in	  fuel	  bills	  for	  the	  householder	  see	  section	  2.4.2	  
5.1.5.2.6 Economics	  of	  Decentralised	  Electricity	  Generation	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.1.1	  there	  are	  system	  wide	  economic	  benefits	  of	  decentralisation.	  Onsite	  production	  of	  electricity	  could	  remove	  the	  requirement	  of	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  costs	  which	  can	  amount	  to	  approximately	  19%	  of	  the	  electricity	  cost	  (see	  Figure	  5-­‐2,	  DECC,	  2013m).	  Generating	  electricity	  closer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use	  can	  reduce	  losses;	  about	  1%	  of	  electricity	  is	  lost	  in	  transporting	  it	  across	  the	  transmission	  system	  and	  6.5%	  in	  distribution	  (Ofgem,	  2007a;	  BERR,	  2008;	  Mitchell,	  2014b).	  This	  can	  mean	  that	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  increases	  overall	  system	  efficiency,	  by	  reducing	  transportation	  losses,	  leading	  to	  lower	  generation	  and	  network	  costs.	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Figure	  5-­‐2	  Breakdown	  of	  average	  household	  gas,	  electricity	  and	  energy	  bill	  in	  2013	  (DECC,	  2013m)	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  barriers	  to	  implementing	  a	  new	  regime	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  whether	  the	  investment	  can	  be	  found	  for	  the	  new	  technologies.	  	  Ofgem	  have	  shown	  a	  requirement	  for	  finding	  up	  to	  £200bn	  worth	  of	  investment	  up	  to	  2020	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  Government	  goals	  of	  a	  low	  carbon	  secure	  system.	  An	  on-­‐going	  discussion	  is	  whether	  this	  total	  amount	  is	  necessary	  and	  if	  preferable	  a	  centralised	  or	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  not	  only	  introduces	  more	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  into	  the	  energy	  system,	  it	  also	  introduces	  more	  smaller	  actors	  from	  householders,	  communities	  and	  businesses	  which	  previously	  would	  not	  have	  invested	  into	  this	  area.	  The	  FIT	  investment	  has	  been	  substantial	  (see	  section	  Error!	  Reference	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issues	  of	  demand-­‐side	  management,	  energy	  poverty,	  local	  siting,	  electricity	  and	  heat	  production	  in	  ways	  that	  existing	  electricity	  and	  gas	  companies	  have	  been	  reluctant	  to	  do,	  and	  connection	  to	  energy	  use	  in	  general.	  If	  these	  local	  networks	  were	  to	  develop	  significantly,	  they	  might	  duplicate	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  network	  infrastructure	  while	  offering	  more	  choice,	  more	  network	  resilience	  and	  lower	  costs	  (Jamasb,	  &	  Pollitt,	  2008).	  
5.2 Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  identified	  the	  key	  impacts	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  system	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  decentralisation	  on	  energy	  security.	  It	  begins	  by	  providing	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  decentralisation	  including	  two	  main	  aspects,	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  institutional	  requirements:	  
• The	  generation	  plant	  would	  be	  either	  connected	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  or	  off	  grid,	  at	  a	  location	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use.	  
• A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  requires	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  with	  ownership	  of	  infrastructure.	  	  This	  chapter	  explores	  aspects	  of	  decentralisation	  which	  are	  deemed	  important	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  including:	  the	  policies,	  economic,	  social,	  climate	  change	  and	  finally	  energy	  security.	  	  The	  benefits	  of	  decentralisation	  for	  energy	  security	  include	  the	  flexibility,	  diversity,	  its	  reduced	  dependence	  in	  insecure	  supplies,	  the	  links	  to	  demand	  and	  how	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  may	  be	  a	  benefit	  for	  system	  economics.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  an	  electricity	  system	  is	  important	  in	  order	  to	  react	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  A	  decentralised	  system	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  short	  time	  scale,	  with	  low	  lead	  times	  for	  builds	  and	  can	  therefore	  develop	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  than	  centralised	  system.	  Decentralisation	  also	  inherently	  incorporates	  a	  high	  level	  of	  diversity	  in	  its	  generation	  mix	  from	  technology	  type,	  primary	  source,	  supply	  chains,	  skills	  and	  location,	  providing	  an	  increase	  in	  security	  against	  any	  technical	  threat.	  The	  diversity	  of	  primary	  resource	  also	  identifies	  the	  fossil	  fuels	  dependence	  on	  an	  insecure	  resource	  which	  has	  been	  controlled	  by	  the	  volatile	  price	  of	  natural	  gas.	  Cost	  of	  generation	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  drivers	  of	  the	  technological	  direction	  for	  electricity	  in	  a	  competitive	  market	  place.	  Therefore	  the	  high	  capital	  costs	  of	  renewable	  technologies	  have	  to	  be	  subsidised	  by	  Government	  until	  market	  parity	  is	  achieved.	  Government	  has	  identified	  that	  for	  solar	  photovoltaic	  generation	  this	  may	  be	  the	  first	  renewable	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technology	  to	  be	  deployed	  without	  subsidy.	  Although	  they	  also	  identify	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  until	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  2020s	  (DECC,	  2014e,	  Elliott,	  2014).	  However,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  low	  carbon	  system,	  investment	  needs	  to	  be	  found.	  One	  advantage	  of	  a	  decentralised	  system	  is	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  additional	  stakeholders	  are	  introduced	  into	  the	  industry	  possibly	  opening	  up	  the	  opportunity	  to	  find	  investors.	  This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  identified	  its	  main	  aspects	  and	  discussed	  the	  negative	  and	  potential	  benefits	  for	  energy	  security.	  However,	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  requires	  a	  large	  scale	  technical	  change.	  Therefore	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  be	  used	  to	  discuss	  transitional	  theory	  and	  the	  different	  approaches	  to	  technical	  change.	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6 Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  System	  Change	  The	  current	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  considered	  highly	  centralised	  and	  dominated	  by	  carbon	  intensive	  electricity	  generation,	  delivered	  through	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks.	  Current	  policy	  is	  focused	  in	  part	  on	  how	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  lower	  carbon	  system	  (as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2).	  This	  thesis	  has	  discussed	  two	  possible	  options:	  low	  carbon	  centralisation	  with	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage,	  or	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  system	  with	  the	  use	  of	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation,	  backed	  up	  with	  electricity	  storage	  and	  demand	  management	  technologies.	  This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  the	  UK’s	  current	  lock-­‐in	  to	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system.	  It	  will	  then	  discuss	  different	  theoretical	  approaches,	  which	  may	  be	  appropriate	  in	  understanding	  a	  shift	  towards	  a	  decentralised	  system,	  focusing,	  in	  particular	  on	  Geels’	  Multi	  Level	  Perspective	  approach.	  The	  chapter	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  governance	  can	  be	  used	  to	  promote	  a	  transition	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  secure	  electricity	  system.	  	  
6.1 Lock-­‐in	  to	  Centralisation	  Roughly	  86%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  electricity	  is	  generated	  from	  large	  scale	  coal,	  gas	  and	  nuclear	  power	  stations	  (Rutledge,	  2012;	  DECC,	  2013a).	  This	  reliance	  on	  large	  scale	  generation	  indicates	  that	  the	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  ‘locked-­‐in’	  to	  a	  centralised	  model	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  certain	  technological	  or	  systemic	  characteristics	  are	  dominant	  and	  that	  other	  technologies	  will	  therefore	  struggle	  to	  establish	  themselves.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  become	  established	  it	  will	  have	  to	  overcome	  this	  lock	  in	  and	  establish	  new	  system	  structures	  (Ahman	  &	  Nilsson,	  2008;	  Unruh,	  2000;	  Safarzynska	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  IEA,	  2011;	  Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Lock-­‐in	  may	  not	  always	  be	  due	  to	  inherent	  low	  cost	  or	  performance	  ability	  of	  a	  technology;	  its	  dominance	  could	  also	  be	  a	  result	  of	  its	  market	  share,	  influencing	  decision	  makers	  and	  ultimately	  ensuring	  the	  incumbent	  approach	  remains	  (van	  der	  Vleuten	  &	  Raven;	  2006).	  Within	  the	  electricity	  system	  lock-­‐in	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  sunk	  investments	  into	  a	  specific	  technology,	  organisational	  and	  market	  structures	  as	  well	  as	  user	  practices	  and	  lifestyles	  (Rip	  and	  Kemp,	  1998;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Geels,	  2010;	  Markard	  et	  al	  2012).	  Other	  factors	  such	  as	  subsidies,	  regulation,	  business	  models	  and	  the	  vested	  interests	  of	  major	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stakeholders	  can	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  consolidating	  technological	  dominance	  (Bento,	  2010).	  By	  increasing	  the	  proportion	  of	  a	  particular	  technology	  type	  means	  that	  the	  system	  may	  become	  reliant	  on	  this	  this	  technology	  and	  therefore	  these	  factors	  will	  be	  developed	  towards	  the	  locked	  in,	  thus	  developing	  a	  coevolutionary	  perspective	  on	  the	  lock	  in.	  This	  would	  make	  it	  more	  beneficial	  for	  actor	  groups	  to	  work	  together	  to	  develop	  a	  single	  stand	  of	  thinking	  (such	  as	  a	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  paradigm)	  (Foxon,	  2010).	  	  These	  issues	  around	  the	  lock-­‐in	  of	  a	  particular	  system	  or	  set	  of	  technologies	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘locking-­‐out’	  of	  specific	  technological	  pathways.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  (see	  chapter	  3)	  and	  the	  penalties	  it	  imposes	  for	  imbalance	  means	  that	  intermittent	  generation	  technologies	  are	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  entering	  the	  market	  in	  comparison	  with	  established,	  predictable	  fossil	  fuel	  or	  nuclear	  generation	  (Sambeek,	  2000;	  IEA,	  2002b;	  Joskow,	  2006).	  
6.2 Transition	  Theory	  In	  order	  to	  move	  from	  a	  carbon	  intensive	  system	  to	  one	  of	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  and	  affordable	  generation	  and	  transportation,	  a	  non-­‐linear	  regime23	  change	  will	  have	  to	  occur.	  During	  the	  1990s	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  transition	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  research	  of	  technical	  innovation	  and	  sustainability	  (Verbong	  and	  Loorbach,	  2012;	  Rip	  and	  Kemp,	  1998;	  Schot	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Rotmans,	  2001;	  Kemp	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  This	  section	  analyses	  the	  transition	  theory	  and	  how	  this	  move	  can	  occur	  or	  the	  possible	  barriers	  to	  transitioning.	  It	  will	  then	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  system	  or	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  	  Using	  transition	  theory	  in	  the	  move	  to	  a	  sustainable	  energy	  system	  is	  not	  a	  new	  concept.	  The	  Dutch	  Government	  have	  conceptualised	  the	  move	  to	  sustainability	  through	  transition	  management	  (Kemp	  and	  Loorbach,	  2006).	  The	  policy	  orientated	  theory	  developed	  in	  the	  Dutch	  academic	  system	  has	  been	  translated	  into	  practical	  actions	  in	  the	  energy	  policy	  field	  (Kern	  and	  Howlett,	  2009).	  In	  2001	  the	  Dutch	  Government	  changed	  its	  policy	  plan	  adopting	  a	  transitional	  approach	  seeking	  a	  more	  sustainable	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  (Smith	  and	  Kern,	  2009)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  A	  non-­‐linear	  regime	  change	  is	  a	  new	  development	  pathway	  which	  consists	  of	  the	  dominant	  set	  of	  
rules	  and	  policies,	  which	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  actors	  and	  the	  infrastructure	  which	  comes	  with	  them	  
(Rotmans	  and	  Kemp,	  2001;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  
	   146	  
6.2.1 Why	  look	  at	  transitions?	  The	  desired	  policy	  outcome	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  for	  it	  to	  be	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  and	  affordable	  (DTI,	  2003;	  2007a;	  DECC,	  2011a).	  These	  three	  outcomes	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘persistent’	  (Rotmans	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Rotmans	  &	  Loorbach,	  2008)	  or	  ‘wicked’	  (Voss	  &	  Kemp,	  2005)	  problems	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  failures	  cannot	  be	  corrected	  by	  the	  market	  without	  external	  influence.	  They	  are	  inherently	  difficult	  to	  manage	  and	  involve	  a	  number	  of	  different	  actors	  with	  a	  range	  of	  interests.	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  these	  problems,	  innovative	  societal	  governance	  structures	  along	  with	  policy	  mechanisms	  would	  need	  to	  be	  formed,	  requiring	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  system’s	  operational	  properties	  (Verbong	  &	  Loorbach	  2012).	  	  The	  ‘persistent	  problems’	  discussion	  often	  revolves	  around	  a	  single	  issue	  which	  is	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  societal	  structures.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  there	  are	  three	  interlinked	  problems	  identified	  by	  Government	  (climate	  change,	  energy	  security	  and	  affordability).	  Each	  of	  which	  will	  need	  to	  be	  overcome	  collectively,	  making	  the	  issue	  far	  more	  complex.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  multiple	  future	  changes	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  complied	  with	  (such	  as	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport).	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  in	  attempting	  to	  transform	  the	  energy	  system,	  the	  governance	  challenge	  becomes	  more	  demanding	  and	  ambitious	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  The	  current	  electricity	  generation	  mix	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  targets	  and	  goals	  which	  have	  been	  set	  out	  to	  combat	  the	  ‘persistent	  problems’	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  This	  thesis	  is	  examining	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  changing	  this	  centralised	  approach	  to	  a	  decentralised	  operation	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  goals,	  specifically	  focussing	  the	  discussion	  on	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  governance	  implications.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  both	  a	  centralised	  and	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  goals	  set	  out	  by	  Government.	  The	  move	  to	  a	  new	  electricity	  future	  will	  inevitably	  require	  large	  sums	  of	  money;	  the	  current	  infrastructure	  requires	  renewal	  and	  expansion	  involving	  huge	  financial	  injections	  (Gil	  and	  Beckman,	  2009;	  UNEP,	  2011;	  Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Technological	  and	  economic	  modelling	  used	  in	  Government	  and	  other	  institutions	  are	  now	  the	  main	  tools	  in	  energy	  pathway	  analysis	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  economic	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  visible	  impacts	  certain	  processes	  can	  have	  on	  the	  system	  which	  include:	  market	  changes,	  profitability,	  contracts,	  regulations	  and	  standards,	  also	  skills	  and	  knowledge.	  Economics	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  policy	  making	  and	  therefore	  the	  future	  direction	  of	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energy	  system	  development.	  However,	  the	  result	  of	  this	  purely	  economic	  model	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  broader	  socio-­‐technical	  impacts	  could	  end	  up	  being	  neglected	  (Strachan	  and	  Warren,	  2011).	  	  Academic	  approaches	  to	  systemic	  change	  are	  currently	  developing	  along	  a	  route	  which	  explicitly	  builds	  in	  these	  broader	  socio-­‐technical	  aspects,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  are	  set	  out	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  An	  increasingly	  influential	  model	  of	  socio-­‐technical	  transitions	  described	  by	  Frank	  Geels	  and	  other	  researchers	  is	  set	  out	  below.	  
6.2.2 What	  is	  a	  Socio-­‐technical	  Transition?	  	  Sectors	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  industry	  are	  made	  up	  of	  networks	  of	  actors	  (individuals,	  firms,	  and	  other	  organisations)	  and	  institutions	  (societal	  and	  technical	  norms,	  regulations,	  standards	  of	  good	  practice),	  as	  well	  as	  material	  artefacts	  and	  knowledge	  (Geels,	  2004;	  2011;	  Markard,	  2011;	  Weber,	  2003).	  The	  way	  in	  which	  these	  dimensions	  interact	  form	  the	  specific	  services	  for	  society	  and	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  (Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  Transitions	  are	  radical	  shifts	  from	  one	  system	  configuration	  to	  another	  at	  the	  macro	  scale	  and	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  (Verbong	  &	  Loorbach	  2012).	  The	  changes	  include	  technological,	  material,	  organisational,	  institutional,	  political,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  movements.	  This	  complexity	  provides	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  transition	  and	  what	  could	  simply	  be	  defined	  as	  an	  incremental	  change	  (Roggema	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  According	  to	  Grin	  et	  al	  (2010)	  transitions	  require	  multiple	  changes,	  involving	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  actor	  groups.	  The	  main	  driving	  force	  of	  a	  sustainable	  transition	  is	  the	  design	  of	  guidance	  or	  governance	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005	  Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  intention	  of	  shifting	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  means	  that	  the	  required	  transition	  is	  purposeful	  and	  intended,	  meaning	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  will	  work	  together	  for	  a	  defined	  outcome	  (Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  rather	  than	  an	  accidental	  outcome	  of	  system	  development.	  However,	  even	  though	  the	  final	  goal	  (a	  low	  carbon	  system)	  is	  agreed,	  the	  different	  actors	  (or	  networks	  of	  actors)	  may	  pursue	  different	  pathways	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal	  (Meadowcroft,	  2011).	  	  Using	  the	  UK	  Government’s	  low	  carbon	  objectives	  as	  an	  example,	  the	  short-­‐term	  impact	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  may	  require	  a	  large	  injection	  of	  investment	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	  However,	  with	  a	  competitive	  market	  place,	  energy	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companies	  may	  find	  it	  more	  profitable	  to	  remain	  on	  the	  current	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  pathway	  and	  not	  invest	  in	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  This	  means	  that	  external	  guidance	  is	  required	  in	  the	  form	  of	  either	  incentives	  or	  penalties	  to	  incentivise	  investment	  in	  desirable	  options.	  
6.2.3 Examining	  system	  transitions	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  analyse	  the	  transitions	  of	  different	  sociotechnical	  systems.	  The	  complexity	  and	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  means	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  approaches	  that	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  the	  literature,	  each	  of	  which	  focuses	  on	  slightly	  different	  aspects	  of	  systemic	  change	  which	  can	  be	  made.	  This	  thesis	  will	  identify	  the	  main	  theories	  relevant	  to	  the	  subject.	  Transition	  management	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  transitions	  can	  be	  influenced	  and	  guided	  (Kemp	  and	  Loorbach,	  2006;	  Loorbach,	  2010,	  Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  main	  principles	  of	  transition	  management	  are	  that	  the	  systems	  are	  complex	  but	  still	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  adapted	  and	  the	  transition	  process	  is	  one	  of	  evolutionary	  governance	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  (Nill	  and	  Kemp,	  2009;	  Voß	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  biggest	  challenge	  transition	  management	  faces	  is	  that	  it	  tries	  to	  translate	  the	  abstract	  theoretical	  dynamics	  of	  transitions	  into	  a	  practical	  management	  framework	  (Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach;	  2008).	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  create	  space	  for	  the	  system	  players,	  whether	  they	  are	  niche	  or	  regime	  players,	  to	  form	  coalitions,	  which	  can	  put	  pressure	  on	  regular	  policy.	  While	  transition	  management	  focuses	  on	  broad	  systemic	  issues,	  strategic	  niche	  management	  adopts	  a	  more	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  perspective,	  investigating	  and	  directing	  how	  niches	  grow,	  stabilise,	  or	  decline	  (Raven,	  2006).	  The	  niche	  is	  a	  conceptual	  technology	  through	  which	  an	  innovation	  can	  develop	  away	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  system’s	  structures	  (Foxon,	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Over	  time	  they	  gain	  enough	  momentum	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  themselves	  within	  the	  recognised	  technologies	  (Kemp	  et	  al.,	  1988;	  Smith,	  2007;	  Markard	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Both	  transition	  management	  and	  strategic	  niche	  management	  were	  developed	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  providing	  a	  policy	  roadmap	  to	  ease	  purposive	  transitions.	  Similarly,	  the	  technological	  innovation	  system	  approach	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  policy	  debate	  about	  barriers	  and	  drivers	  for	  innovation	  (Bergek	  and	  Jacobsson,	  2003;	  Jacobsson	  and	  Bergek,	  2004;	  Jacobsson	  and	  Lauber,	  2006;	  Negro	  and	  Hekkert,	  
	   149	  
2008).	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  on	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  technological	  landscape	  and	  institutional	  and	  organisational	  changes,	  which	  coincide	  with	  development.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  approaches	  provide	  analysis	  of	  a	  transition,	  however,	  the	  approaches	  are	  of	  limited	  usefulness	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  because	  of	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  which	  is	  being	  analysed.	  The	  electricity	  system	  requires	  an	  approach,	  which	  also	  incorporates	  a	  multifaceted	  analysis	  of	  any	  transition	  to	  include	  each	  dimension	  associated	  with	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  transition	  needs	  to	  incorporate	  a	  coevolutionary	  element,	  where	  by	  the	  changes	  which	  occur	  in	  one	  dimension	  would	  need	  to	  coincide	  with	  all	  dimensions	  (Kallis	  and	  Norgaard,	  2010).	  What	  this	  also	  means	  is	  the	  coevolution	  cannot	  be	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  The	  coevolution	  of	  technologies	  and	  institutions	  is	  argued	  to	  promote	  lock-­‐in	  of	  current	  high-­‐carbon	  technological	  systems	  (Foxon,	  2010).	  This	  argument	  can	  also	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  lock-­‐in	  of	  centralised	  electricity	  generation	  and	  delivery	  identified	  in	  this	  thesis.	  This	  thesis	  has	  identified	  the	  multi-­‐level	  perspective	  (MLP),	  which	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  intricacy	  associated	  with	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  (Rip	  and	  Kemp,	  1998;	  Geels,	  2002;	  2004;	  Geels	  and	  Schot,	  2007;	  Markard	  &	  Truffer,	  2008).	  The	  MLP	  approach	  utilises	  a	  holistic	  methodology	  for	  analysing	  a	  transition,	  looking	  at	  all	  aspects	  which	  the	  move	  from	  a	  large-­‐scale	  centralised	  system	  to	  decentralised	  system	  may	  involve.	  Geels	  (2010)	  sets	  out	  three	  different	  dimensions	  which	  influence	  system	  development	  and	  transition	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐1).	  The	  socio-­‐technical	  landscape	  is	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  system;	  it	  provides	  the	  environment	  within	  which	  the	  regime	  dynamics	  are	  influenced	  and	  consists	  of	  macro	  level	  factors	  such	  as	  political	  ideologies,	  or	  in	  the	  context	  of	  current	  system	  change,	  the	  growing	  understanding	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change.	  (Rip	  and	  Kemp,	  1998,	  Verbong	  &	  Loorbach	  2012).	  The	  landscape	  usually	  changes	  slowly,	  as	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  regime	  and	  niche	  level	  have	  very	  little	  influence	  over	  its	  development.	  Landscape	  factors	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  dominant	  regimes	  (Raven	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Holtz,	  2012).	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  landscape	  factors	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  speed	  of	  which	  change	  may	  occur	  (Kern,	  2012).	  Furthermore,	  these	  factors	  can	  evolve	  over	  time	  and	  destabilise	  the	  existing	  regime	  enabling	  any	  lock-­‐in	  to	  be	  broken	  (Shackley	  and	  Green,	  2007).	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Figure	  6-­‐1	  Multi-­‐level	  perspectives	  on	  transitions	  (Geels,	  2011)	  The	  meso-­‐level	  socio-­‐technical	  regime	  consists	  of	  the	  dominant	  rules	  and	  policies,	  which	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  networks	  of	  actors	  and	  the	  infrastructure	  which	  comes	  with	  them	  (Jørgensen,	  2012).	  The	  nature	  of	  a	  stable	  regime	  means	  that	  it	  is	  locked-­‐in	  and	  innovation	  would	  only	  occur	  incrementally.	  These	  changes	  occur	  not	  only	  in	  technology	  but	  in	  the	  policy,	  society,	  market	  and	  scientific	  regimes	  which	  are	  all	  interconnected	  through	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  incremental	  process	  of	  change	  across	  these	  dimensions	  is	  shown	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐2	  (Geels,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐2	  Alignment	  of	  on-­‐going	  processes	  in	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  regime	  (Geels,	  2011)	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Finally,	  at	  the	  micro	  level,	  niches	  are	  defined	  as	  small,	  protected	  spaces,	  in	  which	  innovation	  can	  develop	  away	  from	  harsh	  selection	  criteria	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  prevailing	  regimes.	  They	  can	  include	  the	  research	  and	  development	  (R&D)	  laboratories,	  demonstration	  projects	  or	  small	  market	  openings	  where	  users	  require	  specific	  innovations.	  The	  niche	  actor	  works	  outside	  the	  existing	  regime,	  hoping	  that	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  ‘break-­‐through’	  and	  provide	  a	  seed	  for	  systemic	  change	  (Schot	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Kemp	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Geels,	  2002;	  2010;	  2011;	  Hoogama	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Smith	  and	  Raven,	  2012).	  
6.2.3.1 MLP	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  use	  of	  MLP	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  focussing	  on	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  one,	  which	  is	  highly	  decentralised.	  The	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  likely	  involve	  changes	  to	  the	  whole	  electricity	  system,	  MLP	  theory	  incorporates	  a	  holistic	  overview	  focussing	  on	  the	  macro	  (landscape),	  meso	  (regime	  level),	  and	  micro	  (niche)	  dimensions.	  In	  the	  electricity	  system	  the	  landscape	  factors	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  challenges	  set	  out	  by	  Government:	  carbon	  reduction,	  energy	  security	  and	  affordability.	  Each	  of	  these	  landscape	  factors	  are	  not	  specific	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  therefore	  may	  not	  be	  solved	  by	  an	  electricity	  system	  transition.	  However,	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  these	  challenges	  and	  therefore	  the	  Government	  has	  placed	  an	  impetus	  for	  the	  system	  to	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  them.	  The	  factors	  making	  up	  a	  socio	  technical	  regime	  (Figure	  6-­‐2)	  include:	  the	  socio-­‐cultural,	  policy,	  science,	  user	  and	  market,	  and	  technological.	  For	  the	  electricity	  system,	  these	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  stakeholder	  groups	  (such	  as	  the	  energy	  companies,	  Government,	  regulators,	  network	  companies	  and	  consumers)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  (including	  the	  Government	  and	  company	  policy,	  market	  arrangements	  and	  subsidies)	  (Rotmans	  and	  Kemp,	  2001;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  regime	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  (which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  6.3);	  it	  helps	  structure	  the	  interaction	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  rules	  are	  not	  there	  to	  solely	  constrain	  the	  actor	  but	  they	  also	  enable	  actors	  and	  actor	  networks	  (Geels	  and	  Schot,	  2007).	  The	  UK	  electricity	  system	  is	  dominated	  by	  centralised	  generation.	  This	  centralised	  domination	  can	  be	  argued	  as	  being	  the	  result	  of	  market	  structure	  and	  ownership	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which	  is	  strengthened	  by	  the	  investment	  into	  centralised	  technology	  and	  infrastructure	  (van	  der	  Vleuten	  &	  Raven;	  2006).	  It	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  overcoming	  this	  lock-­‐in	  to	  a	  centralised	  system	  is	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  the	  deployment	  of	  small-­‐scale	  technologies.	  Therefore,	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  Government	  factors	  which	  may	  provide	  such	  a	  change	  is	  required.	  The	  niche	  dimension	  within	  the	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  also	  play	  a	  much	  larger	  role,	  as	  the	  process	  introduces	  a	  number	  of	  smaller	  actors	  working	  outside	  the	  marketplace	  trying	  to	  break	  into	  the	  current	  system.	  However,	  the	  current	  position	  of	  small-­‐scale	  technology	  specifically	  solar	  PV	  is	  that	  it	  is	  beginning	  to	  move	  from	  the	  niche	  to	  the	  regime	  (with	  the	  help	  of	  mechanisms	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.5.4).	  This	  is	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐3	  with	  the	  sharp	  rise	  in	  small-­‐scale	  capacity	  from	  July	  2011	  to	  April	  2013	  (DECC,	  2013c).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐3	  Cumulative	  Installed	  Capacity	  confirmed	  on	  FITs	  at	  end	  of	  month	  (DECC,	  2013c)	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future.	  Figure	  6-­‐4	  is	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  MLP	  approach	  where	  these	  two	  possible	  futures	  are	  identified	  (Verbong	  &	  Loorbach	  2012).	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  unlikely	  for	  a	  purely	  centralised	  or	  purely	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  exist,	  meaning	  there	  would	  be	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  these	  futures.	  The	  question	  is	  not	  how	  specific	  barriers	  can	  be	  removed	  or	  what	  possible	  incentives	  are	  available,	  but	  how	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  guided	  in	  the	  desired	  direction.	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐4	  Bi-­‐Polar	  view	  on	  a	  transition	  to	  low	  carbon;	  centralisation	  or	  decentralisation.	  Adapted	  
from	  (Verbong	  &	  Loorbach	  2012)	  depicting	  the	  Multi	  Layer	  Perspective	  approach	  to	  transitioning	  to	  a	  
low	  carbon	  energy	  system.	  
6.2.3.3 Critique	  of	  MLP	  The	  MLP	  can	  provide	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  analysing	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  to	  a	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  and	  affordable	  future.	  The	  use	  of	  MLP	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  analysing	  transitions	  has	  been	  critiqued	  and	  reviewed	  within	  academic	  literature.	  Therefore,	  this	  section	  will	  identify	  the	  main	  criticisms	  of	  the	  MLP	  framework,	  which	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  its	  use	  with	  the	  electricity	  system	  	  The	  first	  criticism	  is	  its	  lack	  of	  consideration	  of	  agency	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Genus	  &	  Cole,	  2008).	  The	  MLP	  does	  little	  to	  account	  for	  the	  role	  of	  power	  and	  politics	  in	  its	  analysis.	  Genus	  &	  Cole	  (2008)	  suggest	  that	  the	  MLP	  analysis	  would	  need	  to	  be	  integrated	  with	  some	  form	  of	  actor	  network	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  include	  the	  role	  and	  networks	  of	  actors	  within	  the	  model.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  Shove	  and	  Walker	  (2010)	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criticise	  the	  idea	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  power	  and	  place	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  latter	  viewpoint,	  using	  multiple	  relations	  over	  a	  range	  of	  scales	  rather	  than	  levels.	  In	  order	  to	  tackle	  this	  criticism	  this	  thesis	  will	  address	  the	  role	  of	  actors	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  power	  in	  chapter	  10,	  discussing	  the	  use	  of	  governance	  to	  establish	  a	  regime	  and	  the	  different	  methodologies	  of	  understanding	  governance.	  Another	  criticism	  of	  the	  MLP	  framework	  is	  the	  use	  of	  regimes	  as	  a	  specific	  dimension,	  meaning	  the	  theory	  could	  be	  discussed	  at	  different	  scales	  and	  levels	  possibly	  changing	  the	  final	  outcome	  (Berkhout	  et	  al.	  2004).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  with	  the	  electricity	  system.	  A	  study	  can	  be	  made	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  electricity	  is	  transported	  using	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks,	  or	  it	  can	  look	  at	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  considering	  the	  production	  transportation	  and	  consumption	  of	  electricity.	  Therefore,	  what	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  regime	  change	  at	  one	  level	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  incremental	  change	  at	  another	  (Geels,	  2011).	  This	  criticism	  has	  been	  addressed	  as	  this	  thesis	  has	  defined	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  (see	  chapter	  5)	  setting	  the	  parameters	  of	  what	  is	  being	  discussed.	  The	  MLP	  has	  also	  been	  criticised	  for	  its	  predisposition	  to	  discuss	  the	  use	  of	  niches	  as	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  regime	  change.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  bottom	  up	  system	  dynamics	  removes	  itself	  from	  systems	  which	  are	  directly	  addressing	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  order	  to	  enact	  change	  (Berkhout	  et	  al.	  2004).	  While	  the	  critique	  is	  valuable	  in	  developing	  the	  MLP	  approach,	  it	  is	  not	  specifically	  relevant	  to	  this	  research	  because	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  denotes	  an	  increase	  in	  small-­‐scale	  stakeholders	  becoming	  involved	  thus	  introducing	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  possible	  niche	  players.	  In	  addition,	  the	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  technology	  of	  a	  decentralised	  system	  could	  currently	  be	  considered	  as	  niche	  technologies;	  as	  they	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  be	  operational	  in	  the	  current	  market	  place	  without	  the	  subsidies	  developed	  from	  the	  landscape	  issues.	  The	  MLP	  approach	  does	  make	  an	  attempt	  to	  discuss	  the	  various	  perspectives	  of	  a	  system	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  niche,	  regime	  and	  the	  overarching	  landscape.	  However,	  the	  discussion	  over	  the	  impact	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  system	  with	  this	  approach	  is	  limited.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  governance	  analysis	  alongside	  the	  use	  of	  MLP	  will	  help	  provide	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  whilst	  answering	  some	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  MLP	  identified	  above.	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Smith	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  and	  Genus	  &	  Cole	  (2008)	  both	  identified	  MLP	  as	  having	  a	  lack	  of	  agency	  and	  no	  development	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  roles	  and	  perceived	  power	  of	  each	  stakeholder	  group.	  By	  introducing	  an	  aspect	  of	  governance	  not	  only	  will	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  each	  stakeholder	  group	  be	  analysed	  but	  also	  their	  interactions.	  It	  is	  these	  interactions	  which	  generate	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  that	  direct	  the	  actions	  of	  these	  stakeholders.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  regime	  aspect	  of	  MLP	  which	  includes	  the	  socio-­‐cultural,	  policy,	  science,	  user	  and	  market,	  and	  technological	  dimensions.	  The	  use	  of	  governance	  goes	  further	  to	  develop	  these	  aspects	  and	  understand	  how	  the	  regime	  aspect	  develops	  an	  electricity	  system.	  This	  develops	  the	  issues	  for	  MLP	  theory	  Berkhout	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  identified;	  that	  MLP	  has	  a	  predisposition	  to	  discuss	  the	  use	  of	  niches	  as	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  regime	  change.	  By	  developing	  the	  governance	  aspect	  there	  is	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  regime	  develops	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  will	  now	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	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6.3 Governance	  This	  section	  will	  begin	  by	  outlining	  a	  definition	  of,	  and	  then	  look	  at,	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  governance	  including	  the	  classical	  and	  modern	  theories,	  using	  these	  theories	  to	  provide	  a	  specific	  definition	  of	  governance	  for	  this	  thesis.	  It	  will	  then	  apply	  this	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  develop	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationships,	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  stakeholders.	  The	  concept	  of	  governance	  is	  rarely	  defined	  in	  a	  clear	  manner;	  in	  general	  it	  consists	  of	  the	  collective	  decision	  making	  of	  actors	  and	  the	  rules	  that	  follow	  them	  (Chhotray	  and	  Stoker,	  2009).	  Some	  definitions	  attempt	  to	  define	  governance	  as	  the	  “activities	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  administrative	  actors	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  purposeful	  efforts	  to	  guide,	  steer,	  control	  or	  manage	  (sectors	  or	  facets	  of)	  society”	  (Kooiman,	  1993,	  p.2).	  This	  definition	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	  society	  as	  a	  dimension	  to	  be	  governed;	  it	  still	  looks	  at	  governance	  as	  a	  one-­‐way	  entity,	  with	  a	  top	  down	  overview	  of	  how	  certain	  groups	  impact	  on	  society.	  Any	  changes	  to	  governance	  would	  involve	  changes	  to	  institutions	  and	  actors	  both	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  (Kjaer	  2004).	  This	  means	  that	  new	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  may	  require	  new	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  CfDs	  and	  the	  creating	  of	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Contracts	  Company	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Feed	  in	  Tariffs	  which	  has	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  smaller	  energy	  stakeholders	  from	  households	  to	  community	  groups	  and	  businesses.	  Parag	  and	  Janda	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  what	  is	  needed,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  bottom	  up	  approach,	  is	  a	  middle	  out	  look	  at	  how	  stakeholder	  policies	  and	  rules	  interact.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  does	  not	  simply	  rest	  on	  a	  single	  set	  of	  stakeholders	  or	  actors.	  Therefore	  the	  definition	  of	  governance	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  account	  all	  of	  the	  players,	  their	  interactions	  and	  associated	  power.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  governance	  has	  recently	  become	  more	  widely	  discussed	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  in	  the	  policy	  world.	  Its	  popularity	  has	  generated	  many	  different	  meanings	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  the	  understanding	  of	  these	  different	  approaches	  (Kooiman	  and	  Jentoft,	  2009).	  Stoker	  (1998)	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  of	  governance	  for	  consideration,	  each	  of	  which	  discuss	  governance	  as	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  and	  actors	  drawn	  from	  within	  and	  outside	  government.	  Each	  of	  these	  groups	  have	  overlapping	  responsibilities	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within	  the	  system	  meaning	  that	  the	  power	  of	  each	  actor	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  networks	  which	  have	  formed	  and	  their	  collective	  action.	  Here,	  governance	  is	  discussed	  as	  self-­‐governing	  networks	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  get	  things	  done,	  rather	  than	  the	  hierarchical	  powers	  dictating	  or	  using	  authority	  to	  steer	  the	  system	  (Smith,	  2007).	  The	  approach	  with	  which	  governance	  is	  viewed	  within	  a	  particular	  system	  can	  orientate	  how	  a	  system	  progresses.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  governance	  is	  defined	  with	  two	  interlinked	  aspects;	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  The	  basis	  behind	  this	  definition	  is	  set	  out	  in	  the	  next	  few	  sections.	  This	  concept	  of	  governance	  categorises	  the	  energy	  system	  into	  interacting	  groups	  of	  actors	  constrained	  within	  a	  sector.	  For	  this	  thesis,	  an	  electricity	  system	  actor	  is	  defined	  as	  any	  individual	  or	  collective	  of	  players	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  whose	  behaviour	  impacts	  on	  the	  system.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  individual	  household	  consumer;	  currently	  seen	  as	  having	  only	  minimal	  engagement	  with	  energy	  system	  operators	  (DECC,	  2011f).	  Consumers	  as	  a	  group	  however,	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  through	  the	  decisions	  they	  make	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  energy	  company	  they	  buy	  their	  electricity	  from	  and	  their	  demand	  behaviour.	  The	  term	  stakeholder	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  issue;	  it	  is	  time	  and	  site	  specific,	  which	  means	  a	  stakeholder’s	  relevance	  may	  change	  over	  time	  and	  between	  issues.	  A	  stakeholder	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  anyone	  who	  possesses	  the	  power	  of	  action	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  use	  it	  (Glitchen,	  2000;	  Kooiman	  and	  Jentoft,	  2009).	  These	  can	  range	  from	  Government,	  to	  the	  energy	  companies	  operating	  within	  the	  electricity	  system.	  If	  the	  individual	  household	  consumer	  decided	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  small-­‐scale	  generating	  technology	  this	  action	  would	  denote	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  involved	  and	  they	  could	  then	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  stakeholder.	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  are	  the	  cognitive	  routines	  and	  shared	  beliefs,	  capabilities	  and	  competences,	  lifestyles	  and	  user	  practices,	  favourable	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  regulations,	  and	  legally	  binding	  contracts	  which	  relate	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Geels,	  2011).	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  that	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  stakeholders,	  also	  have	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  stakeholders,	  making	  governance	  a	  fluid	  concept.	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The	  need	  for	  governance,	  in	  a	  competitive	  market-­‐based	  system,	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  part	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  markets	  to	  provide	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  incentives	  of	  producers	  and	  consumers	  may	  be	  misaligned,	  requiring	  strategic	  planning	  over	  the	  whole	  system	  (Florini	  and	  Sovacool,	  2009).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  in	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  where	  the	  market	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  provide	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  required	  to	  reduce	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  The	  electricity	  system	  is	  complex;	  wholesale	  electricity	  exchange	  is	  operated	  through	  the	  markets,	  but	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  networks	  are	  regulated	  monopolies.	  This	  requires	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  understanding	  of	  governance	  for	  the	  electricity	  system,	  where	  different	  approaches	  are	  used.	  
6.3.1 Governance	  Theory	  Differing	  governance	  processes	  can	  affect	  how	  a	  system	  develops.	  Electricity	  system	  stakeholders	  have	  a	  range	  of	  motivations,	  which	  can	  influence	  their	  actions	  internally	  and	  externally.	  Internal	  motivations	  are	  developed	  from	  the	  values	  they	  hold,	  the	  resources	  they	  command	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  choose	  to	  follow.	  External	  motivations	  can	  include	  the	  national	  policies,	  market	  rules,	  and	  regulatory	  structure	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  relationships	  between	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  in	  order	  for	  policy	  makers	  to	  find	  the	  optimal	  solution	  for	  the	  system	  but	  also	  identify	  how	  change	  can	  occur.	  This	  thesis	  has	  identified	  the	  different	  rules	  and	  incentives	  for	  market	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  in	  (chapter	  3).	  It	  will	  look	  at	  the	  relationships	  of	  actors	  in	  (section	  6.3).	  This	  section	  will	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  background	  behind	  governance	  theories,	  it	  will	  then	  look	  at	  the	  classical	  governance,	  structural	  governance,	  the	  ranking	  of	  governance	  and	  finally	  it	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  modern	  governance	  approaches.	  
6.3.1.1 Approaches	  to	  understanding	  governance	  The	  classical	  theories	  of	  the	  governance	  often	  cover	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  societal	  change	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  policies	  of	  government	  (Rhodes,	  2007;	  Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach,	  2008;	  Pahl-­‐Wostl,	  2009).	  However,	  government	  is	  merely	  a	  single	  group	  of	  actors	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  a	  system.	  Historically,	  academic	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  policies	  and	  actions	  of	  governments,	  but	  more	  recently	  they	  have	  started	  to	  address	  governance	  outside	  governmental	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structures	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  scales,	  from	  large	  market	  players	  to	  the	  smaller	  individual	  consumer.	  This	  thesis	  will	  look	  beyond	  governance	  as	  government	  and	  use	  the	  assumption	  that	  societies	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  number	  of	  actors	  and	  entities	  made	  up	  of	  both	  public	  and	  non-­‐public	  groups	  (Kooiman	  2003;	  Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach,	  2008).	  The	  structural	  approach	  provides	  three	  dimensions	  to	  organising	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  interactions.	  The	  interactions	  are	  defined	  as:	  hierarchical	  governance,	  self-­‐governance	  and	  co-­‐governance.	  For	  hierarchal	  governance,	  the	  most	  common	  example	  is	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  state	  and	  other	  actors.	  However,	  more	  recently	  the	  perceptions	  of	  hierarchical	  governance	  show	  the	  commanding	  state	  as	  a	  regulatory	  one,	  delivering	  structure	  through	  the	  market	  and	  activating	  other	  roles.	  The	  control	  and	  steering	  of	  the	  system	  is	  key	  to	  forming	  a	  hierarchal	  structure	  (van	  Dijk	  and	  Winters-­‐van	  Beek,	  2008;	  Never,	  2011).	  In	  the	  self-­‐governance	  mode,	  the	  stakeholders	  take	  care	  of	  themselves.	  This	  occurs	  away	  from	  state	  control,	  and	  control	  is	  not	  achieved	  through	  government	  policy;	  it	  occurs	  naturally	  of	  its	  own	  accord.	  The	  concept	  of	  co-­‐governance	  looks	  at	  the	  networks	  of	  different	  actor	  groups	  with	  a	  common	  goal	  or	  ideology.	  Co-­‐governance	  can	  include	  the	  idea	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  and	  co-­‐management	  of	  infrastructure	  (Kooiman	  and	  Jentoft,	  2009).	  In	  practice,	  societies	  are	  governed	  through	  a	  mixture	  of	  these	  three	  modes	  (Kooiman	  and	  Jentoft,	  2009). 
Governance	  ranking	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  structural	  approach,	  however,	  it	  is	  different	  in	  that	  it	  attempts	  to	  identify	  the	  power	  of	  each	  stakeholder	  rather	  than	  the	  interactions	  of	  stakeholders.	  Governance	  ranking	  considers	  the	  ranking	  of	  governance	  activity	  in	  three	  different	  terms:	  first	  order,	  second	  order	  and	  meta	  governance	  (Kooiman	  and	  Jentoft,	  2009).	  First	  order	  governance	  deals	  with	  the	  day	  to	  day	  affairs	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  the	  ‘outer	  ring’	  of	  governance.	  In	  this	  situation	  problems	  are	  identified	  and	  solutions	  enacted.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  the	  state	  organisations	  and	  system	  actors.	  Second	  order	  governance	  focuses	  on	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  where	  the	  first	  order	  governance	  takes	  place.	  These	  arrangements	  include	  the	  rules,	  incentives	  and	  mechanisms.	  Meta	  governance	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  governing	  of	  governance,	  it	  surrounds	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  underlying	  principles	  such	  as	  sustainability,	  the	  economy	  and	  energy	  security	  (Kooiman,	  2003;	  2008).	  There	  are	  no	  clear	  boundaries	  where	  meta	  governance	  takes	  place,	  rather	  it	  is	  simply	  the	  principles	  which	  shape	  the	  structure	  of	  the	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governing	  process.	  Examples	  of	  this	  include	  the	  codes	  of	  conduct	  at	  international	  level	  and	  media	  focus	  on	  specific	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  impact	  climate	  change	  has	  made	  through	  media	  discussions	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  society	  (Evans,	  2012).	  However,	  constraining	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  government	  and	  markets	  alone	  would	  denote	  a	  limited	  impact	  from	  other	  stakeholders	  and	  not	  provide	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  (Smith,	  2007).	  More	  recently	  a	  new	  set	  of	  theoretical	  approaches	  have	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  system	  operates.	  These	  modern	  approaches	  to	  governance	  places	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  particular	  system	  and	  does	  not	  fixate	  on	  Government	  as	  the	  main	  governance	  player.	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  outlined	  below.	  	  The	  Network	  Approach	  describes	  society	  as	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  (Peterson,	  2003).	  Networks	  can	  be	  formal	  or	  informal,	  with	  the	  actors	  having	  the	  same	  vested	  interests,	  these	  interests	  can	  be	  better	  achieved	  as	  a	  group	  rather	  than	  individually.	  This	  approach	  to	  governance	  does	  not	  use	  the	  formal	  discussion	  of	  governments	  being	  a	  hierarchical	  power,	  instead	  it	  uses	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  can	  have	  the	  necessary	  means	  and	  incentive	  to	  drive	  the	  system.	  This	  approach	  follows	  on	  to	  The	  Policy	  network	  approach,	  which,	  is	  designed	  to	  examine	  the	  outcomes	  of	  policy	  decisions,	  analysing	  a	  cluster	  of	  actors	  each	  with	  a	  given	  stake	  or	  interest	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  policy	  success	  or	  failure	  (Rhodes,	  1997;	  Marsh	  and	  Smith	  2000;	  Peterson,	  2003).	  The	  use	  of	  policy	  networks,	  however,	  can	  be	  critiqued	  in	  three	  main	  areas.	  The	  first	  critique	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  model	  and	  primary	  theory.	  It	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  useful	  metaphor	  and	  does	  not	  go	  into	  any	  depth	  to	  explain	  the	  dependency	  of	  actors	  and	  how	  their	  dependency	  is	  restricted.	  Nor	  does	  it	  provide	  any	  testable	  hypothesis	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  networks	  in	  decision	  making	  (König,	  1998).	  The	  second	  critique	  is	  that	  the	  natural	  fluidity	  of	  policy	  making	  means	  there	  is	  little	  chance	  for	  stable	  networks	  to	  exist.	  Stakeholders	  form	  alliances	  around	  specific	  issues	  creating	  ‘issue	  networks’	  (Marsh	  and	  Rhodes,	  1992).	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  promiscuity	  of	  the	  stakeholders,	  networks	  can	  quickly	  disintegrate	  (Kassim,	  1993).	  The	  changing	  agendas	  of	  stakeholders	  means	  that	  they	  automatically	  alter	  networks	  and	  create	  complexity	  in	  the	  coalitions	  formed	  (Thatcher,	  1998;	  Richardson,	  2000).	  The	  third	  critique	  is	  that	  the	  network	  analysis	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  any	  theory	  surrounding	  power	  (Peterson,	  2003).	  Dowding	  (1994)	  shows	  the	  need	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for	  network	  analysis	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  policy	  process	  defining	  a	  theory	  of	  power	  (Owen,	  1995).	  	  
The	  Interactive	  Approach	  discusses	  government	  actors	  working	  closely	  with	  actor	  networks	  and	  stimulating	  them	  through	  targeted	  incentives	  such	  as	  goals	  to	  be	  met	  or	  subsidies	  for	  a	  particular	  technology.	  This	  means	  that	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  not	  directed	  by	  central	  government.	  Central	  government	  may	  enact	  policies	  and	  policy	  mechanisms,	  and	  pass	  laws	  but	  it	  is	  their	  interaction	  with	  stakeholder	  groups	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  each	  other	  which	  defines	  the	  outcome	  (Rhodes,	  1996;	  2007).	  One	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  with	  an	  interactive	  based	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  micro	  level	  analysis	  of	  social	  relations	  and	  can	  often	  lead	  to	  ‘cherry	  picking’	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  decision	  makers	  (Kooiman,	  2003;	  Edelenbos,	  2005).	  	  The	  Multi-­‐level	  Governance	  examines	  the	  interface	  and	  developments	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  organisation,	  each	  of	  which	  require	  different	  strategies.	  At	  each	  level	  the	  participants	  have	  specific	  policy	  instruments	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  work	  toward	  the	  same	  goal	  (Smith,	  2007).	  It	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  state	  is	  important	  or	  could	  be	  the	  most	  important	  stakeholder	  in	  a	  sector,	  it	  identifies	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  monopolise	  the	  policy	  and	  decision	  making	  process.	  Multi-­‐level	  Governance	  theory,	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  hierarchical	  governance	  by	  government	  (Marks	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  However,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  discussed	  as	  policy	  networks,	  which	  are	  ‘nested’	  in	  Government	  institutions	  (Peters	  and	  Pierre	  2000).	  The	  final	  approach	  is	  Social	  Learning,	  which	  is	  aimed	  at	  changing	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  actors	  involved.	  This	  process	  has	  three	  dimensions:	  learning	  by	  doing,	  doing	  by	  learning,	  and	  learning	  by	  learning,	  each	  of	  which	  discusses	  a	  different	  aspect	  on	  how	  society	  changes	  its	  ideas.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  a	  high	  level	  of	  individual	  householder	  engagement	  may	  be	  required	  (Carbon	  Trust,	  2013).	  This	  is	  because	  much	  of	  the	  investment	  will	  come	  from	  additional	  sources	  such	  as	  community	  groups	  and	  individuals.	  Through	  economic	  incentives	  consumers	  begin	  to	  introduce	  themselves	  to	  the	  energy	  system;	  they	  become	  invested	  in	  the	  policy	  and	  decision	  making	  which	  occurs,	  changing	  the	  social	  understanding	  and	  overall	  level	  of	  knowledge	  which	  is	  held	  by	  this	  group	  of	  actors	  (Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach,	  2008).	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It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  these	  approaches	  to	  governance	  as	  these	  are	  often	  used	  to	  analyse	  current	  policy	  and	  to	  discuss	  the	  makeup	  of	  a	  specific	  system	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  Each	  of	  these	  approaches	  identifies	  a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  governance	  theory	  as	  a	  means	  to	  analyse	  either	  previous	  governance	  processes	  or	  as	  a	  forward	  looking	  approach	  to	  driving	  change	  in	  a	  system	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  however,	  a	  definition	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  discuss	  the	  overall	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector	  is	  required.	  It	  is	  also	  needed	  to	  be	  relevant	  when	  discussing	  a	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore,	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  6.3	  this	  thesis	  defines	  governance	  with	  two	  interlinked	  aspects;	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  The	  interaction	  between	  stakeholders	  may	  form	  coalitions	  with	  groups	  which	  have	  the	  same	  desired	  outcome	  or	  the	  need	  to	  share	  resources	  and	  responsibilities.	  These	  networks	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  accountable	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  are	  self-­‐organising.	  They	  can,	  however,	  indirectly	  steer	  the	  networks	  (Rhodes,	  2007).	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  detailed	  policies,	  which	  are	  implemented,	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcomes.	  These	  processes	  are	  obviously	  created	  and	  dictated	  by	  the	  networks	  of	  stakeholders	  but	  they	  also	  go	  some	  way	  to	  forcing	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  networks,	  thus	  making	  them	  co-­‐dependant.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  use	  this	  definition	  to	  review	  the	  governance	  processes	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  sector.	  
6.3.2 Governance	  of	  the	  UK	  Electricity	  Sector	  Following	  on	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  networks	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  relationships	  of	  the	  various	  actors	  provide	  the	  overall	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  thesis	  will	  separate	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  into	  four	  groups:	  government	  lead	  actors,	  regulatory	  bodies,	  market	  led	  actors	  (such	  as	  the	  large	  supply	  companies	  and	  development	  industry)	  and	  civil	  society,	  which	  include	  the	  ‘end	  users’	  but	  also	  organised	  communities	  and	  media	  bodies	  (SDC,	  2007;	  Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  2009).	  This	  is	  a	  simplification	  because,	  in	  reality,	  actors	  cannot	  be	  so	  clearly	  categorised;	  they	  can	  differ	  in	  their	  opinion	  over	  the	  energy	  domain	  and	  may	  also	  be	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  more	  than	  one	  category	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(Parag	  and	  Darby	  2009).	  However,	  by	  examining	  them	  in	  the	  four	  groups	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  able	  to	  evaluate	  the	  nexus	  of	  power	  between	  these	  four	  groups,	  and	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  different	  governance	  systems	  can	  operate.	  This	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  different	  actor	  groups	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  structure	  in	  order	  to	  review	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  approach	  and	  the	  possible	  future	  outcomes.	  
6.3.2.1 Actor	  Relationships	  and	  the	  Balance	  of	  Power	  The	  interactions	  between	  the	  different	  stakeholder	  groups	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  rules	  and	  regulations	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Goldthau	  and	  Witte,	  2010).	  Both	  Foxon	  et	  al	  (2009)	  and	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  (2009)	  demonstrate	  the	  relationship	  between	  government,	  civil	  society,	  the	  market	  players	  as	  a	  triadic	  relationship.	  Foxon	  et	  al	  (2009)	  analyse	  governance	  patterns	  for	  transition	  pathways	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  paper	  explores	  the	  different	  governance	  patterns,	  which	  relate	  to	  central	  government,	  market	  actors	  and	  structures,	  and	  civil	  society.	  Foxon	  et	  al.,	  identifies	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system	  as	  a	  way	  of	  affecting	  the	  technological	  institutional	  and	  social	  change.	  They	  discuss	  the	  governance	  patterns	  as	  the	  relationship	  (the	  balance	  and	  mix	  of	  actions)	  between	  central	  government,	  actors	  in	  liberalized	  markets	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  (Figure	  6-­‐5).	  Within	  this,	  government	  led	  actors	  include	  government	  departments,	  advisory	  and	  regulatory	  bodies	  and	  the	  legislation	  they	  create.	  Market	  led	  actors	  cover	  the	  vertically	  integrated	  supply	  companies	  and	  the	  smaller	  market-­‐based	  actors.	  The	  civil	  society	  led	  actors	  include	  end	  users,	  trade	  unions,	  media	  and	  organized	  environmental	  movements.	  	  Foxon	  et	  al	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  relationship	  of	  power	  between	  each	  of	  these	  actor	  groups	  and	  how	  they	  may	  differ.	  From	  this	  they	  identify	  ‘action	  spaces’	  which	  are	  created	  by	  the	  actor	  groups	  and	  define	  the	  energy	  regime.	  These	  action	  spaces	  change	  depending	  on	  which	  actor	  has	  the	  greatest	  power,	  ultimately	  providing	  a	  framework	  with	  which	  to	  understand	  and	  conceptualise	  the	  existing	  energy	  system.	  This	  thesis	  will	  discuss	  the	  relationships	  of	  power	  between	  the	  actor	  groups	  who	  have	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  later	  in	  this	  section.	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Figure	  6-­‐5	  Action	  space	  for	  transition	  pathways	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  (2009)	  have	  developed	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  examine	  the	  main	  groups	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions.	  Although	  the	  focus	  of	  Parag	  and	  Darby’s	  work	  was	  on	  the	  UK	  residential	  householder	  they	  utilise	  a	  framework	  which	  can	  be	  related	  to	  Foxon	  et	  al.,	  discussing	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  for	  the	  UK	  energy	  sector.	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  examine	  the	  governance	  of	  emissions	  reduction,	  including	  how	  the	  policies	  are	  shaped	  through	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  main	  groups	  of	  actors	  in	  this	  area:	  central	  government,	  gas	  and	  electricity	  suppliers	  and	  energy	  users.	  They	  also	  discuss	  the	  interrelationship	  between	  these	  three	  actor	  groups	  through	  their	  aspirations,	  regulations,	  actions	  and	  transactions.	  These	  relationships	  are	  identified	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐6.	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Figure	  6-­‐6	  Main	  groups	  of	  actors	  in	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  from	  household	  energy	  
demand:	  actions,	  communications	  and	  expectations	  (Parag	  and	  Darby,	  2009)	  	  	  Structuring	  the	  energy	  system	  into	  these	  three	  categories,	  as	  both	  Foxon	  et	  al	  and	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  have	  done,	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  full	  picture	  of	  the	  relationships	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  system	  actors	  for	  energy	  security.	  In	  reality	  categorising	  actor	  groups	  is	  far	  more	  complex;	  each	  actor	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  have	  different	  aspirations	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  thereby	  not	  fitting	  neatly	  into	  one	  category.	  However,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  group	  them	  in	  this	  way	  as	  it	  removes	  much	  of	  the	  complexity	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  add	  a	  fourth	  dimension	  to	  this	  triadic	  relationship,	  not	  identified	  by	  the	  previous	  authors;	  Regulatory	  Based	  Stakeholders.	  Regulatory	  Based	  Stakeholders	  include	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  network	  operators,	  which	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  current	  three	  categories.	  Both	  Foxon	  et	  al	  and	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  
	   166	  
identify	  Ofgem	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Government	  group24,	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  include	  Regulatory	  Based	  Stakeholder	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  research.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  they	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  a	  transition	  (Foxon	  et	  al)	  or	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  (Parag	  and	  Darby).	  	  For	  this	  thesis	  the	  network	  operators	  are	  considered	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  especially	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  These	  Regulatory	  Based	  Stakeholders	  not	  only	  provide	  day	  to	  day	  delivery	  of	  electricity	  (and	  therefore	  security	  of	  supply),	  but	  they	  also	  have	  a	  role	  in	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  through	  the	  smart	  grid	  development	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  accept	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  generation	  on	  the	  networks.	  This	  new	  framework	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐7.	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐7	  Main	  groups	  of	  actors	  involved	  with	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  (adapted	  from	  Parag	  
and	  Darby,	  2009;	  Foxon	  et	  al	  2009).	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  actors	  and	  actor	  groups	  can	  be	  dictated	  by	  their	  perceived	  power	  and	  therefore	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  any	  governance	  approach	  (Berger,	  2003).	  The	  power	  of	  an	  actor	  is	  defined	  by	  their	  ability	  and	  desire	  to	  drive	  change	  (Preble,	  2005).	  This	  power	  can	  be	  provided	  by	  their	  size	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  or	  wealth	  and	  the	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  they	  have	  access	  to	  (Scrase	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  However,	  power	  may	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  one-­‐way	  concept	  with	  one	  actor	  dominating	  over	  another.	  Rhodes	  (1997)	  suggests	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Although	  Ofgem	  is	  directly	  a	  part	  of	  central	  Government	  it	  does	  have	  strong	  ties	  and	  links	  to	  them.	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  include	  them	  in	  this	  category	  rather	  than	  creating	  further	  complexity.	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power	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  exchange	  relationship	  where	  one	  actor	  will	  need	  the	  other.	  For	  example	  the	  Government	  need	  the	  Energy	  companies	  to	  provide	  information	  and	  to	  implement	  the	  policies,	  the	  energy	  companies	  need	  Government	  to	  promote	  their	  interests	  (Richards	  and	  Smith,	  2002).	  	  
“organisations	  depend	  on	  each	  other	  for	  resources	  and,	  
therefore,	  entre	  exchange	  relationships”(Rhodes,	  1997	  pg:	  9)	  Figure	  6-­‐7	  looks	  at	  the	  interaction	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  a	  secure	  energy	  system.	  The	  model	  is	  a	  simplified	  representation	  of	  the	  relationships	  which	  are	  apparent	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Within	  each	  stakeholder	  group	  there	  would	  be	  a	  number	  of	  sub-­‐groups,	  each	  of	  which	  would	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  requirements	  for	  the	  future.	  Although	  this	  matrix	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  explore	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  thesis,	  viewing	  the	  relationships	  and	  the	  interplay	  between	  each	  group	  provides	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  different	  pathways	  might	  play	  out	  within	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  and	  how	  different	  actors	  may	  be	  likely	  to	  react	  to	  changes	  such	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  energy	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
6.3.2.2 Actor	  Responsibility	  and	  Power	  The	  responsibility	  of	  a	  stakeholder	  for	  a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  a	  system	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  legislation,	  which	  can	  also	  set	  out	  their	  ability	  to	  achieve	  this.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  responsibility	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  actor,	  or	  group	  of	  actors,	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  and	  obligation	  to	  act.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  level	  of	  power	  an	  actor	  holds	  can	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  responsibility	  (i.e.	  low	  power,	  low	  responsibility	  and	  vice	  versa).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  system	  operator’s	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  the	  electricity	  system	  balancing,	  achieved	  through	  the	  balancing	  and	  settlement	  code	  (BSC).	  However,	  defining	  responsibility	  for	  a	  wider	  issue	  such	  as	  energy	  security	  which	  can	  encompass	  a	  range	  of	  policies	  is	  not	  easy.	  What	  can	  be	  identified	  is	  that	  responsibility	  is	  set	  out	  by	  the	  legislation	  and	  the	  stakeholder’s	  power	  to	  fulfil	  that	  legislation.	  The	  issue	  with	  energy	  security	  is	  that	  the	  Government	  who	  determine	  policy	  and	  have	  priority	  "deliver	  secure	  energy	  on	  the	  way	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  energy	  future"	  (DECC,	  2012d	  pg.:	  2)	  are	  often	  considered	  as	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case.	  For	  the	  energy	  system	  the	  Government	  has	  partly	  conflicting	  policies	  of	  carbon	  reduction,	  energy	  security	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and	  affordability.	  These	  conflicting	  policies	  may	  mean	  energy	  security	  and	  affordability	  win	  out	  over	  carbon	  reduction.	  Therefore,	  this	  Government	  may	  fall	  back	  to	  the	  pragmatic	  approach	  of	  delivering	  what	  the	  voters	  want.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  crude	  representation,	  however,	  it	  does	  identify	  that	  the	  Government	  only	  may	  have	  a	  short-­‐term	  view	  point.	  This	  was	  also	  identified	  in	  the	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  (see	  section	  4.1.6).	  As	  energy	  security	  requires	  a	  long-­‐term	  view	  point	  (which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  features	  which	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  security	  of	  supply)	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  not	  the	  actor	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  working	  together.	  However,	  this	  network	  does	  require	  guidance	  and	  therefore	  governance.	  (Rhodes,	  1997)	  The	  relationship	  between	  actors	  and	  actor	  groups	  will	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  each	  actor.	  The	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  delivering	  energy	  security	  means	  that	  pinning	  the	  responsibility	  on	  a	  single	  actor	  would	  be	  very	  difficult.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  Rhodes	  (1997)	  identifies	  that	  responsibility	  is	  placed	  upon	  a	  range	  of	  actors:	  
“Policy	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  no	  one	  institution	  but	  emerges	  
from	  the	  interaction	  of	  several”	  (Rhodes,	  1998:	  pg.	  404)	  This	  develops	  the	  understanding	  that	  energy	  security	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  single	  institution.	  It	  will	  be	  a	  network	  of	  policy	  actors	  who	  work	  to	  provide	  an	  outcome.	  However,	  each	  actor	  does	  hold	  a	  level	  of	  responsibility	  for	  individual	  aspects	  which	  help	  deliver	  a	  secure	  energy	  system.	  Richards	  and	  Smith	  (2002)	  identify	  the	  traditional	  model	  of	  responsibility	  as	  being	  closely	  tied	  in	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  hierarchy.	  This	  means	  that	  responsibility	  gravitates	  upwards,	  the	  higher	  the	  hierarchy	  the	  greater	  the	  degree	  of	  responsibility.	  Therefore,	  with	  this	  concept	  a	  defined	  hierarchy	  is	  required.	  However,	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  perspective	  and	  therefore	  different	  between	  actors.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  actor	  groups	  means	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  from	  hierarchy	  to	  heterarchy	  where	  all	  actors	  are	  engaged	  in	  policy	  making.	  Another	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  the	  responsibility	  needs	  to	  be	  coupled	  with	  the	  actors’	  ability	  to	  develop	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  would	  therefore	  couple	  the	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actors’	  perceived	  responsibility	  with	  their	  perceived	  power	  and	  actual	  responsibility	  with	  actual	  power.	  If	  responsibility	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  actors’	  perspective,	  then	  another	  possible	  approach	  is	  to	  view	  an	  actors’	  accountability.	  Accountability	  would	  place	  emphasis	  on	  a	  stakeholder	  with	  a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  energy	  security.	  Thereby	  identifying	  a	  ‘weak	  link’	  and	  ensuring	  a	  ‘system	  of	  accountability’	  (Rhodes,	  1997)	  for	  future	  security.	  However,	  the	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  firstly,	  it	  is	  a	  method	  which	  analyses	  the	  historic	  system	  and	  therefore	  requires	  any	  issues	  to	  occur	  before	  action	  i.e.	  it	  is	  not	  pre-­‐emptive.	  The	  second	  issue	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  responsibility	  of	  a	  policy,	  especially	  energy	  security,	  requires	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  working	  together.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  a	  system	  actor	  accountable	  when	  it	  would	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  many.	  Figure	  6-­‐7	  identifies	  the	  groups	  of	  actors	  as:	  Government	  organisations,	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders,	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  and	  civil	  society	  Figure	  6-­‐8	  uses	  these	  actor	  groups	  and	  shows	  the	  type	  of	  actor	  relevant	  to	  each	  group.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  actor	  groups,	  by	  identifying	  the	  impacts	  of	  perceived	  dominance	  for	  each	  group.	  This	  dyadic	  approach	  to	  stakeholder	  interactions	  implies	  that	  their	  connections	  are	  separate	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  sector.	  In	  reality	  the	  stakeholder	  groups	  would	  all	  operate	  as	  a	  network,	  interacting	  with	  each	  other.	  By	  viewing	  the	  interactions	  as	  separate	  entities	  this	  thesis	  is	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  overarching	  relationships	  and	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  electricity	  governance	  interactions.	  This	  section	  will	  now	  identify	  the	  relationships	  and	  impacts	  of	  the	  perceived	  power	  in	  the	  actor	  groups	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐7	  and	  Figure	  6-­‐8.	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Figure	  6-­‐8	  Diagram	  of	  Actor	  groups	  including	  type	  of	  actor	  group	  (adapted	  from	  Parag	  and	  Darby,	  
2009;	  Foxon	  et	  al	  2009).	  
Relationship	  ‘A’	  (Government	  Organisations	  –	  Civil	  Society)	  The	  relationship	  between	  government	  and	  civil	  society	  is	  dynamic	  and	  complex.	  Government	  sets	  the	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  provide	  the	  desired	  outcome	  (for	  civil	  society)	  but	  also	  to	  protect	  the	  consumers.	  Therefore,	  if	  government	  is	  perceived	  as	  being	  the	  dominant	  actor	  group	  relative	  to	  civil	  society	  actors,	  then	  there	  may	  be	  a	  relationship	  of	  ‘political	  acceptability’,	  wherein	  the	  primary	  concern	  would	  be	  to	  ensure	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  are	  sufficiently	  educated	  and	  ‘onside’	  to	  enable	  policies	  to	  succeed.	  If	  civil	  society	  actors	  held	  more	  power,	  questions	  of	  ‘political	  legitimacy’	  may	  be	  posed	  –	  for	  example,	  if	  a	  government	  tried	  to	  impose	  an	  unpopular	  policy	  on	  civil	  society	  groups,	  questions	  may	  be	  asked	  as	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  such	  decisions	  –	  protests	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  civil	  action	  may	  follow	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  reality	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  a	  changing	  actor	  group.	  They	  have	  a	  four	  year	  possible	  change	  to	  the	  political	  party	  in	  power	  and	  intermediate	  changes	  to	  the	  secretary	  of	  state,	  each	  with	  different	  priorities	  for	  the	  energy	  system.	  Therefore,	  a	  government	  priority	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  stay	  in	  power,	  which	  means	  delivering	  votes.	  This	  is	  the	  longer-­‐term	  view	  of	  civil	  society	  power.	  They	  also	  have	  a	  shorter-­‐term	  impact	  of	  public	  action	  such	  as	  the	  protests	  over	  the	  building	  of	  new	  coal	  fired	  power	  stations	  in	  2008	  (Adam,	  2008)	  and	  even	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through	  planning	  of	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  Although	  it	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  civil	  society	  look	  towards	  Government	  for	  direction	  even	  if	  it	  is	  often	  with	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  distrust.	  
Relationship	  ‘B’	  (Civil	  Society	  –	  Market-­‐based	  Stakeholders)	  The	  relationship	  between	  civil	  society	  and	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  principally	  related	  to	  the	  retail	  markets.	  In	  the	  past	  consumers	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  being	  very	  disengaged	  from	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  not	  looking	  for	  the	  cheapest	  energy	  supplier	  basically	  being	  content	  with	  their	  current	  long	  running	  supplier	  (Waddams,	  2008).	  For	  consumers	  it	  is	  the	  drive	  to	  find	  low	  cost	  energy	  generation	  and	  for	  the	  market	  player	  it	  is	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  most	  profitable	  outcome	  which	  would	  be	  the	  balance	  of	  raising	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  whilst	  keeping	  customers.	  In	  this	  pairing,	  if	  civil	  society	  actors	  have	  the	  greatest	  power,	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  ‘citizen	  entrepreneurs’	  may	  emerge.	  In	  this	  instance,	  citizens	  may	  become	  much	  more	  active	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  generating	  and	  exporting	  their	  own	  electricity,	  which	  at	  present	  utilises	  the	  market	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  place.	  But	  also	  engaging	  politically	  to	  ensure	  key	  planning	  decisions	  go	  the	  way	  they	  wish.	  If	  market	  actors	  rule	  the	  regime,	  a	  dominant	  relationship	  will	  exist	  with	  ‘compliant	  consumers’;	  the	  market	  is	  seen	  to	  ‘know	  best’	  and	  consumers	  simply	  comply	  with	  the	  price	  signals	  sent	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  reality	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  utility	  companies	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  ‘Big	  6’.	  This	  oligopoly	  provides	  limited	  choice	  for	  the	  consumer	  and	  therefore	  reduced	  competition.	  As	  electricity	  is	  considered	  a	  necessity	  the	  consumers	  have	  little	  choice	  and	  require	  ‘protection’	  by	  Ofgem	  from	  the	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder.	  
Relationship	  ‘C’	  (Government	  Organisations	  –	  Market-­‐based	  Stakeholders)	  The	  relationships	  between	  government	  and	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  is	  probably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contentious.	  The	  main	  conflict	  in	  this	  relationship	  is	  between	  the	  suppliers	  business	  objectives	  towards	  profitability	  (to	  increase	  market	  share	  and	  sell	  more	  kWh)	  and	  the	  Government’s	  requirement	  for	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  to	  help	  meet	  the	  targets	  and	  goals	  of	  carbon	  reduction,	  affordability	  and	  energy	  security	  (see	  section	  2.4)	  (Parag	  and	  Darby,	  2009).	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If	  Government	  actors	  are	  deemed	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  relative	  power,	  then	  a	  relationship	  of	  ‘regulatory	  compliance’	  may	  occur.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  market	  actors	  would	  be	  expected	  simply	  to	  comply	  with	  government	  targets,	  posing	  interesting	  questions	  about	  how	  these	  targets	  are	  set	  and	  how	  achievable	  they	  may	  be.	  	  If	  market	  actors	  are	  deemed	  most	  powerful,	  then	  industry	  representatives	  are	  likely	  to	  call	  ‘level	  playing	  field’	  between	  the	  different	  technologies	  and	  actors.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  Government	  would	  have	  to	  stay	  away	  from	  ‘picking	  winners’	  through	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  and	  subsidies	  (such	  as	  the	  FIT	  and	  RO)	  and	  it	  would	  look	  toward	  a	  single	  carbon	  price	  over	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Foxon	  et	  al	  2005).	  The	  reality	  in	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  identify.	  The	  Government	  essentially	  ‘holds	  all	  the	  cards’	  in	  determining	  the	  policy	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  Even	  though	  Government	  uses	  the	  markets	  as	  its	  main	  tool	  in	  energy	  security	  (see	  section	  4.1	  (DECC,	  2012o)	  it	  also	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  intervene	  and	  this	  level	  of	  intervention	  is	  open	  and	  not	  set	  out.	  Having	  said	  this	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  identified	  the	  need	  for	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  investment	  into	  the	  energy	  system,	  part	  of	  which	  will	  be	  delivered	  by	  the	  internationally	  owned	  energy	  companies.	  Without	  this	  investment	  the	  Government	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  ‘driving	  off’	  the	  energy	  companies	  meaning	  they	  can	  ask	  for	  subsidies	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  UK.	  An	  option	  the	  Government	  does	  have	  is	  to	  try	  and	  fund	  this	  investment	  elsewhere.	  In	  order	  to	  find	  large	  scale	  centralised	  generation	  there	  are	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  can	  deliver.	  However,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  open	  the	  generation	  investment	  to	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  investors	  and	  reduce	  the	  power	  of	  a	  single	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder.	  
Relationship	  ‘D’	  (Market-­‐based	  Stakeholders	  –	  Regulatory	  Based	  
Stakeholders)	  The	  relationships	  between	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  and	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders	  is	  one	  of	  necessity	  but	  also	  of	  relative	  detachment.	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The	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  achieved	  though	  the	  markets	  and	  through	  regulation.	  This	  provides	  a	  contrast	  in	  the	  governance	  approaches	  between	  the	  regulation	  based	  stakeholder	  and	  that	  of	  the	  market	  stakeholder.	  	  The	  link	  between	  these	  actor	  groups	  is	  one	  of	  mutual	  benefit;	  one	  develops	  a	  generation	  and	  consumer	  profile	  whilst	  the	  other	  provides	  the	  delivery	  and	  transportation	  of	  the	  generation	  to	  the	  consumer.	  	  This	  means	  that	  in	  reality	  there	  are	  very	  little	  changes	  in	  balances	  of	  power	  between	  them.	  The	  DNOs	  are	  currently	  somewhat	  passive	  in	  the	  energy	  security	  debate	  and	  other	  than	  running	  the	  local	  network	  who’s	  charges	  are	  passed	  through	  the	  energy	  supply	  companies	  (to	  the	  consumers)	  they	  have	  little	  contact.	  The	  TNO	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  has	  an	  association	  through	  the	  connection	  of	  generation	  to	  the	  network,	  which	  is	  beneficial	  to	  both	  parties.	  
Relationship	  ‘E’	  (Government	  Organisations	  –	  Regulatory	  Based	  
Stakeholders)	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  because	  of	  monopolies	  of	  the	  networks,	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders,	  are	  currently	  dominated	  by	  Government	  Organisations,	  with	  pricing	  controls	  set	  out	  in	  advance	  attempting	  to	  develop	  greater	  efficiency	  within	  their	  sectors.	  However,	  with	  a	  reversal	  in	  power	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders	  would	  pursue	  a	  more	  aggressive	  portfolio	  for	  greater	  profits	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  consumer	  and	  the	  energy	  companies.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  shareholders	  to	  glean	  maximum	  revenue	  (Kay,	  2013).	  The	  reality	  here	  is	  that	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders	  as	  monopoly	  companies	  will	  always	  need	  regulating.	  Their	  future	  may	  see	  the	  DNOs	  with	  a	  greater	  activity	  on	  the	  network,	  with	  a	  possibility	  of	  balancing	  both	  supply	  and	  demand.	  However,	  this	  will	  still	  be	  closely	  followed	  by	  Government	  stakeholders.	  
Final	  link	  Civil	  Society	  -­‐	  Regulation	  Based	  Stakeholder	  The	  electricity	  consumer	  has	  a	  wide	  choice	  of	  supply	  companies	  and	  the	  means	  to	  compare	  electricity	  unit	  prices	  through	  internet	  comparison	  sites;	  an	  underlying	  cost	  as	  part	  of	  their	  bill	  is	  a	  charge	  to	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  operators.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  is	  controlled	  by	  the	  network	  operators	  who	  work	  as	  regulated	  regional	  monopolies	  and	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  being	  hidden	  from	  customers	  (Cotton	  and	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2009).	  Another	  connection	  civil	  society	  makes	  with	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the	  regulation-­‐based	  companies	  (such	  as	  network	  operators)	  is	  when	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  problem.	  However,	  these	  limited	  connections	  between	  these	  actor	  groups	  provide	  little	  for	  discussion.	  Governance	  patterns	  need	  to	  change	  in	  two	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Firstly,	  the	  influence	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  would	  need	  to	  be	  increased	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  involved	  with	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  householders,	  businesses	  and	  communities	  closer	  to	  becoming	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders.	  This	  means	  that	  market	  stakeholders	  and	  consumers	  could	  become	  a	  single	  actor	  group.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  the	  consumers	  having	  a	  ‘stake’	  in	  the	  generation	  side	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  demand	  side	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  billing	  system	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  day	  to	  day	  market	  price.	  	  The	  second	  requirement	  for	  change	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  is	  a	  need	  for	  greater	  direction	  from	  Government.	  The	  relationship	  of	  the	  Government	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  system	  actors	  and	  the	  main	  decision	  makers,	  mean	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  may	  be	  perceived	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  power	  and	  therefore	  be	  in	  the	  best	  position	  to	  drive	  change.	  This	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  case	  for	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system;	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  moving	  to	  any	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  whether	  it	  is	  decentralised	  or	  centralised.	  The	  transition	  requires	  strong	  and	  purposeful	  decision	  making	  from	  Government	  players.	  
6.4 Governance	  of	  a	  Transition	  The	  future	  of	  electricity	  will	  require	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  This	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  centralised	  or	  a	  decentralised	  approach.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  issues	  which	  might	  affect	  the	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  For	  example,	  the	  goals	  of	  each	  institution	  may	  not	  be	  aligned;	  Ofgem’s	  role	  in	  the	  past	  has	  been	  to	  protect	  the	  interest	  of	  consumers	  by	  promoting	  effective	  competition	  between	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  generation,	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity	  (Pollit,	  2008).	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  have	  been	  consistent	  with	  the	  Government’s	  energy	  and	  environmental	  goals	  at	  the	  time	  (Parag	  and	  Darby,	  2009).	  While	  the	  Government	  had	  goals	  of	  promoting	  renewable	  generation,	  Ofgem’s	  role	  of	  promoting	  competition	  meant	  that	  the	  cheapest	  forms	  of	  generation	  would	  benefit,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  nascent	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renewable	  technology	  to	  be	  introduced	  (Parag	  and	  Darby,	  2009).	  The	  role	  of	  Ofgem	  since	  then	  has	  been	  amended	  to	  incorporate	  the	  consumers	  interests	  which	  include	  a	  reduction	  of	  greenhouse	  gasses	  (Ofgem,	  2012k).	  More	  recently	  the	  2012	  Energy	  Bill	  uses	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  Strategy	  and	  Policy	  Statement	  (SPS)	  to	  improve	  regulatory	  certainty	  by	  ensuring	  that	  Government	  and	  Ofgem	  are	  aligned	  at	  a	  strategic	  level.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  are	  included	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  The	  majority	  of	  involvement	  for	  consumers	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  which	  supplier	  to	  use,	  leaving	  their	  views	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  unheard.	  The	  difficulty	  here	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  centralised	  system	  means	  that	  the	  energy	  companies	  who	  are	  already	  established	  would	  be	  able	  to	  promote	  the	  centralised	  model	  over	  decentralisation	  (Unruh,	  2000;	  van	  der	  Vleuten	  and	  Raven,	  2006).	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  not	  always	  clear,	  stakeholder	  groups	  can	  often	  have	  different	  ideas	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  within	  a	  dictated	  timeframe	  then	  positive	  action	  or	  reinforcement	  from	  one	  or	  more	  stakeholders	  who	  hold	  the	  power	  to	  make	  the	  change	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  Government	  establishing	  strong	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  which	  promote	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation;	  through	  consumers	  speaking	  out	  for	  how	  and	  where	  they	  want	  their	  energy	  to	  be	  generated;	  or	  by	  investors	  proactively	  identifying	  decentralised	  generation	  as	  their	  investment	  strategies.	  If	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  established	  then	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  alter	  dramatically.	  The	  main	  impact	  will	  be	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  smaller	  owners,	  bringing	  a	  greater	  interaction	  between	  the	  consumers	  and	  the	  energy	  system.	  
6.5 Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  discussed	  the	  transition	  theory	  of	  moving	  from	  one	  system	  to	  another.	  It	  has	  focussed	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  specifically	  on	  the	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  system	  to	  one	  dominated	  by	  decentralised	  generation	  and	  ownership.	  The	  UK	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  locked-­‐in	  to	  a	  system	  of	  centralised	  technology	  and	  operation.	  This	  lock	  in	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  the	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investments	  sunk	  into	  centralised	  technologies,	  to	  the	  organisational	  and	  market	  structures	  together	  with	  user	  practices	  and	  lifestyles.	  This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  new	  approaches	  such	  as	  decentralisation	  to	  get	  established.	  This	  could	  also	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  locking	  out	  of	  decentralisation	  and	  therefore	  a	  transition	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  ‘break’	  this	  lock	  if	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  discussed	  the	  concept	  of	  decentralisation	  as	  not	  being	  just	  a	  technical	  issue,	  but	  also	  includes	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders.	  Therefore,	  any	  theory	  discussed	  will	  need	  to	  incorporate	  the	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  as	  a	  major	  function	  of	  the	  analysis.	  This	  thesis	  looked	  at	  many	  different	  theories	  from	  transition	  management,	  niche	  management	  and	  technical	  innovation.	  However,	  the	  theory	  best	  suited	  to	  the	  situation	  posed	  by	  this	  thesis	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  multi-­‐layer	  perspective.	  This	  incorporates	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  a	  transition	  identifying	  the	  ‘environment’	  or	  the	  overarching	  drivers	  for	  a	  change,	  the	  regime	  aspects	  such	  as	  policy,	  culture,	  society	  ,	  markets	  and	  technology,	  and	  it	  incorporates	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  niche	  development	  in	  the	  transition	  itself.	  Transition	  theory	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  a	  possible	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  From	  this	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  governance	  pathways	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  helping	  to	  break	  the	  lock-­‐in	  of	  centralisation.	  Governance	  is	  defined	  in	  this	  thesis	  as;	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  The	  classical	  governance	  theories	  suggest	  a	  hierarchical	  structure,	  where	  government	  is	  placed	  at	  the	  top.	  This	  is	  from	  the	  government	  being	  the	  decision	  makers	  and	  potentially	  holding	  the	  greatest	  power,	  where	  power	  has	  the	  ability	  and	  want	  to	  create	  change.	  However,	  more	  modern	  theories	  suggest	  a	  network	  approach	  where	  formal	  or	  informal	  networks	  of	  actors	  who	  have	  the	  same	  vested	  interests	  work	  together	  for	  a	  common	  goal.	  In	  terms	  of	  policy	  these	  networks	  of	  actors	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  particular	  policy	  outcome.	  The	  multi-­‐level	  perspective	  provides	  an	  analysis	  which	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  hierarchical	  structure	  with	  government	  at	  the	  top,	  it	  actually	  looks	  at	  actors	  or	  networks	  of	  actors	  in	  different	  levels	  of	  power	  or	  responsibility.	  Thereby	  identifying	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	  actors	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  energy	  security.	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From	  this	  a	  consideration	  of	  governance	  needs	  to	  identify	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  actors	  not	  only	  with	  each	  other	  but	  with	  the	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  incentives	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  definition	  includes	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  In	  the	  past,	  discussions	  around	  the	  electricity	  system	  transitions	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  quantitative	  issues	  such	  as	  price,	  capacity	  and	  technology,	  which	  can	  be	  measured	  and	  projected	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  developing	  future	  strategies	  (Connor	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Goldthau	  and	  Witte,	  2010).	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  dimensions	  that	  can	  impact	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  cannot	  be	  measured.	  These	  can	  range	  from	  the	  social	  and	  behavioural	  interactions	  of	  individuals	  and	  institutions,	  to	  the	  rules	  set	  out	  in	  the	  energy	  system,	  making	  the	  analysis	  of	  energy	  security	  far	  more	  complex	  (Sovacool	  and	  Mukherjee	  2011).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  responsibility,	  power	  and	  direction	  of	  each	  actor	  can	  influence	  future	  changes.	  Therefore,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  institutions	  and	  the	  rules	  that	  form	  them,	  a	  more	  holistic	  perspective	  of	  energy	  security	  can	  be	  achieved.	  Following	  the	  move	  away	  from	  the	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  model	  to	  a	  market-­‐based	  electricity	  system	  means	  that	  policy	  making	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  often	  organised	  through	  market	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  regulatory	  frameworks	  (Moran,	  2003;	  Mitchell,	  2008;	  Bolton	  and	  Foxon,	  2010	  Goldthau	  and	  Sovacool,	  2012).	  Successful	  markets	  need	  governments	  to	  create	  and	  defend	  conditions	  (Scrase,	  2009).	  The	  UK	  Government	  can	  enact	  overarching	  policies	  which	  affect	  the	  market	  and	  market	  players.	  However,	  with	  a	  market-­‐based	  electricity	  system	  the	  Government	  no	  longer	  decides	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  capital,	  technology	  or	  power.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  shown	  the	  background	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  identified	  the	  main	  policy	  goals	  and	  targets	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  achieve	  and	  discussed	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  since	  the	  1990s.	  It	  has	  provided	  discussions	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  energy	  security,	  decentralised	  electricity,	  transitions	  and	  governance.	  Each	  of	  these	  chapters	  has	  been	  leading	  to	  the	  overall	  purpose	  of	  the	  thesis,	  which	  is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  governance	  implications	  for	  energy	  security	  of	  moving	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  operation.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  thesis	  identifying	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  the	  methodology	  behind	  achieving	  these	  objectives.	  
	   178	  
7 Aims	  and	  Methodology	  This	  chapter	  sets	  out	  the	  aims	  and	  methodological	  approaches	  used	  for	  this	  research,	  including	  the	  primary	  data	  collection,	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  qualitative	  approaches:	  the	  main	  research	  strategy	  used	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  from	  purposively	  selected	  participants,	  backed	  up	  by	  data	  from	  UK	  Government	  consultation	  responses	  and	  a	  review	  of	  grey	  literature	  such	  as	  conference	  reports	  and	  non-­‐indexed	  journals	  as	  a	  secondary	  source	  of	  data.	  The	  data	  collected	  from	  these	  sources	  was	  analysed	  using	  a	  ‘qualitative	  content	  analysis’	  framework.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  implications	  of	  energy	  security	  for	  governance	  of	  decentralised	  electricity,	  concentrating	  specifically	  on	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  The	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  topic	  of	  discussion	  means	  that	  the	  networks	  of	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  involved	  stretch	  from	  the	  household	  and	  local	  level,	  up	  to	  Government	  and	  transnational	  companies	  and	  institutions.	  The	  multifaceted	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  multi-­‐level	  nature	  of	  transitioning	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  means	  that	  there	  will	  need	  to	  be	  a	  diverse	  selection	  of	  research	  participants.	  Any	  focus	  to	  a	  specific	  and	  localised	  area	  would	  not	  provide	  the	  range	  of	  understanding	  required	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  aims.	  Therefore,	  the	  research	  participants	  are	  taken	  from	  a	  range	  of	  actor	  groups	  (see	  section	  6.3).	  This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  setting	  out	  the	  research	  aims.	  It	  then	  identifies	  and	  discusses	  the	  primary	  research	  methodology,	  including	  how	  the	  participants	  were	  identified	  and	  the	  potential	  pitfalls	  surrounding	  this.	  It	  will	  also	  set	  out	  the	  process	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  primary	  data.	  The	  analysis	  of	  this	  data	  will	  then	  be	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  theoretical	  governance	  processes	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  any	  correlation	  between	  governance	  theories	  and	  the	  current	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	  Finally	  it	  will	  examine	  the	  changes	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  bring	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	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7.1 Research	  Aims	  This	  thesis	  will	  add	  to	  the	  understanding	  behind	  the	  energy	  security	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  exploring	  the	  governance	  implications	  for	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  It	  will	  answer:	  	  
• How	  will	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  change	  the	  governance	  of	  
energy	  security?	  
• Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  (not	  just	  supply)?	  	  
7.2 Methodology	  	  The	  primary	  research	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  qualitative	  data	  collection	  from	  a	  series	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  and	  consultation	  documents	  based	  around	  the	  topic	  area.	  This	  section	  explains	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  involved,	  the	  reasons	  behind	  such	  processes	  and	  how	  the	  data	  has	  been	  analysed.	  The	  primary	  research	  of	  this	  thesis	  contains	  31	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  within	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  interviews	  lasted	  between	  1	  and	  1½	  hours.	  The	  interviews	  were	  designed	  in	  a	  semi	  structured	  format	  meaning	  the	  researcher	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  ask	  additional	  questions	  in	  order	  to	  follow	  up	  salient	  responses	  (Legard	  et	  al	  2003;	  Denscombe,	  2009).	  As	  far	  as	  possible	  the	  interview	  questions	  were	  identical,	  although	  the	  different	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  participants	  inevitably	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  to	  tailoring	  each	  interview	  to	  reflect	  different	  areas	  of	  expertise.	  A	  sample	  of	  the	  questions	  used	  within	  this	  research	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Annex	  A.	  	  
7.2.1 Why	  use	  interviews?	  Interviewing	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  most	  frequently	  used	  method	  of	  collecting	  qualitative	  data	  (Seale,	  2004;	  Arksy	  and	  Nilson,	  2008).	  The	  use	  of	  interviews	  in	  qualitative	  research	  provides	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  researcher	  to	  gain	  a	  greater	  depth	  of	  understanding	  of	  a	  participant’s	  perspective	  when	  compared	  to	  more	  structured	  tools	  such	  as	  questionnaires.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  the	  one	  to	  one	  interview,	  allowing	  the	  researcher	  to	  further	  question	  specific	  aspects	  when	  in	  subjective	  topic	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Bryman,	  2008).	  The	  purpose	  of	  interviews	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  participants’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	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security	  and	  how	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  impact	  on	  this.	  The	  views	  and	  understandings	  of	  the	  participants	  will	  come	  from	  their	  level	  of	  experience	  in	  a	  specific	  area	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  market,	  R&D	  or	  investment.	  With	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  differing	  participant	  understandings	  and	  knowledge	  together	  with	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  energy	  security,	  the	  interview	  process	  will	  provide	  the	  best	  methodology	  for	  collecting	  the	  information.	  	  While	  the	  interview	  process	  does	  provide	  a	  richly	  informed	  depth	  of	  information	  from	  the	  research	  participant,	  it	  can	  have	  some	  pitfalls.	  One	  such	  issue	  is	  that	  of	  ‘interviewer	  bias’,	  where	  the	  interviewer	  influences	  the	  responses	  by	  providing	  too	  much	  information	  of	  personal	  experiences	  or	  through	  leading	  and	  ‘loaded’	  questions	  (Jones,	  1985).	  Due	  to	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  research,	  with	  many	  facets	  and	  definitions	  requiring	  explanation,	  the	  information	  provided	  to	  the	  interviewees	  was	  carefully	  structured	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  no	  suggestion	  of	  bias.	  Another	  issue	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  surrounds	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  interview	  itself.	  This	  includes	  the	  length	  of	  time	  given	  to	  each	  question,	  the	  order	  of	  questions	  and	  the	  level	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  interviewee.	  If	  the	  structure	  is	  rigid	  and	  inflexible	  then	  relevant	  information	  may	  not	  be	  accessed.	  If	  the	  interview	  is	  unstructured	  then	  finding	  comparisons	  between	  research	  participants	  could	  be	  difficult	  to	  analyse	  and	  justify.	  Having	  said	  this,	  an	  interview	  can	  not	  be	  fully	  unstructured	  or	  predetermined	  (Jones,	  1985).	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  will	  utilise	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  format	  of	  conducting	  interviews	  to	  collect	  the	  data	  required	  whilst	  being	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  final	  data.	  The	  use	  of	  multiple	  actors	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  perceptions	  that	  help	  to	  clarify	  meaning	  and	  verify	  an	  observation	  or	  interpretation	  (Stake,	  2005).	  The	  use	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  can	  help	  given	  the	  range	  of	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  interviewees.	  This	  breadth	  of	  expertise	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  all	  actor	  groups	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  means	  that	  each	  participant	  would	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  varying	  degrees	  of	  depth	  and	  information.	  For	  example,	  many	  of	  the	  local	  Government	  actors	  may	  have	  a	  high	  understanding	  of	  issues	  around	  skills	  and	  planning,	  however,	  with	  little	  interaction	  with	  the	  electricity	  markets	  the	  level	  of	  knowledge	  in	  this	  area	  may	  not	  be	  as	  apparent.	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7.2.2 Recording	  and	  transcription	  of	  the	  Interview	  Qualitative	  research	  data	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  primarily	  provided	  by	  the	  information	  delivered	  from	  the	  research	  participant.	  This	  includes	  what	  they	  say	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  said	  (Bryman	  and	  Teevan,	  2005).	  Therefore,	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  Dictaphone	  for	  transcribing	  the	  information	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  as	  well	  as	  written	  notes	  of	  the	  significant	  additional	  points	  during	  the	  interview	  was	  used.	  The	  transcription	  of	  the	  interview	  recordings	  was	  done	  verbatim,	  meaning	  that	  if	  any	  feature	  of	  the	  research	  changes,	  the	  full	  interview	  was	  available	  and	  a	  secondary	  analysis	  could	  be	  made.	  The	  interviews	  were	  transcribed	  soon	  after	  the	  interview	  had	  taken	  place	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  any	  additional	  information	  which	  would	  be	  required.	  
7.2.3 Sampling	  technique	  The	  power	  and	  relationships	  of	  the	  key-­‐governing	  actors	  within	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  are	  likely	  to	  change	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  This	  change	  can	  include	  who	  the	  key	  actors	  are	  and	  their	  relationships	  within	  their	  network.	  Without	  a	  prior	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  research	  participants	  would	  discuss	  the	  topic	  and	  how	  the	  power	  and	  relationships	  operate	  within	  their	  networks,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  apply	  a	  reflexive	  approach	  to	  the	  research	  participants	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  interviews	  (Denzin,	  2001).	  	  Any	  predetermination	  of	  research	  participants	  without	  prior	  understanding	  of	  their	  views	  on	  the	  dimensions	  associated	  with	  the	  research,	  could	  result	  in	  ‘steering’	  and	  causing	  personal	  bias.	  Therefore,	  a	  snowball	  method	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  suitable	  approach	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  intricate	  relationships	  and	  the	  complexity	  associated	  with	  energy	  security	  (Kvale	  &	  Brinkmann,	  2009).	  Snowballing	  is	  the	  method	  of	  using	  the	  research	  participants	  knowledge	  of	  relevant	  potential	  interviewees	  to	  help	  find	  subsequent	  research	  participants	  through.	  Snowballing	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  overcome	  data	  solving	  problems	  such	  as	  the	  studying	  of	  hidden	  populations	  where	  finding	  relevant	  participants	  may	  be	  difficult	  (Atkinson	  &	  Flint,	  2001).	  Such	  hidden	  populations	  occur	  when	  adequate	  lists	  and	  sampling	  frames	  such	  as	  conference	  and	  meeting	  places	  are	  not	  readily	  available	  (Faugier	  &	  Sargent,	  1997).	  Although,	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  such	  sampling	  frames	  do	  occur,	  for	  instance:	  government	  consultation	  documents,	  conferences	  and	  network	  meetings.	  However,	  engaging	  in	  conversation	  and	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finding	  the	  right	  participants	  for	  the	  research	  is	  easier	  to	  achieve	  when	  organised	  through	  one	  of	  their	  peers.	  In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  a	  particular	  policy,	  a	  network	  analysis	  can	  be	  used.	  Policy	  network	  analysis	  takes	  the	  understanding	  that	  policies	  are	  not	  simply	  run	  by	  government	  agencies,	  but	  include	  the	  relationships	  between	  government-­‐based	  stakeholders,	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  and	  civil	  society.	  It	  also	  includes	  factors	  such	  as	  economics	  and	  market	  changes	  (Parag,	  2006).	  Although	  the	  theoretical	  development	  of	  policy	  network	  analysis	  concentrates	  on	  establishing	  the	  different	  networks	  at	  play	  (Smith,	  2000),	  its	  significant	  attribute	  is	  the	  ability	  for	  explaining	  policy	  outcomes.	  Marsh	  and	  Rhodes	  (1992)	  identify	  two	  types	  of	  policy	  network;	  ‘policy	  communities’	  and	  ‘issue	  networks’.	  The	  ‘policy	  community’	  model	  interprets	  the	  network	  as	  a	  tightly	  integrated	  and	  single-­‐minded	  policy	  network	  (Marsh	  &	  Rhodes,	  1992;	  Peterson,	  2003).	  This	  is	  a	  network	  of	  ‘closed’	  clusters	  of	  actors	  usually	  involving	  Government	  agency	  and	  a	  close	  group	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  have	  a	  shared	  ideology	  about	  a	  policy	  sector.	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  policy	  network	  scale	  are	  the	  issue	  networks	  which	  use	  many	  stakeholders	  groups	  or	  communities	  with	  conflicting	  philosophies	  on	  the	  solution	  to	  a	  particular	  policy	  area.	  The	  fluctuating	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  area	  causes	  the	  ‘membership’	  of	  these	  competing	  groups	  to	  change	  and	  interaction	  to	  be	  irregular	  (Peterson,	  2003).	  These	  policies	  network	  are	  identified	  through	  three	  main	  categories:	  firstly,	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  networks	  members,	  secondly,	  the	  interaction	  with	  outside	  actors	  with	  different	  objectives,	  thirdly,	  the	  strength	  of	  its	  resources,	  do	  the	  members	  rely	  heavily	  on	  each	  other	  or	  are	  they	  independent	  (Peterson,	  2003).	  The	  current	  electricity	  system	  regarding	  energy	  security	  clearly	  falls	  within	  the	  policy	  community	  category.	  The	  single	  goal	  of	  the	  community,	  is	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  actors	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  also	  be	  considered	  ‘closed’.	  The	  electricity	  system	  actors	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  their	  ‘stake’	  or	  power	  in	  the	  electricity	  can	  be	  constrained	  by	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  electricity	  system	  actor,	  which	  include	  the	  policies,	  incentives	  and	  mechanisms	  defined	  by	  Government.	  The	  use	  of	  network	  analysis	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  address	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  questions.	  However,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  data	  is	  subjective,	  the	  support	  or	  objection	  to	  a	  particular	  solution	  cannot	  be	  measured.	  There	  is	  no	  uniform	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definition	  of	  stakeholders	  or	  policy	  networks,	  therefore	  establishing	  links	  between	  stakeholders	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  (Runhaar	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  system	  this	  study	  will	  look	  at	  the	  four	  groups	  identified	  above	  government-­‐based	  stakeholders,	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  and	  civil	  society	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders.	  In	  order	  to	  analyse	  the	  different	  policy	  networks	  the	  research	  will	  have	  to:	  
• Conduct	  an	  audit	  of	  relevant	  agencies	  
• Draw	  a	  strategic	  map	  of	  key	  relationships	  
• Identify	  which	  of	  their	  resources	  will	  help	  them	  to	  influence	  these	  other	  agencies	  Any	  predetermination	  of	  research	  participants	  without	  prior	  understanding	  of	  their	  views	  on	  the	  dimensions	  associated	  with	  the	  research,	  could	  result	  in	  ‘steering’	  and	  causing	  personal	  bias.	  	  
7.2.3.1 Problems	  with	  sampling	  techniques	  Issues	  with	  determining	  research	  participants	  can	  occur	  with	  the	  hidden	  populations	  of	  ‘policy	  communities’.	  Such	  hidden	  populations	  occur	  when	  adequate	  lists	  and	  sampling	  frames	  such	  as	  conference	  and	  meeting	  places	  are	  not	  readily	  available	  (Faugier	  &	  Sargent,	  1997).	  Although,	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  such	  sampling	  frames	  do	  occur,	  for	  instance:	  Government	  consultation	  documents,	  conferences	  and	  network	  meetings.	  However,	  engaging	  in	  conversation	  and	  finding	  the	  right	  participants	  for	  the	  research	  is	  easier	  to	  achieve	  when	  organised	  through	  one	  of	  their	  peers.	  Within	  this	  thesis	  the	  pursuit	  of	  establishing	  each	  actor	  group	  or	  network’s	  position	  on	  the	  research	  topic	  will	  not	  be	  achieved	  easily.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  can	  be	  that	  each	  individual	  in	  a	  particular	  organisation	  or	  institution	  may	  have	  separate	  views	  which	  do	  not	  coincide	  with	  each	  other.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  research	  participants	  could	  provide	  differing	  outcomes.	  	  This	  idea	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  looking	  at	  consumers.	  Although	  the	  consumer	  group	  currently	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  not	  having	  any	  significant	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  with	  a	  more	  active	  demand	  network	  (see	  section	  3.2.1)	  and	  greater	  levels	  of	  consumer	  engagement,	  the	  future	  role	  of	  the	  consumer	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  different	  (Ipsos	  Mori,	  2013;	  Gangale	  et	  al.,	  2013)	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In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  consumer	  group	  consists	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  sub-­‐actor	  groups	  from	  individual	  consumers	  to	  the	  larger	  businesses	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  different	  ideologies	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  varied	  opinions	  and	  perspectives	  of	  the	  consumer	  group	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  participants	  would	  have	  been	  needed	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  actor	  groups.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  discussion	  would	  also	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  questions	  may	  need	  additional	  explanation	  altering	  the	  interview	  structure	  between	  participants	  and	  making	  the	  cross	  referencing	  of	  the	  data	  more	  difficult.	  In	  order	  to	  combat	  this	  problem	  the	  use	  of	  organisations	  which	  attempt	  to	  voice	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  individual	  householder	  within	  the	  energy	  system,	  such	  as	  Consumer	  Focus25	  is	  used.	  Another	  problem	  is	  the	  engagement	  by	  respondents	  as	  informal	  research	  assistants.	  Within	  the	  field	  of	  research	  there	  are	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  applicable	  persons	  to	  interview.	  To	  solve	  this	  problem	  the	  researcher	  invited	  a	  number	  of	  participants	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  many	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  participate,	  leaving	  a	  small	  number	  of	  replies.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  problem	  associated	  with	  the	  control	  and	  monitoring	  of	  the	  chain	  or	  network.	  The	  issue	  here	  is	  that	  the	  type	  of	  network	  would	  need	  to	  be	  analysed	  and	  a	  reflexive	  approach	  used	  to	  ensure	  bias	  is	  not	  established	  and	  proportionate	  number	  and	  level	  of	  experience	  is	  found	  from	  each	  of	  the	  actor	  groups.	  However,	  any	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  research	  direction	  would	  itself	  provide	  bias.	  Therefore	  the	  selection	  process	  had	  to	  be	  scrutinised	  closely	  ensuring	  a	  wide	  diversity	  of	  participants	  from	  all	  actor	  groups.	  
7.2.4 Contact	  of	  Research	  Participants	  After	  the	  selection	  of	  research	  participants	  potential	  interviewees	  were	  contacted.	  Although	  the	  sampling	  ratios	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  is	  important	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  and	  was	  carefully	  organised,	  not	  every	  participant	  contacted	  is	  likely	  to	  respond.	  In	  some	  cases	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  contact	  and	  achieve	  any	  response	  at	  all.	  There	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  higher	  response	  rate	  can	  be	  achieved,	  such	  as	  face	  to	  face	  meeting	  at	  conferences	  and	  seminars	  rather	  than	  using	  a	  ‘blind’	  email	  approach	  where	  the	  lack	  of	  personal	  interaction	  results	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Since	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  primary	  data	  collection	  Consumer	  Focus	  has	  changed	  to	  Consumer	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responses.	  However,	  the	  face	  to	  face	  approach	  often	  meant	  that	  the	  interview	  would	  take	  place	  at	  short	  notice.	  Another	  option	  is	  to	  follow	  up	  any	  request	  with	  a	  telephone	  call.	  However,	  this	  also	  means	  that	  the	  interview	  may	  take	  place	  at	  short	  notice	  and	  over	  the	  telephone	  requiring	  additional	  technology	  to	  record.	  It	  also	  means	  the	  researcher	  looses	  the	  interactivity	  with	  the	  research	  participant	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  note	  mannerisms	  and	  the	  willingness	  of	  a	  participant	  to	  provide	  additional	  information	  (Denzin,	  2001).	  
7.2.5 Actor	  Groups	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  research	  participants	  will	  be	  categorised	  into	  four	  groups.	  With	  a	  large	  number	  of	  interviewees	  comparing	  the	  responses	  to	  a	  particular	  theme	  would	  prove	  complex.	  Therefore,	  the	  categorisation	  of	  research	  participants	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  discussing	  the	  reactions	  and	  responses	  between	  the	  four	  groups.	  The	  groups	  used	  are	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  6.3.2	  and	  include:	  Government,	  Regulatory,	  Market	  and	  Civil	  Society	  (see	  Figure	  7-­‐1	  and	  Table	  7-­‐1).	  Although	  the	  actors	  have	  been	  categorised,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  say	  that	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  could	  be	  placed	  in	  more	  than	  one	  category,	  which	  would	  ultimately	  make	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  thesis	  overly	  complex.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  may	  be	  that	  different	  participants	  from	  within	  a	  specific	  category	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  different	  views.	  Therefore,	  a	  single	  reference	  to	  a	  participant	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  response	  from	  the	  actor	  group	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  that	  another	  participant	  in	  the	  same	  category	  has	  a	  similar	  ideology.	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Figure	  7-­‐1	  Diagram	  of	  Actor	  groups	  including	  additional	  detail	  on	  the	  companies.	  	  	   	  
• Consumer	  Focus	  • Energy	  Consultants	  • E.On	  • Scottish	  and	  Southern	  • EDF	  • RWE	  nPower	  • Good	  Energy	  
• Distribution	  Netowrk	  Operators	  • Transmission	  Network	  Operators	  
• DECC	  • Ofgem	  • Elexon	  • Local	  Council	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Table	  7-­‐1	  Interviewee	  list	  
Interviewee	  No.	   Actor	  Company/Department	   Actor	  group	  
Interviewee	  1	   DECC	   Government	  
Interviewee	  2	   Cornwall	  Planning	   Government	  
Interviewee	  3	   E.ON	   Market	  
Interviewee	  4	   Chatham	  House	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  5	   DECC	   Government	  
Interviewee	  6	   RWE	  nPower	   Market	  
Interviewee	  7	   Micropower	  Council	   Market	  
Interviewee	  8	   European	  Environment	  Agency	   Government	  
Interviewee	  9	   National	  Energy	  Action	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  10	   Association	  of	  Electricity	  Producers	   Market	  
Interviewee	  11	   CE	  Electric	  UK	   Regulatory	  
Interviewee	  12	   Cornwall	  Energy	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  13	   ELEXON	   Government	  
Interviewee	  14	   ELEXON	   Government	  
Interviewee	  15	   Good	  Energy	   Market	  
Interviewee	  16	   Good	  Energy	   Market	  
Interviewee	  17	   National	  Grid	   Regulation	  
Interviewee	  18	   Scottish	  and	  Southern	   Market	  
Interviewee	  19	   National	  Grid	   Regulation	  
Interviewee	  20	   Cornwall	  Energy	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  21	   Ofgem	   Government	  
Interviewee	  22	   Ofgem	   Government	  
Interviewee	  23	   Western	  Distribution	   Regulation	  
Interviewee	  24	   Cornwall	  Council	   Government	  
Interviewee	  25	   Progressive	  Energy	   Market	  
Interviewee	  26	   EDF	   Market	  
Interviewee	  27	   Consumer	  Focus	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  28	   Centre	  For	  Sustainable	  Energy	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  29	   E3G	   Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  30	   Energy	  Technical	  And	  Renewable	  
Services	  
Civil	  Society	  
Interviewee	  31	   Ernst	  and	  Young	   Civil	  Society	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7.2.6 Ethics	  and	  Consent	  The	  ethical	  considerations	  for	  this	  research	  will	  follow	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter	  guidelines.	  The	  purpose	  and	  outline	  of	  the	  study	  sent	  to	  each	  person	  prior	  to	  each	  interview	  ensuring	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  work	  involved.	  The	  recordings	  and	  transcriptions	  stored	  as	  per	  university	  guidance	  (University	  of	  Exeter,	  2011).	  There	  is	  a	  list	  of	  the	  interviewees	  in	  Table	  7-­‐1,	  however,	  they	  were	  assured	  that	  their	  comments	  would	  be	  non	  attributable	  within	  the	  research.	  The	  reason	  for	  anonymity	  is	  that	  it	  lets	  the	  interviewee	  speak	  freely	  and	  frankly	  about	  the	  research	  topic.	  This	  provides	  a	  more	  complete	  discussion	  where	  the	  interviewees	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  restrict	  the	  depth	  of	  information	  provided	  as	  not	  to	  contradict	  the	  company	  position.	  
7.2.7 Pilot	  Study	  Before	  the	  primary	  research	  was	  carried	  out	  a	  pilot	  study	  was	  undertaken	  with	  an	  interviewee	  who	  understood	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  pilot	  and	  had	  knowledge	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry	  and	  therefore	  could	  provide	  feed	  back.	  The	  pilot	  study	  was	  to	  ensure	  questions	  were	  equal	  in	  depth	  to	  provide	  a	  similar	  length	  and	  did	  not	  lead	  the	  respondent	  in	  any	  particular	  direction.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  pilot	  study	  meant	  that	  additional	  clarity	  was	  required	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  and	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  for	  the	  interviewee.	  
7.2.1 Design	  of	  Questions	  The	  interview	  strategy	  had	  two	  primary	  functions.	  Firstly,	  to	  establish	  the	  stakeholders	  perceptions	  of	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  this	  move	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  investigating	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  and	  decentralisation.	  These	  aspects	  will	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  concerns	  around	  investment,	  the	  market	  arrangements,	  knowledge	  and	  skills,	  the	  changes	  to	  distribution	  network	  operators	  and	  the	  changes	  to	  consumers.	  The	  interview	  was	  structured	  to	  cover	  more	  complex	  questions	  as	  it	  went	  on.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  interviewee	  is	  given	  the	  chance	  to	  get	  comfortable	  with	  the	  type	  of	  questions	  being	  asked	  (which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  come	  up	  in	  their	  daily	  routine).	  	  Further	  to	  this,	  the	  level	  of	  understanding	  around	  the	  electricity	  system	  would	  differ	  between	  stakeholders.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  distribution	  network	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operators	  would	  likely	  understand	  the	  potential	  changes	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  however,	  may	  not	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  markets	  operate.	  Therefore,	  prior	  to	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  interview	  the	  research	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  a	  note	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  being	  undertaken,	  along	  with	  a	  definition	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  thesis	  of	  energy	  security	  and	  decentralised	  electricity.	  Therefore,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  interview	  was	  given	  to	  answering	  any	  questions	  over	  the	  different	  definition	  to	  ensure	  the	  participants	  each	  had	  the	  same	  concepts.	  The	  concepts	  of	  both	  energy	  security	  and	  decentralisation	  of	  electricity	  are	  multi	  faceted	  and	  can	  have	  different	  meanings	  between	  stakeholders	  (these	  concepts	  are	  defined	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  respectively).	  During	  the	  primary	  data	  collection	  of	  this	  thesis	  an	  interesting	  theme	  developed;	  ‘responsibility’,	  which	  discussed	  the	  idea	  of	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  and	  would	  this	  change	  in	  a	  system	  dominated	  by	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation.	  From	  this	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  this	  would	  make	  an	  interesting	  point	  in	  the	  research	  and	  was	  therefore	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  questions	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  appendix	  A.	  
7.3 Analysis	  The	  previous	  section	  has	  outlined	  the	  methodology	  behind	  undertaking	  interviews.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  collected.	  This	  thesis	  has	  defined	  and	  developed	  the	  main	  aspects	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  research:	  energy	  security,	  decentralisation	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  policy.	  The	  research	  consists	  of	  31,	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  from	  the	  government	  (GBS),	  regulatory	  (RBS),	  market	  (MBS)	  and	  civil	  society	  based	  actor	  groups	  (CSBS).	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  research	  used	  a	  secondary	  analysis	  of	  consultation	  responses	  and	  Government	  publications.	  Due	  to	  the	  data	  collection	  methodologies	  there	  was	  a	  large	  volume	  of	  material	  to	  process.	  Therefore	  an	  initial	  stage	  was	  to	  read	  through	  all	  materials	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  data	  and	  understand	  the	  discussions	  involved	  (Ritchie	  et	  al.	  2003).	  After	  this	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  synthesise	  and	  condense	  the	  data	  to	  ensure	  the	  data	  was	  based	  around	  the	  research	  question	  posed	  for	  this	  thesis.	  The	  process	  of	  analysis	  often	  takes	  a	  step	  approach	  to	  the	  interview	  transcription	  (Strauss	  &	  Corbin,	  1998;	  Denscombe,	  2009).	  The	  steps	  are	  generally	  made	  up	  of	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the	  preparation,	  familiarisation,	  interpretation,	  verification	  and	  representation.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  the	  transcripts	  will	  be	  analysed	  using	  a	  ‘qualitative	  content	  analysis’(Seale,	  2004).	  A	  content	  analysis	  examines	  the	  text	  and	  codes	  it	  into	  pre-­‐determined	  categories	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  text	  which	  will	  be	  produced.	  The	  coding	  will	  extract	  the	  various	  separate	  ideas,	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  aims	  set	  out	  in	  the	  research.	  This	  provides	  a	  large	  number	  of	  topics	  for	  discussion,	  which	  are	  then	  categorised	  into	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  overarching	  themes,	  which	  provide	  the	  separate	  headings	  for	  discussion	  (see	  Table	  7-­‐2).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  five	  stages	  above	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  arranged	  in	  any	  specific	  order.	  They	  do,	  however,	  need	  to	  be	  thought	  about	  as	  the	  analysis	  progresses.	  This	  is	  because	  as	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  transcripts	  occurs,	  what	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  at	  the	  beginning	  may	  completely	  change	  by	  the	  end.	  This	  is	  discussed	  as	  ‘analytical	  hierarchy’	  in	  (Spencer	  et	  al	  2003).	  	  
	  The	  advantage	  of	  using	  a	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  is	  the	  level	  of	  repeatability	  in	  the	  process,	  meaning	  similar	  results	  are	  possible	  if	  the	  work	  were	  to	  be	  re-­‐analysed	  depending	  on	  how	  much	  researcher	  interpretation	  is	  used.	  For	  instance,	  one	  of	  the	  important	  aspects	  of	  coding	  the	  transcripts	  is	  the	  ‘weighting’	  given	  to	  a	  particular	  statement.	  Weighting	  is	  an	  interpretive	  aspect	  which	  will	  be	  done	  by	  the	  analyst,	  therefore,	  a	  level	  of	  subjectivity	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  work.	  
• Categories	  –	  Higher-­‐level	  concepts	  which	  analysts	  groups	  lower	  level	  concepts	  according	  to	  shared	  properties.	  Categories	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  theses.	  They	  represent	  relevant	  phenomena	  and	  enable	  the	  analyst	  to	  reduce	  and	  combine	  data.	  
• Coding	  –	  Extracting	  concept	  from	  raw	  data	  and	  developing	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  properties	  and	  dimensions	  
• Concepts	  –	  Words	  that	  stand	  out	  for	  ideas	  contained	  in	  data.	  Concepts	  are	  interpretations,	  the	  products	  of	  analysis.	  
• Dimensions	  –	  Variations	  within	  properties	  that	  give	  specificity	  and	  range	  to	  concepts	  
• Properties	  –	  characteristics	  that	  define	  and	  describe	  concept	  	  
Table	  7-­‐2	  Coding	  data	  (Corbin	  and	  Strauss,	  1998)	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Another	  advantage	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  deal	  with	  complex	  and	  subjective	  topics.	  A	  more	  quantitative	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  use	  computer	  software	  like	  NVIVO	  to	  retrieve	  segments	  of	  text.	  The	  subjective	  nature	  of	  the	  works	  and	  the	  terminology	  used	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  would	  provide	  too	  many	  variables.	  For	  example,	  the	  term	  decentralisation	  refers	  to	  the	  technology	  being	  directed	  at	  the	  distribution	  network	  and	  the	  ownership	  associated	  with	  the	  householder	  and	  smaller	  energy	  companies,	  therefore	  the	  terminology	  used	  for	  this	  may	  include	  ‘small–scale’,	  ‘distributed’,	  ‘embedded’	  and	  often	  ‘renewable’	  each	  of	  which	  does	  not	  denote	  an	  aspect	  of	  ownership.	  	  Disadvantages	  of	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  include	  the	  level	  of	  coder	  interpretation.	  Analysing	  any	  document	  will	  require	  a	  level	  of	  interpretation	  as	  discussed	  earlier.	  This	  level	  can	  be	  questionable	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  will	  generate	  bias	  in	  the	  results.	  Once	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  organised	  and	  categorised	  into	  separate	  themes,	  the	  relevant	  material	  was	  then	  processed	  again	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  the	  overarching	  topics	  for	  discussion.	  These	  topics	  are	  analysed	  for	  any	  classifications,	  patterns	  or	  connections	  between	  the	  stakeholder	  groups	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  7.2.5.	  The	  themes	  and	  topics	  which	  emerge	  have	  been	  used	  to	  challenge	  or	  confirm	  the	  literature	  and	  develop	  research	  aims	  to	  further	  the	  understanding	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation’s	  implications	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	  The	  use	  of	  this	  methodology	  provides	  a	  rigorous	  and	  reliable	  format	  for	  the	  research	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  This	  also	  requires	  the	  researcher	  to	  fully	  partake	  in	  this	  rigorous	  methodology	  understanding	  and	  adapting	  to	  any	  changes	  which	  may	  occur.	  These	  changes	  can	  be	  to	  the	  subject	  nature,	  which	  for	  energy	  policy	  is	  constantly	  changing,	  with	  new	  data,	  policies	  and	  players.	  But	  also	  to	  develop	  further	  any	  relevant	  or	  interesting	  topics	  which	  may	  arise.	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8 Moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  
8.1 Introduction	  As	  outlined	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  “unprecedented	  challenges”	  (DECC	  2011b),	  which	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  coming	  decades.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  the	  decarbonisation	  of	  electricity	  generation,	  driven	  by	  concerns	  over	  climate	  change.	  However,	  this	  must	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  interlinked	  Government	  goals	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security	  and	  ensuring	  that	  energy	  remains	  affordable.	  	  These	  challenges	  mean	  that	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  different	  than	  it	  is	  today.	  The	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  will	  require	  a	  major	  change	  to	  the	  current	  operation	  and	  governance	  processes	  (Karger	  and	  Hennings,	  2009;	  Delta	  2010;	  Watson	  and	  Wright,	  2010;	  Finney	  et	  al	  2012).	  The	  governing	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  likely	  require	  different	  processes	  for	  regulation,	  markets,	  incentives	  and	  will	  include	  different	  stakeholders	  than	  the	  present	  system.	  Therefore,	  understanding	  of	  the	  technical	  aspects	  for	  a	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  would	  not	  provide	  the	  whole	  picture,	  and	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  electricity	  generation	  should	  be	  adopted.	  This	  thesis	  examines	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  research	  participants	  in	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  This	  chapter	  will	  look	  at	  the	  research	  participants’	  understanding	  of	  a	  highly	  decentralised	  electricity	  system’s	  impact	  on	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  and	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  it,	  such	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  supporting	  transition	  technologies	  like	  natural	  gas	  electricity	  generation.	  	  This	  chapter	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  security	  concerns	  associated	  with	  changing	  from	  one	  system	  to	  another,	  identifying	  skills	  and	  network	  adjustment	  as	  the	  main	  impact	  areas.	  	  Although	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  going	  to	  try	  to	  add	  to	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  barriers	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation,	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  may	  happen	  in	  terms	  of	  security	  is	  worthwhile.	  The	  shift	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  implies	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  the	  system	  is	  operated	  and	  how	  it	  is	  governed	  because	  of	  the	  higher	  level	  of	  localised	  and	  intermittent	  generation	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  active	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Developing	  an	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understanding	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  and	  how	  any	  issues	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  is	  important.	  In	  February	  2002	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  famously	  made	  a	  statement	  to	  the	  press	  as	  United	  States	  Secretary	  of	  Defence:	  	  
“[T]here	  are	  known	  knowns;	  there	  are	  things	  we	  know	  we	  
know.	  We	  also	  know	  there	  are	  known	  unknowns;	  that	  is	  to	  say	  
we	  know	  there	  are	  some	  things	  we	  do	  not	  know.	  But	  there	  are	  
also	  unknown	  unknowns	  –	  there	  are	  things	  we	  do	  not	  know	  we	  
don't	  know”	  (Rumsfeld,	  2002)	  The	  idea	  of	  understanding	  what	  will	  and	  what	  can	  happen	  in	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  is	  one	  of	  knowing	  all	  the	  unknowns	  (which	  is	  effectively	  impossible).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  issues	  or	  risks	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  such	  as,	  domestic	  activism	  or	  terrorism,	  reliability	  of	  demand	  patterns,	  investment	  in	  infrastructure,	  technological	  failure	  and	  resource	  availability	  (see	  section	  4.2.3)	  
8.1.1 What	  don’t	  we	  know?	  The	  interviews	  provided	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  understanding	  held	  by	  of	  some	  of	  the	  actor	  groups	  regarding	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  A	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  identified	  this	  with	  reference	  to	  establishing	  secure	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  
“So	  I	  think	  we’ve	  got	  to	  a	  point	  now	  knowing	  broadly	  speaking	  
what	  we	  don’t	  know.	  Now	  the	  industry	  is	  committed	  to	  
learning	  all	  the	  things	  that	  they	  need	  to	  know.”	  Interviewee	  6	  
MBS	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  identified	  in	  the	  quote	  above	  is	  from	  one	  of	  the	  ‘Big	  6’	  energy	  companies	  (see	  section	  2.10.1)	  This	  is	  relevant	  because	  the	  discussion	  of	  ‘industry’	  is	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current,	  centralised	  generation	  model.	  While	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  industry	  is	  committed	  to	  learning	  what	  they	  need	  to	  know,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  being	  aware	  that	  this	  may	  be	  shaped	  by	  what	  the	  large	  centralised	  company’s	  best	  interests	  are.	  	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  approach	  could	  require	  understanding	  additional	  implications	  for	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  such	  as	  the	  interactions	  of	  different	  types	  of	  investor.	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  introduce	  smaller	  investors	  who	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  resources	  of	  information	  and	  knowledge	  as	  a	  larger	  centralised	  investor.	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A	  counter	  argument	  to	  this	  was	  given	  by	  interviewee	  11	  a	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  who	  identified	  that	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  current	  electricity	  system	  could	  bring	  unexpected	  outcomes	  and	  therefore,	  security	  concerns.	  
“I’m	  an	  engineer	  so	  we	  are	  always	  on	  our	  guard	  when	  
somebody	  changes	  the	  fundamental	  specifications;	  it	  almost	  
always	  brings	  something	  you	  didn’t	  expect.	  Intuitively	  it	  must	  
do.	  Right	  off	  the	  bat	  I	  can’t	  think	  of	  what	  they	  are,	  therefore	  
I’m	  prepared	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  probably	  down	  there	  in	  the	  
2nd	  or	  3rd	  order.”	  Interviewee	  11	  -­‐	  RBS.	  This	  identifies	  that	  there	  may	  be	  some	  disagreement	  about	  the	  technical	  implications	  of	  more	  decentralised	  generation	  being	  connected	  to	  distribution	  networks.	  However,	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  here	  downplayed	  their	  significance	  meaning	  they	  could	  easily	  be	  remedied.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  could	  be	  that	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  would	  be	  more	  focussed	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  networks	  to	  receive	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  than	  on	  the	  generation	  technology	  itself.	  Both	  of	  the	  examples	  above	  identify	  a	  technical	  based	  discussion	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  many	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  actors	  view	  the	  issues	  around	  energy	  security.	  With	  a	  broader	  approach	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  governance	  processes	  which	  can	  dictate	  the	  technical	  issues,	  a	  more	  universal	  approach	  to	  securing	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  evolve.	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  provided	  by	  this	  thesis	  (see	  section	  4.2)	  There	  is	  an	  inherent	  difference	  between	  understanding	  the	  technical	  issues	  of	  an	  electricity	  system	  and	  understanding	  the	  governance	  implications.	  It	  is	  far	  easier	  to	  quantify	  technical	  issues	  however,	  governance	  implications	  can	  have	  multiple	  influences	  which,	  being	  difficult	  to	  predict	  makes	  the	  changes	  of	  a	  single	  governance	  aspect,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  change	  policy	  or	  to	  the	  stakeholder	  very	  difficult	  to	  accurately	  predict.	  
8.2 Timescales	  of	  change	  The	  electricity	  system	  is	  constantly	  changing	  and	  evolving	  through	  internal	  and	  external	  dimensions	  such	  as	  the	  economy’s	  impact	  on	  the	  end	  price	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  As	  a	  result	  the	  electricity	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  dynamic	  and	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  these	  changes	  as	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discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.	  Therefore,	  fixing	  timescales	  are	  important	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  factors	  affecting	  timescales	  can	  include:	  sourcing	  increased	  investment,	  the	  build	  times	  for	  networks	  and	  generation	  capacity.	  The	  impact	  of	  policy	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  time	  period	  over	  which	  a	  system	  change	  can	  occur,	  delaying	  or	  speeding	  up	  system	  change.	  From	  an	  investment	  point	  of	  view	  policies	  can	  provide	  a	  positive	  incentive	  for	  investors	  to	  develop	  new	  generation	  or	  alternatively	  it	  can	  be	  vague,	  leaving	  the	  future	  open	  to	  other	  options	  whereby	  investors	  may	  foresee	  their	  assets	  undermined	  this	  is	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  chapter	  9.	  Therefore,	  the	  lead-­‐time	  it	  takes	  to	  build	  a	  generation	  plant	  and	  investment	  support	  implemented	  can	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  ability	  for	  a	  system	  to	  adapt	  quickly.	  
8.2.1.1 Speed	  /	  cost	  /	  security	  triangle	  The	  speed	  at	  which	  change	  takes	  place	  can	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  transition	  and	  for	  the	  implied	  security.	  This	  concern	  is	  noted	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Electricity	  Producers	  (AEP)	  in	  the	  quote	  below,	  it	  refers	  specifically	  to	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  market	  through	  the	  EMR:	  
There	  should	  be	  an	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  speedy	  and	  
radical	  implementation	  delivers	  the	  best	  results,	  compared	  
with	  an	  option	  which	  delivers	  and	  number	  of	  quick	  wins	  
followed	  by	  slower,	  more	  evolutionary,	  change	  (AEP,	  2010).	  When	  changing	  to	  a	  supposedly	  ‘improved’	  system	  (whether	  this	  is	  for	  improved	  security	  or	  environmental	  improvements)	  then	  instinctively	  a	  rapid	  change	  would	  be	  beneficial.	  However,	  interviewee	  3	  identified	  that	  a	  rapid	  change	  could	  also	  cause	  problems,	  such	  as,	  higher	  immediate	  costs	  are	  incurred	  from	  reduced	  technological	  development.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  new	  operational	  approaches	  need	  testing	  without	  which	  unforeseen	  issues	  could	  arise.	  This	  provides	  a	  time	  –	  cost	  –	  security	  relationship	  which	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  For	  example,	  solving	  an	  issue	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  approach	  as	  the	  damage	  may	  already	  have	  been	  done.	  This	  means	  the	  longer	  the	  remediations	  are	  left	  the	  costlier	  they	  may	  become.	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8.2.2 Can	  enough	  low	  carbon	  generation	  be	  built	  to	  meet	  future	  capacity	  
levels?	  There	  are	  further	  implications	  for	  security	  with	  a	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future;	  one	  of	  them	  is	  ensuring	  enough	  low	  carbon	  generation	  is	  developed	  to	  meet	  capacity	  levels.	  Concern	  for	  this	  was	  identified	  by	  Scottish	  and	  Southern	  Energy	  in	  2011:	  
“Unabated	  coal	  is	  not	  an	  option	  because	  of	  its	  environmental	  
impacts;	  CCS	  is	  not	  yet	  proven	  at	  scale;	  nuclear	  will	  take	  too	  
long	  to	  build;	  and	  renewables	  can	  not	  provide	  firm	  capacity	  at	  
the	  scale	  needed.	  Therefore	  the	  only	  technology	  which	  can	  
provide	  firm	  capacity	  at	  scale,	  and	  be	  built	  in	  the	  timescales	  
required,	  is	  gas.”(SSE,	  2011b)	  
8.2.2.1 Is	  there	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  energy	  gap	  A	  concern	  surrounding	  the	  building	  of	  network	  generation	  is	  from	  the	  possibilities	  of	  an	  ‘energy	  gap’.	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.5.2	  which	  identifies	  the	  closure	  of	  certain	  power	  stations,	  either	  from	  the	  end	  of	  their	  lifetime	  or	  through	  EU	  policies	  (see	  section,	  2.5.1).	  However,	  interviewee	  31	  identified	  an	  additional	  aspect	  which	  is	  the	  future	  reduction	  in	  gas	  resources.	  
Government	  and	  policy	  makers	  need	  to	  be	  telling	  people	  that	  
in	  15	  years	  there	  might	  not	  be	  gas	  in	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  
country	  and	  need	  to	  be	  shifting	  to	  electric	  heating	  in	  the	  home.	  
(Interviewee	  31	  –	  CSBS)	  This	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder	  discussed	  the	  idea	  of	  switching	  to	  electrical	  heating	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  future	  of	  energy	  security.	  What	  interviewee	  does	  not	  explain	  is	  that	  in	  reality	  as	  the	  level	  of	  natural	  gas	  resources	  decreases,	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  on	  the	  market	  increases.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  until	  the	  cost	  reaches	  an	  unaffordable	  level,	  thereby	  forcing	  the	  user	  onto	  other	  forms	  of	  energy.	  However,	  a	  government	  based	  stakeholder,	  interviewee	  8,	  countered	  this	  argument	  of	  an	  energy	  gap,	  stating	  it	  as	  a	  method	  of	  promoting	  future	  technology.	  
The	  politicians	  screaming	  about	  a	  supply	  gap	  or	  generation	  
gap	  is	  bullshit	  really.	  But	  they	  use	  it	  to	  promote	  whatever	  pet	  
project	  they	  have	  on.	  (Interviewee	  8	  –	  G.B.S.)	  The	  issue	  surrounding	  gas	  is	  that	  it	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  identified	  by	  SSE	  earlier	  gas	  is	  widely	  considered	  a	  ‘transitional’	  fuel	  and	  therefore	  would	  likely	  have	  a	  strong	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  move	  toward	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  However,	  there	  is	  concern	  over	  the	  future	  use	  of	  gas	  as	  a	  support	  for	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  Firstly,	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  implemented	  quickly:	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The	  industry	  cannot	  react	  quickly	  to	  price	  signals	  in	  wholesale	  
fuel	  markets,	  for	  example	  the	  timescale	  from	  initiation	  of	  a	  
CCGT	  or	  Open	  Cycle	  Gas	  Turbine	  (OCGT)	  project	  to	  
commissioning	  can	  be	  up	  to	  nine	  years.	  The	  UK	  needs	  a	  stable	  
and	  predictable	  policy	  framework	  to	  attract	  the	  investment	  it	  
needs	  within	  the	  necessary	  timescales	  (E.ON,	  2011)	  There	  is	  a	  discussion	  over	  how	  quickly	  gas	  powered	  generation	  can	  be	  built.	  The	  figure	  for	  a	  lead-­‐time	  for	  gas-­‐powered	  reactor	  of	  nine	  years	  is	  long	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  renewable	  portfolio.	  However,	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  centralised	  technologies	  such	  as	  nuclear	  generation	  it	  is	  relatively	  short.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  nine	  year	  figure	  would	  likely	  include	  the	  planning	  phase	  while	  the	  construction	  times	  can	  be	  between	  2-­‐4	  years	  (Watson,	  2001;	  Carlisle	  and	  Webber,	  2013).	  Energy	  UK	  identified	  an	  additional	  issue	  for	  CCGT	  in	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  electricity	  market	  consultation.	  This	  was	  that	  without	  Carbon	  Capture	  and	  Storage	  (CCS)	  the	  use	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  future	  could	  only	  be	  limited.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  for	  such	  technologies	  to	  be	  implemented,	  the	  UK	  Government	  would	  need	  to	  identify	  support	  for	  such	  projects	  also	  identified	  by	  Energy	  UK	  in	  the	  same	  consultation:	  
Government	  should	  aim	  to	  provide	  investors	  with	  clear	  signals	  
and	  appropriate	  incentives	  to	  enable	  demonstration	  projects	  
to	  come	  forward.	  (Energy	  UK,	  2012)	  These	  identify	  the	  centralised	  plants	  such	  as	  coal	  with	  CCS	  and	  nuclear	  as	  having	  issues	  with	  build	  and	  development	  timescales	  which	  pin	  points	  a	  key	  negative	  aspect	  of	  centralised	  electricity	  generation:	  the	  length	  of	  time	  for	  each	  plant	  to	  be	  built.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Olkiluoto	  Nuclear	  Power	  Plant	  in	  Finland.	  The	  third	  unit	  of	  this	  generating	  plant	  was	  contracted	  in	  2000,	  construction	  started	  in	  2005	  and	  is	  as	  yet	  not	  completed	  (Rossi,	  2013).	  In	  contrast,	  some	  interviewees	  were	  relatively	  relaxed	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  shift	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system.	  Maintaining	  a	  short-­‐term,	  gas	  based	  approach	  implies	  new	  capacity	  can	  be	  built	  in	  around	  7	  years,	  timescales	  for	  enabling	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system	  may	  not	  be	  much	  longer,	  and	  one	  market-­‐based	  interviewee	  was	  clear	  that	  he	  did	  not	  see	  this	  as	  a	  security	  risk:	  
	  “With	  the	  length	  of	  time	  to	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  system	  to	  
a	  decentralised	  would	  be	  10-­‐20	  years	  and	  therefore	  the	  
changes	  required	  are	  not	  an	  issue	  for	  security”	  (Interviewee	  6	  
-­‐	  MBS)	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The	  “issue	  for	  security”	  discussed	  here	  is;	  if	  Government	  made	  a	  clear	  statement	  about	  its	  intentions	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  then	  the	  transition	  period	  would	  mean	  reduced	  investment	  in	  maintaining	  the	  current	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  if	  the	  market	  structures	  and	  governance	  processes	  were	  established	  for	  decentralised	  generation	  then	  long	  lead	  times	  could	  have	  implications	  for	  security,	  as	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  3	  (a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder).	  
“If	  there’s	  a	  gently-­‐gently-­‐steady-­‐as-­‐it-­‐goes	  sort	  of	  revolution	  
then	  it	  might	  not	  be	  an	  issue,	  but	  when	  we	  try	  and	  push	  things	  
through	  very	  quickly	  then	  yes	  I	  do	  suspect	  there	  will	  be	  a	  
significant	  problem	  finding	  the	  relevant	  qualified	  people.”	  
(Interviewee	  3	  –	  MBS)	  What	  is	  interesting	  here	  is	  that	  both	  the	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  quoted	  above,	  represent	  large	  energy	  companies	  and	  indicate	  the	  requirement	  for	  long	  lead	  times	  to	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  system.	  However,	  for	  the	  current	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  stay	  centralised	  and	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  operation,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  will	  be	  required.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  the	  lead	  times	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  single	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  are	  long	  in	  comparison	  (especially	  when	  discussing	  the	  Olkiluoto	  Nuclear	  Power	  Plant	  in	  Finland	  as	  identified	  earlier)	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  generation	  such	  as	  gas	  or	  renewables	  (Schlissel	  and	  Biewald,	  2008).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  UK	  has	  not	  built	  a	  nuclear	  power	  station	  since	  1995	  (Sizewell	  B),	  even	  though	  the	  technology	  and	  skills	  can	  be	  imported	  there	  may	  be	  additional	  unforeseeable	  issues.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  issues	  with	  integrating	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  in	  the	  current	  system.	  	  
8.2.2.1 What	  impact	  could	  these	  longer	  timescales	  have	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  timescales	  is	  important	  for	  meeting	  the	  Government	  goals	  and	  target.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  for	  establishing	  the	  governance	  processes.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.3,	  governance	  is	  a	  cyclical	  concept	  where	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  set	  by	  the	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  also	  develop	  and	  change	  the	  actors	  and	  stakeholders.	  Therefore	  this	  cyclical	  process	  needs	  time	  to	  occur	  for	  the	  governance	  to	  stabilise.	  If	  the	  process	  is	  rushed	  the	  appropriate	  rules	  and	  incentives	  may	  be	  in	  place	  without	  the	  right	  stakeholders	  to	  carry	  them	  out,	  thereby	  possibly	  causing	  issues	  for	  security.	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There	  are	  two	  main	  aspects	  in	  terms	  of	  timescales:	  firstly	  the	  time	  restrictions	  on	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  This	  is	  set	  by	  policies	  and	  the	  need	  for	  it	  to	  occur	  quickly	  (in	  terms	  of	  mitigation,	  the	  quicker	  the	  better).	  Secondly	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  an	  electricity	  system	  can	  move	  from	  centralised	  to	  decentralised.	  The	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  general	  consensus	  among	  each	  actor	  group	  that	  the	  as	  long	  as	  the	  transition	  is	  not	  sudden	  change	  then	  there	  is	  no	  obstacle	  that	  cannot	  be	  overcome.	  This	  next	  section	  will	  look	  at	  what	  issues	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  encounter.	  
8.3 Skills	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  discussion	  in	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  need	  for	  skilled	  personnel.	  A	  lack	  of	  such	  personnel	  is	  a	  potential	  security	  issue	  for	  any	  low	  carbon	  system.	  The	  skills	  required	  in	  order	  to	  run	  an	  electricity	  system	  include	  the	  ability	  to	  install	  and	  maintain	  generating	  plant	  and	  networks,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  plan,	  finance	  and	  operate	  the	  plant	  installed.	  Without	  the	  right	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  base	  the	  security	  of	  any	  electricity	  system	  may	  be	  compromised	  through	  operational	  or	  technological	  failures.	  These	  include	  the	  market	  mechanisms	  being	  able	  to	  incentivise	  enough	  capacity	  at	  times	  of	  peak	  or	  simply	  not	  being	  able	  to	  maintain	  the	  generation	  plants	  to	  keep	  them	  running	  efficiently.	  	  
8.3.1 What	  are	  the	  different	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  requirements	  for	  the	  
move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  The	  requirement	  for	  additional	  skills	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  are	  often	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  any	  transition,	  but	  only	  as	  a	  point	  to	  say	  this	  is	  an	  unknown	  factor	  (Foxon	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  HM	  Government,	  2009;	  DECC,	  2011a).	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  change	  in	  skills	  will	  include	  the	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  smaller	  scale	  generation	  plants	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  more	  active	  distribution	  networks	  (DECC,	  2010b).	  Changing	  generation	  technologies	  and	  the	  organisational	  systems	  in	  which	  they	  run	  means	  a	  change	  in	  the	  required	  skills.	  This	  means	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  knowing	  what	  skills	  are	  required	  and	  the	  length	  of	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  establish	  the	  knowledge	  and	  understanding,	  will	  be	  essential	  to	  access	  their	  impact	  on	  security.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  setting	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  and	  utilising	  examples	  from	  other	  countries	  such	  as,	  Denmark,	  who	  already	  have	  a	  significant	  level	  of	  low	  carbon	  generation	  (Lund	  and	  Mathiesen,	  2009).	  Since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  feed	  in	  tariffs	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the	  finance,	  planning	  and	  installation	  of	  small-­‐scale	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  has	  started	  to	  become	  more	  established.	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  unclear	  whether	  the	  maintenance	  of	  these	  technologies,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  supply	  chains	  have	  been	  established	  (Willis	  &	  Scott,	  2000).	  Once	  again	  the	  literature	  discusses	  skills	  development	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  change	  and	  that	  new	  strategies	  and	  policies	  for	  the	  on	  going	  promotion	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  will	  need	  new	  skills	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  be	  specific	  as	  to	  what	  those	  skills	  are	  (Chester,	  2010).	  Discussion	  of	  skills	  in	  Government	  documents	  are	  prolific	  yet	  not	  definitive	  (HM	  Government,	  2009;	  DECC,	  2010d;	  2011b;	  2011d).	  Specifically,	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system,	  the	  concepts	  of	  skills	  are	  discussed	  throughout	  but	  without	  any	  indication	  of	  where	  there	  may	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  skills.	  In	  the	  research	  literature	  there	  is	  very	  little	  discussion,	  especially	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  issues	  around	  security.	  It	  is	  often	  discussed	  as	  an	  additional	  point	  that	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  skills	  development	  within	  this	  area	  without	  identifying	  any	  specific	  areas	  for	  attention.	  In	  2009,	  Malcolm	  Wicks	  was	  appointed	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  as	  his	  Special	  Representative	  on	  International	  Energy	  and	  was	  tasked	  with	  providing	  a	  review	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  international	  markets	  to	  energy	  security.	  In	  this	  review	  the	  concept	  of	  skills	  shortages	  was	  highlighted	  for	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry.	  It	  stressed	  the	  risk	  to	  investment	  in	  the	  industry	  from	  shortages	  of	  highly	  qualified	  specialised	  workers,	  showing	  how	  the	  long	  lead	  times	  for	  training	  people	  could	  cause	  problems	  for	  future	  capacity.	  In	  order	  for	  generation	  plants	  to	  operate	  there	  must	  be	  skilled	  individuals	  to	  fill	  the	  gap.	  Higher	  wages	  would	  be	  introduced	  having	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  production	  costs	  which	  feed	  down	  to	  the	  consumer	  (Wicks,	  2009).	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  impact	  this	  may	  have	  is	  not	  yet	  understood.	  In	  2010	  the	  Government	  set	  out	  a	  consultation	  “Meeting	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Skills	  Challenge”	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  key	  skills-­‐related	  priorities	  and	  challenges	  to	  be	  met.	  The	  consultation	  looks	  at	  how	  to:	  
• Enable	  British	  workers	  and	  businesses	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities	  in	  the	  sectors	  key	  to	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  
• Embed	  the	  necessary	  skills	  across	  all	  sectors	  to	  move	  the	  UK	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  and	  resource	  efficient	  economy	  (DECC,	  2010b)	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This	  shows	  that	  the	  Government	  have	  identified	  a	  skilled	  labour	  force	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  future	  energy	  system	  and	  acknowledged	  that	  as	  the	  skills	  requirements	  for	  a	  centralised	  system	  would	  be	  different	  to	  that	  of	  a	  decentralised	  system.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  skills	  needed	  for	  decentralised	  electricity	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  development	  of	  relatively	  small	  renewable	  generation	  plants	  can	  be	  achieved	  without	  importing	  engineers	  or	  operators.	  The	  construction	  of	  renewable	  technology	  is	  fairly	  well	  understood	  in	  this	  country.	  However,	  the	  skills	  required	  for	  a	  nuclear	  generation	  plant	  would	  not	  be	  so	  readily	  available	  and	  may	  require	  international	  help.	  Therefore,	  without	  strong	  direction	  on	  how	  the	  future	  energy	  system	  will	  look,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  skills	  required	  would	  prove	  difficult.	  	  
8.3.2 Skill	  levels	  and	  availability	  and	  geography	  One	  thing	  that	  became	  clear	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  the	  difference	  in	  approach	  to	  skills	  at	  different	  scales	  of	  decentralised	  electricity.	  In	  the	  example	  of	  microgeneration	  deployed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Feed	  in	  Tariffs,	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  across	  all	  actor	  groups	  and	  stakeholders,	  that	  the	  necessary	  skills	  could	  and	  would	  be	  covered	  by	  existing	  tradesmen	  expanding	  their	  portfolios:	  	  
“you	  see	  a	  lot	  of	  plumbers	  and	  electricians,	  small	  business	  men	  
getting	  involved	  becoming	  accredited	  installers	  and	  it’s	  a	  big	  
boost	  for	  small	  businesses	  like	  them.	  Those	  guys	  aren’t	  just	  in	  
one	  or	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  They	  are	  spread	  everywhere.	  
So	  you	  are	  talking	  about	  spreading	  the	  benefits	  of	  
encouraging	  low	  carbon	  growth	  and	  encouraging	  low	  carbon	  
investment	  in	  the	  economy.”	  (Interviewee	  15	  –	  MBS)	  This	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  local	  skills	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  economy,	  reducing	  the	  reliance	  on	  finding	  and	  importing	  higher	  level	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  into	  the	  UK	  which	  may	  be	  more	  costly	  (DECC	  2011b).	  However,	  a	  counter	  argument	  was	  provided	  by	  E.ON	  in	  the	  “The	  UK's	  Energy	  Supply:	  Security	  or	  Independence?”	  consultation.	  	  This	  opposing	  point	  of	  view	  by	  is	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  larger	  scale	  decentralised	  electricity	  installations,	  industry	  in	  particular	  has	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  sufficient	  skills:	  
“Investment	  in	  any	  infrastructure	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  wider	  
supply	  chain	  providing	  both	  materials	  and	  skills.	  Security	  of	  
supply	  is	  very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  these”	  (E.ON,	  
2011;	  p.56)	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The	  issue	  of	  supply	  chains,	  in	  theory,	  could	  be	  relieved	  by	  diversity	  in	  technology	  and	  technology	  suppliers.	  The	  majority	  of	  skills	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  easily	  be	  found	  in	  the	  UK	  (DECC,	  2011b).	  However,	  as	  discussed	  by	  interviewee	  3	  the	  remnants	  of	  a	  centralised	  system	  would	  also	  exist.	  
	  “Even	  a	  nuclear	  no	  vote	  could	  actually	  demand	  lots	  of	  nuclear	  
skills	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  play.”	  (Interviewee	  3	  –	  MBS)	  What	  interviewee	  3	  is	  discussing	  here	  is	  that	  the	  closure	  of	  a	  nuclear	  generation	  plant	  would	  require	  decommissioning	  which	  is	  considered	  a	  highly	  skilled	  job	  set.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  require	  an	  increase	  in	  ‘low	  level’	  skills	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  finding	  the	  ‘higher	  level’	  skills	  required	  to	  close	  many	  of	  the	  larger	  power	  stations.	  Interviewee	  3	  sees	  the	  development	  of	  skills	  dependant	  on	  the	  time	  scales	  which	  relates	  back	  to	  section	  8.2	  of	  this	  chapter	  
“If	  there’s	  a	  gently-­‐gently-­‐steady-­‐as-­‐it-­‐goes	  sort	  of	  revolution	  
then	  it	  might	  not	  be	  an	  issue,	  but	  when	  we	  try	  and	  push	  things	  
through	  very	  quickly	  then	  yes	  I	  do	  suspect	  there	  will	  be	  a	  
significant	  problem	  finding	  the	  relevant	  qualified	  people.”	  
(Interviewee	  3	  –	  MBS)	  It	  is	  arguable	  that	  with	  sufficient	  education	  and	  training,	  the	  necessary	  skills	  for	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  would	  become	  available.	  However,	  this	  depends	  on	  the	  timescale	  on	  which	  the	  skills	  are	  required	  –	  if	  policy	  is	  driving	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system	  at	  a	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  education	  system	  is	  unable	  to	  match	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  skilled	  personnel,	  then	  the	  lack	  of	  skills	  becomes	  a	  significant	  security	  bottleneck.	  The	  main	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  the	  level	  of	  skills	  which	  are	  found	  in	  the	  UK.	  Interviewee	  6	  identified	  this.	  	  
“You	  would	  argue	  that	  we	  have	  a	  better	  skills	  base	  in	  this	  
country	  to	  deal	  with	  renewables	  than	  we	  do	  with	  nuclear,	  
because	  we	  have	  not	  done	  nuclear	  for	  ages	  other	  than	  keeping	  
the	  existing	  ones	  running.	  But	  we	  are	  planning	  to	  build	  6-­‐7	  
new	  nuclear	  power	  stations.	  Renewables	  are	  in	  their	  own	  
sense	  more	  simplistic	  so	  to	  take	  the	  micro	  generation	  level,	  the	  
micro	  gen	  strategy	  came	  out	  yesterday,	  or	  the	  response	  to	  it.	  
The	  general	  view	  was	  that	  there	  were	  plenty	  of	  skills	  out	  there,	  
they	  are	  plumbers	  and	  electricians.”	  (Interviewee	  6	  –	  MBS)	  The	  risks	  involved	  with	  nuclear	  power	  have	  been	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  climate	  change	  or	  economic	  risks	  especially	  after	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster	  (Froggatt	  et	  al.,	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2012).	  On	  top	  of	  this	  a	  shortage	  of	  skilled	  workers	  combined	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  safety	  management	  has	  brought	  nuclear	  safety	  high	  on	  the	  public	  agenda	  (Teravainen	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  If	  nuclear	  safety	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  current	  concern,	  then	  any	  lack	  of	  skills	  for	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  would	  likely	  exacerbate	  this	  concern.	  	  Interviewee	  6	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  6	  main	  centralised	  energy	  utility	  companies,	  which	  only	  goes	  to	  confirm	  the	  statement,	  as	  the	  quote	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  issue	  for	  nuclear	  energy’s	  security.	  This	  means	  that	  with	  decentralised	  electricity	  the	  UK	  would	  become	  less	  reliant	  on	  importing	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  from	  other	  countries	  (although	  not	  completely	  removed	  as	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  include	  more	  than	  just	  micro	  generation,	  it	  can	  include	  community	  scale	  projects	  and	  may	  require	  increased	  activity	  for	  the	  network	  operators).	  The	  cost	  of	  importing	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  higher	  and	  thus	  will	  increase	  the	  end	  cost	  to	  the	  consumer.	  A	  highly	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  can	  utilise	  the	  current	  UK	  skills	  base.	  This	  can	  have	  a	  knock	  on	  effect	  for	  the	  UK	  in	  developing	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  jobs	  rather	  than	  needing	  to	  import	  a	  small	  number	  of	  highly	  skilled	  individuals.	  	  The	  impact	  the	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  base	  of	  a	  particular	  electricity	  system	  can	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  flexibility	  and	  on	  the	  economy.	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  with	  its	  larger	  number	  of	  potentially	  domestic	  skills	  which	  are	  arguably	  easier	  to	  find	  will	  mean	  the	  skills	  required	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  changes	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  these	  larger	  numbers	  of	  lower	  level	  skills	  found	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  also	  provide	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  economy	  though	  the	  generation	  of	  local	  jobs.	  This	  is	  a	  positive	  indicator	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  However	  in	  order	  to	  capitalise	  on	  this,	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives,	  which	  make	  up	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  would	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  can	  not	  only	  be	  found	  but	  benefit	  the	  economy.	  	  
8.4 Summary	  Common	  concerns	  for	  future	  energy	  security	  made	  by	  research	  participants	  are	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  European	  Environmental	  policies	  (the	  LCPD	  and	  the	  IED).	  These	  directives	  dictate	  that	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  generating	  capacity	  will	  be	  required	  to	  close	  within	  the	  next	  decade.	  There	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  fill	  this	  loss	  in	  capacity.	  The	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use	  of	  centralised	  generating	  plants	  for	  developing	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  provides	  doubt	  over	  the	  ability	  for	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  plants	  such	  as	  nuclear	  to	  be	  built	  and	  operational	  in	  the	  restricted	  time	  scales.	  This	  provides	  two	  options:	  firstly,	  to	  continue	  down	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  route	  using	  mainly	  gas	  generation	  to	  fill	  capacity	  gaps	  and	  creating	  the	  risk	  that	  carbon	  targets	  will	  not	  be	  met.	  Or	  secondly,	  to	  invest	  in	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation,	  which	  will	  initially	  need	  Government	  support.	  The	  timescale	  factor	  is	  important	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  an	  electricity	  system	  due	  to	  governances’	  cyclical	  nature.	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place	  well	  in	  advance	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  role	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  actors.	  The	  concern	  over	  time	  scales	  has	  lead	  to	  two	  separate	  points:	  The	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  move	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  timescale	  in	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  for	  the	  system	  needs	  to	  change,	  to	  meet	  carbon	  and	  capacity	  requirements.	  One	  perception	  of	  a	  group	  of	  research	  participants	  was	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  system	  poses	  very	  little	  threat	  to	  security	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  a	  gradual	  change	  in	  which	  the	  whole	  system	  could	  adapt.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  impacts	  the	  stakeholders	  identified	  from	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  on	  the	  type	  and	  number	  of	  skilled	  professionals.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  require	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lower	  level	  skills	  such	  as	  plumbers	  and	  electricians	  for	  the	  installation	  of	  small	  scale	  generation.	  Further	  to	  this	  the	  stakeholders	  identified	  that	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  (research	  participants	  often	  discussed	  nuclear	  as	  the	  main	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  technology)	  is	  likely	  to	  require	  more	  higher	  level	  skills	  for	  building	  and	  operation	  of	  generation	  plants	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  require	  international	  help.	  	  A	  counter	  argument	  which	  was	  made	  is	  that	  even	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  number	  of	  high	  level	  skills	  required	  for	  the	  decommissioning	  of	  the	  current	  nuclear	  plants.	  Therefore,	  a	  fully	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  always	  require	  some	  highly	  skilled	  professionals	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  it.	  However,	  the	  point	  to	  make	  is	  that	  it	  promotes	  more	  employment	  which	  can	  be	  developed	  in	  the	  UK.	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The	  issue	  is	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  drive	  and	  focus	  for	  the	  required	  skills	  to	  emerge.	  Without	  strong	  government	  direction	  any	  change	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  may	  suffer	  a	  lack	  of	  skills.	  	  Another	  interesting	  point	  to	  make	  here	  is	  the	  link	  between	  skills	  and	  investment.	  The	  required	  skills	  are	  needed	  before	  the	  investment	  is	  put	  in	  place.	  However,	  the	  Project	  Discovery	  report	  by	  Ofgem	  (2010a)	  states	  that	  the	  availability	  of	  skills	  can	  be	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  rapid	  deployment	  of	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  The	  skills	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  occur	  without	  the	  demand	  (meaning	  the	  investment)	  being	  in	  place.	  	  The	  availability	  of	  appropriate	  skills	  will	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  ensuring	  the	  secure	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  whether	  centralised	  or	  decentralised,	  as	  recognised	  by	  both	  Government	  and	  industry.	  However,	  little	  concrete	  policy	  has	  been	  developed	  to	  provide	  skills	  appropriate	  for	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system.	  While	  skills	  are	  being	  developed	  on	  an	  informal	  level	  for	  microgeneration,	  there	  are	  still	  concerns	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  skills	  for	  larger	  scale	  decentralised	  installations	  which	  should	  be	  addressed.	  Finally,	  any	  change	  to	  the	  electricity	  systems,	  processes,	  and	  organisational	  bodies	  will	  incur	  costs.	  	  The	  requirement	  for	  low	  carbon	  generation	  in	  the	  UK	  ensuring	  the	  system	  will	  have	  to	  change.	  The	  discussion	  here	  is,	  would	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  cost	  more	  than	  a	  centralised	  system?	  Any	  change	  to	  the	  current	  system,	  especially	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system	  could	  have	  a	  large	  impact.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  change	  will	  inherently	  bring	  with	  it	  additional	  costs.	  Changing	  the	  system	  of	  generation	  to	  a	  decentralisation	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  attract	  additional	  investment	  for	  the	  private	  sector.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	   	  
	   206	  
9 Investment	  for	  a	  Low	  Carbon	  Secure	  Future	  The	  previous	  chapter	  looked	  at	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future,	  specifically	  concerns	  over	  the	  timescales	  of	  such	  a	  move.	  The	  timescales	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  policies,	  goals	  and	  targets	  which	  direct	  the	  electricity	  system.	  It	  was	  apparent	  that	  most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  identified	  that	  the	  closures	  resulting	  from	  European	  Directives,	  the	  LCPD	  and	  IED,	  would	  have	  the	  greatest	  impact	  on	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term	  security,	  specifically	  the	  level	  of	  capacity	  for	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  This	  means	  that	  any	  replacement	  generation	  would	  need	  to	  be	  found	  within	  a	  specific	  timeframe.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  is,	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  need	  to	  promote	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ensuring	  its	  stability	  so	  that	  energy	  security	  is	  not	  compromised.	  The	  governance	  of	  a	  secure	  electricity	  system	  in	  part	  means	  ensuring	  the	  right	  investment	  is	  in	  place	  for	  the	  future.	  For	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  this	  means	  delivering	  low	  carbon	  generation	  on	  top	  of	  this.	  The	  governance	  will	  need	  include	  the	  right	  rules	  and	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  the	  generation	  and	  delivery	  of	  electricity	  is	  achieved.	  Additionally,	  it	  will	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  right	  actors	  are	  involved	  to	  provide	  the	  investment.	  This	  governance	  process	  will	  obviously	  differ	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  future	  is	  centralised	  or	  decentralised.	  Chapter	  9	  will	  identify	  how	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  impact	  on	  the	  investment	  portfolio	  and	  ultimately	  the	  role	  of	  investment	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  in	  the	  future.	  It	  will	  do	  this	  by	  establishing	  how	  different	  stakeholders	  view	  the	  impact	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  and	  explore	  the	  different	  perceptions	  of	  how	  the	  various	  stakeholders	  may	  impact	  on	  future	  development.	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  not	  only	  means	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  generating	  plants	  but	  also	  a	  change	  to	  the	  type	  and	  ‘scale’	  of	  investor.	  It	  involves	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  electricity	  investors	  from	  householders,	  businesses	  and	  industry	  who,	  as	  investors,	  previously	  would	  not	  have	  existed.	  Therefore,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  provide	  a	  different	  avenue	  for	  investment.	  This	  style	  of	  investment	  could	  also	  contribute	  to	  developing	  the	  distribution	  network	  to	  support	  decentralised	  electricity	  with	  the	  advantage	  of	  greater	  efficiency	  and	  security	  of	  that	  network.	  However,	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  not	  simply	  one	  of	  security,	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  UK’s	  carbon	  targets,	  the	  replacement	  generation	  will	  have	  to	  consist	  of	  a	  high	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proportion	  of	  low	  carbon	  generation	  which,	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  built	  quickly.	  The	  issue	  for	  the	  large	  power	  stations	  is	  that	  the	  lead-­‐times	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  very	  long	  (Schlissel	  and	  Biewald,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  not	  only	  is	  a	  large	  injection	  of	  investment	  required	  for	  low	  carbon	  generation,	  it	  is	  also	  needed	  for	  the	  right	  technology	  which	  can	  provide	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  UK	  electricity	  system	  is	  constantly	  changing	  and	  adapting	  to	  its	  immediate	  and	  predicted	  requirements,	  however	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  could	  be	  considered	  slow.	  These	  changes	  are	  directed	  and	  governed	  by	  the	  rules,	  incentives	  and	  the	  interactions	  between	  system	  actors.	  Hypothetically,	  in	  a	  completely	  open	  and	  competitive	  market	  place,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  investment	  would	  go	  towards	  the	  technology	  offering	  the	  highest	  returns	  and	  lowest	  risk.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  unlikely	  for	  the	  market	  to	  deliver	  the	  additional	  requirements	  on	  the	  system	  such	  as	  low	  carbon	  objectives	  and	  addressing	  fuel	  poverty	  without	  external	  influence	  such	  as	  Government	  policies	  and	  subsidies	  (IPCC,	  2014).	  Therefore,	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  find	  appropriate	  investment	  for	  a	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  future.	  	  
9.1 What	  investment	  is	  needed?	  Ofgem	  has	  estimated	  that	  up	  to	  £200bn	  of	  investment	  could	  be	  required	  by	  2020	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  dual	  requirements	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  required	  in	  the	  face	  of	  huge	  global	  demand	  for	  investment,	  unknown	  future	  costs	  of	  commodities,	  and	  the	  continuing	  impacts	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  Of	  this	  estimate,	  £32bn	  has	  been	  set	  out	  for	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  and	  £70.5bn	  for	  new	  electricity	  generation	  (Ofgem;	  2010a).	  Other	  issues	  highlighted	  by	  Ofgem	  include	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  future	  carbon	  prices,	  dependence	  on	  international	  markets,	  the	  impact	  of	  increased	  costs	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  issue	  that	  short-­‐term	  pricing	  signals	  are	  not	  able	  to	  reflect	  the	  value	  customers	  place	  on	  electricity.	  This	  means	  that	  peak	  electricity	  supply	  incentives	  are	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  impact	  on	  investment	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	  However,	  since	  then	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  has	  been	  rolled	  out	  which	  includes	  a	  mechanism	  designed	  specifically	  to	  incentivise	  investment	  into	  ensuring	  peak	  demand	  is	  met	  (DECC,	  2013h).	  The	  Government’s	  policies	  and	  goals	  for	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  have	  a	  large	  influence	  on	  its	  long-­‐term	  future	  pathway.	  This	  long-­‐term	  investment	  within	  the	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electricity	  system	  is	  often	  influenced	  by	  the	  UK’s	  targets	  for	  meeting	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  on-­‐going	  requirement	  for	  a	  secure	  electricity	  system	  that	  has	  been	  set	  by	  Government.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  is	  to	  find	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  right	  amount	  of	  incentive	  for	  investment	  without	  causing	  excessive	  additional	  costs	  to	  the	  consumer	  and	  the	  industry.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  market	  mechanisms	  must	  be	  able	  to	  attract	  the	  required	  finance	  for	  the	  medium	  and	  long-­‐term	  without	  compromising	  the	  existing	  and	  on-­‐going	  investments	  (Ofgem,	  2010a).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  trying	  to	  solve	  a	  short-­‐term	  capacity	  issue	  by	  building	  new	  coal	  fired	  power	  station,	  which	  would	  undermine	  the	  longer-­‐term	  goal	  of	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  Therefore,	  the	  incentives	  need	  to	  be	  set	  out,	  providing	  the	  investors	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  calculate	  their	  investment.	  Interviewee	  27,	  a	  civil	  society	  actor,	  identified	  the	  importance	  for	  any	  investor	  to	  be	  able	  to	  calculate	  the	  risks	  of	  investing	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  over	  any	  alternatives	  whether	  they	  are	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  future.	  
“I	  think	  a	  lot	  of	  investors	  are	  reluctant	  to	  make	  decisions	  until	  
they	  know	  exactly	  what	  the	  financial	  outcomes	  are.”	  
(Interviewee	  27	  CSBS)	  Although	  interviewee	  27	  does	  not	  identify	  the	  Government	  role	  as	  setting	  out	  the	  financial	  return	  of	  a	  project,	  they	  do	  have	  a	  part	  to	  play	  in	  setting	  policy	  framework	  for	  the	  incentives	  and	  market	  mechanisms.	  This	  would	  indicate	  that	  clear	  direction	  from	  Government,	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  that	  investors	  can	  calculate	  the	  perceived	  reduced	  level	  of	  risk.	  This	  idea	  was	  backed	  up	  by	  E.ON	  in	  the	  2011	  Energy	  Security	  or	  Independence	  Consultation:	  
Policy	  uncertainty	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  hiatus	  in	  investment.	  (E.ON,	  
2011)	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  6.3.1	  governance	  theory	  suggests	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  therefore,	  investment	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  these	  stakeholders	  and	  not	  simply	  the	  UK	  Government.	  Since	  these	  interviews	  were	  undertaken,	  the	  Government	  has	  identified,	  through	  the	  EMR,	  support	  for	  both	  renewable	  generation	  and	  nuclear	  generation	  with	  the	  contract	  for	  difference.	  However,	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  2.2.1,	  the	  different	  set	  up	  of	  the	  nuclear	  (baseload)	  CfDs	  could	  signify	  a	  preference	  to	  nuclear	  generation.	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  The	  Government’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  UK	  electricity	  sector	  can	  have	  two	  different	  modes:	  the	  market	  and	  market	  mechanisms	  designed	  for	  electricity	  generation	  and	  supply	  companies,	  and	  the	  regulatory	  approach	  of	  the	  electricity	  transportation	  monopolies.	  The	  investment	  strategies	  into	  each	  are	  different	  and	  therefore	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  split,	  firstly	  into	  the	  investment	  under	  regulation,	  looking	  at	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  networks.	  Secondly,	  the	  generation	  sector,	  focussing	  on	  future	  capacity	  levels,	  the	  importance	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  transitioning	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  the	  wholesale	  market	  approach	  and	  finally	  the	  changes	  decentralised	  electricity	  would	  bring	  to	  the	  number	  and	  type	  of	  investors.	  
9.2 Network	  Investment	  The	  Government	  is	  trying	  to	  address	  investment	  concerns	  around	  building	  new	  forms	  of	  generation	  through	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  (EMR)	  package	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  Investment	  in	  to	  the	  electricity	  networks	  (both	  transmission	  and	  distribution)	  is	  organised	  through	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  TNOs	  and	  DNOs.	  This	  means	  the	  governance	  of	  these	  networks	  is	  controlled	  by	  Ofgem	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  networks	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  set	  up	  of	  RIIO	  (see	  section	  2.3).	  The	  electricity	  networks	  are	  seen	  as	  natural	  monopolies,	  where	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  regional	  water	  supply	  companies,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  a	  single	  organisation,	  without	  realistically	  being	  able	  to	  introduce	  competition.	  Investment	  has	  to	  be	  enabled	  through	  regulated	  mechanisms.	  Expenditure	  into	  the	  networks	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  price	  control	  period	  (see	  section	  2.3).	  However,	  additional	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  Network	  Innovation	  Competitions	  (NIC)	  and	  the	  Low	  Carbon	  Network	  Fund	  (LCN)	  are	  designed	  to	  provide	  funding	  for	  research,	  development	  and	  trials	  for	  new	  technology,	  operating	  and	  commercial	  arrangements	  (Ofgem,	  2012e).	  This	  section	  will	  set	  out	  whether	  sufficient	  investment	  in	  networks	  would	  be	  forthcoming	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  The	  difficulties	  in	  finding	  the	  required	  investment	  for	  the	  networks	  will	  also	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  regulatory	  strategy	  adopted.	  Regulation	  to	  encourage	  the	  deployment	  of	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  will	  differ	  from	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  required	  for	  a	  system	  dominated	  by	  large	  scale	  generating	  plant	  (Chapter	  4).	  A	  system	  centred	  around	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  could	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  intermittent	  renewable	  generation	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  distribution	  networks	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becoming	  more	  active.	  This	  in	  turn	  will	  require	  technology	  and	  training	  for	  managing	  the	  networks	  in	  a	  more	  active	  way.	  Another	  aspect	  to	  discuss	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  demand	  from	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  sectors.	  A	  third	  aspect	  to	  look	  at	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  high	  voltage	  networks,	  such	  as	  the	  transmission	  system	  (Ofgem,	  2010b).	  	  
9.2.1 Future	  of	  Transmission	  Network	  Investment	  Originally	  the	  electricity	  system	  would	  have	  been	  made	  up	  of	  groups	  of	  local	  networks	  feeding	  the	  local	  area.	  The	  transmission	  system	  was	  designed	  to	  connect	  these	  individual	  local	  distribution	  networks,	  allowing	  the	  introduction	  of	  larger	  power	  plants	  and	  connect	  supplier	  and	  consumers	  over	  longer	  distances.	  This	  allowed	  both	  the	  exploitation	  of	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  power	  plants	  also	  an	  enhanced	  degree	  of	  security	  as	  power	  could	  flow	  from	  small	  individual	  networks	  to	  others.	  Over	  time,	  the	  distribution	  networks	  moved	  from	  active	  operation	  to	  being	  passive	  recipients	  of	  power	  from	  the	  transmission	  network.	  With	  most	  generation	  connected	  at	  transmission	  level.	  Very	  little	  power	  is	  now	  injected	  onto	  the	  transmission	  system	  from	  distribution	  networks.	  The	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  may	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  control	  of	  the	  system.	  This	  centralised	  design	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  was	  identified	  by	  identified	  by	  a	  number	  of	  the	  participants	  and	  shown	  by	  interviewee	  12	  and	  11	  (a	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder	  and	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  respectively).	  
“The	  networks	  have	  been	  designed	  from	  a	  centralised	  point	  of	  
view	  to	  push	  electricity	  one	  way,	  from	  big	  plant	  down	  through	  
a	  load	  of	  wires	  until	  it	  hits	  your	  home.”	  (Interviewee	  12	  CSBS)	  
“If	  we	  are	  going	  to	  be	  relying	  more	  on	  low	  carbon	  
decentralised	  energy	  then	  the	  networks	  become	  a	  factor	  in	  
security,	  so	  in	  themselves	  they	  are	  not	  a	  security	  issue,	  you	  just	  
need	  different	  networks	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  security	  
issue”	  (Interviewee	  11	  RBS)	  Interviewee	  12	  and	  11	  indicate	  certain	  issues	  in	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  for	  energy	  security.	  Without	  the	  modification	  of	  the	  electricity	  supply	  network	  a	  future	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  see	  the	  electricity	  networks	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  security.	  Without	  an	  increase	  in	  investment	  into	  network	  development	  the	  concern	  is	  that,	  as	  the	  generation	  on	  the	  distributed	  network	  reaches	  a	  tipping	  point,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  requirement	  to	  feed	  the	  excess	  capacity	  back	  up	  the	  system.	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Although,	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder,	  Interviewee	  11,	  is	  not	  discussing	  the	  transmission	  system	  specifically	  they	  do	  make	  the	  point	  that	  the	  networks	  in	  general	  are	  not	  currently	  seen	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  energy	  security,	  therefore	  identifying	  the	  network	  owners	  as	  having	  no	  responsibility	  of	  energy	  security	  at	  present.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  opinion	  of	  all	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders.	  	  An	  opposing	  point	  of	  view	  was	  published	  from	  CE	  Electric,	  a	  network	  operator,	  in	  the	  EMR	  consultation	  identified	  that	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  electricity	  industry	  means	  it	  has	  a	  role	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security:	  
Although	  CE	  does	  not	  have	  investment	  in	  electricity	  
generation	  assets,	  it	  considers	  that	  it	  has	  a	  relevant	  
contribution	  to	  make	  to	  this	  consultation	  on	  two	  grounds.	  CE	  
has	  a	  clear	  interest	  as	  a	  significant	  participant	  in	  the	  
electricity	  industry	  in	  helping	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  electricity	  
market	  provides	  adequate	  incentives	  for	  generation	  capacity,	  
but	  since	  it	  has	  no	  investment	  in	  generation	  it	  can	  bring	  a	  
knowledgeable	  but	  impartial	  perspective	  to	  solving	  this	  
problem.	  (CE	  Electric,	  2010)	  This	  is	  a	  conflict	  of	  ideas	  over	  the	  perception	  of	  network	  owners’	  role	  and	  responsibilities.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  chapter	  10.3.	  However,	  the	  investment	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  will	  be	  vital	  to	  the	  future	  of	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  Some	  of	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  transmission	  network	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  decentralised	  electricity)	  will	  result	  from	  the	  development	  of	  the	  distribution	  network,	  mainly	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  generation	  on	  the	  local	  networks	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  will	  become	  more	  active	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.2.2	  where	  the	  DNO	  would	  have	  to	  balance	  their	  own	  network.	  Therefore,	  the	  transmission	  network	  is	  likely	  to	  require	  a	  change	  to	  its	  technology	  and	  operation	  (in	  terms	  of	  accepting	  power	  flows	  from	  the	  distribution	  networks)	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  which	  will	  require	  additional	  investment.	  As	  long	  as	  this	  technological	  change	  is	  seen	  as	  possible	  from	  an	  engineering	  point	  of	  view.	  It	  is	  then	  a	  question	  of	  how	  long	  the	  engineering	  may	  take	  to	  install	  and	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  impeded	  from	  a	  financial	  or	  economic	  constraint.	  Two	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders,	  Interviewees	  17	  and	  11,	  may	  provide	  the	  answer	  to	  this.	  They	  discuss	  the	  network	  development	  as	  reflecting	  generation	  and	  the	  ‘demand’	  for	  generation,	  which	  is	  driven	  by	  market	  arrangements:	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“…..the	  networks	  that	  we	  build	  respond	  to	  a	  free	  market	  so	  we	  
have	  to	  take	  a	  view	  on	  what	  solution	  the	  market	  will	  come	  up	  
with”	  (Interviewee	  17	  RBS)	  	  
“The	  [distribution]	  companies	  will	  grow	  in	  capability	  in	  
parallel	  with	  the	  demand”	  (Interviewee	  11	  RBS)	  	  The	  idea	  that	  networks	  will	  respond	  to	  whatever	  the	  market	  provides	  is	  an	  interesting	  aspect	  for	  governance	  and	  transition	  theory.	  This	  identifies	  the	  coevolution	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.2.2.	  The	  transition	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  requires	  the	  stakeholders	  not	  only	  to	  work	  together	  but	  also	  develop	  at	  a	  similar	  rate	  as	  certain	  aspects	  will	  be	  dependant	  on	  each	  other.	  Small-­‐scale	  generation	  requiring	  the	  DNO	  to	  provide	  access	  for	  connection	  in	  some	  cases	  will	  mean	  upgrading	  of	  surrounding	  network.	  The	  governance	  of	  the	  transmission	  system	  operator	  and	  the	  distributed	  network	  operators	  are	  managed	  through	  the	  regulator,	  Ofgem.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  regulator’s	  objective	  would	  be	  to	  ensure	  the	  network’s	  development	  follows	  a	  similar	  pattern	  with	  the	  level,	  location	  and	  type	  of	  generation	  and	  demand	  on	  the	  system.	  	  The	  two	  network	  operators	  quoted	  above	  identify	  that	  they	  do	  not	  see	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  security	  of	  their	  networks	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  down	  to	  the	  regulator,	  Ofgem	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  develop	  the	  electricity	  networks	  to	  ensure	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  can	  contribute	  to	  energy	  security.	  This	  was	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  5	  who	  indicates	  that	  each	  actor	  group	  has	  its	  own	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security.	  
Short	  term	  operational	  security	  it	  is	  national	  grid.	  At	  a	  slightly	  
more	  nebulas	  level	  it	  is	  the	  market	  and	  Ofgem	  as	  the	  regulator	  
has	  a	  duty.	  Then	  at	  a	  political	  level	  the	  energy	  minister.	  
Interviewee	  5	  GBS	  
9.2.2 Increased	  Generation	  On	  Distribution	  Network	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5	  there	  are	  implications	  of	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	  For	  the	  distributed	  network	  operators	  this	  would	  mean	  handling	  an	  increased	  amount	  of	  generation	  on	  their	  networks.	  Much	  of	  the	  current,	  low	  volume	  of	  generation	  connected	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  can	  be	  considered	  ‘invisible’	  to	  the	  network	  owners,	  as	  they	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do	  not	  have	  the	  technology	  to	  know	  the	  different	  flows	  of	  electricity	  that	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  generation	  (Ofgem,	  2007c).	  Instead	  it	  is	  absorbed	  by	  the	  level	  of	  demand	  in	  the	  local	  area	  and	  therefore	  often	  considered	  as	  “negative	  load”	  (Interviewee	  11,	  a	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder).	  However,	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  distributed	  generation	  would	  change	  the	  invisible,	  negative	  load	  to	  one	  which	  requires	  management	  and	  therefore,	  a	  change	  to	  the	  DNO’s	  operations,	  as	  a	  result	  further	  investment	  into	  the	  network	  may	  be	  required.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  this	  was	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  18,	  remarking	  over	  the	  increased	  costs	  involved	  an	  active	  distribution	  network:	  
“The	  more	  decentralised	  it	  becomes	  the	  more	  you	  have	  to	  
make	  a	  distribution	  network	  work	  like	  a	  transmission	  
network.	  You	  are	  balancing	  within	  that	  system	  rather	  than	  at	  
a	  higher	  level	  and	  that	  clearly	  becomes	  more	  expensive	  the	  
more	  decentralised	  it	  becomes”	  (Interviewee	  18	  MBS)	  This	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  18	  quoted	  above),	  from	  one	  of	  the	  big	  six	  energy	  suppliers,	  considers	  that	  balancing	  the	  system	  closer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use	  is	  more	  costly	  than	  balancing	  on	  the	  transmission	  network.	  	  The	  rise	  in	  distribution	  network’s	  cost	  is	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  the	  additional	  connections	  to	  the	  network,	  but	  mainly	  the	  implications	  from	  changing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  distribution	  network	  from	  its	  previous	  design	  criteria.	  This	  increases	  complexity,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  make	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  distribution	  network	  more	  expensive(Clastres,	  2011).	  Moving	  from	  a	  passive	  transportation	  system	  delivering	  electricity	  from	  the	  transmission	  network	  to	  the	  consumer,	  to	  a	  more	  active	  role,	  which	  may	  mean	  having	  to	  balance	  the	  generation	  and	  demand	  on	  its	  networks	  (DECC,	  2012k)	  (as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.2.3).	  	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case,	  a	  counter	  point	  made	  by	  interviewee	  27	  a	  civil	  society	  stakeholder,	  is	  the	  reduction	  of	  investment	  requirements	  for	  transmission	  networks.	  The	  use	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  could	  mean	  a	  lower	  capacity	  requirement	  for	  the	  transmission	  network,	  as	  power	  flows	  are	  increasingly	  concentrated	  in	  distribution	  networks	  and	  therefore	  lower	  associated	  expansion	  or	  reinforcement	  costs	  at	  the	  transmission	  level	  (Chmutina	  and	  Goodier,	  2014).	  However,	  this	  may	  have	  not	  have	  the	  desired	  effect,	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reduced	  level	  of	  ‘traffic’	  on	  the	  transmission	  networks	  the	  transmission	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network	  owner	  (TNO)	  would	  have	  reduced	  income	  thereby	  penalising	  the	  TNOs	  who	  may	  request	  compensation.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  further	  benefits	  from	  a	  decentralised	  future	  to	  the	  electricity	  network	  include:	  the	  changes	  to	  relatively	  inefficient	  current	  system	  where	  5-­‐8%	  of	  the	  electricity	  flowing	  through	  the	  distribution	  network	  is	  lost	  (Ofgem,	  2012b).	  The	  siting	  of	  generation	  on	  distribution	  networks	  can	  reduce	  these	  losses,	  thereby	  improving	  the	  economic	  efficiency	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  (Parliament,	  2011).	  One	  of	  the	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholders	  discussed	  this	  economic	  aspect,	  identifying	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  electricity	  will	  attract	  the	  development	  of	  the	  network	  and	  release	  its	  currently	  unused	  economic	  value	  (interviewee	  11).	  The	  increase	  in	  generation	  on	  the	  distribution	  network	  as	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  local	  grid	  was	  also	  discussed	  by	  interviewee	  3,	  a	  market	  stakeholder.	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  calculating	  future	  costs	  with	  such	  a	  vast	  change	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Without	  being	  able	  to	  accurately	  calculate	  costs,	  investors	  may	  be	  cagey	  about	  investing	  in	  new	  projects,	  which	  in	  turn	  could	  impact	  on	  energy	  security.	  
9.2.3 Decentralisation	  and	  Smarter	  Grids	  The	  move	  to	  a	  smart	  or	  active	  network	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem	  in	  the	  smart	  grids	  forum	  to	  reduce	  costs	  through	  a	  more	  efficient	  network	  operation,	  support	  economic	  growth	  and	  increase	  energy	  security	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014).	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  losses	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  electricity	  are	  found	  in	  the	  distribution	  networks	  and	  losses	  mean	  reduced	  efficiency	  and	  higher	  costs.	  Utilising	  an	  active	  network	  operation	  for	  the	  DNOs	  means	  that	  the	  distribution	  network	  is	  opened	  up	  for	  increased	  amounts	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  and	  increased	  efficiency	  on	  the	  networks.	  The	  complexity	  and	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  discussed	  earlier,	  is	  suggested	  in	  this	  quote	  from	  SSE	  in	  the	  “UK's	  Energy	  Supply:	  Security	  or	  Independence?”	  consultation.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  distribution	  there	  is	  a	  role	  for	  more	  effective	  and	  
dynamic	  distribution	  networks	  that	  manage	  demand	  more	  
effectively	  and	  enable	  a	  larger	  amount	  of	  decentralised	  energy	  
to	  generate.	  These	  smart	  grids	  could	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  in	  
terms	  of	  minimising	  new	  infrastructure	  costs	  by	  using	  assets	  
as	  effectively	  as	  possible,	  whilst	  reducing	  overall	  demand	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thereby	  reducing	  the	  UK's	  reliance	  on,	  and	  exposure	  to,	  
imported	  fuels.	  (SSE,	  2011b)	  The	  move	  to	  a	  more	  active	  or	  smart	  system	  is	  also	  complicated	  by	  the	  concept	  having	  different	  meanings	  for	  different	  groups.	  One	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  11)	  provides	  a	  good	  explanation;	  if	  the	  distribution	  networks	  are	  passive	  then	  the	  transmission	  network	  would	  be	  considered	  active.	  The	  transmission	  networks	  have	  been	  active	  for	  many	  years,	  which	  means	  the	  control	  technology	  can	  be	  rolled	  out	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  real	  time.	  	  
“A	  smart	  network	  is	  the	  one	  that	  is	  actually	  giving	  choice	  to	  its	  
users”.	  (Interviewee	  11	  RBS)	  However,	  an	  additional	  discussion	  which	  arose	  over	  whether	  the	  DNO’s	  would	  want	  to	  be	  involved.	  Interviewee	  been	  identified	  it	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  economics.	  What	  this	  shows	  is,	  that	  the	  incentives	  will	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place.	  
“The	  DNO’s	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  become	  active	  as	  long	  at	  the	  
money	  is	  there.”	  (Interviewee	  30	  CSBS)	  
	  “Technically,	  it	  just	  needs	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  right	  
incentives	  are	  put	  in	  place	  for	  the	  decentralised	  providers	  of	  
energy	  to	  offer	  the	  services	  needed	  to	  run	  a	  stable	  grid.”	  
(Interviewee	  3	  MBS)	  Ensuring	  the	  right	  incentives	  are	  in	  place	  for	  the	  electricity	  networks	  should	  in	  theory	  simply	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  setting	  the	  right	  regulation.	  Interviewee	  12	  identifies	  this	  regulation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  “low	  risk”.	  	  
“[Currently]	  pension	  funds	  effectively	  own	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  
networks	  because	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  low	  risk	  and	  rather	  dull,	  they	  
are	  always	  going	  to	  be	  there,	  long-­‐term	  assets,	  everyone	  is	  
happy,	  it’s	  a	  regulated	  price.”	  (Interviewee	  12	  CSBS)	  Therefore,	  setting	  the	  incentives	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  future	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  low	  risk	  for	  the	  current	  distribution	  network	  operators.	  However,	  interviewee	  12	  also	  reflected	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  activity	  would	  change	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks.	  This	  was	  also	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  6.	  
However,	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  activity	  on	  the	  networks	  you	  
could	  be	  asking	  a	  section	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  effectively	  to	  do	  
something	  that	  is	  completely	  outside	  of	  its	  comfort	  zone”	  
(Interviewee	  12	  CSBS)	  
“Where	  does	  the	  investment	  into	  networks	  come	  from?	  
Obviously	  it’s	  the	  DNOs,	  which	  are	  regulated	  investments.	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Therefore	  are	  there	  issues	  with	  the	  level	  and	  difficulty	  of	  
investing	  in	  the	  networks	  because	  of	  regulation”	  (Interviewee	  
6	  MBS)	  This	  concern	  was	  also	  shared	  by	  one	  of	  the	  government-­‐based	  stakeholders	  (interviewee	  22)	  where	  the	  understanding,	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  required	  to	  regulate	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  will	  likely	  be	  very	  different	  than	  it	  is	  today,	  especially	  for	  the	  distribution	  system.	  
“I	  was	  also	  thinking	  […]	  do	  we	  have	  the	  skills	  to	  regulate	  a	  
very	  decentralised	  system”	  (Interviewee	  22	  GBS)	  If	  Ofgem,	  as	  a	  major	  player	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  is	  seen	  as	  promoting	  a	  centralised	  future	  over	  decentralisation,	  coupled	  with	  DECC’s	  apparent	  promotion	  of	  centralised	  technologies	  for	  energy	  security26,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  section	  10.1.2.	  There	  are	  two	  aspects	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  consider.	  Firstly	  decentralisation	  may	  bring	  an	  unknown	  factor,	  i.e.	  how	  much	  generation	  is	  there	  going	  to	  be	  in	  a	  specific	  location	  and	  therefore,	  how	  much	  reinforcement	  will	  be	  required	  for	  that	  network.	  Secondly,	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  distributed	  generation	  there	  comes	  a	  point	  where	  the	  network	  will	  need	  to	  become	  smarter	  and	  more	  active	  similar	  to	  the	  transmission	  system	  operation	  (see	  section	  3.2.3).	  This	  will	  mean	  a	  much	  larger	  level	  of	  investment	  will	  be	  required	  which	  will	  eventually	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  end	  consumer.	  The	  understanding	  that	  the	  investment	  for	  the	  networks	  can	  be	  found	  through	  regulation	  (see	  section	  2.3)	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  whole	  picture.	  The	  current	  electricity	  system,	  even	  without	  the	  requirement	  to	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future,	  would	  still	  require	  investment	  into	  the	  networks.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  current	  network	  and	  its	  requirement	  for	  replacement	  and	  the	  upgrades	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  demand.	  However,	  by	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  generation	  connected	  to	  the	  distribution	  network,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  required	  investment	  increase,	  as	  does	  future	  complexity	  of	  managing	  the	  networks	  (DECC,	  2012r).	  Therefore,	  regulation	  can	  drive	  investment,	  either	  through	  requiring	  it	  or,	  as	  is	  the	  intention	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  ESS	  (see	  section	  4.1.6)	  and	  through	  the	  capacity	  market	  (see	  section	  2.2.2)	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behind	  RIIO	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.3.1,	  by	  providing	  incentives	  to	  guide	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  DNOs.	  The	  future	  of	  the	  DNO	  will	  likely	  see	  a	  great	  level	  of	  activity.	  For	  the	  DNO	  to	  become	  active	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  would	  be	  operational	  costs	  incurred,	  but	  also	  efficiency	  savings	  and	  benefits	  towards	  energy	  security.	  Having	  said	  this	  the	  pricing	  signals	  with	  the	  smart	  grids	  would	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  to	  reduce	  peak	  loads.	  Simply	  reducing	  overall	  demand	  may	  not	  reduce	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  unless	  the	  peak	  demand	  is	  cut.	  	  The	  move	  to	  a	  smarter	  network	  is	  not	  dependant	  on	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  It	  can	  however,	  be	  considered	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  to	  handle	  the	  larger	  amount	  of	  generation.	  The	  future	  is	  likely	  to	  see	  higher	  levels	  of	  demand	  (see	  section	  3.2.1)	  thereby	  requiring	  a	  more	  active	  DNO	  in	  a	  decentralised	  or	  centralised	  electricity	  system.	  
9.3 Investment	  in	  Generation	  Investment	  into	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  major	  catalyst	  and	  indicator	  of	  the	  UK’s	  progress	  towards	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  the	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  could	  develop	  along	  two	  separate	  pathways:	  either	  a	  centralised	  system	  dominated	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  nuclear	  generation	  and	  fossil	  fuels	  with	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  rolled	  out	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  or	  a	  decentralised	  system,	  utilising	  significant	  levels	  of	  renewables	  and	  demand	  management	  technologies	  with	  storage	  solutions.	  There	  are	  many	  distinctions	  between	  the	  two	  approaches,	  social,	  political,	  technological,	  but	  often,	  the	  comparisons	  made	  between	  them	  is	  economic.	  	  The	  approach	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  quantifiable	  economic	  aspects	  of	  policies	  is	  frequently	  made	  by	  Government	  (DTI,	  1999;	  2000;	  2002;	  2003;	  2006b;	  2007a;	  DECC,	  2011d;	  2012d;	  2012g;	  2013d).	  However,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  means	  that	  by	  looking	  purely	  at	  the	  relative	  costs	  may	  not	  provide	  the	  best	  results.	  The	  additional	  benefits	  of	  decentralisation	  would	  not	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  such	  as	  the	  increased	  ability	  to	  involve	  the	  consumer	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  	  This	  perspective	  also	  extends	  to	  the	  additional	  factors	  which	  play	  out	  in	  the	  investment	  into	  new	  generation.	  A	  comparison	  of	  decentralised	  against	  centralised	  electricity	  systems	  could	  include	  the	  different	  investors	  which	  would	  be	  included	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in	  the	  process	  it	  should	  also	  discuss:	  the	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  the	  investment	  and	  investors,	  the	  future	  costs	  of	  generating	  electricity	  and	  its	  predictability,	  and	  the	  avoidable	  costs	  which	  comes	  with	  a	  new	  system	  compared	  with	  maintaining	  the	  current	  configuration.	  This	  section	  will	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  capacity	  concerns	  for	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  to	  establish	  what	  investment	  is	  required.	  It	  will	  then	  look	  at	  investment	  into	  gas	  fired	  generation	  as	  it	  is	  widely	  considered	  as	  a	  ‘transition	  fuel’	  for	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  secure	  future.	  It	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  stakeholders’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  market	  system	  for	  security.	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  changes	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  bring	  is	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  type	  of	  investor	  that	  could	  operate	  within.	  Finally,	  this	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  stakeholder	  perceptions	  of	  how	  investors	  will	  change	  and	  how	  this	  may	  impact	  on	  energy	  security.	  
9.3.1 Confidence	  in	  Future	  Generation	  Investment	  The	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  future	  will	  likely	  mean	  a	  very	  different	  generation	  portfolio	  than	  there	  is	  today.	  According	  to	  DECC	  the	  GB	  electricity	  system	  is	  due	  to	  lose	  a	  20-­‐25%	  of	  the	  generating	  capacity	  from	  the	  closure	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  and	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  over	  the	  next	  decade	  (DECC,	  2013h)	  (see	  section	  2.5.1).	  A	  reduction	  in	  capacity	  causes	  serious	  concerns	  over	  the	  supply-­‐demand	  margins	  and	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  blackouts,	  which	  can	  in	  turn	  cause	  an	  increase	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  and	  impact	  negatively	  on	  the	  economy	  (Ofgem,	  2012h)	  (see	  section	  2.5.2).	  The	  significance	  of	  these	  impacts	  from	  a	  loss	  in	  capacity	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  UK	  Government	  will	  go	  to	  try	  to	  ensure	  the	  capacity	  is	  retained.	  Interviewee	  3	  a	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  suggests	  that	  the	  general	  public	  would	  have	  serious	  issues,	  if	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  generation	  to	  meet	  demand	  and	  especially	  if	  this	  was	  down	  to	  Government	  policies:	  
People	  will	  start	  screaming	  sometime	  before	  saying	  “its	  
ridiculous	  we’re	  closing	  these	  hardly	  used	  power	  stations	  that	  
run	  10	  days	  a	  year	  because	  of	  that	  certain	  directive	  so	  it	  
means	  the	  lights	  are	  going	  to	  go	  out	  on	  5	  days	  a	  year”.	  So	  I	  
think	  if	  it	  did	  come	  to	  the	  crunch	  something	  will	  be	  done	  if	  
plant	  wasn’t	  actually	  built	  to	  replace	  it.”	  (interviewee	  3	  MBS)	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  EU’s	  Large	  Combustion	  Plant	  Directive	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Emissions	  Directive	  will	  contribute	  to	  much	  of	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  coal	  fired	  power	  stations.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  in	  this	  thesis	  raised	  the	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possibility	  these	  policies	  may	  be	  downgraded	  if	  they	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  UK	  energy	  system,	  on	  the	  basis	  that,	  if	  security	  is	  the	  most	  important	  challenge	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  (especially	  in	  the	  current	  economic	  climate),	  any	  policy	  or	  mechanism	  that	  would	  impact	  seriously	  on	  security	  could	  be	  re-­‐addressed.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  would	  not	  follow	  through	  on	  its	  policies	  and	  directives	  identifies	  an	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  Government	  and	  the	  market	  stakeholders.	  It	  identifies	  a	  possible	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  Government	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  statements	  and	  policies	  and	  that	  security	  is	  seen	  as	  paramount	  above	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  even	  through	  there	  is	  a	  very	  strong	  argument	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Government	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  get	  any	  kind	  of	  derogation	  from	  the	  directives.	  When	  discussing	  this	  with	  a	  government	  stakeholder	  (interviewee,	  5),	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  derogation	  of	  EU	  policy	  would	  not	  be	  possible;	  the	  directives	  are	  set	  in	  law	  and	  therefore	  not	  able	  to	  change.	  Further	  to	  this	  the	  coal	  fired	  power	  plants	  would	  begin	  to	  increase	  their	  running	  hours	  up	  to	  the	  deadline	  in	  order	  to	  close	  early.	  This	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  be	  broken	  into	  parts	  for	  use	  on	  other	  power	  stations.	  Therefore	  if	  the	  directive	  was	  changed	  so	  the	  plant	  did	  not	  have	  to	  close	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  reuse	  the	  power	  plant	  components,	  if	  they	  are	  required	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  investment	  into	  supplementary	  generation	  would	  have	  already	  begun.	  This	  investment	  would	  have	  been	  made	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  stations	  would	  be	  closed	  by	  2016	  (National	  Grid,	  2007).	  If	  the	  directives	  were	  not	  enforced,	  investment	  into	  new	  generation	  would	  be	  undermined	  and	  create	  distrust	  in	  Government	  policy	  for	  future	  investment.	  	  The	  belief	  that	  Government	  may	  try	  to	  go	  back	  on	  the	  EU	  directive,	  when	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  this	  will	  not	  and	  cannot	  happen,	  could	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  Government.	  Any	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  Government	  could	  cause	  problems	  for	  large-­‐scale	  investments	  which	  are	  competing	  with	  other	  international	  projects.	  Alternatively	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  could	  be	  that	  they	  believe	  the	  future	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  under	  such	  a	  threat	  that	  there	  is	  no	  option	  but	  to	  find	  a	  derogation.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  also	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  investment	  in	  new	  technology.	  This	  was	  identified	  by	  E.ON	  in	  the	  Energy	  security	  or	  Independence	  Consultation	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  interviewee	  30.	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Given	  the	  challenges	  the	  UK	  faces	  and	  the	  long	  timescales	  of	  
many	  infrastructure	  developments,	  policy	  certainty	  […]	  should	  
be	  a	  priority	  for	  Government	  (E.ON,	  2011)	  
“I	  think	  the	  biggest	  security	  concern	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  on	  
Government	  policy”	  Interviewee	  30	  CSBS	  Once	  again	  here	  is	  another	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  indicating	  that	  it	  is	  Government	  who	  needs	  to	  ensure	  through	  clear	  policy	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  It	  is	  the	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  who	  would	  be	  looking	  for	  a	  solid	  indication	  of	  the	  future	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  which	  could	  mean	  incentive	  for	  a	  particular	  technology	  type.	  This	  would	  indicate	  a	  requirement	  for	  Government	  involvement	  in	  a	  market-­‐based	  electricity	  system.	  Since	  these	  interviews	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  given	  further	  detail	  to	  the	  Capacity	  Market	  identifying	  how	  they	  believe	  capacity	  will	  be	  found.	  However,	  a	  point	  to	  make	  here	  is	  that	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  stakeholders	  look	  to	  Government	  to	  ensure	  the	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  identified	  Government	  as	  responsible	  for	  setting	  out	  how	  security	  is	  delivered.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  Government	  does	  not	  always	  deliver	  policy	  certainty	  as	  identified	  by	  E.On	  above.	  Uncertainty	  transfers	  to	  risk,	  which	  means,	  without	  higher	  returns,	  a	  reduction	  in	  investment.	  This	  idea	  of	  policy	  certainty	  can	  also	  be	  displayed	  through	  the	  distrust	  in	  politicians’	  ulterior	  motives.	  This	  trust	  in	  Government	  not	  only	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place	  for	  the	  policies	  they	  implement	  but	  also	  for	  their	  modelling	  of	  the	  future.	  Interviewee	  8	  demonstrated	  distrust	  in	  certain	  predictions	  over	  future	  capacity	  concerns:	  
Saying	  you	  will	  run	  short	  of	  electricity	  oil	  or	  gas	  I	  would	  say	  
that	  is	  probably	  just	  a	  flag	  that	  people	  wave	  to	  support	  a	  
lobbying	  organisation…….The	  politicians	  screaming	  about	  a	  
supply	  gap	  or	  generation	  gap	  is	  bullshit	  really.	  But	  they	  use	  it	  
to	  promote	  whatever	  pet	  project	  they	  have	  on.	  (interviewee	  8	  
GBS)	  Concerns	  about	  future	  capacity	  are	  augmented	  by	  the	  potential	  impacts	  from	  the	  increased	  electrification	  of	  the	  heating	  and	  transport	  sectors.	  Government	  has	  identified	  concern	  over	  the	  rise	  in	  demand	  levels	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  However,	  a	  rise	  in	  demand	  may	  not	  be	  a	  severe	  as	  Government	  suggests.	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  over	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the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  and	  advances	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  the	  household	  and	  businesses	  could	  relieve	  much	  of	  the	  demand	  increase.	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  provides	  a	  direct	  link	  from	  the	  electricity	  system	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders	  many	  of	  who	  are	  consumers.	  This	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  these	  consumers.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  close	  link	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  smarter	  networks	  for	  balancing	  the	  distribution	  system,	  thus	  further	  benefiting	  efficiency.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  by	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  the	  capacity	  level	  can	  grow	  in	  a	  short	  space	  of	  time	  and	  alongside	  the	  increase	  in	  demand.	  Small-­‐scale,	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  has,	  in	  general,	  short	  lead	  times	  from	  design	  stage	  to	  being	  operational.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  fill	  future	  capacity	  gaps	  and	  impact	  positively	  on	  future	  energy	  security	  (Sambeek,	  2000).	  However	  there	  was	  concern	  over	  whether	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  replace	  the	  current	  centralised	  system.	  	  
“Particularly	  with	  the	  renewable	  side	  […]	  I	  think	  people	  are	  
quite	  naive	  in	  believing	  that	  we	  can	  scale	  up	  an	  industry	  which	  
is	  still	  a	  very	  nascent	  immature	  industry	  and	  deliver	  reliable	  
construction	  and	  operation	  into	  the	  medium	  term	  and	  we	  risk	  
tipping	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  money	  into	  that.”	  (Interviewee	  31	  
CSBS)	  Interviewee	  31	  went	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  required	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  for	  operating	  and	  maintaining	  such	  a	  plant:	  
“We	  don’t	  have	  a	  scaled	  up	  O&M	  supply	  chain.	  Insurance	  is	  a	  
really	  difficult	  issue.	  There	  are	  so	  many	  risks,	  which	  there	  is	  no	  
actual	  evidence	  to	  assess.	  The	  robustness	  of	  the	  technology	  is	  
largely	  unproven”	  (Interviewee	  31	  CSBS)	  However,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  skills	  required	  for	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  easier,	  compared	  to	  for	  example,	  the	  nuclear	  power	  industry	  see	  section	  8.3	  for	  further	  information	  and	  discussion.	  As	  discussed	  by	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  6).	  	  
	  “if	  you	  take	  it	  back	  to	  its	  first	  principles,	  you	  need	  engineers	  
who	  are	  competent	  in	  engineering	  and	  you	  would	  argue	  that	  
we	  have	  a	  better	  skills	  base	  in	  this	  country	  to	  deal	  with	  
renewables	  than	  we	  do	  with	  nuclear,	  because	  we	  have	  not	  
done	  nuclear	  for	  ages	  other	  than	  keeping	  the	  existing	  ones	  
running.	  But	  we	  are	  planning	  to	  build	  6-­‐7	  new	  nuclear	  power	  
stations.”	  (Interviewee	  6	  MBS)	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Interestingly	  this	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  represents	  a	  company	  who	  were	  planning	  a	  joint	  venture	  to	  build	  a	  new	  nuclear	  power	  plant,	  however,	  in	  2012	  their	  venture	  was	  halted	  and	  they	  sold	  all	  their	  sites	  earmarked	  for	  nuclear	  power	  plants.	  Not	  only	  this,	  decentralised	  generation	  may	  also	  provide	  an	  additional	  boost	  to	  the	  economy	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  jobs	  within	  the	  UK,	  rather	  than	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  more	  expensive	  skilled	  knowledge	  base	  found	  outside	  the	  UK	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.1.3.	  
9.3.2 Investment	  risk	  comparing	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  
Generation.	  When	  looking	  purely	  at	  investment	  funding,	  there	  was	  clear	  concern	  amongst	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees	  that	  the	  risk	  involved	  with	  large-­‐scale	  investments	  is	  high.	  This	  risk	  is	  associated	  with	  pinning	  a	  large	  sum	  of	  money	  on	  a	  single	  project,	  which	  if	  it	  fails	  due	  to	  policy	  changes,	  project	  management	  error	  or	  technical	  failure,	  there	  could	  be	  catastrophic	  financial	  repercussions.	  Here	  is	  a	  list	  of	  quotations	  from	  various	  interviewees	  showing	  a	  feeling	  of	  large	  scale	  investments	  being	  a	  risky	  business.	  
“Very	  large	  projects	  can	  be	  quite	  risky	  things,	  particularly	  if	  
you	  want	  to	  build	  some	  nuclear	  power	  stations	  at	  the	  
moment”	  Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  
The	  nuclear	  generators	  are	  tax	  payer	  subsidised	  and	  
considered	  too	  large	  to	  fail,	  which	  makes	  me	  very	  
uncomfortable.	  Interviewee	  8	  GBS	  
	  “I	  think	  particularly	  with	  the	  financial	  markets	  the	  way	  they	  
are	  at	  the	  moment,	  it	  is	  very	  risky	  business	  for	  these	  people	  to	  
dabble	  into	  large	  investments”	  Interviewee	  9	  CSBS	  
“I	  think	  it	  is	  really	  hard	  to	  call	  because,	  putting	  a	  large	  sum	  of	  
money	  behind	  a	  large	  project	  is	  a	  pretty	  risky	  thing	  to	  do.	  You	  
can	  lose	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  if	  that	  project	  fails.	  Whereas	  if	  you	  are	  
investing	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  small	  projects,	  then	  that	  is	  much	  less	  
risky.”	  Interviewee	  22	  GBS	  
In	  the	  future	  gas,	  oil	  and	  coal	  are	  going	  to	  be	  more	  expensive	  
wherever	  you	  source	  them	  from	  which	  will	  have	  some	  impact	  
on	  a	  macro	  economic	  level.	  From	  that	  perspective	  renewable	  
energy	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact.	  Interviewee	  8	  GBS	  
Nuclear	  is	  an	  interesting	  component	  to	  the	  low	  carbon	  mix.	  I	  
believe	  in	  running	  existing	  plants	  as	  hard	  as	  we	  can	  because	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effectively	  threat	  is	  a	  sunk	  investment.	  For	  new	  investment	  I	  
don’t	  think	  the	  economic	  arguments	  stack	  up.	  You	  are	  
mortgaging	  future	  costs	  very	  strongly	  against	  cheaper	  
electricity	  now,	  by	  passing	  the	  bill	  for	  decommissioning.	  
Interviewee	  8	  GBS	  The	  small	  collection	  of	  quotes	  from	  the	  interview	  process	  are	  representation	  of	  the	  different	  stakeholder	  groups.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  interviewee	  3,	  each	  of	  these	  research	  participants	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  aligned	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  interviewee	  11,	  a	  regulatory	  stakeholder,	  identified	  that	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  investment	  in	  large-­‐scale	  generation,	  the	  risk	  would	  need	  to	  be	  lower	  relative	  to	  the	  small-­‐scale.	  This	  is	  because;	  with	  such	  a	  large	  level	  of	  investment	  the	  investors	  would	  require	  convincing.	  
“The	  risk	  to	  the	  investor	  has	  got	  to	  be	  reduced	  if	  you	  want	  to	  
be	  convinced	  that	  we	  are	  going	  to	  get	  a	  couple	  of	  hundred	  
billion	  poured	  in	  on	  building	  new	  power	  stations”	  (interviewee	  
11	  RBS)	  Therefore	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  system	  to	  be	  implemented,	  it	  could	  require	  greater	  financial	  aid.	  Thereby,	  meaning	  greater	  costs	  to	  the	  consumer	  impacting	  negatively	  on	  energy	  security.	  Further	  to	  this,	  a	  government-­‐based	  stakeholder	  identified	  the	  difficulties	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  has	  in	  terms	  of	  finding	  investors.	  The	  type	  of	  investor	  for	  a	  centralised	  generation	  plant	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  interests	  outside	  the	  UK.	  Therefore,	  the	  investment	  portfolio	  will	  be	  competing	  with	  other	  countries:	  
“most	  of	  the	  companies	  who	  operate	  in	  the	  UK	  now	  are	  
international	  companies.	  Clearly	  they	  have	  a	  choice	  in	  where	  
they	  do	  invest.	  If	  you	  are	  Eon	  do	  you	  invest	  in	  Germany	  do	  you	  
invest	  in	  the	  UK?	  Things	  such	  as	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  would	  
undoubtedly	  drive	  investment	  abroad.”	  Interviewee	  13	  GBS	  This	  identifies	  that	  some	  investors	  and	  some	  Government	  players	  view	  large	  scale,	  low	  carbon	  generation	  as	  a	  risky	  investment	  and	  requires	  higher	  returns.	  This	  has	  been	  reiterated	  recently	  with	  the	  subsidy	  for	  nuclear	  power	  where	  they	  have	  been	  guaranteed	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  market	  price	  for	  electricity	  at	  £92.50	  per	  MW	  (DECC,	  2013n)	  twice	  the	  current	  market	  price	  of	  electricity.	  Although	  the	  strike	  prices	  for	  renewables	  are	  also	  set	  they	  have	  a	  shorter	  guaranteed	  contract	  length	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  adjustable	  reference	  price	  (see	  section	  2.2.1).	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However,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  response	  from	  all	  research	  participants.	  Interviewee	  31	  a	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder	  has	  a	  counter	  argument	  regarding	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  smaller	  groups	  to	  find	  competitive	  investment.	  
At	  the	  moment	  investment	  into	  energy	  projects	  are	  made	  by	  
large	  companies	  with	  good	  credit	  ratings.	  Once	  you	  consider	  
that	  down	  to	  a	  more	  local	  level	  the	  ability	  of	  individuals,	  small	  
businesses	  and	  communities	  to	  raise	  finance	  at	  competitive	  
rates	  with	  what	  could	  be	  raised	  by	  an	  international	  is	  
quadrupled	  (Interviewee	  31	  CSBS)	  These	  are	  very	  open	  comments	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  investment	  at	  the	  moment.	  They	  discuss	  the	  ideas	  around	  the	  risk	  in	  terms	  of	  scale;	  yet,	  the	  risks,	  which	  need	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  investment	  into	  building	  generation	  capacity,	  are	  far	  more	  complex.	  The	  risks	  involved	  in	  investing	  in	  new	  generation	  fall	  into	  several	  categories.	  Firstly,	  the	  costs	  of	  building	  the	  plant,	  including	  the	  consultation	  fees	  such	  as	  planning,	  design,	  engineering	  and	  environmental	  considerations.	  Secondly,	  the	  period	  of	  time	  the	  plant	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  open	  and	  the	  ensuing	  maintenance	  costs.	  Thirdly,	  the	  price	  received	  on	  the	  market	  for	  electricity,	  including	  any	  additional	  subsidies.	  Lastly	  the	  running	  costs	  including	  operation,	  maintenance	  and	  cost	  of	  fuel	  (Gerwen,	  2006).	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.1.2	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  expense	  associated	  with	  any	  electricity	  generating	  plant;	  the	  fixed	  and	  the	  variable	  costs.	  Table	  9-­‐1	  shows	  the	  consumption	  and	  generation	  costs	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  types	  of	  plant.	  The	  variable	  costs	  indicate	  a	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  building	  of	  such	  a	  plant	  and	  therefore	  the	  risks	  involved.	  For	  most	  renewable	  energy	  developments	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  costs	  are	  related	  to	  the	  capital	  costs	  of	  construction.	  Once	  built,	  there	  are	  no	  fuel	  costs	  (apart	  from	  Biomass)	  and	  mostly	  low	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  (Laing	  &	  Grubb,	  2010).	  This	  is	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  conventional	  generation	  where	  the	  fuel	  costs	  dominate	  the	  generation	  costs	  associated	  with	  it	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  9-­‐1.	  This	  does	  not	  identify	  the	  maintenance	  costs	  to	  offshore	  wind,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  much	  higher	  than	  onshore	  wind,	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  turbines	  in	  a	  hostile	  environment.	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Figure	  9-­‐1	  Composition	  of	  generation	  costs	  (Laing	  and	  Grubb,	  2010)	  
Table	  9-­‐1	  Characterisation	  of	  costs	  for	  DG	  and	  RES	  -­‐	  timing	  of	  expense	  (Gerwen,	  2006)	  
Type	  of	  Expense	   Initial	   Continuing	  
Fixed	   Engineering	  cost	  Investments	  Licensing	  cost	  MW-­‐based	  connection	  cost	  Metering	  
MW-­‐based	  distribution	  tariffs	  Fixed	  taxes	  Scheduled	  maintenance	  Insurance	  
Variable	   MWh-­‐based	  connection	  cost	   Unscheduled	  maintenance	  Fuel	  cost	  Fuel	  taxes	  MWh-­‐based	  distribution	  tariffs	  
	  The	  running	  costs	  of	  each	  plant	  is	  arguably	  far	  easier	  to	  estimate	  for	  a	  small-­‐scale	  and,	  specifically,	  for	  a	  renewable	  generation	  plant.	  With	  the	  renewable	  generation	  plant,	  it	  is	  mainly	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  fees,	  which	  can	  be	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defined	  early	  on	  in	  the	  project.	  The	  revenue	  of	  the	  project	  would	  hinge	  on	  two	  factors.	  Firstly,	  the	  output	  of	  the	  plant,	  which	  includes	  time	  and	  level	  of	  power	  generation.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  a	  single	  wind	  turbine,	  the	  wind	  strength	  is	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  time	  and	  output	  of	  the	  generating	  station.	  Single	  day	  forecasting	  of	  generation	  is	  understandably	  very	  difficult,	  however,	  the	  forecasting	  period	  ran	  for	  over	  a	  year	  a	  more	  reliable	  outcome	  could	  be	  achieved	  (Pinson	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  second	  factor	  is	  the	  price	  it	  would	  receive	  on	  the	  market.	  This	  may	  become	  more	  stable	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  EMR	  namely	  the	  contracts	  for	  difference	  (DECC,	  2013h).	  The	  volatility	  in	  price	  for	  fossil	  fuels	  separates	  renewables	  from	  conventional	  generation	  and	  provides	  an	  additional	  unknown	  factor	  in	  the	  running	  costs	  of	  the	  current	  centralised	  plant.	  In	  comparison	  to	  a	  renewable	  energy	  system	  the	  fluctuating	  price	  of	  international	  gas,	  oil	  and	  coal	  mean	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  predict	  how	  much	  it	  will	  cost	  in	  the	  future.	  At	  the	  moment	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  and	  gas.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  dominance	  fossil	  fuels	  have	  on	  the	  market.	  However,	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  system	  fossil	  fuels	  will	  have	  a	  reduced	  impact	  unless	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  is	  implemented	  on	  a	  large-­‐scale.	  The	  volatility	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  and	  their	  future	  is	  uncertain.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  quote	  from	  a	  market	  player	  who	  specifically	  operates	  renewable	  generation	  technologies.	  
	  “One	  comment	  to	  […]	  make	  is	  that	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  freeze	  
our	  prices	  on	  two	  occasions	  in	  the	  last	  six	  months	  at	  a	  time	  
when	  all	  the	  other	  big	  suppliers	  have	  been	  putting	  them	  up	  by	  
about	  9%.	  That’s	  because	  of	  the	  way	  we	  source	  our	  energy.	  
Because	  it	  is	  a	  secure	  reliable	  source	  of	  energy	  in	  that	  sense	  
compared	  to	  [fossil	  fuels].”	  Interviewee	  15	  MBS	  
9.3.3 Future	  of	  Gas	  Investment	  In	  order	  to	  fill	  the	  capacity,	  that	  is	  due	  to	  go	  offline	  over	  the	  next	  decade	  (see	  section	  2.5.2),	  investment	  will	  be	  needed	  for	  new,	  long	  term	  low	  carbon	  generation	  but	  also	  for	  technologies	  which	  will	  be	  able	  to	  act	  as	  a	  replacement	  in	  a	  short	  time-­‐scale.	  One	  option	  for	  this	  is	  to	  construct	  combined	  cycle	  gas	  turbines	  (CCGT)	  plants	  that	  require	  relatively	  short	  lead	  times	  and	  they	  are	  highly	  flexible	  in	  operation,	  which	  makes	  it	  an	  effective	  balancer	  for	  inflexible	  or	  variable	  generation	  technologies.	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Natural	  gas’s	  benefits	  as	  a	  transitional	  fuel,	  stem	  from	  its	  flexibility,	  scalability	  and	  its	  reduced	  greenhouse	  gas	  and	  particulate	  emissions	  when	  compared	  to	  coal	  and	  oil	  (Stephenson	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  If	  natural	  gas	  is	  widely	  considered	  as	  the	  ‘transitional	  fuel’,	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  current	  unsustainable	  energy	  system	  to	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  required	  to	  combat	  climate	  change	  the	  next	  concern	  will	  be	  its	  availability	  and	  its	  cost	  (Stephenson	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  Skea	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  
Although	  global	  gas	  reserves	  remain	  plentiful,	  increased	  
competition	  from	  emerging	  markets	  is	  likely	  to	  exacerbate	  
price	  volatility	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  make	  access	  challenging.	  Global	  
market	  developments	  could	  therefore	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  
security	  of	  supply	  in	  the	  UK.	  (Energy	  UK,	  2012)	  
The	  UK's	  oil	  and	  gas	  reserves,	  whilst	  still	  significant,	  are	  no	  
longer	  sufficient	  to	  meet	  domestic	  demand	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  
increasingly	  exposed	  to	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  global	  fossil	  fuel	  
market.	  (SSE,	  2011b)	  The	  issue	  with	  natural	  gas	  is	  that	  it	  could	  mean	  a	  dependence	  on	  a	  single	  type	  of	  generation	  for	  this	  transitional	  purpose.	  This	  means	  that	  diversity	  and	  therefore	  energy	  security	  would	  be	  harmed	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.4.2.	  Another	  issue	  with	  natural	  gas	  is	  that	  UK	  supplies	  are	  dwindling	  and	  therefore	  the	  UK	  must	  rely	  on	  international	  supplies.	  As	  identified	  by	  Energy	  UK	  in	  the	  consultation	  on	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  and	  SSE	  in	  the	  Energy	  security	  or	  Independence	  Consultation	  above.	  The	  concern	  over	  capacity	  levels	  is	  not	  just	  from	  the	  closure	  of	  certain	  generation	  plants,	  many	  of	  the	  CCGT	  power	  plants	  were	  built	  during	  the	  ‘dash	  for	  gas’	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Although	  they	  were	  built	  with	  a	  forty-­‐year	  life	  span	  (Singh	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  they	  also	  require	  a	  major	  refurbishment	  at	  the	  half	  way	  point.	  This	  refit	  has	  been	  discussed	  as	  ‘mid-­‐lifeing’	  by	  interviewee	  3	  and	  requires	  significant	  investment	  in	  order	  to	  strip	  the	  plant	  down	  and	  renew	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  its	  components.	  Because	  of	  this	  significant	  investment,	  the	  utilities	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  put	  the	  investment	  into	  the	  plant	  and	  have	  it	  run	  for	  another	  twenty	  years	  or	  to	  let	  it	  close.	  	  
“Obviously	  to	  put	  the	  investment	  in,	  they	  have	  got	  to	  be	  sure	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  market	  for	  the	  generation	  from	  that	  plant”	  
Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  
	  “We	  are	  not	  seeing	  the	  scale	  of	  investment	  that	  is	  necessary	  
because	  people	  are	  not	  confident	  that	  they	  can	  invest	  in	  […]	  
gas	  assets	  because	  the	  fear	  is	  that	  you	  would	  not	  be	  rewarded	  
economically”	  Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	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“The	  perceived	  future	  energy	  mix	  is	  often	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  
renewable	  energy	  with	  nuclear	  to	  back	  it	  up.	  In	  the	  meantime	  
new	  CCGTs	  will	  only	  come	  in	  with	  the	  balancing	  of	  wind.	  
Therefore	  there	  is	  no	  investment	  environment	  for	  the	  CCGT	  as	  
it	  has	  no	  major	  role.”	  Interviewee	  30	  CSBS	  
“I	  think	  we	  are	  surrounded	  by	  a	  huge	  uncertainty	  at	  the	  
moment	  and	  there’s	  a	  big	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  future	  of	  gas”	  
Interviewee	  25	  MBS	  As	  can	  be	  identified	  from	  both	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  and	  the	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder	  there	  was	  a	  concern	  over	  the	  level	  of	  incentives	  to	  promote	  gas	  generation.	  These	  stakeholders	  represent	  both	  large	  scale,	  centralised	  systems	  (interviewee	  3	  and	  31)	  and	  the	  smaller	  scale	  renewable	  companies	  (interviewee	  30	  and	  25).	  The	  concern	  over	  ensuring	  investment	  for	  the	  CCGT	  can	  be	  explained	  by,	  as	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  30,	  its	  role	  as	  a	  transitional	  fuel.	  Although	  interviewee	  30	  identifies	  its	  need	  in	  a	  renewable	  electricity	  future	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  it	  will	  also	  be	  beneficial	  towards	  a	  centralised	  low	  carbon	  future.	  Therefore,	  whether	  an	  actor	  is	  promoting	  a	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  electricity	  future	  their	  goals	  to	  promote	  CCGT	  generation	  may	  well	  be	  aligned.	  However,	  this	  mode	  of	  operation	  would	  change	  gas	  from	  its	  role	  from	  base-­‐load	  to	  a	  peak	  load	  plant	  and	  require	  additional	  support	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  investors.	  Generation	  plants	  which	  only	  operate	  at	  peak	  times,	  cannot	  guarantee	  when	  they	  will	  be	  operational	  and	  therefore	  operators	  cannot	  confidently	  predict	  the	  returns,	  making	  it	  more	  of	  a	  financial	  risk.	  
“I	  think	  the	  biggest	  security	  concern	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  on	  
Government	  policy”	  Interviewee	  30	  CSBS	  
Uncertainty	  on	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  UK	  energy	  mix	  has	  also	  
led	  to	  mothballing	  of	  existing	  plant	  and	  delays	  to	  potential	  
new	  gas	  plant.	  It	  is	  therefore	  vital	  that	  Government,	  through	  
long-­‐term	  stable	  policies,	  including	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  
market-­‐wide	  Capacity	  Mechanism,	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  
clear	  investment	  signals	  to	  the	  market.	  (Energy	  UK,	  2012)	  Clarity	  is	  needed	  from	  Government	  to	  ensure	  that	  gas	  fired	  generation	  can	  be	  kept	  profitable	  in	  the	  future,	  low	  carbon	  system	  as	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  30,	  a	  civil	  society	  stakeholder	  and	  by	  Energy	  UK	  in	  the	  consultation	  on	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  electricity	  market.	  If	  government	  is	  perceived	  as	  the	  lead	  stakeholder	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  it	  is	  important	  that	  they	  set	  a	  clear	  and	  defined	  future	  for	  the	  role	  of	  gas.	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9.3.4 Market	  involvement	  in	  investment	   	  The	  UK	  Government	  identified	  in	  the	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  that	  it	  will	  focus	  its	  efforts	  on	  a	  competitive	  market	  (combined	  with	  regulation)	  to	  deliver	  energy	  security.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  markets	  would	  be	  the	  main	  approach	  for	  finding	  the	  investment	  for	  a	  future	  of	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  generation.	  From	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view	  there	  are	  three	  aspects	  to	  consider	  when	  looking	  at	  investment	  opportunities	  in	  electricity	  generation:	  the	  upfront	  capital	  costs,	  the	  on-­‐going	  running	  costs	  and	  the	  price	  the	  electricity	  will	  receive	  on	  the	  market.	  The	  investment	  scene	  for	  electricity	  is	  dominated	  by	  centralised	  technologies,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  electricity	  markets	  are	  structured	  and	  regulated.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  the	  current	  market	  price	  for	  electricity	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  price	  of	  fossil	  fuels.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  cover	  the	  main	  share	  of	  the	  generation	  mix	  and	  are	  often	  the	  marginal	  plant	  in	  the	  market	  place	  (DECC,	  2012h).	  The	  marginal	  plant	  is	  the	  lowest	  offer	  price	  in	  which	  capacity	  is	  met.	  As	  natural	  gas	  is	  the	  technology	  that	  often	  meets	  this	  lowest	  price,	  its	  price	  volatility	  nature	  can	  cause	  instability	  in	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  in	  the	  market	  (Laing	  and	  Michael	  Grubb,	  2010).	  	  Other	  issues	  for	  decentralisation	  within	  the	  market	  at	  the	  moment	  include	  balancing	  and	  settlement	  complexities	  and	  the	  difficulties	  in	  entering	  the	  market	  faced	  by	  small	  to	  medium	  sized	  generators.	  One	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  the	  transaction	  costs,	  which,	  for	  the	  large	  scale	  generators	  can	  be	  reduced	  for	  bulk	  units.	  Also	  BETTA	  requires	  the	  generators	  to	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  their	  output,	  which,	  for	  many	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generators,	  being	  variable,	  makes	  this	  difficult	  (Woodman	  and	  Baker,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  small-­‐scale	  generators	  tend	  to	  sell	  to	  a	  third	  party	  through	  PPAs	  where	  they	  are	  often	  undervalued	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  intermittency	  and	  the	  high	  transaction	  costs	  per	  unit	  (Ofgem,	  2008).	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  for	  a	  renewable	  electricity	  future,	  there	  is	  a	  big	  question	  over	  whether	  the	  current	  market	  approach	  can	  deliver	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  
“If	  you	  were	  to	  implement	  an	  energy	  market	  system	  with	  the	  
need	  for	  low	  carbon	  from	  scratch,	  then	  it	  would	  look	  very	  
different	  than	  it	  does	  now”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  
“The	  problem	  comes	  if	  it’s	  not	  a	  fair	  playing	  field	  because	  the	  
market	  is	  set	  up	  entirely	  with	  centralised	  large	  companies	  in	  
mind	  and	  doesn’t	  really	  think	  about	  small	  players	  and	  the	  fact	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that	  small	  players	  may	  be	  just	  as	  efficient	  in	  terms	  of	  costs	  or	  
may	  even	  be	  cheaper”	  Interviewee	  21	  GBS	  
“There	  has	  always	  been	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  imbalance	  
charges	  which	  come	  about	  from	  the	  market	  rules	  are	  
accurately	  cost	  effective	  or	  they	  unduly	  discriminate	  thereby	  
favouring	  the	  big	  players	  over	  the	  small	  ones”	  Interviewee	  19	  
RBS	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  until	  the	  EMR	  there	  was	  currently	  little	  incentive	  for	  investing	  in	  gas	  purely	  as	  a	  back-­‐up	  technology	  required	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  (DECC,	  2011a;	  Helm,	  2011;	  Hoggett	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Chignell	  &	  Gross	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  over	  whether	  the	  market	  structure	  currently	  in	  operation	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  This	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  6),	  a	  government-­‐based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  21)	  and	  a	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  19).	  The	  different	  market,	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  6,	  would	  be	  that	  it	  would	  support	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generators	  rather	  than	  penalise	  them,	  as	  discussed	  by	  interviewee	  21	  and	  19.	  Many	  of	  these	  changes	  have	  been	  identified	  by	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  through	  the	  Contracts	  for	  Difference,	  however,	  this	  has	  been	  criticised	  as	  a	  way	  of	  subsidising	  nuclear	  power	  (Toke,	  2011;	  Mitchell,	  2011).	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  current	  market	  structure	  has	  been	  set	  up	  with	  the	  centralised	  approach	  in	  mind.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  reforms	  will	  need	  to	  go	  further	  to	  promote	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  rather	  than	  keep	  its	  current	  structure.	  These	  can	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  separate	  market	  dedicated	  to	  small	  scale	  generation.	  However,	  as	  the	  quote	  from	  a	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  (Interviewee	  19)	  suggests,	  the	  reformations	  have	  not	  gone	  as	  far	  as	  they	  could:	  
	  “It’s	  remarkable	  that	  the	  Energy	  Market	  Reform	  does	  very	  
little	  to	  the	  energy	  market”	  Interviewee	  19	  RBS	  As	  the	  interviewee	  subsequently	  pointed	  out,	  most	  of	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  market	  structure	  are	  simply	  an	  adaptation	  of	  the	  standing	  system.	  The	  EMR	  is	  not	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  –	  i.e.	  BETTA	  -­‐	  itself	  but	  is	  simply	  the	  same	  market	  structure	  with	  minor	  adaptations	  outside	  the	  framework	  of	  market	  operation.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  energy	  system,	  rather	  than	  a	  radical	  change,	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  different	  ways.	  One	  aspect	  could	  be	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  market	  structure	  is	  designed	  to	  remove	  Government	  from	  direct	  association	  with	  the	  energy	  system,	  leaving	  them	  with	  a	  reduced	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responsibility	  for	  any	  short-­‐term	  issues,	  which	  may	  occur.	  This	  means	  the	  energy	  system	  will	  be	  left	  as	  an	  open	  competitive	  market	  place.	  	  
9.3.4.1 Market	  Competition	  As	  identified	  in	  section	  4.1.6	  DECC	  has	  signified	  that	  it	  intends	  to	  use	  competitive	  markets	  as	  its	  main	  strategy	  towards	  ensuring	  energy	  security.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  how	  competitive	  the	  current	  markets	  are	  perceived	  to	  be.	  If	  Government	  is	  trying	  to	  provide	  a	  free	  market	  system	  then	  the	  discussion	  from	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  here	  disagrees.	  
“Some	  people	  think	  it’s	  a	  free	  market.	  Well,	  actually,	  no	  it	  isn’t,	  
it	  never	  has	  been	  and	  politicians	  have	  played	  around	  with	  it	  to	  
their	  hearts’	  content	  for	  years”	  Interviewee	  10	  MBS	  However,	  for	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  market	  approach	  could	  mean	  uncertainty	  in	  their	  future,	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  section	  8.1.1.	  Therefore,	  Government	  intervention	  can	  be	  considered	  positive	  for	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  as	  it	  requires	  a	  change	  to	  the	  current	  approach,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  negative	  for	  the	  present	  energy	  companies	  who	  dominate	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  balance	  of	  competition	  over	  intervention	  was	  also	  identified	  by	  Ofgem	  in	  the	  EMR	  consultations;	  it	  signified	  that	  Ofgem	  would	  prefer	  the	  Government	  to	  keep	  an	  open	  competitive	  market	  with	  little	  or	  no	  Government	  intervention.	  
“…we	  see	  that	  under	  the	  FIT	  proposal	  there	  may	  be	  a	  greater	  
role	  for	  Government	  (than	  at	  present)	  in	  determining	  the	  
generation	  mix.	  However	  we	  would	  ask	  the	  Government	  to	  
consider	  maintaining	  competition	  between	  generation	  
technologies	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  an	  efficient	  price	  
discovery	  can	  match.	  We	  consider	  that	  the	  appropriate	  use	  of	  
competitive	  mechanisms	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  best	  outcome	  
for	  consumers	  over	  the	  longer	  term,	  whether	  that	  be	  
competition	  ‘in	  the	  market’	  or	  competition	  ‘for	  the	  market’”	  
(Ofgem,	  2011e).	  However,	  Government	  intervention	  in	  the	  market	  is	  a	  balancing	  act	  that	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  perform.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  for	  Government	  playing	  a	  more	  direct	  role	  in	  the	  electricity	  markets	  is	  to	  balance	  the	  returns	  for	  investors	  and	  excessively	  adding	  to	  the	  end	  cost	  of	  electricity	  for	  the	  consumer.	  Without	  this	  delicate	  balance	  properly	  managed	  then	  the	  UK	  Government	  could	  be	  criticised	  from	  either	  the	  market	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players	  or	  the	  civil	  society	  actors.	  E.ON	  identify	  the	  risk	  on	  not	  providing	  enough	  returns	  for	  an	  investment:	  
	  
None	  of	  [the	  EMR]	  mechanisms	  removes	  developments,	  
construction	  and	  operational	  risks	  which	  are	  major	  factors	  
associated	  with	  new	  nuclear,	  SCCS,	  wind	  and	  biomass	  projects.	  
Political	  risk	  will	  also	  remain.	  Returns	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
adequate	  to	  cover	  these.	  (E.ON,	  2011)	  However,	  what	  E.ON	  neglects	  to	  identify	  here	  is	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  risk	  of	  over	  paying	  these	  projects	  which	  increases	  the	  price	  to	  the	  consumer.	  Although	  this	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Electricity	  Producers	  (AEP)	  in	  the	  same	  consultation:	  
We	  are	  mindful	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  consumers.	  In	  their	  interests,	  
the	  Government	  must	  demonstrate	  that	  its	  chosen	  measures	  
are	  the	  most	  cost	  effective	  in	  delivering	  carbon	  emissions	  with	  
security	  of	  supply.	  (AEP,	  2011)	  Having	  said	  this,	  choosing	  the	  most	  cost	  effective	  measures	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  task.	  This	  is	  mainly	  because	  many	  of	  the	  aspects	  relating	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  are	  not	  quantifiable.	  Government	  currently	  quantifies	  many	  of	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  putting	  a	  figure	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  an	  individual	  having	  ownership	  or	  a	  ‘stake’	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  not	  easy.	  
To	  consumers,	  who	  will	  ultimately	  pay	  for	  these	  initiatives,	  to	  
fully	  appreciate	  the	  financial	  impact	  of	  the	  proposals	  the	  
economic	  rationale	  and	  financial	  impact	  is	  clearly	  articulated	  
and	  understood.	  (AEP,	  2011)	  The	  AEP	  identify	  that	  consumers	  may	  not	  understand	  how	  the	  complex	  market	  and	  initiatives	  operate	  and	  therefore,	  understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  will	  have	  on	  the	  consumer	  bills.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  markets	  means	  the	  small-­‐scale	  investor	  and	  generator	  is	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  their	  level	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  operation.	  This	  complexity	  comes	  from	  the	  transaction	  charges	  and	  a	  need	  to	  predict	  output	  in	  advance.	  Due	  to	  this	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generator	  is	  unlikely	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  BETTA	  market	  system.	  The	  complexity	  found	  in	  BETTA	  is	  also	  apparent	  in	  the	  EMR.	  Therefore	  as	  identified	  by	  Centrica,	  Government	  intervention	  would	  be	  required,	  calling	  for	  a	  more	  simplified	  market	  alternative.	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“Implementation	  of	  the	  EMR	  package	  would	  create	  a	  complex	  
electricity	  market	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  Government	  
intervention	  […]	  a	  simpler,	  more	  market-­‐based	  alternative	  
should	  also	  be	  considered.”	  (Centrica,	  2011)	  However,	  there	  are	  support	  mechanisms	  for	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  Mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  FIT	  enable	  a	  bypass	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  investor	  around	  the	  market	  complexities,	  providing	  a	  clear	  cut	  understanding	  of	  how	  much	  the	  technology	  will	  cost	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  much	  it	  generates,	  as	  shown	  by	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder:	  
	  “Decentralised	  energy	  requires	  much	  simpler	  mechanisms	  to	  
support	  them	  compared	  to	  large	  scale	  centralised	  generation”	  
Interviewee	  15	  MBS	  The	  FIT	  provides	  the	  small	  investor	  with	  information	  of	  upfront	  capital	  costs,	  the	  on-­‐going	  costs,	  and	  the	  price	  received	  for	  generating	  electricity.	  This	  means	  an	  investor,	  whether	  they	  are	  a	  large	  corporation	  or	  a	  single	  householder	  can	  calculate	  the	  costs	  and	  returns	  of	  investment	  with	  relative	  ease.	  However,	  some	  stakeholders	  did	  not	  see	  the	  Feed	  in	  Tariffs	  as	  a	  way	  of	  supporting	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  discussed	  below	  by	  civil	  society,	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  
“the	  small-­‐scale	  developer	  is	  generally	  being	  encouraged	  by	  
feed	  in	  tariffs,	  basically	  being	  paid	  an	  excessive	  amount	  which	  
exceeds	  the	  value	  of	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  in	  order	  to	  
encourage	  them	  to	  do	  it.	  […].	  Government	  is	  prepared	  to	  pay	  
out	  huge	  amounts	  of	  cash	  on	  solar	  at	  a	  local	  level,	  not	  because	  
it’s	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  but	  because	  it	  wants	  to	  try	  to	  develop	  
the	  supply	  chain.”	  Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  
“None	  of	  the	  renewables	  stuff	  works	  without	  the	  subsidy	  
therefore	  the	  subsidy	  is	  driven	  by	  policy	  and	  that	  is	  not	  a	  
market	  driver	  at	  all,	  indeed	  often	  it’s	  working	  against	  the	  
market.”	  Interviewee	  18	  MBS	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  each	  of	  these	  research	  participants	  represent	  or	  support,	  large	  scale	  generation	  companies	  which	  would	  view	  the	  promotion	  of	  small	  scale	  generation	  as	  possibly	  damaging	  to	  their	  own	  current	  portfolio.	  Although	  the	  initial	  conception	  of	  the	  FIT	  did	  support	  small-­‐scale	  renewables	  over	  and	  above	  the	  wholesale	  price	  of	  electricity,	  the	  FIT	  works	  to	  set	  up	  supply	  chains	  for	  nascent	  technologies	  and	  as	  these	  technologies	  become	  established	  the	  returns	  are	  reduced	  as	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  current	  FIT	  in	  2012	  (Ofgem,	  2012a).	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  nascent	  technology	  can	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  and	  operate	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alongside	  current	  market	  technologies.	  However	  the	  current	  market	  approach	  penalises	  the	  variable	  renewable	  generation.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  for	  small-­‐scale	  renewable	  generation	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  place,	  it	  would	  likely	  require	  either	  a	  change	  to	  current	  market	  approach	  or	  a	  separate	  market	  system	  for	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  An	  interesting	  point	  to	  make	  here	  is	  that	  Government	  are	  using	  the	  market	  as	  its	  main	  mechanism	  in	  delivering	  energy	  security.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  do	  not	  see	  the	  FIT	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  this	  mechanism,	  this	  includes	  two	  government	  based	  stakeholders.	  
“by	  introducing	  large	  scale	  fit	  and	  capacity	  mechanisms	  you	  
are	  distorting	  the	  markets.	  As	  soon	  as	  you	  start	  distorting	  the	  
market	  you	  are	  making	  things	  more	  expensive	  only	  time	  will	  
tell	  on	  this.”	  Interviewee	  14	  GBS	  
“a	  lot	  of	  decentralised	  energy	  is	  going	  to	  be	  subsidised,	  a	  lot	  of	  
it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  renewable.	  So	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  problems	  
to	  come	  out	  from	  my	  point	  of	  view.	  You	  are	  essentially	  
muddying	  the	  market,	  reducing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  price	  
signals”	  Interviewee	  21	  GBS	  Interviewee	  14	  here	  identifies	  the	  feed	  in	  tariffs	  and	  capacity	  mechanisms	  as	  a	  distortion	  to	  the	  market,	  furthering	  this	  with	  the	  perception	  that	  this	  might	  cause	  an	  increase	  in	  cost	  of	  electricity.	  However,	  this	  occurs	  at	  present	  with	  the	  nuclear	  industry;	  the	  Government	  is	  subsidising	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  power	  through	  the	  contracts	  for	  difference,	  thereby	  raising	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  for	  consumers,	  which	  is	  also	  on	  a	  relatively	  established	  technology..	  	  Interviewee	  21	  identifies	  the	  “muddying	  of	  the	  market	  through”	  renewable	  subsidies	  as	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  price	  signals.	  However,	  in	  order	  for	  greater	  efficiency	  in	  the	  electricity	  system,	  price	  signals	  would	  need	  to	  also	  operate	  for	  the	  consumer,	  at	  the	  present	  time	  there	  are	  very	  little	  short-­‐term	  price	  signals	  for	  demand.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  viewpoint	  may	  be	  the	  lock-­‐in	  to	  a	  centralised	  approach,	  which	  has	  become	  established.	  Government	  based	  stakeholders	  may	  believe	  that	  the	  current	  centralised	  approach	  is	  easier	  to	  govern	  and	  therefore	  fail	  to	  see	  the	  benefits	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  in	  the	  market.	  This	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  markets	  to	  the	  particular	  investment	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  future	  technology	  mix.	  Therefore,	  the	  future	  of	  the	  investment	  scene	  depends	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  EMR.	  Whether	  the	  reforms	  better	  promote	  a	  centralised,	  or	  a	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decentralised	  electricity	  future,	  they	  will	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  determining	  the	  future	  of	  the	  system.	  
“The	  Government	  has	  talked	  about	  this	  under	  the	  energy	  
market	  reform	  so	  we	  are	  going	  to	  see	  a	  floor	  price	  underneath	  
carbon,	  effectively	  that	  is	  a	  subsidy	  for	  nuclear	  power”	  
Interviewee	  25	  MBS	  For	  the	  case	  of	  decentralisation,	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees	  see	  the	  future	  as	  very	  bleak,	  this	  is	  identified	  in	  the	  quote	  from	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder.	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  markets	  is	  that	  they	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security.	  If	  the	  research	  participants	  view	  the	  markets	  as	  penalising	  or	  promoting	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  then	  this	  would	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  to	  be	  envisioned.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  energy	  security	  is	  the	  markets	  dominance	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  (Temperton,	  2011;	  Gross	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  how	  the	  Government	  sets	  out	  the	  market	  arrangements	  and	  any	  subsidiary	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  FIT	  will	  dictate	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  means,	  the	  Government	  needs	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  and	  strong	  indication	  of	  how	  the	  future	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  will	  look.	  This	  brings	  back	  the	  concept	  of	  any	  policy	  uncertainty	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  energy	  security.	  This	  idea	  of	  uncertainty	  also	  follows	  on	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
9.3.5 Investors	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  In	  order	  to	  find	  the	  investment	  and	  develop	  a	  new	  electricity	  system,	  the	  type	  of	  investor	  that	  would	  be	  targeted	  needs	  to	  be	  understood.	  The	  current	  large	  scale	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  utilises	  investment	  from	  large	  global	  investors.	  Whereas	  investment	  for	  smaller	  scale	  projects	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  from	  communities,	  businesses	  and	  individual	  householders.	  What	  each	  of	  these	  different	  types	  of	  investors	  are	  looking	  at	  is	  the	  risk	  and	  returns	  involved	  with	  a	  particular	  project.	  
there	  is	  a	  serious	  risk	  that	  this	  investment	  will	  not	  be	  available	  
if	  investors	  do	  not	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  UK	  electricity	  market	  
arrangements.(AEP,	  2010)	  Without	  the	  right	  market	  operations	  and	  incentives	  investment	  would	  be	  unlikely.	  This	  was	  identified	  by	  AEP	  in	  the	  Carbon	  price	  floor:	  support	  and	  certainty	  for	  low-­‐carbon	  investment.	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The	  EMR,	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.2	  according	  to	  Government	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  provide	  long-­‐term	  assurances	  for	  investors.	  One	  of	  the	  methods	  in	  which	  this	  is	  achieved	  is	  by	  putting	  in	  place	  a	  carbon	  price	  floor	  incentivising	  low	  carbon	  investment	  and	  reducing	  investor	  uncertainty.	  
“As	  we	  go	  forward	  we’ll	  have	  decentralised	  power.	  You’ll	  have	  
a	  greater	  mix	  of	  technology	  and	  therefore	  more	  advent	  of	  
small	  technology	  players	  and	  greater	  distribution	  of	  the	  assets	  
themselves,	  therefore	  less	  belongs	  to	  the	  very	  large	  
companies”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  
“The	  potential	  benefit	  from	  the	  investment	  of	  the	  smaller	  scale	  
decentralised	  generation	  is	  that	  you	  open	  up	  projects	  which	  
are	  at	  a	  level	  where	  you	  don’t	  necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  a	  gigantic	  
investor	  to	  be	  able	  to	  contribute”	  Interviewee	  27	  CSBS	  
“If	  you	  have	  lots	  of	  New	  players	  you	  have	  access	  to	  new	  
sources	  of	  capital	  I	  guess	  that	  would	  mean	  there	  is	  a	  wider	  
pool	  that	  you	  can	  tap	  into	  the	  project	  finance	  and	  if	  that	  is	  the	  
case	  then	  perhaps	  that	  would	  help	  with	  the	  investment	  
challenge.	  It	  really	  depends	  on	  who	  are	  these	  players	  and	  what	  
is	  the	  success	  of	  these	  generators	  on	  the	  distribution	  network.”	  
Interviewee	  5	  GBS	  
“the	  introduction	  of	  new	  players	  to	  the	  market,	  increasing	  
competition,	  increasing	  the	  diversity	  of	  energy	  supply”	  
Interviewee	  1	  GBS	  
“those	  players	  coming	  into	  decentralised	  energy	  but	  you	  are	  
also	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  community	  type	  smaller	  local	  
companies	  who	  think	  about	  doing	  it	  as	  a	  side	  business.	  That	  
brings	  a	  whole	  load	  of	  extra	  capital”	  Interviewee	  21	  GBS	  The	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  involve	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  investors,	  increasing	  diversity	  and	  removing	  the	  proportion	  of	  assets	  owned	  by	  the	  larger	  energy	  companies	  as	  discussed	  by	  market,	  civil	  society	  and	  three	  government-­‐based	  stakeholders.	  The	  one	  category	  of	  stakeholders	  not	  represented	  in	  this	  collection	  of	  quotes	  is	  the	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholder.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  regulated	  monopoly	  of	  the	  networks	  means	  that	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  their	  investment	  structure	  would	  not	  change.	  The	  investment	  would	  still	  be	  achieved	  through	  regulation.	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  increasing	  the	  numbers	  of	  investors	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  electricity	  introduces	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  investment	  opportunities.	  Current	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investment	  works	  in	  a	  large	  scale	  for	  each	  single	  project,	  meaning	  that	  once	  the	  investment	  is	  in	  place	  there	  is	  a	  reduced	  ability	  to	  change.	  This	  inherent	  irreversibility	  of	  investments	  leaves	  the	  system	  rigid	  in	  its	  pathway	  (Fielder	  1996;	  Watson	  &	  Wright,	  2010).	  Smaller	  scale	  generation	  provides	  an	  alternative	  for	  the	  traditional	  ‘lumpy’	  investment	  patterns	  that	  accompanies	  a	  centralised	  system	  (Sambeek,	  2000).	  Although,	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  investors	  provide	  an	  increase	  in	  flexibility	  from	  the	  smaller	  investor	  is	  not	  without	  its	  risks.	  Investment	  works	  on	  two	  sides.	  Firstly,	  they	  would	  look	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  investment	  itself	  and	  then	  secondly,	  the	  credit	  of	  the	  investor.	  If	  the	  investment	  is	  seen	  possibly	  as	  risky,	  but	  the	  investor	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  having	  a	  high	  credit	  rating,	  then	  the	  investment	  may	  still	  be	  approved.	  
“a	  lot	  of	  the	  centralised	  or	  large	  scale	  low	  carbon	  generation	  
are	  being	  delivered	  by	  large	  scale	  utilities	  and	  investors	  who	  
have	  good	  credit	  rating	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  raise	  capital	  at	  
reasonable	  cost[…]The	  ability	  of	  individuals,	  small	  business	  
and	  communities	  to	  raise	  finance	  at	  a	  competitive	  rate	  with	  
what	  could	  be	  raised	  by	  a	  major	  international	  utility	  is	  
questionable	  because	  the	  risk	  profile	  is	  very	  different”	  
Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  
	  “I	  guess	  a	  lot	  of	  this	  comes	  down	  to	  perceived	  risk.	  So	  if	  I’m	  a	  
bank	  am	  I	  more	  worried	  about	  lending	  to	  E.ON	  or	  a	  collection	  
of	  smaller	  companies	  [...]	  E.ON	  for	  example	  has	  got	  a	  triple	  A	  
rated	  credit	  rating	  to	  borrow	  money.	  Are	  you	  likely	  to	  get	  that	  
down	  at	  the	  company	  that’s	  a	  tenth	  of	  the	  size	  of	  E.ON?”	  
Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  However,	  if	  the	  investment	  is	  seen	  as	  high	  risk	  and	  the	  investor	  has	  a	  low	  credit	  rating	  then	  the	  project	  could	  come	  to	  a	  halt.	  This	  is	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  31	  (civil	  society)	  and	  3	  (market	  stakeholder).	  The	  two	  interviewees	  identified	  above	  are	  from	  different	  stakeholder	  groups,	  however,	  they	  both	  either	  represent	  or	  have	  links	  with	  large	  scale	  centralised	  electricity	  generators.	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  understood	  that	  they	  would	  perceive	  investment	  into	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  as	  a	  high	  risk	  to	  their	  companies.	  An	  alternative	  point	  of	  view	  is	  identified	  in	  the	  quote	  below	  from	  the	  same	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  as	  above	  identifies	  the	  positives	  found	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  smaller	  investors	  being	  able	  to	  borrow	  money.	  These	  include	  the	  ability	  to	  find	  additional	  capital	  which	  in	  a	  centralised	  system	  could	  be	  deemed	  as	  inaccessible,	  bringing	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new	  types	  of	  investors	  into	  the	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  new,	  smaller	  scale	  generating	  plant.	  
	  “the	  communities	  own	  capital	  reserves,	  which	  they	  are	  willing	  
to	  lend	  to	  the	  project	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  return	  because	  they’ve	  
got	  a	  stake	  in	  it,	  and	  an	  interest	  in	  it.	  You	  do	  sometimes	  see	  
that,	  where	  people	  will	  invest	  in	  things	  as	  a	  local	  community	  
rather	  than	  looking	  for	  a	  commercial	  rate	  of	  return.	  So	  you	  
can	  see	  an	  advantage	  of	  that	  model	  if	  it	  allows	  you	  to	  access	  
capital.”	  Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  Interviewee	  3	  here	  still	  identifies	  the	  investment	  as	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  reduced	  rate	  of	  return	  and	  therefore	  higher	  risk,	  they	  also	  identify	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation,	  that	  it	  has	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐quantifiable	  aspects	  which	  will	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  or	  at	  least	  taken	  into	  account.	  They	  identify	  that	  an	  investor	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  higher	  risk	  if	  they	  have	  a	  direct	  stake	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  investment.	  An	  additional	  point	  to	  make	  surrounds	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  banks	  in	  the	  UK	  can	  deliver	  to	  the	  small	  investor.	  
The	  banking	  system	  in	  Germany	  grew	  up	  with	  the	  smaller	  
system	  and	  has	  found	  ways	  of	  meeting	  that	  demand.	  In	  the	  UK	  
the	  banks	  have	  not	  embedded	  the	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  
into	  the	  small	  scale	  Interviewee	  28	  CSBS	  This	  identifies	  how	  changes	  will	  be	  required	  not	  only	  to	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  but	  also	  the	  other	  interlinked	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  banks	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  and	  promote	  a	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  the	  nuclear	  power	  industry	  the	  financing	  of	  a	  project	  can	  often	  be	  made	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  investors.	  For	  example	  the	  proposed	  Hinkley	  Point	  C	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  is	  part	  owned	  between	  EDF	  Group	  (45-­‐50%)	  and	  letters	  of	  intent	  from	  China	  National	  Nuclear	  Corporation	  (CNNC)	  and	  China	  General	  Nuclear	  Corporation	  (CGN)	  to	  take	  30-­‐40%	  between	  them,	  while	  reactor	  designer	  Areva	  will	  take	  10%	  (Chazan	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  With	  a	  centralised	  investment	  strategy	  you	  are	  trying	  to	  find	  large	  amounts	  of	  capital,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  Hinkley	  C	  example	  they	  can	  often	  be	  from	  overseas	  (Sambeek,	  2000).	  Where	  this	  investment	  comes	  from	  is	  important	  because	  the	  level	  and	  continuation	  of	  this	  investment	  needs	  to	  be	  secure.	  
“What	  you	  have	  got	  to	  do	  to	  get	  that	  investment	  is	  convince	  
somebody	  to	  put	  it	  into	  UK	  generation,	  […]	  but	  you	  are	  also	  
competing	  at	  the	  big	  level,	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  invested	  in	  a	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shopping	  mall	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  or	  Manila	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  
invested	  in	  mining	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Whereas	  if	  you	  go	  for	  
decentralisation	  you	  move	  away	  from	  these	  people,	  the	  big	  
banks,	  the	  Morgan	  Chase.	  And	  you	  move	  to	  smaller	  community	  
groups	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  
“Most	  of	  the	  people	  who	  are	  investing	  in	  assets	  and	  energy	  
infrastructure	  are	  not	  indigenous	  UK	  businesses	  .The	  UK	  at	  the	  
moment,	  whilst	  an	  open	  liberal	  market	  with	  plenty	  of	  
investment,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  stack	  up	  strongly	  when	  
compared	  to	  other	  options	  for	  investors	  to	  invest.”	  Interviewee	  
31	  CSBS	  This	  type	  of	  investment	  means	  competition	  at	  an	  international	  level	  as	  identified	  in	  the	  quotes	  from	  market	  and	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholders.	  This	  could	  mean	  a	  higher	  risk	  to	  large	  scale	  generation	  for	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Interestingly,	  risk	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  policies,	  rules	  and	  regulations	  being	  set	  out	  to	  reduce	  risk	  for	  the	  investor.	  However,	  with	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  main	  players	  (such	  as	  a	  centralised	  system)	  and	  the	  risk	  involved	  can	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  requirement	  on	  the	  players	  in	  investing	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  centralised	  generating	  stations	  such	  as	  nuclear	  means	  they	  are	  too	  large	  to	  fail,	  as	  discussed	  by	  interviewee	  8	  (GBS).Thereby	  creating	  more	  risk	  of	  additional	  costs	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  features	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  that	  it	  includes	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  actors	  and	  stakeholders.	  By	  utilising	  a	  larger	  level	  of	  decentralised	  generation	  an	  additional	  investment	  portfolio	  is	  introduced.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  quote	  below	  from	  a	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder,	  the	  idea	  of	  finding	  the	  investment	  is	  beyond	  the	  ‘capacity	  of	  current	  utility	  structures’.	  
“you	  start	  getting	  different	  non	  energy	  actors	  entering	  the	  
energy	  field,	  this	  is	  where	  we	  talked	  about	  the	  need	  to	  have	  
massive	  financial	  injections	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  
current	  utility	  structures.?”	  Interviewee	  4	  CSBS	  This	  point	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  features	  decentralisation	  can	  bring	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  It	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  discussion	  that	  economic	  modelling	  which	  currently	  dominates	  many	  of	  the	  future	  energy	  scenarios	  from	  Government,	  may	  not	  feature	  this	  benefit	  in	  finding	  investment	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	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9.4 Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  looked	  at	  the	  investment	  issues	  and	  proposals	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  networks	  and	  generation.	  It	  has	  identified	  the	  research	  participants’	  perceptions	  for	  the	  future	  of	  investment	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  It	  has	  also	  discussed	  how	  decentralised	  electricity	  would	  likely	  bring	  a	  different	  avenue	  for	  investment	  through	  its	  scale	  and	  ability	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  short	  timescale	  when	  compared	  to	  centralised	  generation.	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  also	  likely	  develop	  the	  way	  the	  network	  operates.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  impacts	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  on	  the	  distribution	  network.	  This	  will	  include	  adjusting	  the	  DNO’s	  link	  to	  the	  transmission	  network	  and	  alter	  the	  demand	  profile.	  As	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  grows	  the	  distribution	  networks	  will	  have	  to	  change	  alongside.	  The	  research	  participants	  did	  not	  show	  concern	  that	  the	  networks	  could	  not	  cope	  technologically	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  generation	  as	  long	  this	  happened	  over	  a	  long	  enough	  time	  scale.	  They	  saw	  no	  problem	  in	  the	  networks	  and	  network	  operators	  developing	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  However,	  the	  changes	  brought	  by	  a	  decentralised	  system	  for	  distribution	  network	  would	  require	  an	  increased	  level	  activity	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  DNO’s.	  The	  question	  here	  was	  whether	  the	  DNOs	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  that	  risk	  and	  put	  the	  investment	  in	  place.	  Once	  again	  the	  answer	  came	  down	  to	  one	  of	  cost,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  operators	  were	  sufficiently	  compensated	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  risk	  then	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  invest.	  Therefore,	  the	  electricity	  networks	  may	  require	  substantial	  upgrade	  and	  investment	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  fulfil	  their	  future	  role.	  How	  this	  investment	  is	  to	  be	  attained,	  was	  discussed	  by	  the	  research	  participants	  in	  this	  study.	  It	  was	  identified	  that	  because	  of	  their	  monopolistic	  nature,	  investment	  in	  the	  networks	  are	  regulated	  and	  therefore	  with	  the	  right	  regulatory	  framework	  the	  investment	  should	  be	  achievable.	  However,	  this	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  hindrance	  by	  some	  of	  the	  participants.	  The	  promotion	  of	  greater	  investment	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  characterised	  in	  two	  ways:	  by	  an	  incentive	  or	  a	  penalty.	  Incentives	  are	  made	  by	  making	  the	  generation	  technology	  cheaper	  to	  produce	  or	  more	  profitable	  during	  its	  lifespan.	  Penalties	  can	  be	  formed	  by	  the	  act	  of	  not	  moving	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  system,	  such	  as	  
	   241	  
over	  running	  the	  EU	  ETS	  allowances	  (Carbon	  Trust,	  2008).	  This	  was	  discussed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees	  (interviewee	  31,	  an	  energy	  consultant).	  The	  discussion	  involved	  how	  and	  who	  determines	  the	  penalty	  for	  not	  meeting	  the	  UK	  Government	  targets.	  	  If	  the	  penalty	  is	  too	  low	  then	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  cheaper	  not	  to	  meet	  the	  target.	  For	  instance,	  if	  it	  costs	  £70.5bn	  to	  meet	  the	  Government’s	  low	  carbon	  goals	  for	  investment	  into	  generation	  (as	  identified	  in	  Ofgem’s	  Project	  Discovery)	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  not	  meeting	  its	  low	  carbon	  goal	  is	  much	  less	  than	  this,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  incentive	  to	  invest.	  However,	  in	  general,	  the	  cost	  of	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions	  will	  get	  higher	  the	  longer	  it	  is	  left	  (Stern,	  2006).	  This	  falls	  back	  to	  Government	  direction	  and	  whether	  they	  send	  clear	  signals	  to	  the	  investors	  on	  the	  direction	  the	  energy	  system	  will	  take.	  The	  cost	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  system	  with	  an	  active	  operation	  for	  the	  DNO’s	  was	  another	  important	  point.	  The	  consumer	  is	  already	  paying	  additional	  charges	  for	  carbon	  reduction	  policies,	  on	  top	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  costs	  of	  developing	  an	  active	  system.	  The	  main	  discussion	  here	  is,	  would	  the	  cost	  of	  introducing	  an	  active	  and	  smart	  electricity	  system	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.	  These	  benefits	  include	  energy	  efficiency	  improvements	  which	  reduce	  costs	  for	  the	  consumer,	  the	  level	  of	  generation	  required	  and	  the	  positive	  impact	  on	  climate	  change	  targets.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  if	  the	  networks	  can	  be	  balanced	  in	  their	  local	  area	  then	  additional	  infrastructure	  further	  up	  the	  line	  might	  not	  be	  required.	  However,	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  require	  substantial	  back	  up	  from	  the	  transmission	  system.	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  investment	  to	  renew	  the	  transmission	  system	  you	  would	  still	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  paying	  for	  its	  use	  as	  back	  up.	  Further	  to	  this	  the	  transmission	  network	  owner	  will	  likely	  need	  compensating	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  ‘traffic’	  on	  its	  network	  by	  developing	  a	  suitable	  reward	  structure.	  Investment	  in	  generation	  is	  a	  far	  more	  complex	  issue,	  it	  includes	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  risk	  involved	  with	  a	  specific	  generation	  technology,	  the	  profits	  found	  through	  the	  wholesale	  markets	  and	  market	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  type	  of	  investors	  who	  are	  involved.	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  concerns	  with	  the	  future	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  European	  directives	  (LCPD	  and	  IED)	  which	  will	  result	  in	  a	  substantial	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level	  of	  UK	  capacity	  being	  be	  lost.	  There	  was	  a	  discussion	  over	  whether	  the	  UK	  Government	  would	  find	  a	  derogation	  on	  these	  directives.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  this	  would	  not	  happen	  is	  strong.	  This	  may	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  market	  players	  either	  have	  very	  little	  trust	  in	  Government,	  or	  the	  security	  concern	  for	  future	  capacity	  is	  so	  high	  that	  the	  power	  plants	  will	  have	  to	  continue.	  	  Therefore,	  replacement	  generation	  would	  need	  to	  be	  built.	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  closures	  are	  due	  in	  2016	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  which	  has	  already	  been	  felt	  (see	  section	  2.5.1).	  The	  options	  for	  replacing	  this	  generation	  are	  limited	  as	  the	  time	  scales	  are	  so	  short.	  If	  this	  capacity	  is	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  low	  carbon	  generation,	  then	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  at	  least,	  nuclear	  power	  is	  not	  an	  option,	  leaving	  renewables	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  opportunity.	  An	  alternative	  option	  is	  to	  use	  gas-­‐fired	  generation	  as	  a	  transition	  technology	  and	  hope	  that	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  technologies	  will	  be	  operational	  in	  a	  short	  time	  period.	  The	  advantages	  of	  gas	  generation	  are	  its	  quick	  build	  times	  and	  flexibility,	  making	  it	  suitable	  as	  a	  source	  of	  backup	  capacity.	  Combined	  cycle	  gas	  fired	  turbines	  would	  provide	  a	  good	  back	  up	  to	  low	  carbon	  technology	  especially	  during	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system.	  However,	  the	  capital	  needed	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  gas	  fired	  generation	  plant	  would	  mean	  that	  this	  technology	  needs	  a	  solid	  foot	  hold	  in	  the	  future	  electricity	  system.	  As	  back	  up	  this	  technology	  has	  an	  unsure	  future.	  A	  policy	  discussion,	  which	  assures	  its	  future	  in	  the	  market	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  investment	  worthwhile.	  The	  wholesale	  market	  has	  been	  designed	  as	  a	  competitive	  system	  and	  is	  often	  looked	  at	  as	  the	  main	  mechanism	  for	  delivering	  electricity	  security	  of	  supply.	  This	  competitive	  feature	  of	  the	  market	  was	  seen	  by	  some	  as	  an	  issue	  when	  six	  energy	  companies	  dominated	  the	  market.	  The	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  introduce	  a	  much	  larger	  number	  of	  companies	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  would	  introduce	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  to	  the	  electricity	  system,	  increase	  the	  diversity	  of	  investors	  and	  opens	  up	  competition	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  technology	  and,	  with	  the	  right	  mechanisms	  and	  structure,	  the	  market.	  However,	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  the	  type	  of	  investors	  would	  also	  need	  the	  knowledge	  and	  understand	  of	  these	  market	  operations	  and	  supply	  chains,	  which	  might	  be	  extremely	  complex	  if	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  currently	  used	  models.	  This	  section	  has	  discussed	  the	  difficulties	  in	  finding	  the	  right	  investment	  to	  ensure	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  and	  the	  changes	  which	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	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electricity	  system	  may	  bring	  to	  investment.	  However,	  energy	  security	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  simply	  supplying	  electricity.	  An	  on-­‐going	  theme	  within	  this	  chapter	  was	  the	  level	  of	  clarity	  and	  trust	  the	  stakeholders	  have	  with	  Government.	  The	  lack	  of	  understanding	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  may	  undermine	  the	  investments	  to	  be	  made.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  level	  of	  responsibility	  UK	  Government	  has	  over	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  look	  at	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  these	  additional	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  looking	  at	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	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10 Responsibility	  for	  Ensuring	  Security	  of	  The	  UK	  Electricity	  
System	  The	  previous	  section	  looked	  at	  the	  stakeholder’s	  perception	  of	  investment	  in	  the	  networks	  and	  generation	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  It	  discussed	  the	  impacts	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  have	  on	  investment.	  Specifically	  the	  ability	  for	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  to	  open	  up	  new	  avenues	  for	  future	  investment.	  The	  small-­‐scale	  investment	  associated	  with	  decentralisation	  allows	  the	  introduction	  of	  investors	  who	  would	  not	  have	  existed	  in	  a	  centralised	  system.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  the	  primary	  research	  for	  this	  thesis,	  two	  significant	  questions	  arose.	  Firstly,	  who	  is	  currently	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security?	  Is	  it	  a	  single	  organisation	  or	  the	  combined	  actions	  of	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders?	  Secondly,	  what	  are	  the	  possible	  challenges	  or	  changes	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  bring	  to	  this	  situation?	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  questions	  directly	  links	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Through,	  the	  relationships	  of	  the	  actors	  which	  form	  the	  governance	  and	  therefore	  the	  perception	  of	  responsibility	  will	  help	  describe	  the	  actor	  relationships.	  Thereby,	  directly	  adding	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  governance	  for	  energy	  security.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  this	  section	  will	  use	  the	  statements	  given	  by	  the	  research	  participants	  regarding	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  energy	  security	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  changes	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  may	  bring.	  This	  includes	  a	  change	  in	  the	  number	  of	  power	  plants,	  their	  owners	  and	  the	  investors	  (see	  section	  5.1).	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  a	  definition	  of	  responsibility	  is	  first	  required.	  Responsibility	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.3.2	  can	  be	  defined	  from	  an	  ex-­‐ante	  or	  an	  ex-­‐post	  viewpoint.	  An	  individual	  or	  organisation	  can	  be	  deemed	  liable	  for	  an	  event	  through	  the	  choices	  they	  have	  made,	  making	  them	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions.	  Or	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  individuals	  or	  organisations	  conducting	  themselves	  in	  a	  manner,	  which	  either	  promotes	  or	  supports	  an	  issue,	  whether	  through	  a	  moral	  sense	  of	  duty	  or	  obligation	  (Umbach,	  2010).	  	  This	  thesis	  discusses	  the	  changes	  in	  governance	  that	  a	  move	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  entail,	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  involved	  will	  change	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  system.	  Exactly	  what	  this	  means	  in	  terms	  of	  responsibility	  is	  not,	  at	  present,	  clear,	  because	  the	  term	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‘responsibility’	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  concept	  (Giddens,	  1999;	  Gunder	  and	  Hillier,	  2007).	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  concept	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  plausible	  definitions,	  which	  can	  be	  specific	  to	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  used	  (Bovens,	  1998).	  The	  definition	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  obviously	  be	  based	  in	  the	  policy	  context.	  However,	  in	  the	  policy	  context,	  the	  idea	  of	  responsibility	  is	  often	  discussed	  but	  rarely	  defined	  (Pellizzoni,	  2004).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  liability,	  responsibility	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  your	  actions	  are	  voluntary	  and	  performed	  within	  the	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  situation	  (Wallington	  and	  Lawrence,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  particular	  organisation	  responsible	  for	  its	  actions,	  the	  State	  is	  required	  to	  clearly	  define	  its	  aims	  and	  apply	  rules	  and	  incentives	  to	  achieve	  this	  (Pellizzoni,	  2005).	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  responsibility	  will	  be	  considered	  to	  apply	  to	  an	  actor,	  or	  group	  of	  actors,	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  and	  obligation	  to	  act.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  level	  of	  power	  an	  actor	  holds	  can	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  responsibility	  (i.e.	  low	  power,	  low	  responsibility	  and	  vice	  versa)	  (see	  section	  6.3.2).	  This	  chapter	  will	  identify	  how	  the	  research	  participants	  view	  the	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security.	  It	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  is	  Government’s	  responsibility	  for	  the	  system	  security.	  Energy	  security	  is	  secured	  in	  different	  ways	  by	  different	  countries	  (Soutar	  and	  Whiting,	  2013).	  Some	  countries	  (i.e.	  Denmark)	  hold	  a	  single	  organisation	  accountable	  for	  overseeing	  the	  security	  of	  the	  entire	  energy	  system.	  Other	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  do	  not.	  However,	  the	  UK	  Government	  does	  have	  a	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  (1989).	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  Government	  is	  responsible	  for	  supply	  security,	  not	  the	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security.	  This	  chapter	  will	  pursue	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  energy	  security	  as	  identified	  in	  this	  thesis	  is,	  and	  needs	  to	  be,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  long-­‐term	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  future.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  perception	  that	  energy	  security	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Government	  means	  that	  the	  stakeholders	  have	  given	  the	  power	  to	  Government	  in	  deciding	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  Government	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  focussed	  on	  delivering	  security	  through	  centralised	  electricity	  technologies	  thereby	  obstructing	  decentralised	  electricity’s	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	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The	  UK	  energy	  system	  security	  is	  maintained	  through	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  energy	  system	  actors.	  The	  central	  actors	  include,	  Government,	  the	  Regulator,	  the	  Network	  Operators	  and	  the	  Energy	  Companies.	  Error!	  Reference	  source	  not	  
found.	  below	  identifies	  the	  roles	  of	  each	  of	  these	  actor	  groups.	  
	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  will	  change	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  has	  been	  recognised	  by	  DECC	  in	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  Vision	  and	  Routemap:	  
we	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  all	  the	  
players	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014:	  pg.	  
6)	  In	  the	  UK	  there	  is	  an	  interrelated	  set	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  are	  controlled.	  Responsibility	  of	  each	  of	  
• Government	  
o Set	  policy	  framework	  for	  decarbonisation	  
§ Investment	  in	  low	  carbon	  technology	  via	  the	  EMR	  
§ Capacity	  via	  the	  EMR	  
o Set	  the	  Duties	  and	  give	  guidance	  to	  the	  Regulator	  
§ Networks	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  
§ Market	  
§ System	  Operator	  
§ Retail	  Competition,	  i.e.	  liquidity	  
• Regulator	  
o Ensuring	  appropriate	  regulation	  for	  
§ Transmission	  operator	  
§ Distribution	  operator	  
§ System	  operator	  
§ All	  Costs	  and	  Licences	  
• Network	  Operators	  
o Ensuring	  the	  Network	  is	  operational	  
• System	  Operator	  
o Balancing	  of	  the	  Network	  
• Big	  Six	  Energy	  Companies	  
o The	  changing	  technical	  issues	  	  
Figure	  10-­‐1	  Roles	  of	  each	  actor	  group	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these	  dimensions	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  stakeholder	  or	  group	  of	  stakeholders	  operating	  within	  the	  electricity	  system.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  electricity	  network	  operators	  who	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  the	  networks	  are	  operational	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  generation.	  
10.1 Government	  responsibility	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  can	  be	  analysed	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  When	  viewed	  as	  a	  hierarchal	  structure	  the	  Government	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  being	  at	  the	  pinnacle	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  (Rhodes,	  2007;	  Rotmans	  &	  Loorbach,	  2008;	  Pahl-­‐Wostl,	  2009).	  However,	  modern	  governance	  theories	  have	  identified	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  approach	  to	  governance	  illuminating	  how	  a	  single	  group,	  in	  practice,	  does	  not	  hold	  all	  the	  power.	  Whether	  the	  theory	  coincides	  with	  the	  reality	  is	  another	  question.	  	  DECC	  have	  developed	  four	  priorities	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years:	  the	  support	  of	  vulnerable	  consumers;	  the	  delivery	  of	  secure	  energy	  on	  the	  way	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future,	  driving	  action	  on	  climate	  change,	  and	  managing	  the	  energy	  legacy	  delivering	  value	  for	  money	  (DECC,	  2012d).	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals,	  different	  mechanisms	  and	  operational	  structures	  are	  being	  established,	  such	  as	  the	  reformation	  of	  the	  electricity	  market,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  future	  (DECC,	  2011a).	  	  Equally	  the	  New	  Green	  Deal	  is	  intended	  to	  help	  reduce	  energy	  consumption	  for	  the	  householder,	  business	  and	  public	  sector.	  These	  mechanisms	  and	  policies	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  define	  the	  future	  of	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  regime	  and	  in	  turn	  dictate	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  actors	  (Verbong	  and	  Geels,	  2012).	  Therefore	  the	  significance	  the	  Government	  gives	  to	  each	  of	  these	  challenges	  can	  define	  how	  the	  energy	  system	  develops	  and	  in	  turn	  whether	  they	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  energy	  security	  or	  not.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  stakeholder	  perceptions	  of	  Government.	  It	  will	  identify	  what	  the	  stakeholders	  believe	  the	  current	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  Government	  are	  and	  then	  establish	  how	  this	  could	  change	  in	  a	  system	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation.	  It	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  historical	  and	  current	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  level	  of	  control	  Government	  has.	  It	  will	  then	  look	  at	  the	  perception	  of	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Government	  towards	  a	  decentralised	  system	  and	  finally	  the	  Governmental	  priorities	  and	  motivations.	  	  
10.1.1 Government	  Control	  The	  Government,	  from	  the	  1980s	  to	  2010,	  can	  be	  considered	  increasingly	  disengaged	  from	  the	  energy	  system	  (Helm,	  2002;	  Umbach,	  2010,	  Chester,	  2010).	  The	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  removed	  Government	  from	  directly	  owning	  any	  assets	  associated	  with	  the	  electricity	  industry	  (Stern,	  2010).	  Therefore	  their	  ability	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  altered	  from	  State	  owned	  monopoly	  days.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  they	  implement	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  orientate	  the	  energy	  system	  through	  markets	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  certain	  investment	  avenues.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  EMR	  has	  identified	  a	  shift	  in	  Government	  to	  become	  more	  engaged	  in	  playing	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  system.	  The	  EMR,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.2,	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  positive	  promotion	  by	  Government	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  promoting	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  clear	  through	  the	  capacity	  mechanism	  where	  the	  Government’s	  aim	  is	  to	  stimulate	  sufficient	  investment	  into	  electricity	  generation	  capacity	  to	  meet	  electricity	  demand	  at	  all	  times.	  Government	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  setting	  the	  duties	  of	  Ofgem,	  the	  regulator.	  Ofgem	  can	  then	  cascade	  the	  technical	  and	  regulatory	  requirements	  to	  system	  actors	  through	  the	  codes	  and	  licences	  and	  incentives.	  Government	  is	  therefore	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  with	  the	  electricity	  do	  promote	  energy	  security.	  Given	  that	  Government	  directs	  the	  electricity	  system	  including	  investment	  and	  operation	  through	  its	  policies	  or	  via	  duties	  on	  Ofgem	  for	  regulation.	  Is	  Government	  in	  reality	  the	  main	  stakeholder	  involved	  with	  delivering	  energy	  security?	  As	  identified	  in	  the	  section	  4.1,	  Government	  prioritises	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  it	  would	  be	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  system	  actors	  to	  ensure	  long-­‐term	  security.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  over	  whether	  stakeholders,	  such	  as	  the	  energy	  suppliers	  are	  best	  placed	  to	  deliver	  Government	  policies.	  
“Government,	  I	  don’t	  think,	  feels	  confident	  at	  going	  out	  to	  the	  
consumers	  and	  telling	  them	  the	  story	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
additional	  cost.	  We	  get	  a	  very	  obscured	  way	  of	  expressing	  it	  
from	  Government.	  The	  utilities,	  when	  I	  talk	  to	  them,	  feel	  that	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anything	  that	  they	  try	  to	  say	  to	  explain	  to	  the	  consumer	  that	  
bills	  need	  to	  rise	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  self	  serving	  justification	  
for	  driving	  profits	  up.”	  Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  
“In	  the	  old	  days,	  CEGB,	  national	  grid,	  everything	  was	  decided	  
in	  Whitehall	  and	  they	  were	  just	  told	  to	  get	  on	  with	  it.	  So	  price	  
changes	  were	  politically	  decided.	  Then	  they	  nationalised	  it	  all	  
and	  you’ve	  then	  got	  the	  Big	  Six.	  The	  Government	  don’t	  treat	  it	  
as	  an	  arm	  of	  state,	  through	  all	  the	  initiatives,	  warm	  homes,	  
and	  FIT	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  We	  need	  a	  policy	  on	  energy	  
security,	  let’s	  get	  the	  energy	  companies	  to	  deliver	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  they	  wouldn’t	  tackle	  food	  security	  via	  control	  of	  the	  
supermarkets.”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  As	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  (section	  9.3.1)	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  Government	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  its	  future	  vision	  for	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Any	  uncertainty	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  energy	  security	  by	  making	  investment	  more	  risky.	  This	  is	  also	  shown	  in	  the	  quotes	  above	  from	  interviewee	  31	  and	  6,	  where	  the	  research	  participants	  identify	  that	  they	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  Government	  policies.	  	  The	  energy	  companies	  have	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  the	  consumers,	  making	  them	  the	  main	  link	  between	  the	  consumer	  and	  the	  energy	  industry.	  However,	  from	  a	  business	  point	  of	  view	  the	  suppliers	  are	  trying	  to	  maximise	  their	  sales	  and	  therefore	  providing	  energy	  efficiency	  technologies	  would	  seem	  counterintuitive	  unless	  they	  can	  make	  more	  money	  selling	  services	  that	  they	  can	  supply.	  This	  is	  explained	  in	  the	  quotes	  from	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  and	  a	  civil	  society	  based	  stakeholder.	  The	  point	  to	  make	  here	  is	  that	  because	  Government	  does	  not	  own	  any	  assets	  in	  the	  electricity	  industry,	  they	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  other	  stakeholders	  to	  deliver	  their	  policies.	  They	  rely	  on	  the	  network	  operators	  to	  maintain	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  network,	  on	  the	  System	  Operator	  to	  ensure	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  network,	  and	  on	  the	  energy	  generator	  to	  deliver	  investment	  into	  new	  capacity.	  Therefore,	  Government	  does	  not	  have	  complete	  control	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  It	  does	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  develop	  the	  framework	  which	  can	  influence	  a	  future	  of	  energy	  security.	  The	  concern	  from	  the	  research	  participants	  above	  is	  that	  these	  policies	  should	  not	  be	  operated	  through	  the	  energy	  companies.	  Government	  should	  shoulder	  the	  responsibility	  and	  ensure	  security	  themselves.	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Having	  said	  this,	  the	  British	  market	  approach	  to	  energy	  security	  has,	  so	  far,	  provided	  sufficient	  generation	  capacity.	  One	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  noted	  the	  future	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  “unclear”	  (interviewee	  19).	  Whilst	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  LCPD	  and	  IED	  are	  largely	  understood	  –	  reducing	  amounts	  of	  high	  polluting	  coal	  plants-­‐	  it	  is	  unclear	  which	  technological	  replacements	  will	  be	  favoured.	  Whether	  nuclear,	  renewable,	  or	  fossil	  fuels	  with	  carbon	  capture	  technologies	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  these.	  Additional	  uncertainty	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  need	  for	  investment	  in	  peaking	  capacity	  in	  a	  system	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  variable	  power.	  Therefore,	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  requires	  strong	  Governmental	  direction	  (Parag	  &	  Darby,	  2009).	  
“The	  risks	  and	  the	  dangers	  are	  actually	  down	  the	  booms	  and	  
bust	  cycle	  the	  Government	  put	  us	  in.	  They	  ramped	  everything	  
up	  for	  FIT	  and	  then	  they	  are	  doing	  to	  ramp	  it	  down	  again	  
because	  there	  is	  a	  shortage	  of	  Government	  money.	  They	  have	  
done	  that	  before	  with	  the	  grants.”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  
“There	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  mix	  of	  decentralised	  
energy	  in	  our	  system	  which	  I	  am	  pretty	  sure	  is	  the	  industry	  
consensus.	  And	  the	  trend	  is	  going	  in	  that	  direction.	  But	  despite	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  coherent	  Government	  strategy	  to	  work	  out	  
and	  define	  what	  that	  role	  is	  and	  say	  ‘this	  is	  how	  we	  are	  going	  
to	  do	  it’.	  I	  would	  say	  from	  a	  control	  point	  of	  view	  you	  are	  
loosening	  administrative	  control.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  you	  
are	  providing	  a	  lower	  risk	  incentive	  through	  the	  feed	  in	  tariff	  
to	  encourage	  generation	  …	  ”	  Interviewee	  15	  MBS	  Without	  strong	  Governmental	  direction,	  investors	  looking	  at	  a	  specific	  technology	  may	  not	  feel	  confident	  about	  the	  future	  and	  therefore	  not	  provide	  the	  investment	  required	  (Laing	  &	  Grubb,	  2010;	  Gross	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  The	  discussion	  here	  regarding	  industry	  consensus	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  which	  actor	  is	  making	  the	  argument.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  main	  mechanism	  Government	  uses	  to	  ensure	  a	  secure	  system	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  markets	  and	  the	  market	  mechanisms	  with	  Government	  intervention	  when	  required.	  This	  addition	  of	  Government	  intervention	  in	  the	  ESS	  (DECC,	  2012o)	  is	  interesting	  as	  it	  does	  not	  suggest	  how	  much	  intervention	  and	  it	  does	  not	  set	  out	  when	  it	  may	  be	  required.	  However,	  the	  move	  to	  greater	  decentralised	  electricity	  would	  change	  this.	  
“So	  if	  you	  work	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  financial	  instruments	  for	  
smaller	  companies	  are	  being	  used,	  this	  transfers	  the	  risk	  from	  
the	  generator	  towards	  Government.”	  Interviewee	  15	  MBS	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As	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  15	  the	  general	  consensus	  between	  the	  research	  participants	  was	  that	  the	  role	  of	  Government	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  change.	  This	  level	  of	  change	  would	  depend	  on	  how	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  is	  incentivised	  (i.e.	  through	  a	  separate	  market	  or	  utilising	  a	  mechanism	  controlled	  by	  Government	  such	  as	  the	  FIT)	  then	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  Government’s	  level	  of	  responsibility	  will	  increase.	  	  Government	  would	  therefore	  be	  directly	  responsible	  for	  setting	  out	  the	  type	  of	  technology	  required	  for	  the	  future	  electricity	  system.	  This	  would	  indicate	  a	  very	  dictatorial	  role	  for	  Government,	  thereby	  increasing	  their	  obligation	  towards	  energy	  security.	  Another	  option,	  is,	  a	  separate	  market	  specifically	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  is	  established.	  This	  would	  then	  release	  Government	  from	  additional	  responsibility	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  once	  the	  market	  has	  been	  established.	  A	  further	  point	  to	  make	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  future	  is	  whether	  any	  obligations	  placed	  on	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  suppliers	  would	  reduce	  the	  individual	  companies’	  responsibility	  and	  lead	  to	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Government.	  However,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  change	  from	  a	  small	  number	  of	  larger	  energy	  companies	  to	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  energy	  companies	  would	  change	  the	  risk	  and	  perceived	  level	  responsibility	  of	  Government.	  If	  this	  were	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  Government	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  electricity	  system	  becomes	  increasingly	  important.	  Whether	  Government	  would	  prefer	  to	  decarbonise	  the	  current	  centralised	  energy	  system	  or	  whether	  a	  highly	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  better	  suit	  their	  requirements	  for	  governance.	  In	  2007	  the	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  Alistair	  Darling	  commented	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  Government	  influence	  over	  the	  energy	  system	  actors	  (New	  Statesman,	  2007).	  He	  stated	  that	  it	  would	  be	  far	  easier	  to	  make	  a	  change	  to	  six	  large	  energy	  companies	  rather	  than	  attempt	  to	  influence	  every	  individual	  householder.	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  the	  previous	  Government,	  the	  message	  may	  still	  ring	  true	  today,	  it	  is	  also	  echoed	  by	  Interviewee	  3,	  a	  market	  based	  stakeholder.	  
“…if	  I	  want	  to	  achieve	  change	  in	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
every	  household	  in	  this	  country,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  persuade	  a	  small	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number	  of	  providers	  to	  bring	  that	  process	  about	  than	  it	  is	  for	  
millions	  of	  individuals.”	  (New	  Statesman,	  2007)	  
“The	  Government	  would	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  negotiate	  with	  6	  large	  
utilities	  rather	  than	  a	  1000	  smaller	  ones.”	  Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  could	  be	  the	  links	  that	  Government	  has	  with	  industry.	  With	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  energy	  companies	  involved,	  Government-­‐Industry	  communication	  would	  be	  easier	  than	  with	  thousands	  of	  companies.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  it	  disregards	  many	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  involving	  the	  individual	  householder	  with	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  can	  include,	  the	  operational	  processes	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  demand	  response	  and	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  individual	  householder	  in	  providing	  an	  additional	  source	  of	  funding	  for	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  However,	  the	  research	  showed	  that	  Alistair	  Darling	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  supporting	  the	  idea	  of	  only	  having	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  small	  number	  of	  stakeholders,	  the	  quote	  below	  from	  one	  of	  the	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  shows	  how	  negotiation	  must	  be	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  Government’s	  role	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  
“If	  I	  was	  sat	  in	  Government	  I	  might	  be	  concerned	  that	  I	  was	  
losing	  my	  grip	  on	  the	  energy	  industry.	  The	  way	  everything	  is	  
going	  at	  the	  moment	  is	  that	  it’s	  being	  centrally	  controlled.	  And	  
when	  push	  comes	  to	  shove	  the	  energy	  minister	  can	  call	  the	  
heads	  of	  the	  big	  six	  into	  his	  office	  and	  say	  look	  there’s	  an	  issue	  
here,	  how	  are	  we	  going	  to	  sort	  it?	  I	  want	  you	  to	  do	  this	  
‘XY&Z.’”	  Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  The	  centralised	  control	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  discussed	  in	  the	  quote	  above	  is	  in	  the	  context	  of	  long-­‐term	  planning	  for	  a	  balanced	  grid	  over	  the	  whole	  network.	  What	  the	  participant	  identifies	  is,	  the	  Government	  wants	  to	  have	  close	  control	  over	  the	  operational	  aspects	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  The	  suggestion	  here	  is	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  dialogue	  between	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  energy	  companies	  would	  change,	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  currently	  held.	  However	  a	  counter	  argument	  was	  made	  by	  interviewee	  4.	  
“The	  way	  in	  which	  current	  large	  generators	  influence	  
regulation	  and	  energy	  legislation	  would	  be	  very	  different	  if	  
the	  ownership	  were	  with	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  
companies.”	  Interviewee	  4	  CSBS	  From	  a	  technical	  perspective	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  can	  be	  caused	  by	  using	  large	  scale	  generation	  plants	  would	  not	  have	  the	  same	  impact	  as	  a	  large	  number	  of	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small-­‐scaled	  installations.	  For	  example	  the	  timing	  of	  routine	  maintenance	  of	  a	  large	  scale	  plant	  would	  have	  a	  larger	  impact	  on	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  network	  compared	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  smaller	  scale	  generation.	  	  A	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  likely	  mean	  a	  reduced	  amount	  of	  power	  to	  any	  single	  energy	  company.	  Therefore,	  reducing	  the	  influence	  of	  industry	  in	  lobbying,	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  energy	  companies	  over	  energy	  goals.	  One	  strategy	  the	  Government	  has	  regained	  control	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  EMR.	  Although	  along	  with	  this	  control	  comes	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  responsibility	  and	  therefore	  political	  risk.	  	  In	  2011	  the	  Government	  published	  a	  White	  Paper	  (DECC,	  2011a),	  setting	  out	  the	  Government’s	  plans	  to	  reform	  the	  electricity	  market	  so	  that	  it	  is	  more	  able	  to	  deliver	  energy	  policy	  goals.	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  section	  2.2,	  where	  the	  key	  policy	  mechanisms	  (CfDs	  and	  the	  Capacity	  Market)	  were	  identified	  and	  discussed	  as	  drivers	  for	  investment	  in	  either	  low	  carbon	  or	  flexible	  generation	  plant.	  
“The	  EMR	  is	  very	  quiet	  on	  decentralised	  energy.	  It	  makes	  
limited	  reference	  to	  demand	  side	  measures.	  When	  it	  appears	  
to	  be	  a	  principally	  a	  mechanism	  to	  try	  to	  stimulate	  mass	  
investment	  in	  zero	  carbon	  assets	  and	  there’s	  quite	  a	  strong	  
perception	  it	  thinks	  that	  it’s	  trying	  to	  stimulate	  new	  nuclear,	  
which	  by	  its	  nature	  won’t	  be	  decentralised	  energy.”	  
Interviewee	  27	  CSBS	  
“The	  Government	  policy	  says	  we	  want	  low	  carbon,	  we	  want	  
efficient	  networks,	  and	  yet	  the	  rule	  book	  and	  the	  charges	  all	  
make	  it	  harder	  and	  harder	  for	  small-­‐scale	  developer	  to	  
actually	  deliver	  that.”	  Interviewee	  12	  CSBS	  The	  emphasis	  in	  the	  EMR	  documentation	  is	  largely	  focused	  on	  centralised	  generation,	  and	  there	  is	  little	  attention	  given	  to	  issues	  around	  decentralisation.	  However,	  it	  does	  acknowledge	  decentralisation’s	  ability	  to	  deliver	  solutions	  which	  meet	  the	  demand	  of	  local	  people	  and	  communities	  and	  also	  provide	  new	  opportunities	  for	  local	  business,	  although	  it	  lacks	  any	  real	  detail	  in	  how	  decentralised	  electricity	  will	  be	  promoted.	  The	  comment	  here	  from	  interviewee	  12	  identifies	  the	  importance	  of	  Governance	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  research	  participant	  is	  discussing	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives,	  which	  allow	  a	  small-­‐scale	  developer	  to	  sell	  its	  electricity	  on	  the	  wholesale	  markets.	  These	  are	  the	  licence	  conditions,	  which	  place	  rules	  on	  how	  the	  stakeholders	  can	  operate.	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Therefore,	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  necessary	  to	  form	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  need	  to	  be	  accessible	  to	  the	  small-­‐scale	  developer.	  If	  they	  are	  too	  complicated	  they	  will	  limit	  the	  type	  of	  investor	  able	  to	  promote	  this	  type	  of	  system.	  Interviewee	  3	  indicated	  that	  in	  order	  for	  this	  to	  work	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  of	  the	  operational	  processes	  would	  need	  to	  be	  adapted.	  
“You’d	  have	  to	  legislate	  and	  say	  that	  decentralisation	  has	  got	  
to	  provide	  the	  services	  that	  are	  currently	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  
large	  generators	  through	  their	  licence	  conditions,	  because	  you	  
are	  no	  longer	  getting	  that	  balancing	  done	  at	  the	  grid	  level.”	  
Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  Interviewee	  3,	  from	  one	  of	  the	  larger	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  is	  correct	  in	  the	  current	  market	  approach.	  However,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  need	  a	  market	  that	  supports	  small-­‐scale	  energy	  
10.1.2 Government	  Priorities	  and	  motivations	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  established	  a	  set	  of	  factors,	  which	  energy	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  need	  to	  address.	  These	  include	  energy	  security,	  fuel	  poverty	  and	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions.	  Understanding	  which	  of	  these	  factors	  is	  most	  important	  to	  the	  UK	  Government	  could	  be	  considered	  unanswerable	  as	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  fluid,	  changing	  	  result	  which	  would	  be	  dependant	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors(Bang,	  2010).	  The	  concern	  over	  each	  factor	  individually	  is	  related	  to	  many	  different	  aspects,	  such	  as	  pressure	  from	  the	  general	  public,	  industry,	  or	  international	  agencies.	  It	  is	  the	  Government’s	  role	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  UK	  citizens.	  However,	  as	  each	  Government	  is	  put	  into	  power	  through	  the	  voting	  of	  the	  general	  public	  how	  this	  protection	  is	  be	  achieved	  can	  be	  swayed.	  If	  the	  general	  public	  showed	  a	  strong	  need	  for	  action	  in	  a	  particular	  area	  then	  Government	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  follow	  this	  lead	  (Hughes,	  2009;	  Bang,	  2010).	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  9.3,	  there	  was	  a	  question	  regarding	  the	  closure	  of	  many	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  plants	  because	  of	  the	  LCPD	  and	  the	  IED	  (see	  section	  2.5.1).	  The	  interviewees	  identified	  that	  the	  LCPD	  and	  IED	  may	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  energy	  security.	  This	  threat	  may	  mean	  that	  the	  directives	  would	  not	  be	  followed	  through	  as	  energy	  security	  is	  of	  a	  higher	  importance	  to	  consumers.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  9.3.1,	  ignoring	  the	  directive	  would	  be	  unlikely	  because	  they	  are	  set	  in	  law.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  many	  of	  the	  coal	  fired	  power	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stations	  have	  begun	  to	  close	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  they	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  run	  when	  the	  directive	  is	  in	  place.	  In	  2010	  the	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Chris	  Huhne	  referred	  to	  energy	  security	  as	  being	  considered	  up	  until	  recently	  a	  “second	  order	  issue”	  (DECC,	  2010c).	  This	  implied	  that	  energy	  security	  was	  moving	  closer	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  Government	  agenda.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  recent	  high	  levels	  of	  energy	  security	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2013),	  it	  would	  signify	  a	  possible	  concern	  for	  the	  future	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  Another	  motivation	  could	  be	  due	  to	  a	  change	  in	  Government’s	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.1,	  moving	  from	  a	  notion	  of	  primary	  supply	  security	  to	  a	  more	  complex	  idea	  involving	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  energy	  (DECC,	  2012o).	  However,	  with	  the	  recent	  economic	  crisis,	  affordability	  of	  electricity	  and	  heating	  has	  become	  a	  much	  more	  prominent	  political	  concern	  (Umbach,	  2010;	  Schauer,	  2009;	  IEA,	  2009).	  
“Affordability	  has	  come	  right	  back	  up	  and	  if	  anything	  is	  sitting	  
now	  on	  top	  of	  the	  agenda.	  Three	  years	  ago	  it	  was	  probably	  
environmental	  issues.	  Then	  sustainability,	  I	  think	  we	  are	  now	  
beginning	  to	  see	  security	  of	  supply	  rapidly	  moving	  back	  up	  the	  
agenda.”	  Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  
“I	  actually	  think	  that	  there	  isn’t	  a	  real	  risk	  of	  the	  lights	  going	  
out.	  It	  is,	  can	  we	  ensure	  that	  we	  can	  keep	  the	  lights	  on	  at	  a	  
reasonable	  cost?	  […]	  I	  can’t	  see	  in	  our	  economy	  with	  our	  
politicians	  and	  in	  our	  industry	  will	  let	  that	  happen,	  barring	  
some	  earth	  shattering	  event,	  some	  awful	  war	  or	  something	  
unforeseen.”	  Interviewee	  12	  CSBS	  
	  “What	  is	  the	  Government’s	  priority	  over	  the	  three	  main	  goals	  
of	  energy	  policy?	  Energy	  Security,	  Climate	  Change,	  Fuel	  
Poverty.	  In	  countries	  such	  as	  Finland	  fuel	  poverty	  is	  not	  seen	  
as	  an	  issue	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  not	  through	  cheap	  electricity	  or	  
better	  housing	  stock	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  good	  welfare	  
system”	  Interviewee	  10	  MBS	  The	  link	  between	  affordability	  and	  security	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4.	  Vulnerability	  to	  fluctuations	  in	  energy	  costs,	  whether	  caused	  by	  the	  level	  of	  available	  resources	  or	  the	  costs	  incurred	  in	  generation	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  insecurity.	  This	  notion	  is	  echoed	  in	  the	  quotes	  from	  civil	  society	  stakeholders.	  These	  shows	  an	  increase	  in	  concern	  for	  energy	  security	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  affordability	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  economy.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  is	  a	  short-­‐term	  indicator	  for	  energy	  security.	  There	  is	  a	  link	  between	  the	  short-­‐term	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availability	  of	  supply	  with	  the	  end	  cost	  to	  consumers.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  the	  civil	  society-­‐based	  stakeholders	  would	  want	  it	  as	  a	  priority	  of	  government	  policy.	  The	  third	  quote	  from	  interviewee	  10	  here	  identifies	  an	  interesting	  point.	  It	  shows	  the	  interrelated	  links	  between	  different	  Government	  goals.	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  state	  has	  a	  low	  level	  of	  national	  poverty,	  then	  overall	  affordability	  of	  electricity	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  dominant	  concern.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  perceived	  by	  the	  research	  participants	  to	  be	  a	  principal	  stakeholder	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  Government	  is	  focussed	  on	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  not	  on	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  energy	  security.	  Without	  a	  broader	  outlook	  for	  energy	  security,	  Government	  has	  centred	  many	  of	  their	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  for	  security	  on	  centralised	  electricity	  technologies.	  This	  is	  evident	  through	  the	  EMR	  (see	  section	  2.2)	  and	  in	  the	  ESS.	  	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  in	  order	  for	  energy	  security	  to	  be	  achieved	  it	  cannot	  be	  organised	  through	  a	  single	  stakeholder.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  working	  together.	  This	  chapter	  will	  now	  explore	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  these	  other	  key	  stakeholders.	  
10.2 Role	  of	  Ofgem	  	  The	  role	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  Ofgem	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  the	  legislative	  framework	  organised	  by	  DECC.	  The	  primary	  role	  of	  Ofgem	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  consumers	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  networks	  that	  monopolise	  the	  system	  (Utilities	  Act,	  2000).	  Additional	  priorities	  include	  “helping	  to	  secure	  Britain’s	  energy	  supplies	  by	  promoting	  competitive	  gas	  
and	  electricity	  markets	  -­‐	  and	  regulating	  them	  so	  that	  there	  is	  adequate	  investment	  in	  
the	  networks”	  (Ofgem,	  2012c).	  This	  identifies	  that	  Ofgem	  has	  a	  priority	  towards	  ensuring	  the	  markets	  deliver	  electricity	  to	  meet	  demand.	  Thereby	  signifying	  Ofgem’s	  role	  in	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  identifying	  them	  to	  have	  a	  role	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore,	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  suggest	  that	  Ofgem	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  responsibility	  towards	  energy	  security.	  However,	  when	  asked,	  the	  participants	  rarely	  identified	  Ofgem	  as	  having	  a	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	  
	   257	  
Their	  role	  is	  discussed	  as	  simply	  to	  ensure	  the	  Government’s	  framework	  is	  in	  place,	  as	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  14.	  
“I	  think	  Government	  would	  sometimes	  like	  to	  think	  that	  it	  is	  
not	  responsible,	  but	  I	  think	  Government	  is	  responsible	  for	  
setting	  the	  right	  framework	  and	  policy.	  The	  energy	  regulator	  
will	  have	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  policy	  is	  implemented	  and	  
complied	  with”	  Interviewee	  14	  This	  lack	  of	  discussion	  from	  the	  research	  participants	  of	  Ofgem’s	  role	  could	  be	  for	  a	  through	  the	  way	  in	  which	  energy	  security	  has	  been	  perceived;	  often	  the	  view	  is	  that	  security	  of	  supply,	  which	  means	  the	  responsibility	  may	  be	  with	  the	  organisations	  that	  have	  a	  direct	  association	  with	  electricity	  generation	  and	  delivery.	  Having	  said	  this	  interviewee	  5	  did	  provide	  a	  good	  statement	  identifying	  the	  different	  stakeholder	  responsibilities.	  
Short	  term	  operational	  security	  it	  is	  national	  grid.	  At	  a	  slightly	  
more	  nebulas	  level	  it	  is	  the	  market	  and	  Ofgem	  as	  the	  regulator	  
has	  a	  duty.	  Then	  at	  a	  political	  level	  the	  energy	  minister.	  
Interviewee	  5	  GBS	  It	  is	  the	  Government’s	  role	  to	  set	  the	  guidance	  and	  duties	  on	  Ofgem	  who	  then	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  execute	  them.	  An	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  the	  legislation	  set	  can	  be	  considered	  broad,	  and	  requires	  Ofgem	  to	  interpret	  their	  duties.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  open	  and	  general	  legislation	  is	  that	  Government	  does	  not	  wish	  be	  seen	  to	  micro-­‐manage	  an	  independent	  regulator.	  This	  implies	  that	  Ofgem’s	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security	  could	  be	  based	  on	  how	  they	  interpret	  the	  broad	  set	  of	  duties	  placed	  upon	  them.	  In	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  Ofgem’s	  role	  could	  be	  different.	  The	  current	  electricity	  system	  sees	  that	  a	  small	  number	  of	  players	  would	  operate	  and	  own	  the	  majority	  of	  electricity	  generation	  and	  supply.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  organisations	  and	  stakeholders	  would	  provide	  greater	  diversity	  within	  the	  market	  (as	  long	  as	  a	  market	  approach	  is	  utilised).	  Thus	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  would	  increase.	  This	  increase	  would	  be	  in	  the	  number	  of	  electricity	  generators	  each	  with	  different	  technologies	  and	  levels	  of	  skills.	  The	  operational	  structure	  of	  the	  decentralisation	  would	  be	  different	  including	  changes	  to	  market	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  networks	  to	  promote	  small-­‐scale	  connection.	  Ofgem	  would	  then	  have	  to	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  changes.	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However,	  even	  though	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  bring	  many	  changes	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  the	  primary	  role	  of	  Ofgem	  is	  unlikely	  to	  change.	  Although	  Ofgem	  has	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  towards	  delivering	  security,	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  still	  set	  out	  by	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  attempting	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  goal,	  that	  of	  a	  secure	  low	  carbon	  future.	  The	  role	  of	  Ofgem	  is	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  these	  goals	  whether	  they	  should	  be	  a	  through	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  process.	  
10.3 Role	  of	  Network	  Owners	  Often	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  the	  frontline	  of	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply	  are	  the	  network	  companies,	  specifically	  The	  National	  Grid	  Transmission	  Company	  (NGTC).	  The	  NGTC	  can	  be	  divided	  between	  the	  transmission	  operator	  arm	  and	  its	  system	  operator	  function	  (an	  entirely	  separate	  division	  of	  NGTC)	  who’s	  influence	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
“I	  think	  distributers	  are	  very	  much,	  as	  opposed	  to	  transmission	  
companies	  and	  generators,	  second	  order	  you	  could	  even	  say	  
tertiary	  in	  terms	  significance	  to	  security	  itself.	  “Interviewee	  3	  
MBS	  
“a	  distribution	  company,	  to	  give	  a	  bit	  more	  perspective	  is	  
obviously	  not	  so	  engaged	  in	  energy	  security	  as	  perhaps	  a	  
supplier	  or	  a	  generator	  might	  be.”	  Interviewee	  23	  RBS	  Currently,	  the	  role	  of	  distribution	  network	  operators	  (DNOs)	  in	  system	  wide	  security	  is	  limited.	  At	  present,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  supply	  of	  the	  electricity	  profile,	  other	  than	  ensuring	  their	  network	  is	  operational.	  This	  was	  indicated	  by	  most	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  interviewed	  and	  shown	  in	  the	  quotes	  from	  interviewees	  3	  and	  23.	  Interviewee	  23,	  a	  representative	  from	  a	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholder	  (a	  DNO)	  is	  discussing	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  network	  rather	  than	  the	  impacts	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  issue	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks.	  Therefore,	  although	  the	  DNO’s	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  the	  networks	  are	  operational,	  interviewees	  seem	  to	  consider	  them	  to	  have	  a	  low	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  security	  is	  often	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  meeting	  demand.	  However,	  energy	  security	  is	  far	  more	  complex,	  In	  addition	  the	  network	  operators	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  centralised	  generation	  to	  access	  the	  grid.	  They	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  additional	  costs	  of	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generation	  caused	  from	  short-­‐term	  outages,	  by	  failure	  in	  the	  power	  lines	  or	  natural	  disasters	  such	  as	  trees	  coming	  down	  on	  power	  lines	  of	  floods.	  Also	  short-­‐term	  outages	  could	  be	  caused	  by	  failures	  in	  the	  power	  lines	  or	  natural	  disasters	  such	  as	  trees	  coming	  down	  on	  the	  lines	  or	  floods.	  	  However,	  a	  counter	  argument	  by	  a	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder	  group	  (CE	  electric)	  showed	  that	  this	  may	  not	  the	  case	  for	  all	  distribution	  network	  owners.	  In	  the	  consultation	  for	  the	  EMR,	  CE	  Electric	  identified	  that	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  electricity	  industry	  means	  it	  has	  a	  role	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security:	  
Although	  CE	  does	  not	  have	  investment	  in	  electricity	  
generation	  assets,	  it	  considers	  that	  it	  has	  a	  relevant	  
contribution	  to	  make	  to	  this	  consultation	  on	  two	  grounds.	  CE	  
has	  a	  clear	  interest	  as	  a	  significant	  participant	  in	  the	  
electricity	  industry	  in	  helping	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  electricity	  
market	  provides	  adequate	  incentives	  for	  generation	  capacity,	  
but	  since	  it	  has	  no	  investment	  in	  generation	  it	  can	  bring	  a	  
knowledgeable	  but	  impartial	  perspective	  to	  solving	  this	  
problem.	  (CE	  Electric,	  2010)	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  energy	  governance.	  CE	  Electric	  show	  they	  have	  a	  role	  and	  a	  responsibility	  towards	  energy	  security	  even	  though	  they	  have	  no	  generation	  assets	  and	  very	  little	  power	  to	  ensure	  energy	  security	  at	  present.	  Having	  said	  this,	  the	  future	  role	  of	  the	  DNO	  will	  involve	  an	  increase	  in	  activity	  on	  their	  network.	  This	  arises	  from	  extra	  generation	  connections	  and	  a	  possible	  increase	  in	  operation	  and	  responsibilities	  including	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  local	  networks.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  impacts	  on	  the	  future	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  that	  in	  order	  to	  handle	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  generation	  on	  the	  distribution	  network,	  the	  operational	  system	  would	  have	  to	  change.	  At	  present	  there	  is	  a	  single	  System	  Operator	  who	  balances	  the	  whole	  network	  through	  the	  transmission	  system.	  
“You	  are	  dealing	  with	  small	  numbers.	  If	  something	  goes	  wrong,	  
national	  grid	  can	  ring	  the	  power	  station	  up	  and	  sort	  it	  out,	  
whatever,	  and	  it’s	  translating	  that	  down	  to	  now	  having	  a	  system	  
with	  thousands	  and	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  providers	  of	  these	  
services.”	  Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  One	  option	  is	  to	  have	  this	  SO	  take	  on	  the	  task	  of	  balancing	  all	  the	  different	  networks.	  Another	  is	  to	  make	  the	  DNO	  balance	  their	  individual	  networks.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  it	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  local	  grid	  security.	  This	  scenario	  may	  also	  require	  the	  overall	  SO	  to	  balance	  between	  the	  DNOs	  adding	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further	  complexity	  in	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  whole	  system	  for	  System	  Operator.	  This	  was	  identified	  by	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder.	  However,	  this	  also	  works	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  with	  smaller	  numbers	  of	  large	  generating	  plants	  each	  one	  can	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  the	  electricity	  balancing.	  If	  a	  single	  generation	  plant	  shuts	  down	  then	  it	  can	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  balance	  the	  network	  in	  that	  area.	  In	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  if	  a	  generator	  has	  problems	  the	  impact	  is	  minimal	  in	  comparison	  as	  other	  stations	  can	  fill	  the	  shortfall.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  network	  owners	  at	  present	  have	  a	  minimal	  role	  in	  energy	  security	  other	  than	  ensuring	  the	  running	  of	  their	  networks.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  future	  role	  of	  the	  network	  operators	  whether	  it	  is	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  will	  be	  very	  different	  and	  involve	  them	  in	  security	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  level.	  Therefore,	  their	  aim	  now	  should	  be	  to	  identify	  how	  they	  can	  fulfil	  this	  future	  responsibility.	  
10.4 System	  Operator	  (SO)	  The	  SO	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  short-­‐term	  generating	  provision,	  which	  covers	  anomalies	  in	  demand	  prediction	  and	  technical	  failures	  in	  generation.	  The	  SO	  also	  has	  a	  licence	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  capacity	  is	  available	  to	  meet	  demand	  (Energy	  Act,	  2013).	  Therefore,	  the	  SO	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  essential	  to	  the	  front	  line	  security	  of	  supply.	  Concern	  around	  the	  National	  Grid	  being	  able	  to	  meet	  its	  responsibilities	  as	  the	  profile	  moves	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system	  was	  identified	  by	  some	  of	  the	  research	  participants.	  The	  discussion	  is	  from	  an	  operational	  point	  of	  view,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  move	  to	  greater	  numbers	  of	  smaller	  generators	  and	  generation	  companies	  the	  portfolio	  of	  generation	  would	  become	  far	  more	  complex.	  
“You	  progressively	  lose	  the	  firm	  handle	  on	  what	  likely	  
generation	  profile	  might	  look	  like	  and	  where	  it	  physically	  is.”	  
Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  
“What	  we	  say	  at	  the	  control	  at	  the	  moment	  is	  people	  
individually	  are	  erratic	  and	  unpredictable	  but	  as	  a	  group	  we	  
have	  a	  pretty	  good	  idea	  of	  that	  they	  are	  going	  to	  do	  which	  is	  
why	  we	  have	  a	  pretty	  good	  degree	  of	  accuracy.	  We	  have	  a	  
good	  forecasting	  and	  it	  would	  mean	  we	  would	  have	  to	  extend	  
that	  forecasting	  capability	  to	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  activities	  
across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  day.”	  Interviewee	  17	  RBS	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Currently,	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  technologies	  are	  considered	  as	  negative	  demand.	  The	  network	  does	  not	  have	  any	  information	  of	  generation	  in	  a	  specific	  area	  and	  as	  the	  local	  demand	  consumes	  the	  generation	  before	  it	  reaches	  the	  transmission	  network	  no	  information	  is	  returned	  to	  the	  system	  operator.	  However,	  as	  a	  decentralised	  generation	  profile	  increases,	  the	  system	  operator	  will	  require	  greater	  levels	  of	  information	  to	  balance	  the	  network.	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  quote	  from	  interviewees	  31	  and	  17.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  would	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  move	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  This	  issue	  was	  also	  discussed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholders,	  the	  increase	  in	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  major	  concern.	  The	  growth	  of	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  will	  coincide	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  information	  transfer	  over	  the	  networks.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  this	  expansion	  of	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  is	  not	  achieved	  too	  rapidly,	  then	  the	  balancing	  of	  highly	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  system	  would	  not	  be	  a	  major	  concern.	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  quote	  of	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholders:	  
“The	  bottom	  line	  is	  on	  system	  balancing.	  We	  need	  
information,	  we	  need	  secure	  action	  channels	  to	  the	  people	  
who	  can	  make	  a	  difference	  particularly	  at	  short	  notice	  very	  
close	  to	  real	  time.	  So	  we	  need	  information	  and	  controls	  to	  do	  
our	  residual	  balancing	  and	  system	  balancing	  roles.”	  
Interviewee	  17	  RBS	  The	  extra	  infrastructure	  which	  will	  be	  required	  to	  balance	  the	  grid,	  will	  also	  allow	  DNOs	  to	  reduce	  inefficiencies	  within	  the	  network	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  data	  for	  the	  consumers	  which	  in	  turn,	  will	  impact	  overall	  demand	  patterns.	  Modelling	  on	  smart	  grids	  has	  identified	  that	  it	  is	  a	  more	  cost	  effective	  strategy	  than	  conventional	  method.	  The	  results	  from	  savings	  on	  network	  costs,	  increased	  economic	  growth	  as	  identified	  by	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem	  in	  the	  smart	  grids	  roadmap,	  Increased	  energy	  security	  (Ofgem,	  2012d;	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014).	  The	  responsibility	  of	  the	  system	  operator	  to	  ensure	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  clear.	  What	  is	  less	  understood	  is	  the	  future	  role	  of	  the	  system	  operator	  and	  how	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  impact	  upon	  it.	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10.5 Role	  of	  Big	  6	  Energy	  Companies	  The	  greatest	  change,	  arguably,	  could	  come	  with	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  big	  six	  vertically	  integrated	  energy	  companies.	  The	  current	  role	  of	  energy	  companies	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  complex.	  Each	  of	  the	  energy	  companies	  have	  different	  generation	  and	  demand	  portfolios,	  therefore,	  they	  would	  have	  different	  requirements	  of	  the	  system.	  Many	  of	  the	  electricity	  company’s	  actions	  are	  regulated	  through	  Ofgem	  and	  controlled	  through	  specific	  mechanisms	  implemented	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change.	  However,	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  big	  six	  does	  mean	  they	  have	  considerable	  lobbying	  power,	  they	  are	  still	  ultimately	  controlled	  by	  the	  need	  to	  grow	  their	  business	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  shareholders.	  There	  was	  a	  consensus	  among	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees	  that	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  has	  been	  left	  to	  the	  market.	  This	  idea	  has	  also	  been	  reiterated	  by	  Government	  in	  the	  EMR	  and	  energy	  security	  strategy	  documentation.	  However	  this	  may	  not	  always	  be	  the	  best	  option.	  
“they	  [i.e.	  Government]	  wouldn’t	  tackle	  food	  security	  via	  
control	  of	  the	  supermarkets.”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  As	  it	  is	  the	  large	  energy	  companies	  who	  dominate	  the	  wholesale	  markets	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  large	  energy	  companies	  should	  take	  certain	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  security	  of	  supply.	  This	  ethos	  has	  been	  used	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  responsibility.	  	  However,	  if	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  company,	  the	  energy	  companies	  could	  cause	  difficulties	  for	  energy	  security.	  Other	  than	  having	  a	  contractual	  obligation	  to	  their	  customers,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  that	  the	  energy	  companies	  have	  no	  role	  to	  play	  in	  energy	  security.	  A	  decentralised	  energy	  system,	  however,	  would	  likely	  reduce	  the	  ‘power’	  held	  by	  a	  single	  energy	  company.	  The	  obligations	  would	  be	  socialised	  between	  the	  larger	  numbers	  of	  energy	  companies	  involved	  in	  the	  system.	  This	  would	  reduce	  the	  security	  risk	  on	  any	  specific	  company	  and	  generate	  more	  flexibility.	  
“Greater	  decentralisation	  brings	  less	  and	  less	  immediate	  
accountability	  and	  responsibility	  on	  each	  of	  those	  participants	  
for	  delivering	  the	  overall	  attributes	  of	  a	  secure	  system.”	  
Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  The	  idea	  of	  reducing	  the	  responsibility	  for	  each	  energy	  company	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  quote	  by	  interviewee	  31.	  The	  participant’s	  point	  of	  view	  is	  that	  the	  electricity	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system	  currently	  relies	  on	  the	  energy	  companies	  to	  provide	  energy	  security	  and	  that	  they	  therefore	  should	  be	  provided	  with	  a	  greater	  role	  and	  responsibility.	  However,	  this	  was	  backed	  up	  by	  interviewee	  19:	  
The	  small	  generators	  do	  not	  have	  to	  provide	  any	  compulsory	  
balancing	  to	  the	  system	  operator.	  Interviewee	  19	  RBS	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  rules	  and	  regulations	  would	  need	  to	  change	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  However	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  is	  not	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  main	  energy	  generation	  companies.	  Although	  utility	  companies	  probably	  have	  the	  greatest	  ability	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  that	  role	  and	  responsibility	  within	  energy	  security	  is	  limited	  as	  they	  are	  dictated	  by	  the	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  set	  by	  Government	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  
10.6 Summary	  The	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  developed	  by	  and	  therefore	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  working	  together.	  This	  section	  has	  identified	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  main	  energy	  system	  actor	  group	  in	  ensuring	  the	  security	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  It	  has	  also	  looked	  at	  how	  these	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  may	  change	  in	  a	  system	  of	  higher	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation.	  	  One	  of	  the	  first	  points	  to	  note	  is	  that	  energy	  security	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  intent	  rather	  than	  an	  outright	  policy.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  the	  energy	  policy	  measures	  which	  have	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  carried	  out	  (Chester,	  2010).	  Analysis	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  it	  seems.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  energy	  security	  means	  that	  specific	  aspects	  of	  security	  would	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  For	  instance	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  security	  supply	  such	  as	  network	  balancing,	  electricity	  capacity	  levels	  matching	  demand	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  any	  external	  threats	  on	  the	  system	  are	  all	  important	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security.	  However,	  other	  issues	  need	  to	  be	  included,	  such	  as	  being	  able	  to	  find	  the	  investment	  required	  to	  meet	  future	  demand	  levels.	  This	  could	  mean	  having	  the	  appropriate	  market	  system	  generation	  or	  the	  appropriate	  regulatory	  system	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  connections	  in	  specific	  areas.	  Each	  of	  these	  specific	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  would	  therefore	  be	  attributable	  to	  a	  specific	  stakeholder.	  Ensuring	  balancing	  and	  settlement	  code	  is	  in	  place	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  role	  of	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ELEXON	  which	  ultimately	  has	  to	  be	  set	  out	  by	  Government.	  One	  of	  the	  salient	  points	  in	  this	  research	  is,	  definitions	  of	  energy	  security	  (specifically	  when	  associated	  with	  Government)	  are	  often	  dominated	  by	  quantifiable	  aspects	  such	  as	  security	  of	  supply.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  required	  which	  incorporated	  the	  non-­‐quantifiable	  and	  longer	  term	  aspects	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  future.	  Throughout	  the	  process	  of	  the	  research	  there	  has	  been	  one	  common	  perspective	  expressed	  by	  the	  research	  participants.	  That	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  UK	  Government	  to	  ensure	  that	  overall	  energy	  security	  is	  achieved.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  energy	  system,	  where	  each	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  look	  to	  the	  Government	  to	  provide	  the	  policies,	  mechanisms,	  rules	  and	  incentives	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  operate.	  This	  is	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  modern	  governance	  theories	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.3.1.	  	  However,	  the	  UK	  Government	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  concentrate	  on	  utilising	  centralised	  electricity	  generation	  to	  deliver	  energy	  security.	  Secondly,	  Government	  would	  not	  be	  the	  best	  placed	  stakeholder	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  security	  of	  supply.	  Largely	  this	  is	  because	  Government	  tends	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  timescale	  that	  is	  short	  (based	  on	  electoral	  cycle)	  and	  this	  short	  timescale	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  energy	  security.	  The	  UK	  Government,	  as	  identified	  in	  section	  4.1	  is	  focussed	  on	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply	  issues	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  longer	  term.	  It	  may	  be	  concluded	  that,	  at	  present,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  stakeholder	  best	  place	  to	  deliver	  energy	  security.	  Rather	  responsibility	  falls	  to	  the	  network	  of	  all	  actors	  from	  consumers	  to	  the	  main	  energy	  companies	  and	  Government.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  energy	  security,	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  broader	  issues	  including	  a	  better	  perception	  of	  what	  different	  stakeholders	  can	  achieve.	  This	  would	  require	  a	  very	  different	  response	  to	  the	  current	  perception	  of	  energy	  security	  being	  the	  responsibility	  of	  Government.	  The	  perception	  that	  Government	  is	  the	  sole	  stakeholder	  responsible	  this	  has	  further	  impacts.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  the	  current	  energy	  system	  needs	  to	  move	  to	  one	  which	  is	  low	  carbon	  and	  affordable,	  achievable	  through	  a	  centralised	  program	  utilising	  nuclear	  power	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  technologies	  or	  a	  decentralised	  program	  where	  renewable	  generation	  would	  be	  the	  dominant	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technology.	  However,	  the	  Government	  is	  unlikely	  to	  express	  a	  preference	  for	  any	  specific	  pathway	  as	  it	  would	  restrict	  investments	  in	  alternative,	  possible	  futures.	  	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  the	  discussion	  has	  been	  around	  either	  the	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  generation	  profile.	  Therefore,	  the	  Government’s	  preference	  to	  operate	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  large	  and	  small	  scale	  generation	  will	  influence	  the	  energy	  system	  development.	  The	  governance	  theory	  suggests	  the	  responsibility	  of	  energy	  security	  falls	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  working	  together	  for	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  However	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  identified	  Government	  as	  the	  principle	  stakeholders.	  Therefore,	  with	  a	  perceived	  power,	  stakeholders	  look	  to	  Government	  for	  direction	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  A	  move	  to	  the	  system	  of	  greater	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  would	  undoubtedly	  change	  the	  governance	  structure	  seen	  today.	  From	  discussions	  with	  stakeholders	  operating	  in	  the	  electricity	  system,	  it	  is	  unclear	  exactly	  how	  all	  of	  these	  changes	  will	  arise.	  Some	  changes	  are	  more	  widely	  discussed	  by	  the	  interviewees	  than	  others,	  such	  as	  whether	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  greater	  involvement	  by	  the	  distribution	  network	  operators	  in	  terms	  of	  network	  management.	  An	  increase	  in	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  with	  the	  distribution	  system	  will	  make	  balancing	  the	  local	  networks	  more	  complex.	  As	  the	  decentralised	  generation	  increases	  on	  the	  network	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  be	  considered	  negative	  demand.	  Increasingly	  the	  network	  will	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  redistribute	  the	  increased	  electricity	  production,	  possibly	  outside	  the	  local	  network.	  This	  would	  impact	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  system	  operator	  who	  will	  experience	  supply	  form	  part	  of	  the	  network	  it	  had	  previously	  only	  seen	  demand.	  Another	  change	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  be	  the	  role	  of	  the	  consumer	  as	  discussed	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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11 Role	  of	  Consumers	  The	  previous	  section	  discussed	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security.	  It	  looked	  specifically	  at	  the	  role	  of	  Government,	  Ofgem,	  network	  owners,	  the	  System	  Operator	  and	  the	  big	  six	  energy	  companies.	  It	  identified	  Government	  as	  a	  principle	  stakeholder	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  albeit	  the	  UK	  Government	  holds	  no	  assets	  in	  generation	  or	  transportation	  of	  electricity.	  Having	  said	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Government	  sets	  the	  agenda	  and	  policy	  for	  the	  other	  players	  to	  operate	  within.	  This	  signifies	  a	  perception	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  modern	  governance	  literature	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.3.1.	  The	  previous	  section	  looked	  at	  the	  Government,	  market	  and	  regulatory-­‐based	  stakeholders	  without	  discussing	  the	  impact	  of	  consumers,	  specifically	  their	  behaviour,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  final	  chapter.	  A	  key	  point	  to	  make	  is	  that	  current	  energy	  security	  is	  dominated	  (incorrectly)	  by	  the	  ethos	  of	  supply	  meeting	  demand.	  This	  has	  been	  backed	  up	  by	  the	  perception	  that	  consumers	  (as	  a	  group)	  have	  little	  or	  no	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	  However,	  the	  demand	  aspect	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  a	  vital	  tool	  in	  the	  balancing	  of	  electricity	  supply	  and	  demand.	  Although,	  there	  are	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  now	  and	  for	  the	  future	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  promote,	  complement,	  and	  speed	  up	  these	  mechanisms	  and	  ultimately	  change	  this	  demand/supply	  paradigm.	  The	  technological	  characteristics	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  shape	  the	  role	  and	  behaviour	  of	  individuals	  and	  businesses.	  At	  present	  consumers	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  disengaged;	  their	  focus,	  predominantly,	  does	  not	  go	  beyond	  the	  payment	  of	  energy	  bills	  and	  generating	  plants	  are	  out	  of	  sight	  and	  out	  of	  mind	  (GOfS,	  2008;	  NESTA,	  2010).	  The	  move	  toward	  a	  decentralised	  energy	  system	  will	  involve	  a	  greater	  interaction	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders,	  potentially	  including	  the	  consumer,	  be	  they	  individuals	  or	  businesses.	  	  By	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation,	  conflict	  with	  the	  current	  grid	  infrastructure	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  (McDonald,	  2008).	  This	  is	  because	  the	  growth	  of	  distributed	  generation	  puts	  pressure	  on	  the	  distribution	  network	  the	  network’s	  stability,	  power	  quality	  and	  the	  operational	  challenges	  implied	  by	  a	  shift	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from	  a	  predominantly	  large	  scale	  to	  small-­‐scale	  generating	  technology.	  Therefore,	  consumer	  response	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  future.	  In	  order	  to	  help	  provide	  a	  reliable	  supply	  of	  electricity	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  options.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  establish	  enough	  reliable	  backup	  storage	  such	  as	  flywheels	  pumped	  storage	  and	  compressed	  air	  to	  balance	  out	  any	  unforeseen	  anomalies	  which	  may	  occur	  (Gottwalt	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  (see	  section	  3.2.1.4).	  However,	  these	  technologies	  are	  currently	  expensive	  to	  build	  and	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  model	  the	  number	  and	  scale	  of	  their	  use	  during	  a	  certain	  period,	  as	  a	  result	  predicting	  their	  return	  in	  the	  current	  market	  would	  be	  near	  impossible.	  So,	  a	  separate	  mechanism	  for	  funding	  such	  projects	  will	  be	  required.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  less	  capital-­‐intensive	  method,	  which	  involves	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  network	  through	  the	  primary	  dimension	  of	  demand	  patterns	  (Short,	  2004;	  Strbac,	  2008;	  IEA,	  2008;	  Clastres,	  2011).	  This	  includes	  changing	  the	  demand	  patterns	  to	  meet	  the	  level	  of	  capacity,	  requiring	  a	  greater	  involvement	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  additional	  information	  such	  as	  the	  short-­‐term	  price	  signals	  for	  the	  consumers.	  This	  is	  one	  example	  of	  how	  demand	  patterns	  and	  consumer	  behaviour	  can	  impact	  on	  energy	  security	  and	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  CE	  Electric	  in	  the	  EMR	  consultation:	  
Customer	  response	  could	  also	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  
balancing	  market,	  e.g.	  smart	  appliances	  with	  frequency	  
response.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  the	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  
of	  different	  sorts	  of	  interventions.	  (CE	  Electric,	  2010)	  Having	  said	  this	  the	  impact	  of	  demand	  on	  energy	  security	  is	  rarely	  ever	  discussed.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  whether	  the	  consumer	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  on	  these	  applications.	  As	  identified	  in	  chapter	  5,	  a	  low	  carbon,	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  synonymous	  with	  many	  of	  the	  renewable	  technologies	  which	  are	  considered	  by	  their	  nature,	  variable	  generation	  sources.	  Therefore,	  the	  use	  of	  demand	  management	  would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  its	  balancing	  if	  not	  a	  requirement.	  Decentralisation	  also	  provides	  access	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  consumers,	  vital	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  demand	  management.	  This	  section	  will	  also	  look	  at	  the	  consumers’	  role	  in	  managing	  a	  complex	  system	  with	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders	  involved.	  Lastly,	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  increase	  in	  engagement	  that	  is	  often	  associated	  with	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small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation	  projects	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  possible	  pitfalls	  to	  engaging	  more	  consumers.	  
11.1 Demand	  Management	  Demand	  management	  is	  a	  technique	  in	  which	  demand	  can	  be	  controlled	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  system.	  In	  the	  electricity	  system	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  ensure	  the	  balancing	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  where	  historically	  this	  has	  been	  achieved	  mostly	  through	  the	  supply	  side.	  	  At	  present	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  demand	  management	  on	  the	  GB	  electricity	  network	  is	  achieved	  through	  the	  large	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  businesses	  alongside	  the	  Economy	  7	  tariff	  for	  some	  individual	  householders	  heating	  requirements	  (Torriti	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  A	  recent	  DECC	  consultation	  document	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  UK	  capacity	  margin	  of	  around	  10%	  is	  required	  to	  ensure	  a	  secure	  electricity	  supply	  (DECC,	  2011e;	  BNEF,	  2012).	  While	  the	  UK	  capacity	  margin	  has	  historically	  been	  above	  this	  level,	  with	  future	  threats	  to	  the	  energy	  system	  ensuring	  this	  level	  of	  security	  may	  come	  at	  a	  higher	  price.	  	  The	  security	  of	  supply	  issue	  is	  seen	  more	  as	  a	  need	  to	  prepare	  the	  generation	  sector	  to	  withstand	  any	  likely	  outages	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2012).	  This	  preventative	  approach	  is	  achieved	  by	  providing	  additional	  generating	  units	  which	  are	  able	  to	  be	  dispatched,	  ensuring	  security	  under	  any	  situation.	  Therefore,	  the	  system	  is	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  almost	  any	  outages	  but	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  optimum	  efficiency.	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  simplicity	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  increased	  costs	  (Strbac,	  2008)	  because	  the	  lowest	  cost	  plant	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  operate	  throughout	  the	  year,	  the	  higher	  cost	  generators	  would	  operate	  for	  only	  a	  few	  hours	  a	  day.	  Therefore,	  to	  keep	  the	  higher	  cost	  plant	  available	  for	  these	  peak	  times	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  enough	  incentive,	  meaning	  additional	  costs	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  Demand	  management	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  demand	  profile	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  demand	  profile	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  includes	  the	  changes	  in	  consumption	  over	  a	  certain	  time-­‐scale,	  be	  it	  a	  day,	  month	  or	  yearly	  fluctuations.	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  in	  consumption	  mean	  that	  excess	  capacity	  is	  needed	  to	  meet	  the	  maximum	  level	  of	  demand,	  though	  it	  may	  not	  always	  be	  utilised.	  By	  managing	  demand,	  the	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  can	  be	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reduced.	  However,	  demand	  management	  requires	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  consumer	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  at	  present.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  for	  this	  to	  occur	  additional	  incentives	  will	  need	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  by	  Government.	  
Matching	  supply	  and	  demand	  is	  an	  important	  principle	  
running	  through	  the	  proposals,	  and	  the	  Government	  should	  
engage	  more	  fully	  with	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry	  to	  
ensure	  that	  both	  generation-­‐side	  and	  demand-­‐side	  flexibility	  
are	  cost-­‐effectively	  utilised.	  (CE	  Electric,	  2010)	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  of	  demand	  response	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  the	  UK	  Government	  to	  promote	  mechanisms	  and	  incentives,	  which	  will	  promote	  the	  demand	  side	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  balancing.	  	  The	  quote	  from	  CE	  Electric	  shows	  a	  perception	  of	  some	  research	  participants	  looking	  toward	  Government	  to	  develop	  the	  structure	  and	  processes	  for	  other	  stakeholders	  to	  follow,	  such	  as	  the	  consumer	  group,	  to	  develop	  and	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  the	  system.	  However,	  UK	  Government	  modelling	  is	  dominated	  by	  economics	  and	  quantifying	  the	  different	  aspects	  for	  the	  future.	  	  
Whilst	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  exactly	  how	  much	  of	  an	  effect	  
these	  types	  of	  demand-­‐side	  measures	  will	  have	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  they	  could	  be	  significant.	  (SSE,	  2011b)	  The	  issue	  identified	  here	  is	  that	  quantifying	  demand	  response	  may	  not	  be	  easy.	  The	  costs	  to	  networks	  and	  consumers	  could	  be	  estimated.	  However	  the	  response	  to	  the	  mechanism	  is	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  predict.	  This	  measuring	  of	  demand	  side	  measures	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  SSE	  in	  the	  Energy	  Security	  or	  independence	  Consultation.	  An	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  generation	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  involve	  the	  consumer	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  Strengers	  (2012)	  discusses	  the	  idea	  of	  changing	  the	  consumer–	  supplier	  relationship,	  where	  decentralising	  the	  energy	  system	  can	  change	  the	  role	  of	  the	  consumer,	  making	  them,	  no	  longer	  passive	  recipients	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  network	  of	  infrastructure	  (Hogget	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  They	  would	  become	  active	  stakeholders	  managing	  their	  own	  practices	  and	  involved	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  (Van	  Vliet	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  This	  can	  be	  the	  consumer	  actively	  purchasing	  generation	  equipment	  or	  being	  able	  to	  see	  the	  generation	  technology	  operating	  in	  their	  area	  increasing	  the	  direct	  relationship	  with	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	  offers	  a	  channel	  for	  increasing	  the	  information	  the	  consumer	  receives.	  There	  are	  also	  financial	  incentives	  which	  are	  associated	  with	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the	  micro	  generation	  technologies	  through	  the	  FIT	  export	  tariff	  which	  is	  currently	  set	  at	  a	  low	  rate	  and	  has	  little	  impact	  but	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  increase.	  Along	  with	  the	  micro	  scale	  technologies,	  the	  consumer	  is	  able	  to	  monitor	  the	  generation	  and	  consumption	  levels	  of	  their	  individual	  household,	  providing	  the	  technological	  aspect	  of	  demand	  management.	  Demand	  management	  can	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  two	  different	  timescales:	  firstly	  short-­‐term	  absorption	  of	  changes	  in	  demand,	  where	  the	  short-­‐term	  pricing	  signals	  are	  used	  to	  alter	  the	  daily	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  in	  the	  demand	  profile.	  Secondly	  the	  longer-­‐term	  economic	  changes	  to	  meet	  wholesale	  market	  conditions	  such	  as	  the	  availability	  of	  a	  particular	  technology.	  This	  can	  include	  the	  availability	  of	  primary	  resource	  such	  as	  natural	  gas	  or	  through	  changes	  to	  Governmental	  policies.	  
In	  the	  new	  world	  demand	  will	  be	  less	  predictable	  and	  indeed	  
demand	  will	  have	  to	  start	  to	  hunt	  after	  generation	  at	  times	  so	  
when	  the	  wind	  is	  available	  that	  is	  when	  we	  want	  to	  have	  
demand.”	  Interviewee	  13	  GBS	  Research	  participants	  rarely	  discussed	  demand	  management	  in	  a	  security	  context.	  One	  of	  the	  only	  references	  made	  is	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  variable	  generation,	  as	  shown	  by	  interviewee	  13.	  What	  interviewee	  13	  identifies	  is	  the	  concern	  over	  future	  balancing	  in	  a	  system	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  renewable	  generation.	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  demand	  response	  will	  only	  be	  required	  if	  supply	  cannot	  meet	  demand.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.2	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  different	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  demand.	  If	  the	  future	  were	  to	  include	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat	  and	  transport	  then	  there	  will	  likely	  be	  higher	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  thereby	  make	  demand	  management	  more	  of	  a	  priority.	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  demand	  management	  could	  be	  a	  requirement	  in	  a	  centralised	  system	  as	  well	  as	  a	  decentralised	  system.	  In	  all	  aspects	  of	  demand-­‐side	  management	  the	  end	  goal	  is	  to	  either	  move	  or	  reduce	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  of	  the	  electricity	  demand	  profile	  and	  ultimately	  increase	  the	  electricity	  system	  efficiency	  (Clastres,	  2011).	  In	  addition,	  any	  overall	  reduction	  in	  demand	  through	  demand	  management	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  carbon	  emissions	  (Strbac,	  2008	  Faruqui	  et	  al	  2009;	  FERC,	  2009;	  Clastres,	  2011).	  Therefore	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  demand	  management	  can	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  energy	  security	  through	  balancing	  and	  the	  efficiency	  savings.	  If	  demand	  management	  clearly	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promotes	  a	  secure	  system	  then	  the	  question	  for	  this	  thesis	  is;	  how	  can	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  influence	  or	  promote	  demand	  management?	  
	  “If	  the	  market	  is	  very	  complicated	  and	  very	  difficult	  for	  people	  
to	  understand	  if	  you’re	  looking	  to	  backup	  capacity,	  part	  of	  me	  
would	  think	  by	  the	  time	  you	  have	  thousands	  of	  people	  offering	  
decentralised	  generation	  would	  have	  a	  pretty	  responsive	  
demand-­‐side.”	  Interviewee	  5	  GBS	  
“Because	  decentralisation	  empowers	  consumers	  we	  are	  in	  
good	  shape	  to	  get	  the	  demand	  management	  and	  therefore	  the	  
energy	  balancing	  which	  we	  could	  not	  have	  got	  with	  a	  supply	  
type	  production	  strategy.”	  Interviewee	  6	  MBS	  There	  are	  clear	  arguments	  to	  suggest	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  implies	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  need	  for	  demand	  management	  (Hurley	  et	  al.	  2013).	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  literature	  (Strbac,	  2008;	  Torriti	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  from	  interviewee	  5	  and	  6.	  The	  two	  interviewees	  quoted	  above	  are	  discussing	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  as	  being	  synonymous	  with	  the	  application	  of	  demand	  reduction.	  However,	  simply	  increasing	  the	  level	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  on	  the	  system	  will	  not	  intrinsically	  mean	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  management.	  Demand	  management	  would	  require	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  information	  to	  be	  passed	  between	  the	  consumer	  and	  provider,	  the	  roll	  out	  of	  demand	  management	  technologies,	  and	  short-­‐term	  pricing	  signals	  for	  consumers.	  	  At	  present	  policy	  mechanisms	  for	  this	  are	  in	  place	  for	  large	  consumers	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  demand	  management	  through	  the	  use	  of	  interruptible	  tariffs,	  whereby	  the	  business	  which	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  mechanism	  can	  be	  cut	  off	  at	  times	  when	  demand	  is	  high	  and	  supply	  is	  low	  (Torriti	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  interviewee	  12	  discusses	  the	  uptake	  of	  this	  as	  low	  (at	  3.8%	  (Ofgem,	  2010e)),	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  on	  industry	  of	  having	  to	  reduce	  consumption	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice	  which	  would	  cost	  more	  to	  the	  business	  than	  the	  savings	  made.	  
“We	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  in	  recent	  history	  the	  demand	  side	  
response	  has	  not	  taken	  off,	  because,	  National	  Grid	  may	  say,	  we	  
will	  offer	  you	  a	  contract	  and	  if	  you	  can	  say	  that	  you	  will	  turn	  
off	  something	  with	  half	  an	  hour’s	  or	  4	  hours	  notice	  we	  will	  pay	  
you	  X.	  Big	  businesses	  will	  say	  well	  we	  can’t	  do	  that,	  its	  going	  to	  
cost	  us	  more	  money	  to	  do	  that	  than	  not.	  So	  there	  has	  to	  be	  
more	  of	  a	  dialogue	  between	  network	  users,	  how	  they	  use	  the	  
network,	  what	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  do	  change	  their	  abilities,	  
how	  much	  of	  that	  can	  be	  done	  passively,	  how	  much	  can	  be	  
done	  pro-­‐actively,	  by	  customer.”	  Interviewee	  12	  CSBS	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This	  identifies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  communication	  between	  the	  consumers	  and	  the	  system	  operator.	  It	  shows	  that	  simply	  passing	  information	  down	  to	  the	  user	  is	  not	  enough.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  involvement	  and	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  inclusion	  and	  action	  from	  the	  consumers.	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  current	  interruptible	  tariff	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  over	  when	  a	  cut	  off	  may	  occur	  and	  very	  little	  control	  for	  the	  consumer.	  Another	  option	  is	  to	  use	  a	  real	  time	  pricing	  mechanism,	  where	  rather	  than	  cutting	  off	  the	  consumer	  at	  times	  of	  low	  capacity	  margins,	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  would	  be	  designed	  to	  reflect	  the	  level	  of	  security	  of	  supply,	  where	  if	  the	  generation	  capacity	  on	  the	  network	  is	  low,	  the	  end	  price	  would	  be	  high	  and	  vice	  versa	  letting	  the	  consumer	  decide	  when	  they	  increase	  or	  decrease	  consumption.	  The	  time	  of	  use	  tariffs	  means	  that	  the	  consumer	  is	  given	  the	  choice	  whether	  to	  pay	  extra	  for	  continuous	  security	  of	  supply.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.3	  a	  dynamic	  and	  flexible	  electricity	  system	  is	  key	  to	  ensuring	  security.	  The	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  any	  abnormalities	  and	  fluctuations	  which	  may	  occur	  in	  electricity	  pricing	  key	  to	  providing	  flexibility	  and	  therefore	  security	  (Strbac,	  2008).	  Real	  time	  electricity	  pricing	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  through	  changing	  behaviour.	  However,	  real	  time	  pricing	  in	  some	  circumstances	  be	  discussed	  as	  not	  being	  effective	  at	  the	  moment.	  
“We	  did	  a	  quick	  You-­‐gov	  survey	  around	  consumers	  at	  that	  
point,	  early	  stage	  of	  2008	  to	  try	  and	  get	  a	  quick	  sense	  of	  
consumer	  understanding	  of	  how	  much	  extra	  are	  you	  prepared	  
[to	  spend]	  for	  your	  electricity	  to	  be	  lower	  carbon.	  We	  didn’t	  
ask	  questions	  about	  security	  of	  supply	  because	  it	  was	  a	  
concept	  which	  would	  be	  quite	  difficult	  to	  get	  across.	  But	  it	  was	  
quite	  clear	  that	  the	  consumer	  at	  that	  stage	  didn’t	  see	  very	  
much	  reason	  to	  be	  paying	  anything	  more	  for	  low	  carbon	  
energy	  and	  I	  think	  actually	  for	  security	  they	  wouldn’t	  perceive	  
what	  value	  they	  should	  attribute	  to	  secure	  supplies.	  That	  has	  
been	  consistent,	  not	  surprisingly	  since	  that	  point.”	  Interviewee	  
31	  CSBS	  This	  may	  be	  because	  in	  order	  for	  real-­‐time	  pricing	  mechanism	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  demand	  profile	  you	  would	  need	  to	  establish	  the	  right	  pricing	  structure	  and	  how	  much	  consumers	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  secure	  supply.	  As	  interviewee	  31	  discussed,	  this	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  identify.	  Just	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  surveys	  are	  around	  the	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system,	  many	  of	  the	  information	  campaigns	  also	  discuss	  carbon	  emissions	  rather	  than	  security.	  This	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  energy	  
	   273	  
security	  information	  campaigns	  could	  be	  because	  energy	  security	  is	  not	  currently	  considered	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  which	  the	  consumer	  can	  be	  involved	  in.	  The	  complexities	  around	  the	  concept	  mean	  that	  a	  discussion	  with	  the	  general	  public	  would	  be	  very	  difficult.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  that	  carbon	  emissions	  provides	  a	  moral	  question	  where	  the	  developed	  world	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  responsible,	  whereas	  security	  has	  always	  been	  a	  state	  run	  aspect	  of	  the	  system.	  Therefore,	  finding	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  security	  to	  consumers,	  both	  the	  individuals	  and	  the	  businesses,	  would	  be	  useful.	  However,	  as	  identified	  by	  interviewee	  31	  in	  the	  previous	  and	  following	  quotes	  this	  may	  not	  be	  easy.	  
“How	  much	  is	  a	  consumer	  prepared	  to	  pay	  for	  security,	  does	  
the	  consumer	  even	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  security”	  
Interviewee	  31	  CSBS	  For	  this	  to	  occur	  the	  consumer	  would	  need	  to	  firstly	  understand	  what	  a	  secure	  energy	  system	  means	  to	  them	  (Damigos	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  However,	  as,	  interviewee	  28	  (CSBS)	  identified	  “[Energy	  Security]	  is	  rather	  a	  vague	  construct	  that	  means	  different	  
things	  to	  different	  people”.	  Therefore,	  the	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  on	  top	  of	  which,	  the	  concept	  would	  be	  different	  between	  different	  persons.	  However,	  the	  question	  is,	  how	  much	  are	  consumers	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  security?	  	  
“They	  said	  in	  an	  ideal	  world	  with	  smart	  tech	  and	  smart	  
metering	  actually	  the	  individual	  consumers	  will	  be	  able	  to	  
take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  much	  of	  a	  risk	  they	  wanted	  to	  take	  with	  
their	  supply	  and	  pay	  the	  capacity	  premium.	  So	  if	  I’m	  sitting	  at	  
home	  and	  I	  don’t	  mind	  power	  cuts	  I	  could	  benefit	  from	  saying	  I	  
will	  just	  pay	  for	  energy	  and	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  over	  pay	  for	  
ensuring	  capacity	  is	  available.”	  Interviewee	  17	  RBS	  
“one	  of	  the	  other	  things	  we	  thought	  is	  that	  local	  involvement	  
might	  make	  people	  more	  concerned	  and	  appreciative	  of	  the	  
value	  of	  energy	  because	  there	  has	  been	  an	  issue.	  So	  far	  it	  has	  
not	  exactly	  been	  to	  cheap	  to	  meter	  but	  have	  people	  really	  been	  
playing	  the	  true	  cost	  of	  what	  they	  want	  in	  terms	  of	  investing	  in	  
the	  future	  and	  the	  answer	  is	  probably	  no.	  So	  it	  comes	  as	  a	  
shock	  when	  they	  have	  to	  pay	  more.”	  Interviewee	  14	  GBS	  This	  may	  be	  true	  with	  how	  consumers,	  particularly	  individual	  householders,	  view	  energy.	  Its	  ubiquitous	  nature	  means	  that	  energy	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  necessity	  and	  should	  be	  delivered	  by	  Government	  at	  a	  reasonable	  cost.	  Therefore	  evaluating	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  consumer	  should	  be	  a	  balance	  which	  means	  they	  are	  not	  overcharged	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but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  consumers	  do	  change	  behaviour	  to	  react	  with	  the	  price	  signals.	  
“So	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  the	  distribution	  networks	  truly	  smart	  
grids	  is	  an	  awful	  lot	  less	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  putting	  in	  place	  
copious	  amounts	  of	  copper	  the	  quadrupling	  which	  you	  would	  
need	  to	  do	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  
unconstrained	  manor.	  If	  you	  could	  actually	  start	  to	  shift	  
demand	  around	  you	  thereby	  avoid	  this	  investment.”	  
Interviewee	  14	  GBS	  Not	  only	  can	  the	  cost	  of	  security	  be	  difficult	  to	  explain,	  the	  costs	  involved	  in	  setting	  up	  a	  demand	  response	  system	  are	  also	  complex.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  an	  active	  demand	  system	  the	  information	  provided	  between	  the	  consumer	  and	  provider	  would	  need	  to	  be	  increased.	  Technologically	  the	  current	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  networks	  are	  fast	  approaching	  the	  end	  of	  their	  specified	  lifetime.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  these	  networks	  are	  due	  to	  be	  replaced.	  This	  opens	  up	  the	  opportunity	  to	  upgrade	  networks	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  enable	  technologies	  such	  as	  demand-­‐side	  management	  to	  operate	  (Strbac,	  2008).	  
“Technically,	  it	  just	  needs	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  right	  
incentives	  are	  put	  in	  place	  for	  the	  decentralised	  providers	  of	  
energy	  to	  offer	  the	  services	  needed	  to	  run	  a	  stable	  grid.”	  
Interviewee	  3	  MBS	  
“The	  DNO’s	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  become	  active	  as	  long	  at	  the	  
money	  is	  there.”	  Interviewee	  30	  CSBS	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  a	  market-­‐based	  stakeholder	  identifies	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  incentives	  are	  in	  place,	  theoretically	  that	  should	  be	  no	  problem	  for	  the	  DNO’s	  to	  fulfil	  the	  role	  of	  an	  active	  network	  operator	  (interviewee	  3).	  This	  idea	  was	  also	  confirmed	  by	  a	  civil	  society	  stakeholder	  (interviewee	  30).	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  the	  DNOs	  at	  present	  have	  very	  little	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	  If	  they	  are	  to	  become	  active	  network	  managers	  they	  will	  need	  to	  identify	  this	  at	  an	  early	  stage.	  The	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem	  smart	  grids	  forum	  at	  least	  identify	  that	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  DNO’s	  will	  change	  in	  a	  future	  of	  low	  carbon	  generation.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  they	  identify	  that	  the	  consumer	  will	  be	  given	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  the	  electricity	  system:	  
The	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  consumers	  in	  this	  type	  of	  
energy	  system	  will	  be	  different	  allowing	  them	  to	  participate	  
more	  actively	  in	  the	  energy	  market	  place	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  
2014:	  pg.	  9).	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The	  future	  profile	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  will	  likely	  be	  decided	  by	  the	  best	  investment	  strategy	  which	  meets	  the	  goals	  set	  out	  by	  Government.	  Interviewee	  5	  (government	  based	  stakeholder)	  discussed	  this	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  future	  energy	  system	  will	  look	  like	  and	  how	  this	  will	  impact	  on	  energy	  security.	  
“if	  you’re	  looking	  to	  backup	  capacity	  part	  of	  me	  would	  think	  
by	  the	  time	  you	  have	  thousands	  of	  people	  offering	  
decentralised	  generation	  you	  would	  have	  a	  pretty	  responsive	  
demand-­‐side.	  If	  we	  have	  a	  pretty	  responsive	  demand-­‐side	  then	  
that	  changes	  the	  security	  question	  quite	  significantly.	  At	  the	  
moment	  there	  is	  some	  demand-­‐side	  response	  clearly	  in	  terms	  
of	  those	  people	  who	  have	  interruptible	  contracts	  but	  it’s	  pretty	  
price	  inelastic.”	  Interviewee	  5	  GBS	  Once	  again	  this	  government-­‐based	  stakeholder	  identifies	  a	  link	  between	  demand	  response	  and	  decentralised	  generation.	  They	  also	  link	  it	  directly	  to	  energy	  security	  realising	  its	  benefits.	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  connection	  between	  the	  decentralisation	  of	  electricity,	  demand	  response	  and	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  a	  response	  from	  a	  DECC	  employee.	  However,	  as	  identified	  by	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  is	  the	  EMR	  consultation,	  where	  this	  connection	  between	  demand	  response	  and	  energy	  security	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  capitalised	  upon.	  
Proposals	  set	  out	  in	  DECC’s	  EMR	  consultation	  document	  […]	  
are	  geared	  towards	  building	  more	  electricity	  generating	  
plants,	  rather	  than	  cutting	  the	  need	  for	  them	  to	  the	  through	  
energy	  efficiency,	  smart	  grids,	  storage	  and	  connections	  with	  
other	  European	  country	  (Friends	  of	  the	  Earth,	  2010)	  The	  demand	  management	  is	  an	  underutilised	  dimension	  of	  enhancing	  energy	  security.	  The	  overall	  reduction	  in	  consumption	  from	  active	  demand	  management	  will	  provide	  a	  reduction	  in	  costs	  for	  additional	  infrastructure	  (Poudineh	  and	  Jamasb,	  2014)	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  providing	  an	  additional	  level	  of	  security.	  The	  level	  of	  demand	  management	  implemented	  will	  impact	  on	  the	  benefit	  but	  also	  the	  overall	  cost	  to	  the	  consumer.	  However,	  in	  a	  system	  of	  highly	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  some	  of	  these	  demand	  management	  benefits	  may	  be	  achieved	  from	  the	  additional	  consumer	  engagement	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  brings	  and	  effectively	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  implementing	  a	  demand	  management	  scheme.	  	  The	  perception	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  clearly	  shows	  that	  demand	  management	  can	  be	  beneficial	  to	  both	  centralised	  and	  decentralised	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore,	  the	  future	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	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see	  some	  form	  of	  demand	  management.	  However	  what	  is	  also	  clear	  is	  that	  quantifying	  the	  benefits	  of	  demand	  management	  is	  not	  easy.	  This	  means,	  for	  Government,	  setting	  out	  the	  right	  incentives	  which	  will	  balance	  the	  cost	  of	  implementing	  demand	  management	  to	  consumers	  with	  the	  savings	  made	  implementation.	  One	  of	  the	  difficult	  aspects	  in	  this	  is	  from	  consumer	  behaviour,	  this	  includes	  the	  benefits	  of	  engaging	  consumers	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  
11.2 Engagement	  The	  idea	  of	  engaging	  consumers	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  is	  not	  a	  new	  concept.	  This	  has	  been	  discussed	  by	  environmental	  advocates	  since	  the	  1970s	  in	  order	  to	  address	  issues	  such	  as	  self	  sufficiency	  and	  empowerment	  (Lovins,	  1977;	  Willis	  2006;	  GOfS	  2008).	  Current	  engagement	  of	  consumers	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  is	  well	  known	  to	  be	  limited,	  especially	  for	  the	  individual	  householder	  where	  often	  the	  only	  interaction	  is	  with	  the	  electricity	  bills	  (and	  often	  they	  are	  paid	  by	  direct	  debit)	  (Owens	  &	  Driffill,	  2008).	  Larger	  businesses,	  depending	  on	  their	  size,	  have	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  energy	  system	  through	  specific	  contracts	  within	  their	  energy	  companies,	  however,	  they	  still	  have	  only	  a	  limited	  level	  of	  control.	  	  Promoting	  the	  level	  of	  engagement	  of	  consumers	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  in	  some	  ways	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  demand	  management	  process	  discussed	  earlier	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  greater	  information	  and	  technology	  for	  consumers.	  But	  realistically	  engaging	  energy	  consumers	  means	  providing	  them	  with	  more	  power	  (the	  ability	  and	  desire	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system).	  Throughout	  the	  process	  of	  the	  primary	  research	  the	  participants	  were	  asked	  how	  the	  engagement	  of	  consumers	  could	  affect	  the	  security	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  response	  across	  each	  stakeholder	  group	  was	  almost	  unanimously	  that	  greater	  inclusion	  of	  the	  electricity	  consumer	  in	  the	  system	  it	  would	  not	  adversely	  affect	  security	  levels.	  Often	  the	  discussion	  over	  the	  engagement	  of	  consumers	  provided	  a	  positive	  outlook	  on	  energy	  security	  which	  coincides	  with	  the	  literature	  (Sauter	  and	  Watson,	  2007;	  Chappells	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Wolfe,	  2008;	  Chmutina	  and	  Goodier,	  2014).	  By	  engaging	  consumers	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  impacts	  which	  occur	  on	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  alter	  their	  demand	  accordingly,	  also	  the	  inclusion	  of	  consumers	  may	  open	  up	  the	  investment	  portfolio	  for	  electricity	  generation.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  always	  seen	  as	  a	  positive.	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“This	  is	  not	  just	  information	  campaigns	  it’s	  also	  the	  
technology,	  the	  smart	  meters.	  If	  delivering	  those	  solutions,	  the	  
smart	  meter,	  the	  engagement	  is	  actually	  more	  expensive”	  
Interviewee	  12	  CSBS	  There	  were	  a	  few	  examples	  discussed	  when	  engaging	  the	  consumer	  could	  pose	  a	  problem	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  costs	  incurred.	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  ‘power’	  of	  the	  consumer,	  various	  strategies	  would	  need	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place,	  including	  the	  technology	  that	  will	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  change,	  and	  the	  understanding	  of	  how	  they	  should	  alter	  behaviour	  which	  would	  provide	  the	  desire	  to	  change.	  These	  methods	  of	  engaging	  consumers	  would	  obviously	  require	  investment	  to	  implement.	  The	  increase	  in	  cost	  of	  engagement	  would	  likely	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  savings	  made	  from	  a	  more	  efficient	  electricity	  system.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  engagement	  impacts	  on	  further	  aspects	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  such	  as	  fuel	  poverty	  and	  climate	  change	  through	  an	  increase	  in	  efficiency	  (Preston	  et	  al	  2009).	  Although,	  without	  conclusive	  evidence	  of	  this,	  the	  results	  cannot	  be	  confirmed	  (Thøgersen	  and	  Ölander	  2003).	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  changes	  to	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  consumer	  would	  occur.	  
“It	  depends	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  taking	  on	  all	  the	  risk.	  Or	  
whether	  you	  are	  actually	  saying	  well	  no	  they	  are	  not	  going	  to	  
have	  to	  take	  on	  all	  the	  risk	  if	  their	  lights	  go	  out”	  Interviewee	  
18	  MBS	  The	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  engagement	  would	  likely	  provide	  the	  consumer	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  level	  of	  perceived	  power.	  Interviewee	  18	  discussed	  the	  idea	  that,	  if	  the	  consumer	  ends	  up	  with	  greater	  power	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  they	  will	  also	  need	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  the	  risk	  to	  energy	  security	  that	  comes	  with	  that.	  	  In	  fact	  they	  are	  taking	  on	  very	  little	  risk	  if	  the	  system	  operator	  would	  ensure	  sufficient	  backup	  capacity.	  An	  increase	  in	  the	  electricity	  consumer	  engagement	  does	  not	  automatically	  mean	  increased	  responsibility.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  policies,	  regulations	  and	  mechanisms	  are	  developed	  will	  develop	  the	  stakeholder	  responsibility.	  The	  responsibility	  associated	  with	  the	  current	  energy	  companies	  for	  energy	  security	  is	  limited	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  10.5.	  It	  is	  more	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  costs	  involved	  in	  ensuring	  security	  and	  the	  consumer	  being	  able	  to	  follow	  the	  pricing	  structure	  so	  that	  they	  adapt	  to	  what	  the	  electricity	  system	  requires.	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In	  the	  current	  electricity	  system,	  the	  consumers	  understanding	  of	  energy	  bills	  can	  be	  considered	  low.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  around	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  and	  green	  policies,	  where	  the	  understanding	  of	  consumers	  can	  be	  considered	  very	  different	  to	  that	  of	  the	  opinion	  amongst	  industry	  experts.	  An	  example	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation	  to	  the	  consumer	  bills.	  DECC	  states	  that	  at	  present	  the	  RO	  adds	  on	  average	  £26	  to	  the	  consumer	  bills	  and	  by	  2020	  it	  will	  rise	  to	  just	  over	  £50	  (DECC,	  2013d).	  The	  savings	  from	  green	  energy	  policies	  are	  also	  projected	  to	  save	  the	  consumer	  £94	  per	  year	  by	  2020	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  11-­‐1	  (DECC,	  2012f)	  also	  see	  section	  2.4.2.	  
	  
Figure	  11-­‐1	  Showing	  The	  Estimated	  Impact	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Policies	  on	  Average	  
Household	  Energy	  Bills	  in	  Year	  2020	  (DECC,	  2013d)	  
	  Although	  the	  savings	  from	  green	  energy	  policies	  are	  clear,	  the	  message	  was	  not	  publicised	  in	  the	  media	  meaning	  information	  provided	  to	  the	  consumer	  is	  not	  complete	  (Stevens,	  2011;	  Shankleman,	  2012).	  Headlines	  such	  as	  ‘What’s	  fuelling	  your	  energy	  Bill?’	  and	  ‘Green	  policies	  are	  costing	  Britons	  the	  earth’	  are	  often	  highly	  selective	  in	  their	  use	  of	  facts	  and	  bias	  (Panorama,	  2011;	  Porter,	  2012;	  Groves	  2012).	  Having	  said	  this	  a	  recent	  YouGov	  survey	  found	  the	  majority	  of	  consumers	  (55%	  for	  wind	  and	  74%	  for	  solar)	  are	  still	  asking	  the	  Government	  to	  increase	  the	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use	  of	  wind	  and	  solar	  power	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  (YouGov,	  2011;	  Parliament	  2012b).	  
“in	  one	  hand	  I	  see	  it	  as	  good	  because	  it	  means	  that	  people	  are	  
actually	  starting	  to	  recognise	  the	  value	  of	  power	  which	  I	  don’t	  
think	  we	  do	  at	  the	  moment.	  We	  flick	  it	  on	  at	  the	  switch	  and	  it	  
works.	  If	  you	  are	  producing	  you	  are	  becoming	  more	  [aware]	  of	  
your	  consumption	  of	  it	  as	  well.”	  Interviewee	  13	  GBS	  One	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  with	  looking	  at	  the	  context	  of	  wide	  scale	  engagement	  is	  that	  there's	  very	  little	  practical	  experience	  which	  can	  be	  analysed	  and	  discussed.	  However,	  what	  is	  apparent	  is	  the	  current	  gradual	  move	  to	  greater	  levels	  of	  engagement	  through	  renewable	  energy	  projects.	  	  
11.3 Summary	  At	  present	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  consumers	  play	  a	  very	  limited	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	  The	  connection	  they	  do	  have	  is	  through	  the	  interruptible	  tariffs	  and	  their	  investments	  into	  small-­‐scale	  technologies	  used	  to	  offset	  electricity	  bills.	  The	  majority	  of	  supply	  security	  is	  achieved	  by	  ensuring	  a	  high	  level	  of	  capacity.	  The	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  peak	  demand,	  the	  higher	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  generating	  plant.	  The	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  introduce	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  from	  electric	  vehicles	  and	  the	  electrification	  of	  heat.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  peak	  demand	  will	  increase.	  If	  the	  usual	  model	  for	  meeting	  demand	  is	  used	  this	  will	  increase	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  dramatically.	  Another	  form	  of	  meeting	  this	  demand	  will	  be	  required.	  One	  answer	  is	  to	  develop	  and	  invest	  in	  additional	  storage	  technologies;	  however,	  these	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  costly.	  The	  classical	  methodology	  to	  meeting	  supply	  and	  demand	  is	  rarely	  through	  the	  demand-­‐side.	  This	  paradigm	  needs	  to	  change	  and	  demand	  management	  needs	  to	  be	  utilised	  to	  its	  full	  potential.	  	  Managing	  demand	  can	  take	  on	  different	  forms,	  from	  using	  technology	  to	  information	  campaigns.	  Interviewees	  in	  this	  research	  identified	  a	  connection	  with	  the	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  and	  demand	  management.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  variable	  generation	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  engage	  consumers	  in	  the	  system	  and	  any	  route	  is	  through	  demand	  management	  initiatives.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  low	  carbon,	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  will	  require	  some	  forms	  of	  demand	  management.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  future	  will	  include	  greater	  demand	  
	   280	  
levels	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  inflexible	  power	  plants	  such	  as	  nuclear	  power	  that	  struggle	  to	  follow	  demand.	  Furthermore	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  supply	  system	  would	  increase	  the	  complexity	  of	  balancing	  the	  network.	  This	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  DNOs.	  Demand	  management	  would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  the	  extremes	  and	  help	  reduce	  the	  complexity	  of	  balancing	  the	  system.	  One	  of	  the	  counter	  arguments	  to	  consumers	  increased	  action	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  identified	  by	  some	  research	  participants	  was	  down	  to	  its	  cost.	  There	  is	  inherent	  value	  in	  active	  consumers	  but	  if	  this	  value	  is	  swamped	  by	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  them	  active	  that	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  worthwhile.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  not	  be	  quantifiable	  specifically	  when	  discussing	  consumer	  engagement.	  For	  example,	  what	  is	  the	  financial	  benefit	  of	  individuals	  becoming	  interested	  in	  where	  electricity	  comes	  from?	  Therefore	  trying	  to	  quantify	  the	  impact	  of	  energy	  security	  may	  not	  provide	  the	  whole	  picture	  and	  thereby	  diminish	  the	  role	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  can	  play	  in	  energy	  security.	  Finally,	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system	  was	  identified	  as	  engaging	  the	  consumers	  and	  hence	  developing	  a	  change	  in	  their	  behaviour.	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  help	  to	  modify	  demand	  but	  it	  encourages	  them	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  system.	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12 Conclusion	  
12.1 Introduction	  The	  ubiquitous	  nature	  of	  energy	  within	  society	  has	  meant	  that	  it	  is	  embedded	  in	  nearly	  all	  the	  current	  issues	  facing	  the	  world	  today.	  Social,	  political	  and	  environmental	  problems	  are	  currently,	  and	  will	  remain,	  interconnected	  with	  energy	  issues.	  These	  can	  include	  links	  between	  low-­‐income	  households	  and	  fuel	  poverty,	  the	  impact	  of	  energy	  prices	  on	  energy	  intensive	  industry,	  the	  geopolitical	  implications	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  the	  most	  dominant	  issue	  for	  the	  energy	  system,	  the	  impact	  of	  carbon	  intensive	  electricity	  generation	  on	  climate	  change.	  	  Therefore,	  energy	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  commodity	  but	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  commodities	  to	  function,	  signifying	  that	  energy	  is	  a	  primary	  driver	  behind	  much	  of	  society’s	  needs	  and	  wants	  (Schumacher,	  1973;	  Goldthau	  and	  Sovacool,	  2012).	  The	  principal	  motivation	  behind	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  the	  energy	  system	  will	  need	  to	  change	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  climate	  change,	  resource	  depletion	  and	  the	  changing	  political	  and	  economic	  climate.	  The	  future	  energy	  system	  will	  need	  to	  face	  each	  of	  these	  issues	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  providing	  a	  secure	  approach	  to	  energy	  generation	  delivery	  and	  consumption.	  	  This	  thesis	  discusses	  the	  move	  to	  a	  predominantly	  decentralised	  electricity	  system,	  specifically	  looking	  at	  the	  changes	  this	  would	  bring	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  within	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Two	  research	  question	  were	  posed:	  
• How	  will	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  change	  the	  governance	  of	  
energy	  security?	  
• Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  (not	  just	  supply)?	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  defining	  the	  main	  themes	  raised	  in	  the	  research	  is	  required.	  This	  thesis	  has	  called	  for	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  to	  include:	  	  
• The	  provision	  of	  reliable	  energy	  supplies	  for	  primary	  fuels	  and	  their	  
delivery	  
• The	  requirement	  for	  the	  energy	  system	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  in	  
order	  to	  respond	  to	  unforeseen	  future	  changes.	  	  
	   282	  
• A	  requirement	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  fuel	  vulnerable	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
energy	  price	  rises	  and	  confidence	  that	  the	  economy	  would	  not	  be	  
undermined	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  energy	  security.	  	  This	  definition	  was	  achieved	  by	  identifying	  the	  key	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  including	  the	  drivers,	  issues,	  risks	  and	  impacts.	  From	  these	  dimensions	  a	  set	  of	  ‘requirements’	  were	  found	  which	  theoretically	  would	  provide	  energy	  security	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future.	  These	  requirements	  define	  the	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  for	  this	  thesis.	  When	  using	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  such	  as	  the	  one	  in	  this	  thesis	  the	  current	  approach	  of	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  not	  be	  the	  best-­‐placed	  model	  for	  meeting	  the	  UK	  future	  energy	  targets	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  energy	  security.	  This	  thesis	  is	  arguing,	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  certain	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  which	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  cannot.	  Decentralisation	  of	  electricity	  generation	  requires	  two	  main	  properties.	  Firstly,	  a	  
technological	  aspect,	  where	  the	  generation	  plant	  is	  connected	  either	  to	  the	  
distribution	  network	  or	  off	  grid	  at	  a	  location	  close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  use.	  
Secondly,	  the	  ownership	  aspect,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  results	  in	  
an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  with	  ownership	  of	  infrastructure.	  
12.2 Outline	  of	  theoretical	  approaches	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  move	  to	  decentralised	  electricity,	  the	  concept	  needs	  to	  be	  placed	  within	  a	  theoretical	  framework.	  This	  thesis	  sets	  out	  the	  different	  modern	  approaches	  to	  transition	  theory,	  focussing	  specifically	  on	  energy	  and	  electricity	  systems.	  This	  begins	  by	  examining	  the	  current	  lock-­‐in	  to	  a	  centralised	  approach	  and	  the	  difficulties	  in	  developing	  decentralised	  electricity	  technologies,	  policies	  and	  system	  structures.	  This	  also	  poses	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  policies	  and	  system	  structures	  presently	  exist	  in	  the	  centralised	  system	  lock-­‐out	  a	  decentralised	  approach	  to	  electricity	  generation.	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  transition	  theories	  from	  transition	  management	  to	  strategic	  niche	  management	  which	  are	  discussed.	  It	  was	  identified	  that	  the	  multi-­‐level	  perspective	  could	  be	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  discussing	  the	  transition	  theory	  from	  centralised	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  The	  multi-­‐level	  perspective	  is	  made	  up	  of	  three	  aspects:	  the	  landscape,	  the	  regime,	  and	  the	  niche	  innovation.	  This	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perspective	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  a	  complex	  arrangement	  such	  as	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  The	  landscape	  factors	  may	  not	  be	  specific	  to	  the	  system	  in	  question	  and	  therefore	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  the	  system	  change.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  the	  landscape	  factors	  would	  include	  climate	  change,	  energy	  security	  and	  energy	  affordability.	  These	  are	  the	  main	  challenges	  as	  set	  out	  by	  the	  UK	  Government.	  	  The	  regime,	  which	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  landscape	  factors	  (but	  not	  controlled	  by	  them)	  for	  the	  electricity	  system,	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  stakeholder	  groups	  (such	  as	  the	  energy	  companies,	  Government,	  regulators,	  network	  companies	  and	  consumers)	  and	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  (including	  Government	  and	  company	  policy,	  market	  arrangements	  and	  subsidies	  and	  regulation)	  (Rotmans	  and	  Kemp,	  2001;	  Smith	  et	  al,	  2005).	  The	  niche	  dimension	  in	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  introduces	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  actors	  working	  outside	  the	  marketplace	  trying	  to	  break	  into	  the	  current	  system.	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  multi-­‐level	  perspective	  is	  that	  it	  lacks	  the	  definition	  of	  how	  governance	  can	  impact	  on	  a	  system	  transition.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  discusses	  the	  governance	  needed	  for	  this	  particular	  transition.	  Governance	  is	  defined	  with	  two	  interlinked	  aspects:	  the	  organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives,	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  	  This	  thesis	  identified	  a	  range	  of	  governance	  models,	  including	  the	  classical	  theories	  where	  the	  hierarchical	  structure	  would	  include	  government	  as	  the	  main	  decision	  maker	  and	  then	  power	  is	  filtered	  down	  to	  the	  other	  actors	  and	  actor	  groups.	  These	  classical	  theories	  purely	  take	  the	  viewpoint	  that	  change	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  policies	  of	  government	  (Rhodes,	  2007;	  Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach,	  2008;	  Pahl-­‐Wostl,	  2009).	  Historically,	  academic	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  policies	  and	  actions	  of	  government,	  however,	  this	  thesis	  is	  goes	  beyond	  governance	  as	  government.	  It	  utilises	  a	  more	  modern	  approach	  to	  governance	  where	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  that	  societies	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  number	  of	  actors	  and	  entities	  made	  up	  of	  both	  public	  and	  non-­‐public	  groups	  (Kooiman	  2003;	  Rotmans	  and	  Loorbach,	  2008).	  This	  means	  government	  is	  merely	  a	  single	  group	  of	  actors	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  a	  system.	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These	  modern	  governance	  theories	  suggest	  that	  ‘responsibility’	  or	  ‘power’	  occurs	  in	  a	  non-­‐hierarchical	  structure	  and	  it	  is	  the	  effort	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  who	  shape	  the	  system.	  	  Through	  considering	  different	  theoretical	  approaches,	  from	  the	  structural	  approach	  to	  the	  network	  analysis,	  this	  thesis	  has	  defined	  governance	  as:	  the	  
organisation	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  the	  electricity	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rules	  
and	  incentives	  which	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcome.	  	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  identified	  here	  are	  the	  detailed	  policies	  that	  are	  implemented	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcomes.	  The	  rules	  and	  incentives	  are	  co-­‐dependent	  on	  the	  stakeholders.	  The	  networks	  of	  stakeholders	  create	  these	  policies	  and	  mechanisms.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  can	  create	  and	  develop	  the	  stakeholders.	  It	  is	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  development	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  relationships	  which	  adapt	  the	  policies	  that	  advance	  the	  electricity	  industry.	  The	  relationship	  between	  stakeholders	  provides	  a	  discussion	  of	  power	  between	  each	  of	  the	  actors	  and	  actor	  groups.	  The	  power	  of	  an	  actor	  is	  defined	  by	  their	  ability	  and	  desire	  to	  drive	  change	  (Preble,	  2005).	  Foxon	  et	  al	  (2009)	  discuss	  the	  relationship	  of	  power	  between	  different	  actor	  groups	  looking	  at	  civil	  society,	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  and	  Government	  organisations.	  They	  consider	  governance	  patterns	  for	  transition	  pathways	  for	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  in	  the	  UK.	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  Parag	  and	  Darby	  (2009)	  have	  developed	  this	  approach	  to	  examine	  the	  main	  groups	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  reducing	  carbon	  emissions.	  This	  method	  of	  utilising	  actor	  groups	  to	  model	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  the	  GB	  electricity	  system	  is	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  both	  Parag	  and	  Darby,	  and	  Foxon	  et	  al	  lacked	  an	  important	  actor	  group	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  This	  being	  the	  regulatory	  based	  stakeholder,	  which	  includes	  the	  network	  operators	  for	  both	  transmission	  and	  distribution.	  Their	  responsibility	  in	  energy	  security	  (specifically	  the	  DNOs)	  may	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  central	  at	  present.	  However	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  would	  result	  in	  a	  far	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  balancing	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  relationship	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐7.	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Figure	  12-­‐1	  Main	  groups	  of	  actors	  involved	  with	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  (Parag	  and	  Darby,	  
2009;	  Foxon	  et	  al	  2009).	  When	  this	  concept	  of	  power	  and	  relationships	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  electricity	  system	  a	  third	  aspect	  arises,	  the	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  responsibility	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  actor,	  or	  group	  of	  actors,	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  and	  obligation	  to	  act.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  level	  of	  power	  an	  actor	  holds	  can	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  responsibility	  (i.e.	  low	  power,	  low	  responsibility	  and	  vice	  versa).	  The	  responsibility	  of	  a	  stakeholder	  can	  be	  set	  out	  in	  legislation	  giving	  them	  a	  legal	  responsibility	  toward	  a	  particular	  dimension	  such	  as	  energy	  security.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  have	  overall	  responsibility	  as	  the	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  can	  change	  depending	  on	  the	  stakeholders.	  For	  instance,	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  toward	  ensuring	  energy	  security,	  however	  the	  definition	  they	  use	  focuses	  too	  heavily	  on	  security	  of	  supply	  rather	  than	  the	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  UK	  Government	  also	  delegate	  different	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  to	  other	  stakeholders	  and	  by	  extension	  makes	  them	  accountable.	  Therefore,	  theory	  would	  suggest,	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  defined	  through	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  actor	  or	  actor	  group.	  However,	  it	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  research	  undertaken	  that	  overall	  energy	  security	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  UK	  Government,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  stakeholders	  looking	  to	  Government	  for	  guidance	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  investment	  security.	  This	  achieved	  by	  the	  setting	  of	  Government	  policy,	  which	  was	  also	  criticised	  for	  not	  providing	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enough	  clarity	  for	  the	  future.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  theory	  that	  governance	  is	  apolitical	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  reality	  which	  shows	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  central	  actor	  in	  the	  energy	  security	  debate.	  
12.3 Key	  Points	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  thesis	  identified	  four	  key	  points	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  future	  would	  introduce	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  small	  investors,	  who	  in	  a	  centralised	  system	  would	  not	  exist.	  The	  second	  key	  point	  is,	  the	  UK	  Government	  is	  responsible	  for	  security	  of	  supply27	  and	  their	  actions	  are	  focused	  on	  centralised	  electricity	  technologies.	  The	  third	  point	  is	  that	  energy	  security	  (in	  its	  boarder	  definition)	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  working	  together.	  The	  fourth	  point	  is	  that	  current	  energy	  security	  is	  incorrectly	  dominated	  by	  supply	  meeting	  demand.	  	  
12.3.1 Investment	  In	  a	  Decentralised	  Electricity	  System	  The	  first	  key	  point,	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  introduces	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  investors	  who	  previously	  would	  not	  have	  existed,	  can	  be	  split	  into	  two	  separate	  aspects:	  	  Firstly,	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  provide	  a	  different	  avenue	  for	  investment.	  This	  means	  a	  there	  would	  be	  a	  change	  to	  the	  scale	  and	  flexibility	  of	  each	  investment	  project	  and	  to	  the	  type	  of	  investor.	  The	  large	  scale	  projects	  the	  current	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  requires,	  requires	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  capacity	  on	  the	  electricity	  system,	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  funding	  is	  required.	  The	  research	  participants	  identified	  that	  achieving	  this	  funding	  not	  only	  can	  take	  a	  long	  time	  but	  it	  can	  also	  cause	  issues	  if	  the	  project	  comes	  into	  difficulties	  (such	  as	  a	  loss	  in	  faith	  of	  future	  returns	  for	  the	  investor).	  This	  brings	  up	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  aspects	  from	  all	  research	  participants;	  the	  UK	  Government	  needs	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  signal	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  specifically	  identified	  that	  any	  uncertainty	  in	  future	  energy	  policy	  would	  cause	  risk	  for	  investment.	  Therefore,	  demand	  higher	  returns.	  It	  could	  also	  create	  an	  issue	  for	  security	  as	  the	  low	  carbon	  future	  will	  require	  greater	  levels	  of	  investment.	  Further	  to	  this,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Security	  of	  supply	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  energy	  security	  see	  section	  4.2	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that	  large	  scale	  centralised	  investments	  would	  be	  harder	  to	  find,	  thus	  requiring	  greater	  direction	  and	  future	  rigidity	  from	  Government.	  In	  contrast	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  can	  stagger	  the	  overall	  investment	  costs	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years	  meaning	  projects	  can	  be	  started	  in	  shorter	  time	  scales	  and	  can	  expand	  or	  contract	  depending	  on	  market	  considerations.	  This	  means	  decentralised	  projects	  has	  a	  lower	  risk	  level	  and	  possibly	  opens	  up	  he	  investment	  opportunities.	  In	  addition,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  smaller	  generation	  plants	  opens	  up	  the	  investment	  portfolio	  to	  new,	  smaller	  investors.	  One	  concern	  of	  this	  introduction	  of	  smaller	  investors	  which	  was	  discussed	  by	  interviewee	  31	  (CSBS)	  is	  that	  the	  knowledge	  and	  skill	  level	  of	  each	  of	  these	  investors	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  the	  larger	  investor	  and	  therefore	  the	  incentive	  mechanism	  or	  market	  operation	  cannot	  be	  overly	  complex.	  Therefore,	  easier	  market	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  smaller	  investor,	  such	  as	  the	  FIT	  are	  required.	  This	  could	  mean,	  even	  though	  small	  scale	  generation	  technology	  are	  able	  to	  reach	  market	  parity,	  they	  may	  still	  require	  a	  FIT	  type	  mechanism	  in	  order	  for	  the	  investors	  to	  understand.	  The	  issue	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Government	  would	  need	  to	  continue	  to	  set	  the	  price	  for	  renewable	  energy	  technology.	  The	  concern	  around	  this	  identified	  by	  a	  government	  based	  stakeholder	  is	  that	  these	  mechanisms	  distort	  the	  market	  price	  of	  electricity,	  thereby	  making	  electricity	  more	  expensive.	  The	  current	  larger	  energy	  companies	  be	  they	  generators,	  suppliers	  or	  utilities	  have	  a	  large	  resource	  base	  in	  terms	  their	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  electricity	  markets.	  This	  is	  a	  resource	  which	  smaller	  companies,	  householders	  or	  communities	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  match.	  Therefore,	  to	  encourage	  the	  small	  investor,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  allowance	  for	  the	  consumer	  to	  calculate	  their	  expenditure	  and	  returns	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  certainty.	  	  The	  variable	  nature	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  markets	  means	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  costs	  of	  coal	  and	  gas	  can	  be	  uncertain.	  When	  this	  is	  compared	  to	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  generation	  where	  the	  long-­‐term	  running	  costs	  are	  more	  predictable,	  a	  future	  investment	  portfolio	  can	  be	  easily	  calculated.	  This	  was	  identified	  by	  a	  small	  scale	  market	  based	  stakeholder	  who	  identified	  that	  as	  they	  predominantly	  deal	  in	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  they	  have	  not	  had	  to	  change	  their	  end	  price	  of	  electricity	  because	  of	  fossil	  fuels.	  However,	  some	  renewable	  technologies	  do	  have	  a	  variable	  generation	  profile	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in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  although	  when	  this	  is	  extrapolated	  over	  a	  long	  time	  period	  a	  fairly	  accurate	  predication	  can	  be	  made.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  longer	  term	  investment	  (over	  a	  long	  period)	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  predict.	  Another	  option	  is	  to	  have	  a	  central	  aggregator	  who	  can	  operate	  in	  a	  complex	  market	  system	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  number	  of	  small	  generators.	  The	  aggregation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generators	  will	  ensure	  that	  as	  a	  cumulative	  group	  each	  generator	  is	  able	  to	  get	  a	  better	  price	  for	  power	  in	  the	  market.	  It	  would	  also	  mean	  that	  all	  generators	  would	  benefit	  from	  lower	  prices	  made	  possible	  through	  the	  economy	  of	  scale.	  	  One	  of	  the	  big	  advantages	  identified	  by	  some	  research	  participants	  is	  promoting	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  investment	  is	  that	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  competing	  with	  other	  international	  projects;	  such	  as	  a	  shopping	  mall	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  invested	  in	  mining	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Interviewee	  6).	  Larger	  scale	  generation	  plants	  could	  require	  international	  investors	  who	  would	  look	  for	  the	  best	  financial	  return	  at	  the	  lowest	  risk.	  Consequently,	  the	  GB’s	  large	  scale	  generation	  projects	  would	  be	  competing	  with	  other	  international	  projects.	  A	  second	  aspect	  of	  this	  key	  points	  is	  the	  necessary	  investment	  into	  other	  technologies	  required	  for	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Low	  carbon,	  centralised	  electricity	  generation	  includes	  technologies	  such	  as	  nuclear	  generation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  with	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage.	  Decentralised	  electricity	  technologies	  would	  be	  pre-­‐dominantly	  small-­‐scale	  and	  renewable	  generation	  generally	  results	  in	  a	  low	  carbon	  system.	  The	  small-­‐scale	  nature	  of	  these	  installations	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  markets	  operate	  as	  the	  current	  system	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  penalising	  the	  small-­‐scale	  variable	  generation	  as	  identified	  by	  Interviewee	  6,	  19	  and	  21.	  Investment	  into	  distribution	  networks,	  at	  present,	  is	  regulated	  through	  price	  controls,	  (the	  RPI-­‐X	  and	  in	  2015	  it	  will	  be	  the	  RIIO-­‐ED1	  price	  control).	  Decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  can	  cause	  issues	  to	  the	  network	  such	  as	  constraints	  in	  the	  physical	  lines	  and	  constraints	  in	  the	  ability	  for	  new	  generation	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  network.	  In	  order	  to	  resolve	  any	  issues	  found	  with	  connecting	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  to	  the	  networks	  a	  more	  forward	  looking	  approach	  to	  connection	  is	  required	  where	  the	  networks	  can	  predict	  and	  adapt	  to	  future	  requirements.	  At	  present	  the	  RPI-­‐X	  provides	  an	  overly	  specific	  approach	  to	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network	  development	  (this	  means	  constraints	  are	  fixed	  when	  need	  arises).	  What	  is	  required	  is	  an	  approach	  where	  anticipation	  is	  used	  rather	  than	  a	  reactive	  methodology.	  This	  will	  require	  the	  new	  RIIO	  model	  to	  allow	  the	  DNO’s	  to	  fund	  the	  development	  network	  areas,	  not	  to	  just	  provide	  access	  for	  a	  single	  project	  but	  cope	  with	  multiple	  access	  from	  a	  particular	  region.	  	  An	  additional	  technical	  aspect	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  that	  there	  would	  be	  less	  activity	  on	  the	  transmission	  network.	  This	  could	  result	  in	  a	  reduced	  requirement	  for	  upgrading	  and	  an	  improved	  efficiency	  factor	  in	  moving	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  Although,	  this	  would	  only	  be	  true	  if	  the	  DNOs	  were	  to	  balance	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  their	  own	  network.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  each	  distribution	  network	  will	  need	  the	  back	  up	  of	  the	  transmission	  system	  to	  balance	  each	  local	  network.	  Further	  to	  this,	  any	  reduced	  activity	  on	  the	  transmission	  network	  would	  mean	  reduced	  revenues	  for	  the	  TNO.	  Although,	  a	  counter	  argument	  to	  this	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  supergrid,	  where	  the	  future	  of	  the	  transmission	  system	  would	  likely	  be	  very	  different.	  The	  supergrids	  would	  provide	  long	  distance	  links	  for	  the	  balancing	  of	  local	  sources	  of	  electricity	  generation.	  Investment	  in	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  an	  aspect	  which	  touches	  on	  all	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security,	  climate	  change	  and	  affordability.	  Without	  intelligent	  investment	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future	  the	  UK	  Government	  goals	  and	  targets	  will	  not	  be	  met.	  Therefore,	  a	  level	  of	  clarity	  is	  required	  from	  the	  UK	  Government	  in	  how	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  will	  look.	  This	  aspect	  was	  identified	  by	  nearly	  all	  research	  participants.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  centralised	  or	  decentralised	  approach.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  there	  are	  many	  additional	  benefits	  for	  energy	  security	  associated	  with	  a	  decentralised	  approach	  although	  these	  are	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  However,	  the	  Government	  should	  plan	  for	  a	  more	  flexible	  future	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  not	  focus	  on	  a	  single	  model	  whether	  it	  is	  centralised	  or	  decentralised.	  	  
12.3.2 Government	  Role	  in	  Ensuring	  Energy	  Security	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security.	  This	  was	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Electricity	  Act	  1989.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Authority	  have:	  
“the	  need	  to	  secure	  that	  all	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  electricity	  
are	  met”	  (Electricity	  Act,	  1989:	  (2)	  (a))	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Theoretically,	  overall	  responsibility	  for	  electricity	  security	  should	  be	  placed	  firmly	  on	  Government.	  However,	  there	  are	  two	  different	  aspects	  to	  consider.	  Firstly,	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  real	  world	  responsibility.	  Even	  though	  Government	  has	  a	  legal	  responsibility	  toward	  energy	  security	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  pass	  different	  aspects	  of	  energy	  security	  on	  to	  other	  stakeholders.	  If	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry	  fails,	  the	  Government	  could	  pass	  that	  accountability	  on	  to	  another	  stakeholder	  or	  actor	  group.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  Government	  would	  not	  have	  total	  responsibility,	  but	  needs	  to	  ensure	  that	  other	  stakeholders	  are	  responsible	  and	  kept	  accountable.	  The	  second	  aspect	  to	  consider	  is	  how	  the	  Government	  views	  energy	  security.	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  defined	  energy	  security	  as:	  
“ensuring	  that	  consumers	  have	  access	  to	  the	  energy	  services	  
they	  need	  (physical	  security)	  at	  prices	  that	  avoid	  excessive	  
volatility	  (price	  security)”	  (DECC	  2012o	  pg.	  5).	  Previous	  to	  this,	  the	  UK	  Government	  had	  not	  defined	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  energy	  security	  and	  merely	  discussed	  security	  in	  terms	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  rather	  than	  energy	  security.	  This	  principle	  has	  guided	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  application	  of	  energy	  security	  measures	  through	  the	  markets	  and	  effective	  regulation	  (DECC,	  2012o).	  The	  UK	  Governments	  main	  strategy	  for	  energy	  security	  only	  looks	  at	  short/medium	  term	  outlook	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  a	  much	  broader	  definition	  and	  approach	  to	  energy	  security	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  the	  best	  option	  for	  energy	  security	  that	  will	  also	  meet	  the	  UKs	  future	  energy	  goals.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Government’s	  strategies	  for	  ensuring	  security	  of	  supply	  seems	  to	  be	  focussed	  on	  the	  use	  of	  centralised	  technology.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  presently	  in	  place,	  where	  there	  is	  very	  little	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  decentralised	  technologies	  for	  ensuring	  security.	  Specifically	  the	  Government’s	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  made	  little	  or	  no	  reference	  to	  small-­‐scale	  decentralised	  technologies	  other	  than	  recognising	  their	  existence	  and	  relating	  them	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Government’s	  main	  mechanism	  in	  ensuring	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  the	  Capacity	  Market	  (CM).	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  CM	  is	  that	  it	  is	  focused	  on	  large	  scale	  capacity	  investment	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  Government	  does	  not	  view	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  as	  being	  able	  to	  deliver	  energy	  security.	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Although	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  security	  of	  supply,	  the	  broader	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  requires	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  stakeholders,	  working	  together	  to	  deliver	  a	  low	  carbon,	  secure	  electricity	  system.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  this	  thesis	  an	  interesting	  response	  regarding	  the	  responsibility	  of	  energy	  security	  was	  found	  from	  the	  research	  participants.	  The	  overriding	  perception	  of	  the	  primary	  stakeholder	  responsible	  for	  energy	  security	  in	  UK	  was	  identified	  as	  Government.	  This	  is	  in	  contradiction	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  governance	  identified	  in	  section	  6.3.	  The	  modern	  approaches	  to	  governance	  identify	  a	  change	  in	  that	  governance	  is	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  Government	  more	  that	  it	  is	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  network	  of	  actors.	  The	  Government	  may	  have	  a	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  electricity	  security,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  can	  operate	  this	  responsibility	  is	  limited,	  particularly	  in	  a	  liberalised	  market	  with	  multiple	  stakeholders.	  	  The	  Government	  holds	  some	  power	  in	  setting	  the	  parameters	  for	  the	  future	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  therefore	  to	  some	  extent	  it	  is	  Government’s	  responsibility	  to	  set	  the	  future	  system,	  as	  the	  stakeholders	  will	  follow	  the	  Government	  framework.	  The	  issue	  is,	  if	  Government	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  the	  future	  should	  develop	  then	  confusion	  may	  set	  in	  as	  to	  where	  investment	  should	  be	  placed.	  	  Until	  recently	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  identified	  energy	  security	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  energy	  system,	  without	  identifying	  in	  any	  detail	  the	  issues	  of	  energy	  security	  or	  provided	  a	  definition.	  The	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  published	  in	  2012	  was	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  policy	  response	  to	  specific	  energy	  security	  issues	  in	  the	  electricity,	  gas	  and	  oil	  sectors.	  The	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  provides	  little	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  as	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  energy	  security	  other	  than	  confirming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  framework	  to	  support	  small-­‐scale	  renewables	  through	  the	  FIT.	  This	  could	  indicate	  that	  the	  Government	  is	  looking	  to	  progress	  along	  with	  a	  centralised	  electricity	  system	  and	  developing	  small-­‐scale	  renewables	  more	  as	  an	  afterthought.	  This	  could	  also	  indicate	  the	  UK	  Government	  does	  not	  recognise	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  energy	  security.	  There	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  without	  a	  structured	  approach	  to	  the	  development	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  from	  the	  UK	  Government,	  investors	  in	  the	  sector	  will	  have	  their	  confidence	  undermined.	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There	  is	  also	  a	  question	  over	  what	  type	  of	  future	  the	  UK	  Government	  would	  prefer.	  Some	  interviewees	  identified	  that	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  mean	  Government	  “loosing	  a	  grip	  on	  the	  energy	  system”	  (Interviewee	  3).	  They	  identified	  that	  Government	  may	  prefer	  6	  large	  companies	  over	  1000	  smaller	  ones.	  This	  idea	  was	  also	  echoed	  in	  the	  2007	  energy	  round	  table	  by	  the	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  Alistair	  Darling.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is,	  the	  perception	  amongst	  the	  research	  participants	  of	  Government	  as	  the	  central	  stakeholder	  in	  delivering	  energy	  security	  gives	  Government	  the	  dominant	  position.	  If	  they	  are	  looking	  to	  develop	  a	  centralised,	  over	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  then	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  neglected.	  However,	  the	  model	  of	  governance	  for	  energy	  security	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  if	  a	  network	  of	  stakeholders	  working	  together	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  
12.3.3 Energy	  Security	  as	  a	  Network	  of	  Actors	  In	  the	  UK	  electricity	  system	  the	  dominant	  perception	  is	  that	  Government	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  UK	  energy	  security.	  However,	  the	  UK	  Government	  may	  not	  the	  best	  place	  stakeholder	  to	  take	  on	  this	  role.	  The	  UK	  Government’s	  priorities	  would	  be	  towards	  protection	  of	  the	  UK	  citizens	  but	  the	  relatively	  short-­‐term	  of	  each	  Government	  suggests	  that	  they	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  view	  the	  electricity	  system	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  This	  was	  indicated	  in	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  energy	  security	  from	  Government	  where	  it	  discusses	  short-­‐term	  security	  of	  supply	  issues.	  The	  EMR	  and	  Energy	  Security	  Strategy	  do	  identify	  long-­‐term	  energy	  security,	  however,	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  is	  still	  focussed	  on	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term	  (see	  sections	  2.2	  and	  4.1.6).	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  from	  the	  research	  participants	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  stakeholder	  or	  stakeholder	  group	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  as	  it	  is	  defined	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Each	  stakeholder	  group	  may	  have	  a	  legislative	  responsibility	  towards	  a	  specific	  aspect	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Government	  towards	  energy	  security	  for	  the	  whole	  system.	  However,	  the	  legislative	  responsibility	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  actors’	  roles	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  group	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  by	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  and	  stakeholders	  working	  together	  to	  ensure	  a	  common	  goal.	  For	  the	  electricity	  system	  it	  is,	  security,	  low	  carbon	  and	  affordability,	  which	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are	  the	  priority	  goals.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  there	  are	  different	  methodologies	  in	  which	  this	  can	  be	  achieved	  The	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  incorporates	  the	  rules	  and	  incentives	  which	  are	  developed	  through	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  involved.	  It	  is	  these	  interactions	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  here,	  including	  the	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security	  and	  its	  different	  aspects	  and	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  associated	  power	  within	  the	  supply	  system.	  As	  identified	  in	  section	  6.3	  of	  the	  governance	  literature,	  a	  specific	  goal,	  such	  as	  energy	  security,	  is	  achieved	  through	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  operating	  within	  a	  system	  rather	  than	  governance	  by	  Government	  alone.	  In	  theory	  this	  holds	  true	  for	  the	  electricity	  system,	  where	  the	  policies	  and	  rules	  are	  created	  by	  the	  stakeholders	  as	  well	  as	  Government	  these	  include	  Ofgem,	  DNOs,	  TNOs,	  system	  operator	  and	  the	  energy	  companies.	  
12.3.3.1 Ofgem	  As	  identified	  in	  the	  section	  2.6.4	  the	  role	  of	  Ofgem	  (set	  by	  Government)	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  existing	  and	  future	  consumers	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  monopoly	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  Ofgem	  have	  a	  duty	  towards	  ensuring	  energy	  security,	  whereby	  they	  promote	  competitive	  markets	  and	  ensure	  investment	  is	  made	  into	  the	  supply	  networks.	  However,	  the	  role,	  as	  perceived	  by	  the	  research	  participants,	  of	  Ofgem	  in	  energy	  security	  is	  one	  of	  ensuring	  the	  Government’s	  framework	  is	  operational.	  This	  does	  place	  Government	  as	  the	  hierarchical	  pinnacle	  of	  energy	  security	  responsibility	  and	  power.	  In	  fact	  there	  was	  a	  dearth	  of	  discussion	  around	  Ofgem	  and	  its	  role	  in	  maintaining	  energy	  security.	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  Ofgem	  have	  a	  direct	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  energy	  security	  as	  set	  out	  by	  Government.	  In	  this	  Government	  provide	  broad	  guidance	  in	  how	  to	  achieve	  their	  role	  in	  order	  to	  let	  Ofgem	  interpret	  their	  own	  duties.	  They	  would	  also	  have	  a	  role	  in	  ensuring	  the	  competition	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  similarly,	  they	  are	  also	  key	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  networks	  which	  will	  be	  required	  to	  secure	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  A	  future	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  see	  a	  larger	  number	  of	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small	  scale	  investors	  and	  generation	  owners.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  how	  Ofgem	  achieves	  its	  duty	  but	  not	  the	  duty	  itself.	  
12.3.3.2 Distribution	  Network	  Operators	  The	  current	  role	  of	  the	  DNO	  is	  to	  ensure	  the	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  their	  network	  and	  to	  negotiate	  the	  connection	  of	  new	  distributed	  generation.	  The	  perceptions	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  were	  that	  the	  DNOs	  at	  present	  had	  limited	  or	  no	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security.	  One	  role	  they	  do	  have	  is	  that	  they	  have	  an	  influence	  in	  what	  and	  where	  generation	  is	  connected	  to	  their	  network.	  It	  was	  discussed	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  distributed	  electricity	  generation	  would	  result	  in	  huge	  changes	  to	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  DNOs,	  effectively	  giving	  them	  more	  responsibility	  and	  power	  in	  controlling	  the	  network.	  The	  increase	  in	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  will	  likely	  require	  more	  active	  management	  at	  a	  local	  level.	  For	  this	  to	  happen	  a	  change	  to	  the	  system	  operation	  procedures	  will	  need	  to	  occur.	  The	  indication	  from	  the	  research	  participants	  was	  that	  the	  DNOs	  would	  become	  more	  active	  in	  balancing	  their	  networks.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  DNOs	  would	  become	  system	  operators	  of	  their	  local	  network.	  	  When	  asked	  whether	  the	  DNOs	  would	  want	  to	  become	  more	  active	  the	  response	  was	  that	  they	  are	  happy	  to	  do	  this	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  rewarded	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  increased	  DNO	  involvement	  would	  increase	  costs,	  although	  there	  would	  likely	  be	  a	  reduction	  in	  costs	  from	  a	  more	  efficient	  network	  operation,	  the	  support	  of	  economic	  growth,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  energy	  security	  (DECC	  and	  Ofgem,	  2014).	  
12.3.3.3 Transmission	  Network	  Owner	  The	  role	  of	  the	  transmission	  network	  owner	  is	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  the	  transmission	  network.	  At	  present	  there	  are	  three	  transmission	  network	  owners	  across	  the	  UK	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  network	  owned	  by	  National	  Grid.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  distribution	  network	  owners,	  the	  transmission	  network	  owners	  were	  not	  seen	  by	  the	  research	  participants	  as	  contributing	  to	  energy	  security.	  Their	  role	  is	  to	  deliver	  electricity	  from	  the	  point	  of	  generation	  to	  the	  distribution	  networks.	  However,	  unlike	  the	  DNO	  the	  TNO’s	  role	  will	  probably	  not	  change	  in	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  other	  than	  allowing	  access	  for	  a	  reversal	  of	  load	  from	  the	  distribution	  to	  transmission	  network.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	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that	  the	  key	  role	  they	  do	  play	  is	  to	  minimise	  losses	  and	  maximise	  efficiency	  in	  the	  network.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  changes	  to	  the	  transmission	  network	  owners	  in	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  be	  a	  reduction	  in	  use	  of	  the	  network.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  would	  be	  reduced	  revenue	  for	  the	  transmission	  network	  owner.	  Therefore	  they	  would	  likely	  demand	  an	  increase	  in	  charges	  for	  network	  usage	  resulting	  in	  a	  probable	  increase	  costs	  overall.	  
12.3.3.4 System	  Operator	  At	  present	  there	  is	  a	  single	  System	  Operator	  who	  has	  the	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  the	  short-­‐term	  generating	  provision	  meets	  demand	  in	  Great	  Britain.	  The	  S.O.	  is	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company	  who	  also	  owns	  the	  transmission	  network	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  	  The	  research	  participants	  identified	  that	  in	  a	  system	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  the	  system	  operator	  may	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  meet	  its	  responsibilities.	  During	  the	  interviews	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  identified	  the	  need	  for	  the	  distribution	  network	  operators	  to	  become	  more	  active.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  DNOs	  would	  act	  as	  separate	  system	  operators	  for	  each	  local	  network	  rather	  than	  there	  being	  a	  single	  operator	  who	  would	  run	  the	  whole	  system.	  Therefore,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  separate	  system	  operator	  independent	  of	  National	  Grid	  who	  oversees	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  distribution	  networks	  and	  the	  transmission	  networks.	  There	  is	  the	  possibility	  the	  National	  Grid	  Company	  could	  continue	  to	  oversee	  the	  whole	  system	  as	  the	  system	  operator.	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  power	  and	  influence	  the	  NGC	  would	  hold	  could	  impact	  negatively	  on	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  as	  they	  are	  owners	  of	  the	  transmission	  network	  producing	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest.	  Therefore	  the	  recommendation	  is	  that	  the	  SO	  should	  be	  completely	  independent	  from	  the	  TNO	  and	  DNOs.	  
12.3.3.5 Energy	  Companies	  One	  theme	  developed	  from	  the	  research	  was	  that	  energy	  security	  was	  achieved	  though	  the	  running	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  wholesale	  market	  as	  identified	  by	  one	  of	  the	  major	  market-­‐based	  stakeholders	  (interviewee	  6).	  As	  the	  current	  small	  number	  of	  large	  companies	  dominate	  the	  electricity	  market	  then	  they	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  the	  market	  runs	  efficiently.	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However,	  it	  is	  Ofgem’s	  role	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  and	  secure	  operation	  of	  the	  markets.	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  if	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  company,	  the	  energy	  companies	  could	  cause	  difficulties	  for	  energy	  security	  by	  not	  investing	  or	  not	  operating	  generation	  plants.	  The	  energy	  companies	  would,	  of	  course,	  need	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  contractual	  obligation	  to	  their	  customers,	  therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  that	  the	  energy	  companies	  have	  little	  or	  no	  role	  to	  play	  in	  ensuring	  energy	  security.	  
12.3.4 Consumer’s	  Role	  in	  Energy	  Security	  At	  present,	  consumers	  have	  very	  little	  influence	  on	  energy	  security	  or	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry	  as	  a	  whole.	  For	  industry,	  business	  and	  householders	  there	  are	  tariff	  mechanisms	  which	  aid	  in	  balancing	  supply	  and	  demand,	  however,	  they	  are	  fairly	  passive	  at	  present	  and	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  utility	  companies.	  Tariffs	  include	  interruptible	  contracts	  for	  large	  consumers	  or	  multi	  rate	  tariffs,	  such	  as	  economy	  7,	  for	  domestic	  users.	  Interruptible	  contracts	  are	  agreements	  with	  the	  System	  Operator	  in	  which	  the	  consumers	  get	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  levies	  charged	  to	  use	  the	  system	  or	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  overall	  energy	  bill	  for	  limiting	  the	  amount	  of	  energy	  they	  use	  when	  the	  capacity	  margins	  are	  tight.	  Multi	  rate	  tariffs	  work	  by	  offering	  the	  consumer	  cheaper	  electricity	  at	  night	  but	  more	  expensive	  rates	  during	  the	  day	  (in	  comparison	  to	  a	  standard	  tariff).	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  see	  a	  drastic	  change	  as	  more	  consumers	  become	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  industry.	  This	  would	  occur	  by	  firstly,	  engaging	  consumers	  with	  the	  electricity	  system	  through	  the	  location	  of	  the	  plant	  and	  its	  closeness	  to	  use,	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  voluntary	  engagement.	  Secondly,	  an	  increased	  connection	  by	  becoming	  an	  energy	  actor	  and	  owning	  assets	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  electricity,	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  voluntary	  engagement.	  Thirdly,	  through	  demand	  management,	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  ‘linked’	  to	  a	  decentralised	  system	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  any	  variable	  sources	  of	  generation.	  Mechanisms	  will	  need	  to	  incentivise	  demand	  management	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  This	  in	  turn	  will	  help	  to	  develop	  the	  necessary	  technology	  and	  to	  engage	  businesses,	  industry	  and	  householders	  in	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  modifying	  demand	  patterns.	  Involvement	  can	  occur	  through	  the	  ‘time	  of	  day’	  pricing	  which	  allows	  consumers	  to	  react	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  throughout	  the	  day.	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In	  addition	  to	  this	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  effective	  development	  of	  Demand	  Management	  technology	  including	  meters	  for	  the	  consumer	  to	  identify	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  during	  the	  day	  and	  automatic	  response	  devices	  for	  air	  conditioning,	  refrigeration	  and	  any	  device	  which	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  switched	  on	  and	  off	  according	  to	  the	  price	  of	  electricity	  without	  causing	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  user.	  Each	  of	  these	  different	  forms	  of	  engagement	  identify	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  consumers	  to	  become	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  energy	  system.	  Currently,	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  generation	  following	  demand	  patterns.	  If	  generation	  capacity	  fails	  to	  meet	  demand	  then	  supply	  security	  is	  compromised.	  However,	  the	  consumer	  group	  as	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  has	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  players,	  therefore,	  it	  has	  a	  profound	  ability	  to	  change	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  shape	  its	  future.	  Consequently,	  the	  electricity	  system	  would	  need	  to	  see	  demand	  and	  generation	  as	  equal	  assets	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  the	  electricity	  system.	  The	  greatest	  change	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  resulting	  from	  decentralised	  electricity	  may	  not	  be	  the	  increase	  in	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  but	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  stakeholders	  into	  the	  electricity	  supply	  industry.	  These	  would	  range	  from	  individuals	  householders	  and	  communities	  to	  small	  energy	  companies.	  An	  increase	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  smaller	  stakeholders	  will	  not	  only	  come	  from	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  but	  also	  through	  the	  increased	  engagement	  with	  demand	  side	  response	  and	  smarter	  networks	  designed	  to	  increase	  flexibility	  of	  the	  system.	  A	  small	  number	  of	  research	  participants	  discussed	  the	  idea	  of	  not	  only	  engaging	  the	  energy	  consumer,	  but	  also	  delivering	  technologies	  such	  as	  smart	  meters	  as	  having	  possible	  negative	  impacts.	  Interviewee	  12	  identified	  such	  changes	  as	  being	  more	  costly	  to	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Thus	  having	  an	  adverse	  affect	  on	  energy	  security.	  However,	  they	  were	  not	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  benefits	  an	  engaged	  consumer	  can	  bring	  to	  the	  energy	  system.	  Further	  to	  this,	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  discussion	  over	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  prosumer	  movement	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.11.1.	  The	  prosumer	  movement	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  ability	  for	  a	  consumer	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  power.	  The	  prosumer	  movement	  is	  also	  beginning	  to	  change	  the	  way	  in	  which	  consumers	  view	  the	  electricity	  system	  and	  change	  their	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	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This	  also	  leads	  to	  another	  theme,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  consumer	  in	  energy	  security.	  The	  literature	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  stakeholders	  imply	  that	  consumers	  have	  little	  or	  no	  role	  in	  energy	  security.	  A	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  be	  that	  energy	  security	  is	  seen	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  meeting	  demand,	  however,	  the	  electricity	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  arrangement	  where	  demand	  can	  also	  be	  modified	  to	  meet	  supply	  through	  demand	  management	  technologies	  and	  operations.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  to	  employ	  the	  consumer’s	  demand	  as	  a	  mechanism	  contributing	  to	  energy	  security.	  Equally,	  consumers	  who	  become	  stakeholders,	  either	  individually	  or	  within	  community	  projects,	  will	  become	  more	  active	  in	  contributing	  to	  a	  secure	  energy	  system.	  However,	  a	  research	  participant	  (interviewee	  18)	  did	  suggest	  a	  consumer	  who	  is	  engaged	  in	  the	  electricity	  system	  should	  have	  to	  take	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  their	  lights	  going	  out.	  One	  response	  to	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  if	  the	  lights	  go	  out,	  then	  energy	  security	  has	  failed.	  
12.4 What	  are	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  in	  a	  
decentralised	  electricity	  future.	  This	  thesis	  has	  argues	  the	  changes	  to	  governance	  which	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  bring	  to	  energy	  security.	  One	  aspect	  which	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  strong	  direction	  provided	  by	  Government	  for	  the	  future	  low	  carbon	  electricity	  system,	  whether	  this	  is	  centralised	  or	  decentralised.	  On	  top	  of	  this	  the	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  used	  by	  Government	  needs	  to	  go	  further	  than	  simply	  quantifiable	  aspects	  and	  security	  of	  supply.	  This	  would	  mean	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  are	  viewed	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  light.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  longer	  term	  goal.	  The	  research	  participants	  identified	  the	  short	  term	  costs	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  decentralised	  electricity.	  However,	  the	  longer	  term	  benefits	  from	  its	  flexibility	  and	  diversity	  could	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  outweigh	  these	  costs.	  The	  issue	  here	  is	  that	  asking	  consumers	  or	  business	  what	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  in	  order	  to	  move	  to	  a	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  may	  not	  take	  in	  to	  account	  then	  longer	  term	  savings	  and	  benefits.	  Therefore,	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  low	  carbon	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  to	  occur	  it	  would	  need	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  development	  in	  the	  primary	  understanding	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of	  energy	  security	  alongside	  decentralised	  electivity	  currently	  being	  viewed	  as	  environmentally	  and	  socially	  better.	  
12.5 Recommendations	  for	  policy	  The	  implications	  for	  policy	  for	  this	  thesis	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  two	  parts:	  the	  markets	  and	  the	  regulation.	  The	  two	  main	  governance	  tools	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  these	  two	  aspects.	  	  
12.5.1 Markets	  and	  Incentives	  The	  current	  market	  operation	  was	  set	  up	  with	  a	  centralised	  system	  in	  mind	  and	  therefore	  is	  dominated	  by	  a	  centralised	  process.	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  this	  operation	  can	  penalise	  some	  forms	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  by	  ‘locking	  out’	  smaller	  scale	  technologies.	  The	  Electricity	  Market	  Reform	  is	  intended	  to	  establish	  mechanisms	  to	  replace	  and	  upgrade	  the	  UK’s	  infrastructure	  by	  incentivising	  a	  further	  £110bn	  worth	  of	  investment	  (DECC,	  2012n).	  However,	  the	  perception	  from	  the	  research	  participants	  is	  that	  the	  EMR	  is	  less	  of	  a	  reform	  and	  more	  a	  stimulus	  for	  minor	  adaptations	  to	  the	  current	  electricity	  market	  approach.	  A	  low	  carbon	  future	  will	  likely	  require	  a	  major	  change	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  including	  the	  market	  system	  to	  allow	  more	  low	  carbon	  generation	  to	  enter.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  say	  that	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  would	  require	  a	  trialling	  phase.	  Trialling	  new	  market	  arrangements	  would	  require	  time	  to	  analyse	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  generation	  system.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  EMR	  with	  the	  carbon	  floor	  price	  is	  a	  direct	  promotion	  of	  nuclear	  generation,	  thereby	  possibly	  undermining	  investment	  into	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  At	  present	  the	  small-­‐scale	  electricity	  generation	  is	  supported	  through	  the	  FIT,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  wholesale	  markets	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  there	  will	  need	  to	  be	  changes	  to	  current	  and	  reformed	  market	  operations.	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  current	  wholesale	  market	  is	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  volatile	  price	  fossil	  fuels	  which	  thereby	  dictate	  the	  price	  of	  electricity.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  wholesale	  market	  would	  be	  increased	  in	  a	  system	  of	  decentralised	  electricity	  (shown	  by	  Interviewee	  1,	  5,	  6	  and	  27)	  as	  long	  as	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  entered	  in	  the	  market	  place.	  A	  major	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change	  would	  be	  requires	  to	  the	  recent	  market	  reforms	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  to	  be	  introduced	  alongside	  the	  large	  scale	  generation.	  Large	  and	  small-­‐scale	  technologies	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  complimentary	  technologies.	  The	  second	  option	  is	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generators	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  separate	  mechanism	  similar	  to	  the	  current	  FIT.	  A	  mechanism	  such	  as	  FIT	  requires	  that	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  are	  provided	  with	  a	  separate	  support	  mechanism,	  compared	  with,	  for	  example,	  nuclear	  generation.	  The	  small-­‐scale	  support	  mechanisms	  should	  be	  easier	  to	  develop	  and	  understand	  and	  so	  be	  more	  open	  to	  a	  wider	  public.	  However,	  these	  mechanisms	  frequently	  require	  the	  intervention	  of	  a	  third	  party	  (often	  the	  Government)	  to	  set	  out	  the	  price	  paid	  for	  energy	  for	  each	  technology.	  In	  this	  way	  Government	  would	  be	  picking	  winners	  rather	  than	  allowing	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  technology.	  The	  third	  option	  is	  to	  have	  a	  completely	  separate	  market	  for	  small-­‐scale	  generation.	  This	  market	  would	  be	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  competitive	  framework	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  and	  not	  conflict	  with	  any	  centralised	  generation	  already	  in	  place.	  It	  could	  also	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  develop	  the	  technologies	  through	  competition	  rather	  than	  through	  external	  subsidies.	  
12.5.2 Regulation	  The	  second	  process	  of	  governance	  of	  the	  electricity	  system	  is	  through	  regulation.	  The	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  networks	  are	  natural	  monopolies	  and	  therefore	  require	  outside	  monitoring	  to	  ensure	  they	  meet	  the	  rules	  set	  out	  by	  Government.	  	  The	  perception	  of	  the	  research	  participants	  was	  that	  as	  the	  networks	  were	  designed	  from	  a	  centralised	  perspective.	  Regulation	  reflects	  this	  centralised	  ethos	  and	  there	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  requirement	  for	  change	  to	  meet	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  changes	  from	  a	  centralised	  to	  decentralised	  system	  is	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  generation	  on	  the	  distribution	  network	  means	  the	  DNO’s	  will	  need	  greater	  investment	  in	  their	  networks	  which	  is	  controlled	  by	  Ofgem.	  This	  needs	  to	  happen	  for	  two	  reasons:	  firstly,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  new	  generation	  is	  able	  to	  access	  the	  grid	  at	  multiple	  locations.	  Secondly,	  DNOs	  will	  become	  more	  active	  and	  possibly	  become	  system	  operators	  of	  each	  network	  area.	  Effective	  control	  of	  each	  area	  will	  require	  greater	  levels	  of	  information	  of	  activity	  on	  the	  network	  and	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the	  development	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  base	  in	  order	  to	  operate	  an	  active	  network.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  these	  objectives,	  changes	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  regulatory	  structure.	  These	  changes	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  two	  ways,	  firstly,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  price	  controls	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.3.	  The	  price	  controls	  will	  need	  to	  allow	  the	  networks	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  by	  a	  forward	  looking	  approach	  to	  system	  constraints	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  ability	  for	  connection	  to	  the	  grid.	  The	  second	  approach	  it	  to	  use	  specific	  incentives	  to	  fund	  specific	  projects.	  The	  incentives	  will	  need	  to	  be	  intelligently	  formatted	  to	  ensure	  the	  uptake	  in	  projects	  is	  adequate	  to	  provide	  sufficient	  generating	  capacity.	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12.6 Further	  Research	  
12.6.1 Examining	  the	  changes	  to	  regulation	  in	  a	  decentralised	  
electricity	  system	  During	  the	  process	  of	  this	  research	  it	  was	  identified	  by	  a	  government-­‐based	  stakeholder	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  sure	  if	  they	  could	  regulate	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system:	  
“do	  we	  have	  the	  skills	  to	  regulate	  a	  very	  decentralised	  system”	  
Interviewee	  22.	  	  Therefore	  it	  will	  be	  worthwhile	  examining	  what	  changes	  to	  regulation	  and	  the	  regulator	  will	  need	  to	  occur	  to	  ensure	  a	  secure	  decentralised	  electricity	  future.	  This	  will	  mean	  understanding	  how	  the	  decentralised	  system	  will	  impact	  on	  other	  scenarios	  such	  as	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  networks,	  the	  System	  Operator	  and	  the	  energy	  companies.	  
12.6.2 Differences	  in	  an	  international	  non-­‐UK	  based	  electricity	  system	  This	  thesis	  has	  specifically	  concentrated	  on	  the	  GB	  electricity	  system	  and	  the	  UK	  policies	  for	  governing	  such	  a	  system.	  A	  point	  for	  further	  research	  is	  to	  examine	  how	  these	  governance	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  achieved	  outside	  the	  UK	  and	  identify	  whether	  the	  same	  response	  to	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  is	  achieved.	  This	  would	  obviously	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research	  and	  require	  a	  much	  wider	  scale	  of	  investigation.	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  compare	  the	  results	  to	  different	  countries	  with	  different	  organisational	  frameworks	  such	  as	  an	  are	  which	  is	  controlled	  more	  by	  the	  state.	  
12.6.3 An	  energy	  system	  overview	  In	  order	  to	  tighten	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  the	  research	  was	  focussed	  on	  the	  electricity	  system.	  Therefore	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  would	  impact	  on	  the	  energy	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  even	  when	  focussing	  on	  a	  decentralised	  energy	  system	  the	  possible	  future	  scenarios	  can	  be	  wide,	  including	  different	  technologies,	  networks	  and	  actors.	  These	  issues	  would	  need	  to	  be	  established	  at	  the	  beginning.	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Annex	  A	  
Questions	  to	  Research	  Participants:	  
• What	  do	  you	  see	  are	  the	  current	  threats	  to	  energy	  security?	  
• In	  your	  opinion	  what	  are	  the	  main	  impacts	  of	  electricity	  decentralisation	  on	  energy	  security?	  
• Do	  you	  think	  decentralisation	  will	  affect	  investment	  patterns	  thereby	  negatively	  or	  positively	  affecting	  energy	  security?	  
• Would	  electricity	  decentralisation	  affect	  the	  current	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  base	  we	  have?	  
• Matching	  electricity	  supply	  and	  demand	  is	  a	  constant	  issue	  for	  network	  operators.	  Would	  a	  highly	  decentralised	  energy	  system	  make	  this	  easier	  or	  more	  difficult	  thus	  having	  an	  effect	  on	  energy	  security?	  
• Would	  a	  decentralised	  electricity	  system	  impact	  on	  the	  current	  electricity	  market	  arrangements?	  	  
• Are	  there	  risks	  to	  making	  the	  energy	  system	  more	  accessible	  to	  consumers?	  
• Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  energy	  security	  and	  how	  may	  this	  change	  in	  a	  system	  dominated	  by	  decentralised	  electricity	  generation	  
• Other	  issues	  you	  wish	  to	  raise?	  	  
